The Invasion of France, 1814

Captain Frederick William O. Maycock, D.S.O.

• Publisher: Wagram Press
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781908902573
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Napoleonic Wars
• Index: History

Beset along the northern border of France by enemies that out-numbered him by at least five to one, where ordinary generals might have despaired, Napoleon went on to win a remarkable series of victories that recalled the rapidity of his brightest early campaigns. Although not enough to turn the tide of the Allies march on Paris, they are hugely important for the methods used by the Emperor in his last campaign before Waterloo. Turning on isolated parts of the Prussian Field Marshal Blücher's army, composed of both Russians and Prussians, Napoleon won the battles of Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry and Vauchamps, inflicting nearly 20, 000 casualties for a loss of 3, 000 of his own men.
However, this magic could not last...
A well-known and respected writer on the Napoleonic Wars, Captain Maycock's work is a fine addition to any bookshelf on a much neglected campaign.
This book is part of the Special Campaigns series produced around the turn of the 20th century by serving or recently retired British and Indian Army officers. They were intended principally for use by British officers seeking a wider knowledge of military history.
Title – The Invasion of France, 1814

CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTORY

Effects of the Disasters of the Previous Campaign—The Condition of France at the Beginning of 1814—The Country desires Peace—Napoleon's Preparations for the Defence of the Empire—Characters of Schwarzenberg, Blücher, the Czar and Metternich

To Napoleon, the year 1813 proved even more disastrous than its predecessor, for the campaign had ended in a crushing defeat at Leipzig, and though the transitory success gained over Wrede at Hanau had enabled the beaten army to cross the Rhine unmolested, the situation was none the less extremely critical. Hitherto invincible on the field of battle, the Emperor had been decisively defeated. France found herself forsaken by her allies, while the miserable remnant of the 300,000 conscripts hurried to the front some few months earlier, long before they had reached the legal age, were dying in thousands from typhus and dysentery.

Lying bulletins no longer availed to minimise the consternation caused by the long series of disasters, which had occurred in such close proximity to the frontier that the inhabitants of the Rhine provinces had tangible evidence of the severity of the reverses and of the forlorn state of the army. Had the Allies been able to follow up their successes in the field by a prompt and vigorous pursuit, they would have met with but little resistance; however, the sudden overthrow of the French rule and the disruption of the “Confederation of the Rhine” had plunged the whole of Germany into such hopeless chaos that a considerable time must necessarily elapse before the confusion could be remedied. Moreover, political differences paralysed the strategy of the Allies, whose troops had also suffered heavy losses during the late campaign, while Prince Schwarzenberg, the nominal generalissimo of the armies of the Confederation, was utterly deficient of that “driving power“ which is so marked a characteristic of the really great commander.

Thus it happened that the Emperor was allowed several precious weeks' respite before he was called upon to defend his frontiers, and he used the breathing-space afforded him by the difficulties and incompetence of his opponents to the best possible advantage. At the beginning of November the inhabitants of Mainz, long unused to the horrible realities of war, were appalled by the miserable state of the troops, some 70,000 strong, who for two days denied continuously across the bridges over the Rhine. The town was filled to overflowing with thousands of sick, amongst whom typhus and dysentery wrought such havoc that for several weeks the death-rate reached the alarming proportion of over four hundred a day.

Though his presence was urgently needed in his capital, Napoleon was forced to remain with the army for some days to superintend the distribution of the troops along the left bank of the Rhine and to restore some semblance of discipline among the stricken host.

France, long a stranger to the stern realities of war, had now an opportunity of witnessing the price she paid for her triumphs and the misery wrought by the insatiable ambition of her ruler. Napoleon eventually arrived in Paris on the 9th of November, not in the least dismayed by his reverses, and fully determined to carry on the war, though the state of the country urgently demanded peace, if it could be obtained on any but the most ruinous terms.

