The German Air Force versus Russia, 1943

Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher

• Publisher: Eschenburg Press
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781787206052
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The German Air Force versus Russia, 1943, written by Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher, revised and edited by Mr. Harry Fletcher, and first published in 1968, is one of a series of historical studies written for the United States Air Force Historical Division by men who had been key officers in the German Air Force during World War II.
The overall purpose of the series is twofold: 1) To provide the United States Air Force with a comprehensive and, insofar as possible, authoritative history of a major air force which suffered defeat in World War II, a history prepared by many of the principal and responsible leaders of that air force; 2) to provide a firsthand account of that air force's unique combat in a major war, especially its fight against the forces of the Soviet Union. This series of studies therefore covers in large part virtually all phases of the Luftwaffe's operations and organization, from its camouflaged origin in the Reichswehr, during the period of secret German rearmament following World War I, through its participation in the Spanish Civil War and its massive operations and final defeat in World War II, with particular attention to the air war on the Eastern Front.
In the course of the crucial battles in the East at the close of 1942, the only important mission assigned to the Luftwaffe was that of providing for the support of the Army, usually direct support on the field of battle. This remained the Luftwaffe's main mission throughout the year 1943, and was almost exclusively dependent upon Army operations. Therefore, in this third volume on the war in Russia, it is again necessary, in fact even more than before, to treat the ground situation in some detail.

Chapter 1 — THE BEGINNING OF 1943: CRISIS BETWEEN THE DON AND DNEPR RIVERS

Developments on the Eastern Front 1941-1942

Hitler began his campaign against Russia (Operation BARBAROSSA) at daybreak on 22 June 1941. He had always viewed the Soviet Union as the principal ideological enemy of the Reich and hoped to settle matters in the East through a “lightning war” so that he could be free to bring military operations against Britain to a conclusion.{5} He also hoped to secure sources of raw materials in the Soviet Union which were needed by Germany’s war program and sizeable areas which could be used for German colonization.{6} The Führer was not alone in his anxieties concerning Soviet intentions. Many of his top military advisors shared these views, and were genuinely alarmed over the Soviet Union’s aggressive and expansionist undertakings in eastern Europe between 1939 and 1941. They believed that Stalin intended to attack Germany as soon as Russia was ready for such an operation and a suitable pretext for war could be found.{7}

Forces available for the campaign against Russia consisted of 145 German and allied divisions, which were divided among three major commands, Army Groups South, Center, and North, and one minor command, with less critical objectives, Army Group Far North. This field army advanced from its concentration areas in East Prussia, Poland, and Rumania, overwhelming a large number of Red Army units and scoring victory after victory in rapid succession. The German and allied forces surged steadily eastward through the dust of the summer, deep into the vast expanses of Russia, taking thousands of prisoners and capturing massive amounts of enemy matériel.

At the same time the Luftwaffe demonstrated its power by immediately destroying the bulk of the largely obsolete Soviet Air Force and quickly establishing air supremacy over the entire Eastern Theater of Operations. So devastating was this air blow that it might have been a decisive factor had the Luftwaffe also been able to destroy the sources of Soviet military power and to interdict the flow of matériel through the ports of the Black and Caspian Seas, and through Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. These goals were never attained.

By October 1941 the Wehrmacht was poised for what the German High Command then believed would be the final assaults upon the strategic objectives of Moscow and Leningrad. In November, however, serious logistical difficulties, including shortages of winter clothing and equipment, unexpectedly fanatical enemy resistance, and an unusually early and severe onset of winter, slowed the German attack along the entire front. By 5 December the great offensive had come to a halt and the key cities of Moscow and Leningrad remained in Russian hands.

During these operations, Russian troops, assisted by mass civilian labor forces, exhibited surprising ability to rehabilitate their units, evacuate heavy equipment, and make hasty improvisations in defense lines and field fortifications. Moreover, they were able to withdraw large numbers of troops to the East before the German forces could surround and destroy them.{8} In these encounters the individual Russian soldier proved to be a cunning and ruthless adversary, skilled in the use of cover and concealment, and able to endure great physical hardships and privations.

