Reflections On The Vietnam War

General Cao Van Vien, Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786254610
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Guerre du Vietnam

This monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion."The Vietnam War was an unusual and complex experience. Directed and sustained by Communist North Vietnam under the label of national liberation, it combined the elements of insurgency and conventional warfare. It began with guerrilla tactics but developed into and concluded with open invasion. Basically, however, it remained an ideological conflict whose ultimate outcome depended on popular participation and support.The requirements to fight this war were multiple and challenging. Counterinsurgency demanded that we mobilize our resources to strengthen the regime, protect the people and obtain their allegiance, root out the enemy infrastructure, and extend our armed forces to maintain security over the national territory. All this had to be done in the midst of mounting political dissent and social divisiveness. To meet the threat of large-scale conventional attacks, we had to contend with enemy sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the inhospitable terrain of our extensive borders, and uninterrupted infiltration. However, our efforts were greatly restrained by limited forces and prevailing policies.To analyze critically the chain of events which shaped the final outcome of the war in order to learn from our failures and successes, we have drawn primarily on our first-hand knowledge of major events and our personal involvement in the conduct of war efforts. We hope that in addressing the Salient points raised in all previous monographs of this series with fresh insights, our work will be able to provide a critical, comprehensive view of the war experience on the South Vietnam side."-Author's Preface.

CHAPTER I—NATION-BUILDING AND INSURGENCY: 1954-1963

The Geneva Agreements of 1954, which put an end to the French-Viet Minh War in Indochina, split Vietnam into two parts along the Ben Hai River at the 17th parallel, intended as a temporary demarcation line. Close to one million North Vietnamese inhabitants chose to migrate south where, together with the southern-born people and the National Army of Vietnam, they expected to build a new nation. With the direct support provided by the United States, South Vietnam was to become a free republic devoted to the anti-Communist cause.

Soon after its regrouping from above the 17th parallel, the French Expeditionary Corps began to leave South Vietnam, and French authorities also turned over full sovereignty to the nationalist government led by Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem. The French Military Mission, which advised the Vietnamese National Army, was replaced by a joint U.S.-French training mission (TRIM) until 28 April 1956 when the French High Command in Indochina was disbanded, marking the end of French involvement in South Vietnam. From that day onwards, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V) took over the mission of training, reorganizing, and advising South Vietnam’s armed forces.

Concept of Defense

The U.S. military strategy in Southeast Asia at that juncture was no doubt heavily influenced by the U.S. war experience in Korea during 1951-1953. In helping South Vietnam reorganize its national defense, MAAG-V therefore propounded the concept of deploying conventional infantry forces in depth from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) southward to face the eventuality of overt aggression from the North. As conceived by MAAG-V, the primary mission of the Vietnamese National Army in this defense posture was to fight a delaying action in case of invasion pending a direct intervention by SEATO forces.

South Vietnam’s military authorities fully concurred with this defense concept. However, they did not regard it as the only strategic approach to meeting the Communist threat. Based on their experience during the early period of the Resistance war and the subsequent fight against the Viet Minh alongside French forces, South Vietnamese military leaders also advanced the concept of territorial or area defense as a complement to conventional force deployment. This concept envisaged the division of the RVN territory into areas of defense, each to be placed under the control of a territorial command whose responsibility was to coordinate all military activities designed to maintain security within its area of responsibility. To fulfill this mission, each territorial command was given control authority over all military, paramilitary, and police forces assigned, to include mobile intervention units attached to it by the regular army.

MAAG-V authorities concurred in part with this territorial defense concept when they initially approved the RVNAF force structure to be composed of two elements: strike units (field divisions) and area defense units (light divisions and separate territorial regiments). In time, however, they rejected this concept altogether. MAAG-V therefore devoted its advisory efforts and all military assistance resources to organizing, training, and equipping the RVNAF as a conventional, anti-invasion military force.

The conventional war of aggression that MAAG-V strategists had assumed and for which they had helped South Vietnam build its defense did not materialize when the first signs of Communist aggression were detected. North Vietnam must have learned a lesson from the Korean War. It had seen how an overt act of aggression had failed in the face of determined and concerted reaction by the Free World under U.S. leadership. Taking advantage of its strong point which had proved successful against the French, North Vietnam began to wage people’s or insurgency warfare with the purpose of seizing control in the South. Toward that end, Hanoi had reactivated the local Viet Minh infrastructure and guerrilla elements which had remained behind in 1954 and at the same time reinfiltrated the southern-born Viet Minh cadres and troops who had regrouped to the North and received insurgency training there.

During the initial phase of insurgency the underground Communists employed every subversive tactic in an attempt to control the resource-rich and populous rural areas. These were precisely the areas which had not received adequate attention in the RVN defense system.

Not until 1961 did MAAG-V realize that to ensure proper protection for South Vietnam and save it from a Communist takeover, the country’s defense should be founded not only on its capability to face an invasion from the outside but also on its ability to maintain security within the national borders. From this awareness, a compromise concept combining anti-invasion defense and territorial security began to evolve. But six years had elapsed and were irretrievably lost. Had the area defense concept been properly emphasized from the beginning, South Vietnam’s defense efforts in terms of training and force structure organization could have been more equitably distributed between anti-invasion and territorial security capabilities. And if at the start of Communist insurgency South Vietnam had had adequate territorial forces to maintain effective security, especially in vital areas, then perhaps its general posture by 1961 would have been much better.

Organization and Training

Command and Control

The initial dissension in defense concept between MAAG-V and the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) led to the existence of two systems of command and control: territorial and tactical. The territorial system consisted of four levels of control headquarters: military region, sub-region (French sub-division), sector, and subsector while the tactical system was composed of corps headquarters and infantry divisions. Although separate, both were placed under the control of the JGS.

The RVN believed that the territorial command system was necessary to control and coordinate area security activities. This belief derived from lessons learned during the 1946-1954 French-Viet Minh war. Thus in spite of MAAG-V’s objection, the RVN continued to maintain this system after the French departure. South Vietnam at that time was militarily divided into three military regions, nine sub-regions and 45 sectors. In 1957, the sub-regions were deactivated following the gradual grouping of separate infantry regiments and battalions into divisions. The sectors therefore became directly subordinated to military region headquarters.

As security continued to deteriorate, the GVN felt an acute need to improve effectiveness in controlling and coordinating territorial military activities, especially in MR-1 (which encompassed then the territory of former Cochinchina) whose headquarters was overburdened by the increased tempo of insurgency. In 1960, therefore, the GVN decided to reduce MR-1’s span of territorial control by creating MR-5—with its headquarters at Can Tho—which was assigned responsibility for the Mekong Delta. As a result, South Vietnam had four military regions, each directly responsible for from 5 to 16 sectors or provinces.

In spite of its leverage in dispensing military aid, MAAG-V did not pressure the GVN into disbanding the territorial control system which it disavowed, apparently because of political sensitivities. In keeping with its original defense concept, MAAG-V concentrated instead on developing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and consolidating the ARVN command and control system. These efforts resulted successively in the activation of seven infantry divisions by 1957, a Field Command in 1958, and three corps headquarters in 1959.

According to many South Vietnamese military authorities, however, the ARVN Field Command was not a MAAG-V sponsored product. They believed that its activation had been motivated by internal politics. In any event, from its inception to 1964 when it was finally disbanded, the ARVN Field Command accomplished nothing significant in connection with combat operations. Moreover, it was criticized as being a holding area where military officers who were distrusted by the regime marked their idle time.

The activation, of corps headquarters, however, received wide acceptance among the RVNAF. Most authorities regarded it as the hallmark of South Vietnam’s coming of age in terms of military growth. Aside from national pride, the GVN also felt gratified by the additional support assets these army corps provided despite the possibility that their activation would upset and complicate the existing territorial command and control system.