On the 15th of November a fresh batch of 300,000 conscripts was called out, and though the legal age had been reduced to eighteen, and lads of seventeen were taken in thousands, recruits came in very slowly. The nation was horrified by the terrible sufferings endured by the troops during the last campaign; every vestige of enthusiasm had vanished. The price of a substitute had risen to between four and five hundred pounds, and even at that exorbitant sum it was almost impossible to find anyone willing to endure the hardships of military service. Recruits deserted in hundreds on their way to the depots, and to cope with this ever-increasing evil, the prefects were compelled to enforce the laws for the punishment of absconding conscripts with the most merciless severity. The bolder spirits, faced by the alternative of death on the field of battle or from disease, or of a rigorous imprisonment, naturally betook themselves to the mountains or forests, and thus increased the misery of the rural population by their depredations.

At a meeting of the Council of State, the Emperor explained the situation with the utmost frankness and set forth the measures he intended to adopt to deal with the desperate situation. He withdrew over a million pounds from the treasure hoarded in the vaults of the Tuileries, enormously increased the taxes on land, property of all sorts and salt, while the excise duties were nearly doubled, but even these drastic measures failed to produce the necessary supply of ready money. Three per cent. Government stock stood at forty-five, while the national credit had fallen so low that it was impossible to find a single capitalist willing to advance money on the State guarantee.

The Emperor's warlike policy met with no opposition from the Senate, but in the Chamber of Deputies, in spite of the fact that the President had been appointed by the Emperor and the vacant seats filled up by his nominees, a very different spirit prevailed. The session was opened by Napoleon with great pomp, and he delivered a stirring speech, in which he declared that the recent disasters were entirely due to the treachery of his allies, proclaimed his desire for peace, should suitable terms be offered, and concluded by calling on the deputies to shrink from no sacrifices necessary to ensure the safety of their native land. His oratory, however, produced very little effect, and it was obvious that a large proportion of the deputies desired peace on almost any terms and were bitterly opposed to the continuation of the struggle.

At the end of December, the report rendered on the terms offered by the Allied monarchs showed in most unmistakable manner the temper of the deputies, and in disgust the Emperor dissolved the Chamber, and assumed the role of Dictator. The defences of the Empire urgently needed attention, and a commission had been ordered to investigate the state of the fortresses on the Belgian frontier and on the left bank of the Rhine. Their report, however, proved to be most discouraging, for France had been so long accustomed to wage offensive campaigns in distant countries that she had been lulled into a false state of security and had allowed the fortresses guarding her frontiers to fall into a lamentable state of disrepair.

Commissioners were also sent into the provinces to accelerate the despatch of conscripts to the various depots, collect supplies of arms and equipment and to arrange for a “levy en masse“ of all the able-bodied inhabitants in the more exposed districts, in case of necessity. At the beginning of January 1814, an Imperial decree fixed the budget for the ensuing year at the enormous sum of £47,000,000 sterling, as it was then considered, but in spite of the large increase of taxation it appeared almost certain that a large proportion of this amount would remain uncollected.

The prodigious conscriptions of the two preceding years had ruined agriculture by withdrawing all the able-bodied men from the fields, while commerce had been almost destroyed by the undisputed command of the sea obtained by the British navy after Trafalgar.

The Emperor had of late years become more and more prone to deceive himself as to the possibilities of success, and had developed an almost fanatical belief in his “star.” His faith, however, was by no means shared by his most able councillors; Caulaincourt urged him to accept the terms offered by the Allied sovereigns, and Talleyrand, his astute but unscrupulous Foreign Minister, was already busily intriguing with his enemies, fully convinced that the downfall of the Empire was inevitable.

Though the Emperor used every means in his power to rouse the spirit of national resistance and to make it appear that he was putting himself at the head of a united nation, determined to resist to the last the aggression of its enemies, he met with little success or encouragement. The Royalist, Clerical and Ultra-Republican parties, taking advantage of the popular discontent, commenced to intrigue actively against the Government, and though individually they could have effected little, their united efforts, combined with the profound discontent of the well-to-do classes and the sullen apathy of the people, added considerably to the difficulties and dangers of the situation. In fact, France was on the verge of absolute bankruptcy, and here sources, both of men and money, were almost exhausted by the ceaseless drain of the last two years.