Having failed to secure the strategic objectives of the campaign by the end of 1941, the German Army then found itself forced to fight off heavy Soviet counterattacks launched by newly arrived Siberian units, and, being critically short of supplies and manpower, had to withdraw from its advanced positions and go over to the defensive. Only by implementing the most stringent measures, including the Führer’s order of 16 December 1941 to hold fast “without retreating a step,” was the Wehrmacht able to avert a disaster of immense magnitude near Moscow.{9} With considerable intrepidity and great resourcefulness, German and allied forces were able by the end of January 1942 to check the Soviet counteroffensive and to shorten their front lines for more effective defense.

On 12 February 1942 the German High Command issued orders for a resumption of the offensive, to begin as soon as logistical and weather conditions were propitious. Hitler was certain that the 1942 campaign in southern Russia would be a decisive victory if it resulted in the seizure of the Caucasus oil region. Such a plan, however, entailed the assumption that the Russians would be willing to commit the greater part of their forces in the area of the Don River bend, where the Wehrmacht could envelop and destroy them.{10}

Hitler issued on 5 April his Directive No. 41 (Operation BLAU), which outlined a four-step plan for the conquest of the Caucasus and, providing all conditions were favorable, for the seizure of Leningrad as well. While Army Group Center was to hold its position, Army Group North in conjunction with its Finnish allies was to seize Leningrad. In Combat Zone South, the offensive was to begin with a breakthrough in the Kursk area by left flank units (Fourth Panzer Army and Hungarian Second Army) of Army Group South, thereby opening the way for a pincers operation against Voronezh. The two armies were then to advance southeastward, linking up with the Sixth Army thrusting eastward along the Valuy River from Kharkov. These combined forces, spearheaded by strong armored and motorized units, were then to make a rapid advance along the Don to the south-east, meeting near Stalingrad the First Panzer Army and Seventeenth Army of Army Group South, which were to make a swift drive toward the Don River from Taganrog. It was assumed that this would envelop the bulk of the Red Army in the Don River bend and clear the path for a general advance into the Caucasus. All movements were to be made from one phase line to another, making the most judicious use possible of available forces by concentrating maximum force at the crucial points of battle.

The summer offensive was launched at the end of the muddy season and by July German forces had advanced to the Don River along a front extending from the area north and east of Orel into the bend of the Don, and thence to Rostov in the south. At this juncture, a radical change was made in the overall plan of attack. On 23 July Hitler issued Directive No. 45, setting forth two principal objectives for a continued offensive in the East, the seizure of Stalingrad and the lower Volga industrial complex, and the conquest of the Caucasus oil region.{11} {12} In his thinking the Führer without doubt was heavily influenced by logistics and by the conviction that the Red Army must be suffering equally as much as the Wehrmacht from the material and personnel losses of previous operations. Therefore, he was tempted to concentrate upon the seizure of the Caucasus oil fields, which seemed to be much more important to Germany’s war effort than the conquest of Moscow, which continued to be urged by some of the German High Command,{13}

In order to implement his plan, the right wing (Eleventh Army and Third Rumanian Army in the Crimea, and the Seventeenth Army and First Panzer Army in the northern Caucasus) of Army Group South was, by late July, redesignated Army Group “A.” The remaining forces of Army Group South (Second and Sixth Armies, Fourth Panzer Army, and Hungarian Second Army, with the Rumanian Fourth and Italian Eighth Armies in reserve) were placed under the newly organized Army Group “B.”

Army Group “B” was to drive down the Don to Stalingrad to secure the lower Volga River area, while Army Group “A” was to seize Rostov and the Caucasus oil region. Since these drives were virtually at right angles to each other, they violated the principle of advance by phase lines which, until then, had been so successful.

By mid-November Army Group “A” had driven to the Kuma River as far as Alagir and to Mt. Elbrus, deep in the Caucasus, and from thence to the area west of Tuapse, to Iskaya, and then to the Black Sea coast near Novorossiysk. Army Group “B” had advanced to the Don from the area west of Yelets, and its Sixth Army had reached the vicinity of Stalingrad, while motorized units of the group had penetrated as far southward as the Elista area in the northern Caucasus.{14}Logistical problems began to mount enormously, and the cost of the offensive was taking a heavy toll of men and equipment in both army groups, especially in the Sixth Army of Army Group “B,” which continued to exhaust itself in futile attempts to take the city of Stalingrad.

