Napoleon In Italy, 1796-1797

Lt.-Col. Elijah Adlow

• Publisher: Wagram Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786254986
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Napoleonic Wars
• Index: History

Includes 26 maps.The story of Napoleon's brilliant first campaign in Italy is here expertly recounted by Elijah Adlow, former Lieutenant Colonel in the US 26th Infantry Division."Of the many campaigns in which Napoleon participated, that in which he first exercised independent command is rich in example. In the Italian Campaign of 1796 we discover in amazing sequence those basic combinations upon which rests the structure of the art of war. What is more, the contrasting talents of the opposing commanders enable us to discover the part which spiritual as well as physical factors play in the process of war.Aside from the brilliant successes which gave him fame, Napoleon must always appeal to students of warfare because of the distinct quality of simplicity which marked all his operations. He had the talent for making himself strategically and tactically articulate. To the young soldier who seeks to discover the secret of an art whose mysteries have been revealed to but few, there is some compensation in being able to identify objectively those elements which determine the outcome of military events. If this presentation has aided in the process, its purpose will have been fulfilled."-Author's Preface.

PART I — Introduction

1 — The Events Preceding the Campaign

THE overthrow of Louis XVI was the signal for Europe to arm. Revolutionary France was confronted not only by the horror and suffering of internecine strife but by the problem of repelling from its borders the armies of Europe as well. In Belgium, on the Rhine, and along the Alps huge French armies under mature and experienced generals contended with the enemies of the Republic. The coalition directed by England and Austria threatened to undo all that had been accomplished in the name of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. To the crowned monarchs of Europe the Revolution was a conflagration which threatened to devour every government. Crowned heads had become uneasy at the spectacle of Louis XVI on the guillotine. Their war with France was a war to preserve the Old Order. It was a war to save themselves.

From 1792 to the end of 1795 these armies contended with one another with varying success. France, torn asunder by internal strife, managed to maintain its vast military array in a manner which challenges adequate explanation. The victories of her armies were few. Jemappes and Valmy had served to fire the nation, but these victories brought neither concrete benefits nor prospects of peace. Only in one respect had France visibly profited by its embattled frontier. The military structure of the nation had been transformed by the Revolution. With many of the officers in the army of Louis XVI fugitives in foreign lands, and promotion open to everyone, the genius and talent which the old system had kept submerged in the ranks was brought to the surface.

The three years which had elapsed since the beginning of the war had brought to the front the talent which was to save France eventually from her enemies. This period witnessed the emergence from obscurity of Ney, Masséna, and Augereau. Even many officers who had enjoyed commissions in the King’s army, but had been destined to live out their lives in the lower ranks of the commissioned grades, found opportunity for speedy advancement. A nation desperate for life was quick to applaud the most modest success. Small wonder then that the successful termination of the siege of Toulon and the suppression of the revolt of the 13th Vendémiaire had given to Napoleon Bonaparte a military reputation which, under a strange combination of circumstances, procured for him the command of the Army of Italy.

How a mere youth who had never before exercised an independent command should be called to a position of such responsibility requires explanation. Some historians have credited his rapid rise to the intrigues of Josephine, some to the influence of Barras, and some to the political influence of his brothers. While all or some of these influences may actually have been at work in his behalf, an examination of Napoleon’s work as a staff officer in the Army of Italy will reveal that he owed his elevation to nothing except his own merit. The interests of historical truth require that we examine further the circumstances leading to his promotion.

When General Montesquiou, with a small French army, seized the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice in 1792, the King of Piedmont made little or no effort to recover his possessions. He contented himself merely with the defense of the passes over the Alps leading from the occupied territory into Piedmont. For the next two years warfare of an indifferent sort was waged on this front. The proximity of the Piedmontese to their bases of supply made their problem an easy one compared to that of the French, who, perched on the western side of the Alps, found transport difficult and supply irregular. The supplies for the French army had to be brought from the interior of France or from Genoa. Coastwise shipping could be employed for their transport or they might be hauled overland. But both methods had their shortcomings. By sea there was the constant threat of the English fleet, while the pirates who infested the harbors along the Riviera menaced those ships which clung to the coastline for safety. The land route was long, and the organized bandits known as the Barbets, who plundered the transports, made it dangerous.