One of the most immediate and pressing dangers was the continued success of operations of the Anglo-Spanish force under Wellington on the southern frontier, and Napoleon endeavoured to counteract this by offering to restore Ferdinand to the throne on the condition that he dismissed the British force from the Peninsula. He could not, however, make up his mind to withdraw his troops unreservedly from Spain, and consequently the Cortez eventually refused to ratify the agreement. His greatest difficulty, however, was the numerical weakness of the French forces and the fact that, except for the Guard and the troops serving under Soult and Suchet, the army was almost entirely composed of immature and partially trained conscripts.

After nearly twenty years of aggression, France once again found herself menaced by her foes on every side, as had been the case at the commencement of the revolutionary period, but the former energy and determination had been succeeded by a hopeless lethargy.

It has sometimes been urged that Napoleon jeopardised the success of the life-and-death struggle he was about to wage on the plains of Champagne against the main body of the Allies, by the troops he employed in the subsidiary theatres of operations, and thus violated his cardinal principle of massing superior numbers at the critical point. At first sight there appears some justification for this view, but on a closer consideration of the situation it becomes obvious that this dispersion was to a great extent unavoidable. When the Emperor had fallen back from the Elbe some three months previously, after the failure of his stroke at Blücher's army, a large number of French troops had been left as garrisons in Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dresden and some of the minor fortresses. Though, for the most part, they were young soldiers, taking part in their first campaign, they would have been veterans compared to the hastily raised regiments of conscripts with which Napoleon took the field in 1814. However, when the Emperor had concentrated to his rear, round Leipzig, to crush the main body of his opponents under Schwarzenberg, he had no intention of definitely abandoning the line of the Elbe and continuing his retreat to the Rhine. After disposing of his adversaries' main force, he had intended to resume the offensive, but the overwhelming reverse he met with in the great battle, and his subsequent hurried retreat, upset all his plans. Consequently large bodies of French troops, some 50,000 strong, composing the garrisons of the fortresses, were left to their fate in the midst of a hostile population and without any prospect of relief.

Owing to the great numerical superiority of his opponents, Napoleon had no option of assuming the offensive and was, for the first time in his career, compelled to embark on a defensive campaign.

Roughly, his plan was to contain the hostile forces in the subsidiary theatres by detachments, while he operated against the main armies of the Allies, under Schwarzenberg and Blücher, by means of two wings and a central reserve, under his own command. As he was too weak to defend the line of the Rhine, he entrusted Marmont with the role of observing and retarding the advance of the army of Silesia, while Mortier, Ney and Victor checked the progress of the Grand Army through the difficult country covered by the Vosges.

When the Allied forces had been somewhat reduced by the detachments necessary to observe the frontier fortresses and to safeguard their communications, Napoleon intended to join one of his wings with the picked force under his personal command and to fall on whichever of the hostile armies first offered him a favourable opportunity of striking a telling blow.

The knowledge of his opponents, gained in the previous campaign, convinced him that the hare and the tortoise might as reasonably be expected to run kindly in double harness as Blücher and Schwarzenberg co-operate successfully in carrying out any combined plan of operations.

Now that Masséna, “the spoilt child of victory,” undoubtedly by far the ablest of the French marshals, was living in retirement, broken in health and still in partial disgrace, owing to the failure of his campaign in the Peninsula against Wellington, the Emperor had only Soult on whom he could absolutely rely to carry out independent operations. The latter was a commander of remarkable ability, both as a strategist and a tactician, but was fully engaged in endeavouring to check Wellington's vigorous advance in the south of France. Suchet, Macdonald and Marmont, though not quite in the same class, were all commanders of outstanding ability; the former especially had always proved himself a thoroughly capable leader in the field and was, moreover, an excellent administrator, but was by no means a favourite with Napoleon, principally on account of his incorruptible integrity and sternly republican principles. Macdonald, though capable, determined and singularly clear-headed, had never met with the success in the field to which his abilities undoubtedly entitled him, and was, as the Emperor said, “a most unfortunate general.”