On 19 November the Red Army opened its first massive counteroffensive of the war all along the Don front from Stalingrad to the area west of Serafimovich, breaking through the left side of the Third Rumanian Army front and rolling up the right flank of the Italian Eighth Army immediately to the north. Within two days the Russians had driven as far as Kalach-on-the-Don, where they reached spearhead units of strong Soviet forces driving westward from Krasnoarmeysk, and on 22 November had completely encircled the Sixth Army, together with elements of many other German and allied units, in a large pocket west of Stalingrad.{15}

Realizing that the Sixth Army was already critically short of supplies and replacements, and exhausted from months of heavy fighting, several senior Army and Luftwaffe commanders attempted to persuade Hitler either to withdraw the forces from the Caucasus or to approve a Sixth Army breakout to the south-west, since the encirclement of the Sixth Army, serious as it was, might also be the prelude for a concerted Russian drive on Rostov. If that city could be reached, an entire German army group would be cut off in the Caucasus. The Führer, however, assured by Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring that the Luftwaffe could supply all of the entrapped army’s needs by air, ordered, the Sixth Army to hold at “all costs,” and directed the Luftwaffe to establish an airlift to give it all necessary logistical support.

Generaloberst Hermann Hoth and his Fourth Panzer Army then tried to extricate the Sixth Army by a relief attack from the south-west. When his relatively weak force had reached its farthest point of advance, a junction with the encircled army might have been possible if Generaloberst Friedrich Paulus, the Sixth Army Commander, had been willing to defy his Führer’s orders and make a south-westerly dash over the remaining few miles between the armies. This, he was unwilling to do.

The airlift operation was equally ill-fated, since the forces on hand for the undertaking were grossly inadequate even at the outset, especially in view of the fact that the Luftwaffe had to help stem the tide of Soviet attacks on an immensely broad front. Robbing school and training installations of their last transport aircraft did not materially alter the situation at Stalingrad, since the attrition rate was always higher than the rate of replacement. This serious condition was further compounded by acute shortages of personnel, tools, replacement parts, combat aircraft, and other types of supplies and equipment, all during a period of extended adverse weather. It is, in fact, surprising that the Luftwaffe’s airlift functioned as well as it did. Yet, despite heroic sacrifices, German air units never came close to the minimum objective of maintaining the Sixth Army’s supply levels, much less to the creation of reserve stockpiles.

Operations in 1942 were shattering, and every German effort appeared to have been made in vain. One German army and three of its allies’ armies had suffered devastating losses, with at least 50 divisions completely destroyed. Other losses amounted to the strength of about 25 divisions. Along with this were lost incalculable quantities of heavy infantry weapons, light and heavy artillery pieces, tanks and assault guns, and other matériel, an aggregate which was definitely heavier than the losses inflicted upon the enemy during this period. But by the far the most significant losses for Germany were in personnel, since the Soviets, despite their heavy losses, still had far greater reserves of manpower at their disposal.

Battles in the Don-Dnepr River Areas, January-Mid-March 1943

A...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
• FOREWORD
• AUTHOR’S FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• Chapter 1 - THE BEGINNING OF 1943: CRISIS BETWEEN THE DON AND DNEPR RIVERS
• Chapter 2 - LUFTWAFFE OPERATIONS IN DEFENSE OF THE KUBAN BRIDGEHEAD
• Chapter 3 - LUFTWAFFE COMMAND EAST IN COMBAT ZONE CENTER OF THE EASTERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
• Chapter 4 - THE AFTERMATH OF ZITADELLE
• Chapter 5 - AIR AND FLAK FORCES IN THE BATTLE FOR THE CRIMEA
• Chapter 6 - OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN AND FAR NORTHERN AREAS IN 1943
• Chapter 7 - CRITIQUE OF LUFTWAFFE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN THEATER IN 1943
• APPENDIX I - BIOGRAPHICAL SECTION
• LIST OF MAPS
• LIST OF CHARTS
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER