Flank Defense In Far-Reaching Operations [Illustrated Edition]

Generaloberst Heinz Guderian

• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786251473
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

Includes the World War Two On The Eastern Front (1941-1945) Illustration Pack – 198 photos/illustrations and 46 maps.
Often written during imprisonment in Allied War camps by former German officers, with their memories of the World War fresh in their minds, The Foreign Military Studies series offers rare glimpses into the Third Reich. In this study the father of the Panzerarmeen, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian discusses how he and his tanks attained such success in Russia.
Focussing on the Second Panzer Army's, which he commanded during 1941, General Guderian discusses the actions for the offensive over the Bug, the crossing of the Dnepr, the attack at Smolensk, the thrust at Kiev, the breakthrough at Orel-Bryansk and the operations around Tula.

VII. Observations

By way of comparison with the events described, attention should be called to Report # 728 on XXXXI Panzer Corps during the battle of Moscow from September 1941 to mid-January 1942. The operations of this Corps show the same problems as those of Second Panzer Army.

A few weeks after its beginning, World War I in 1914 became a war of position. The flanks of the belligerents were protected by the sea or by borders of neutral countries. In a strategic sense, the problem of flank protection did not even occur. In a tactical way, the problem attained only limited importance in connection with the fruitless breakthrough attempts of both parties. World War II was different.

The endeavor of the German leader to force an early campaign decision by the strategic units of large, fast units demanded grouped commitment of the forces in a main effort in order to break through connected fronts be they frontier security positions as in Poland or fortress lines as in Belgium and France. Following G successful breakthrough, the attacker offered regularly open flanks on both sides and had to concern himself with that problem already during the planning stage of the offensive.

The campaigns in Poland in 1939 and in France in 1940 consisted of offensives on limited objectives due to the small size of the enemy countries. Not so the campaign in Russia. Once the Bug was crossed, the end of the operations could not be foreseen. Only one thing was certain: The German forces were less in a position to cover the area of Russia with connected fronts than they were able to do in Poland or France. This area grew in breadth with every kilometer of penetration into this huge country. Since the beginning, the German forces were unable to achieve that distribution in depth which in France had eliminated any threat to the flanks and rear of advanced units. They had to reckon with large intervals between the advancing armies, especially between the mobile units, and thus faced to a greater degree the problem, how the open flanks of those spearheads could be protected. The Germans...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• Introductory Note:
• I. The Planned Offensive Across the Bug
• II. The Forced Crossings of the Dnepr
• III. Flank Protection south of Smolensk
• IV. The Thrust against Kiev
• V. The Breakthrough in Direction Orel-Bryansk
• VI. Tula
• VII. Observations