Between 1792 and 1794 the inability of the French to supply their army regularly had rendered its condition most miserable. Such was its predicament when Napoleon Bonaparte reported to General Dumerbion, its commander, on March 21, 1794. His official position with this army was that of General of Artillery. But he was not content to confine his efforts to his official duties. Actually he exercised a wider influence. General Dumerbion was quick to recognize his ability, and, in short order, Bonaparte became the Operations Officer on Dumerbion’s staff. He immediately formulated plans to relieve the supply situation. As a result the French drove the pirates from their base at Oneglia and pushed the Piedmontese back to the Col de Tende. The supply situation immediately showed a marked improvement.

To Bonaparte, measures for the improvement of the administrative conditions constituted nothing more than the routine performance of his duties as Operations Officer. While many in his position would have been content with these limited objectives, he proceeded to ponder the situation with a view to transforming the army in which he served from a mere passive agent into a dynamic factor playing a positive role in the general military situation in Europe. How he eventually accomplished this provides a most interesting story—a story which reveals at the outset of his career the grandeur of his outlook and the keen perception of his mind. We discover here the point of view of one who sees beyond the sector or zone of immediate operations, who skilfully analyzes the situation of the contending armies, who ventures opinions as to the various plans available for the employment of these armies, and, finally, who dares to offer a plan which in his opinion can end the war. It is an example not only of sound and clear military thinking but of passionate and determined advocacy of his ideas. An examination of the general situation and of his plans to meet it will throw light on the beginnings of Europe’s greatest strategist.

With possessions in Italy contiguous to Piedmont, Austria had formed an alliance with Piedmont early in the war. It was an alliance of necessity rather than friendship. Concerned only with the safety of Lombardy, the Emperor of Austria sent no troops to Piedmont. But the indifference of Austria gave the Piedmontese little occasion for alarm. The barrier of the Alps was too great an obstacle for this French army to overcome. Even if the obstacles of the Alps were mastered, the roads leading into Piedmont on the eastern slopes were covered by powerful fortresses at Barde, la Brunette, Exilles, Fenestrelle, Demonte, Coni, and Ceva. It does not appear that the French intended or desired to invade Piedmont at this time. Their occupation of the western acclivities of the Alps was directed mainly toward retaining the areas which had been seized.

To Bonaparte the pursuit of this defensive policy was absurd. It led nowhere. France was at war with Austria and contending with her armies along the Rhine. If the war could be activated in Italy it would affect the Austrian situation along the Rhine to the advantage of France. He proceeded to develop plans for the advantageous employment of the Army of Italy. Fortunately for him the representative of the government with the Army of Italy was Augustine Robespierre, brother of the dictator. Bonaparte confided his plans to him and won his approval. An aggressive campaign to carry the French army into the plains of Piedmont was planned at once. The execution of the plan was undertaken at the end of July, 1794. It succeeded from the very start and brought the French army to the gates of Ceva.

But the political situation in France was to end the campaign prematurely. On August 7, 1794, the army received news of the fall of Robespierre. Because Robespierre believed in a war of aggression, his brother had given his approval to Napoleon’s plan for the invasion of Piedmont. His fall meant that Carnot would henceforth dictate the policies of the French government with respect to the conduct of the war. Carnot was anxious to impress Europe with the desire of France for peace. He believed in a defensive war. The moment the Army of Italy learned of the fall of Robespierre and of the ascendancy of Carnot it gave up the plan for the invasion of Piedmont and withdrew to the coast. The death of Robespierre meant the loss of a powerful ally to Napoleon. It even resulted in his arrest; but his detention was short-lived. In an army sadly lacking in talent, ways were soon found to secure his liberation.