Marmont, a man of great intellectual power and abrilliant strategist, was of a somewhat uncertain disposition and, as a tactician, was inclined to rashness, but was a most capable commander and a great favourite of the Emperor. Ney, brave as a lion and unrivalled at the art of covering the retreat of an army, was more remarkable for his extreme rashness on the field of battle than for his tactical ability. His intellect was not of a sufficiently high order to enable him to penetrate his opponent's designs or forecast his probable movements, hence as a strategist he was feeble and uncertain and quite out of his depth in command of an independent force.

Victor, Oudinot and Mortier were all excellent divisional commanders, who had won their batons by sheer hard fighting but were possessed of no exceptional ability, though they had all achieved considerable success in subordinate capacities. The Emperor expected little from his corps commanders but energy, coupled with prompt and unhesitating obedience; he was inclined to discourage initiative in his subordinates, hence, with few exceptions, the marshals were only at their best when serving under the immediate direction of their great chief. Moreover, most of them had amassed large fortunes during their numerous campaigns, and were weary of war; in fact, they longed for a period of peace in which to enjoy their hard-earned wealth. Napoleon was fully aware of their feelings and was consequently inclined to rely more and more on leaders such as Gérard, Morand and Maison, who had still their names to make and had not yet reached the summit of their ambitions.

Murat, who had returned to his kingdom of Naples at the close of the previous campaign, was actively intriguing with the Austrian Government, and was only restrained from throwing in his lot with the Allies by the fear of the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne of Naples. He wrote to Napoleon, suggesting that the whole of Italy, south of the Po, should be added to his dominions and guaranteeing in that case to hold it against the Austrians, but as he received no answer to his letter, he definitely decided to join the Allies.

The campaign of 1814 is often looked upon merely as an example of the advantages a really great commander can obtain from operating on interior lines against a numerically superior force and the masterly use the Emperor made of the network of rivers converging on Paris. But in reality the characters and aims of Blücher, Schwarzenberg, the Czar and Metternich exercised a far greater influence on the conduct of the campaign than the topography of the country or the fact that the Allies were operating on exterior lines, and explain many of the movements, which would otherwise appear almost incomprehensible.

The eventual success of the campaign was undoubtedly due in a great measure to the undaunted courage and grim determination of the veteran Prussian general, on whom the brunt of the fighting fell and who, in spite of difficulties and disasters, never for an instant abandoned his intention of advancing on the French capital. Though Blücher was seventy-two years of age, he had lost none of his pristine energy and but little of his youthful vigour, while the way in which he endured the strain and hardships of the campaign was truly marvellous. His career had been a most chequered one, for when little more than a boy, he had entered the Swedish service but had been shortly afterwards taken prisoner by the Prussians and joined one of their Hussar regiments. During the occupation of Poland, his vigorous methods had caused him to fall into disfavour with Frederick the Great. He had been passed over for promotion and eventually dismissed from the army.

He then married and settled down to farm his estate; at heart, however, he was always a soldier, and continually petitioned to be allowed to return to the army. Frederick the Great would have none of him, and it was not until that monarch's death, some sixteen years later, that Frederick William reinstated him in his old regiment with the seniority he would have held, had he never left the service. He was promoted Major-General in 1794, having already earned a great reputation as a most energetic and capable cavalry leader. He saw no further active service until the disastrous campaign of 1806, when he commanded the cavalry at the battle of Auerstädt and greatly distinguished himself during the retreat of part of the beaten army to Lübeck and by his gallant defence of the town against overwhelming numbers.

At the close of the campaign, every Prussian commander who had been forced to surrender was brought before a court martial, and Blücher was one of the very few senior officers who came through the ordeal with an unimpaired reputation and whose conduct was held to have been beyond r...