Indeed, this soon proved to be a substantial impediment to effective command and control. The difficulties stemmed from the fact that each corps was assigned the same area of responsibility as a military region and from the lack of directives defining the respective authority of a corps and a military region commander and the relationship between them with regard to common problems of defense and security. Both the corps and the military region commander, therefore, seemed to enjoy an equal authority since both were equally responsible to the JGS. This situation gave rise to duplication of responsibility and overlapping of authority between the corps and the military region commander, which Inevitably entailed jealousy and conflict. Both felt equally responsible for the maintenance of security and equally empowered to employ military forces assigned to their area for that task. Each also reported directly to the JGS and even to the Commander-in-Chief (President) for every event that occurred within his area of responsibility. The victims of this confusion were the infantry division commanders, caught between their direct superior, the corps commander, and the territorial chief; they could not satisfy the demands of one without incurring the wrath of the other. If a division commander failed for example to make his units available for territorial security duties at the request of the military region commander, his uncooperativeness could be reported to the President. On the other hand, if he met the military region commander’s request, he risked reprimand by the corps commander for insubordination.

The realignment of territorial organization during 1961-62 which saw the deactivation of military region headquarters and the addition of another corps, each responsible for a corps tactical zone (CTZ), effectively resolved difficulties in command and control. This was in essence a compromise of defense concepts which offended neither MAAG-V nor the JGS since it provided for territorial control at the region and sub-region level through the creation of division tactical areas (DTA) without impeding unity of command. Still, being a compromise, this solution seemed to please neither, especially the JGS.

To the RVN authorities, the deactivation of military region head-quarters and assigning territorial responsibilities to corps and the half-hearted revival of the old sub-region organization by making infantry divisions responsible for it indicated a certain reluctance on the part of MAAG-V authorities to regard territorial security as a truly primordial task. Indeed, MAAG-V seemed oblivious to the fact that the problem of territorial security encompassed much more than just combat activities. By its permanent nature, the task of maintaining territorial security involved innumerable administrative and support activities designed to sustain combat actions on a continuous basis which only a permanent territorial organization could provide. Tactical activities were essentially temporary; they flowed and ebbed and they might even cease altogether during certain periods of lull. While tactical units—corps and divisions—could be redeployed at will depending on requirements, those forces responsible for territorial security could not. This was both dictated by the nature of a war in which enemy attacks were usually unpredictable and the strategic necessity to exert a constant military pressure on the enemy in order to counterbalance his protracted warfare and guerrilla tactics.

A territorial control system, therefore, had to be construed as the backbone of the counterinsurgency war machinery, the mainstay of tactical forces on which their performance and effectiveness necessarily depended. Consequently, we believe that in the first place the importance of territorial security should have been correctly assessed and given proper priority within the framework of counterinsurgency efforts. Once this primordial condition had been met, it ensued that American and South Vietnamese authorities should be able to face the defense problem squarely and explore it in depth in order to take proper, realistic actions. We are convinced that at that early stage of the war, the activation of army corps was not a real necessity and that efforts should have been devoted instead to consolidating the territorial defense system and making it effective. This could be achieved by reinforcing command and staff capabilities at the sector level and at the same time reducing the span of control of military region headquarters, making them more effective in the coordination and control of territorial security activities. To the best of our judgment, each military region should be responsible for no more than five to seven provinces at the most, and the size of each sector headquarters should be commensurate with the territory and forces under its control. We do not think that the deactivation of corps headquarters would have had any adverse effect on the conduct of the war at that juncture aside perhaps from a feeling of organizational regression which, from a psychological viewpoint, might just be a mild and passing revulsion. The consolidation and buildup of a strong territorial defense and control system no doubt would have incurred additional expenditures and manpower, but we think that this was an indispensable cost.

The deployment of infantry divisions for the defense and protection of populous and resource-rich areas was certainly a logical move. However, the assignment of permanent tactical areas of responsibility (DTAs) to divisions and burdening division headquarters with territorial duties appeared to be too much of an expediency to suit a protracted war. Moreover, this affected the mobility of infantry divisions which were designed to operate as strike forces, and the fact that these mobile units stayed in a certain area for a long time made their extrication extremely painful and damaging because of the physical and psychological void they would leave behind in that area. Definitely, the confinement of all nine ARVN infantry divisions to permanent areas of responsibility was not a satisfactory solution to the problem of territorial security.

Some authorities had proposed an alternative which would reinstate the old sub-region headquarters, thereby freeing divisions from territorial duties and alleviating the overwhelming control burdens placed on military region headquarters. This was an entirely feasible solution, they felt, because if need be, we could always deactivate some divisional headquarters and reallocate their manpower and equipment to the sub-region commands. Then the disconnected regiments could be reassigned as sub-region intervention or reserve forces. As to the remaining divisions once disengaged from territorial responsibility, they could be employed as region intervention or reserve forces. At the discretion of the JGS and depending upon the tactical situation, these divisions could take turns receiving MR assignments in certain well-defined but limited areas of operation for short periods of time. While this idea sounded tempting because it would help strengthen the territorial security system and provide substantial strike forces for the sub-regional level, we think that its major flaw lay in the creation of an intermediary command echelon, making the system administratively cumbersome and operationally slow. Also, the reduction of infantry divisions was not something to be taken lightly in the face of stepped up combat requirements.

The best solution in our judgment would have been to realign our territorial organization into seven or nine military regions, each con-trolling from five to seven sectors. The best employment of our nine infantry divisions would have been to maintain them in a general reserve status and alternately assign them as required to military regions for the conduct of pacification operations within a specific and temporary area of tactical responsibility.

At the top level of the defense structure, the RVN organization for command and control underwent no change when MAAG-V assumed advisory responsibilities for the Vietnamese National Army in 1955. This organization remained essentially as it had been except for a few minor alterations especially in the areas of finance and logistics. During this period, the double subordination of technical services—to the Ministry of Defense command-wise and to the JGS support-wise—caused numerous difficulties in coordination and combat support, making both slow and ineffective. This situation seemed to be perpetrated by political motives. The directors of these services generally outranked the JGS staff division chiefs; most also enjoyed the trust and esteem of the regime, being themselves affiliates of political organizations loyal to Mr. Diem. As a result, they did not have much respect for the JGS or its authority.

Top-level defense organizations abounded. There were policy-making bodies such as the National Security Council (NSC) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and under them, the Permanent Secretariat of Defense (PSOD) and the JGS. But no one among them was entrusted with real authority, and their services were seldom appropriately used. As far as defense policies and military matters were concerned, President Diem seemed to trust only himself and his brother-counselor. Between them, they devised policies, studied problems, made plans, and then privately issued directives to the executors, often down to a low level and usually bypassing channels. The conduct of the war, therefore, suffered from lack of uniform planning and coordination. The PSOD, for example, which was intended as an executive body in charge of monitoring, coordinating, and following up on the execution of NSC decisions made in the framework of total war efforts, was left in a position of impotence and inaction just like the Field Command and, to a lesser extent, the JGS. From the day he took power, President Diem never trusted the JGS or made proper use of its planning capabilities. He became even more estranged with the JGS especially after the paratroopers’ abortive coup in 1960 and the aerial bombing of his palace in 1962.

The fact that the JGS always performed the duties of an Army command in addition to its joint responsibilities clearly violated an important principle of staff planning and operation in spite of the economy in personnel and facilities. The JGS, therefore, tended to devote most of its efforts to day-to-day ARVN operations to the detriment of joint and long-range planning. Despite MAAG-V recommendations, President Diem never fully consented to the idea of a separate ARVN command. When he finally but reluctantly approved its activation in 1962, he failed to give this command organization any terms of reference with regard to its authority and responsibilities vis-a-vis the JGS.

Regular Combat Forces

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