In September of the same year the Austrians attempted to seize Savona, but their drive to the coast was frustrated by the successfully fought battle of Dego, which had been planned by Bonaparte. After the battle General Dumerbion wrote to the Committee of Public Safety: “It is to the ability of the General of Artillery that I owe the clever combinations which have secured our success.” That this success was not followed up can be ascribed entirely to the prevalence of the Carnot policy against offensive operations.

Shortly after the battle of Dego, two new representatives of the government, Ritter and Turreau, joined the Army of Italy. Bonaparte soon acquired an influence over them which won them to his views. Before any new operations were undertaken, however, he left the army and returned to Paris. His presence there meant that the same personality and magnetism which had attracted to his viewpoint all the leaders at the headquarters of the Army of Italy could operate at close range on the persons in control of the Committee of Public Safety. It was only natural that the defeat of General Kellermann at Borghetto in June, 1795, should result in Napoleon’s being consulted by the Committee of Public Safety with respect to the situation of the Army of Italy.

Here at last was his great opportunity. He proceeded to show how the area between Vado and Ceva provided a gap in the Maritime Alps through which an army could enter Italy. He showed how the presence of an army at Vado would make both the Piedmontese and Austrians apprehensive of an invasion, and that the tendency of any operation toward Vado would be for the Austrians to move to points protecting Lombardy, while the Piedmontese would take positions protecting Piedmont. Combining logic with persuasiveness he convinced the Committee that the natural reactions of the allies, once Vado was reoccupied, would separate Piedmont from the alliance and leave Austria alone in Italy to oppose the French. Once the Austrians were isolated, they could be driven from Italy. The Army of Italy could then join the Army of the Rhine by advancing through the Tyrol and move on Vienna. Carnot saw the wisdom of this plan and became converted to a policy of aggression.

General Schérer, who now commanded the Army of Italy, was directed by the Committee to proceed in accordance with the plan suggested by Bonaparte. The result was the battle of Loano, fought on November 24, 1795. It was a great victory. The Austrians were forced to relinquish their hold on the coast, leaving the passes about Altare uncovered and withdrawing to Acqui. But Schérer was slow to follow up his victory. Though the gateway to Italy was undefended and part of his army was north of the mountains, he was embarrassed by the problem of supply. He had been ordered to take Ceva; he found it impossible to comply with his instructions. Bonaparte was disappointed. He insisted that the operation must be pushed on. He wrote on February 19, 1796:

“If the Army of Italy lets the month of February go by without doing anything, as it has allowed the month of January to pass, the campaign of Italy will be a complete failure. Great success in Italy can be obtained only in the winter. If the army starts at once it can take Ceva before the Austrians in Acqui can have time to join the Piedmontese.”

Schérer had no faith in the plan. He emphasized to the Committee that he needed larger forces before he could start any movement into Piedmont. He was beset by problems of supply. What is more, his misgivings were not without foundation. Little could be expected from a general in this state of mind. Deficiencies in numbers or in supply may be offset by enthusiasm, but in war there is no counterpoise for indifference. When Schérer, on February 4, 1796, wrote to the Committee and asked that a successor be appointed, his resignation was accepted. On March 2 Napoleon Bonaparte was named Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

This appointment cannot be brushed aside as political. If anything, its wisdom is vindicated by the logic of preceding events. Where in all military history has a man been assigned to command an army who has given in advance more evidence of his understanding of the problem involved and of his enthusiasm for the proposed plan of operations? What is more, his strategic outlook had already been tested and vindicated. Owing to his insistence, the French Army had been transformed from a passive to an active status. As a result of his planning, the army had obtained a foothold inside the ring of mountains and controlled the coastline facing the passes suitable for the passage of an army. This general had ideas. He had demonstrated to Carnot that he had a plan for separating the Piedmontese from the Alliance, driving the Austrians from Italy, joining the Army of Italy with the Army of the Rhine, and moving on Vienna. In other words, he had a plan with an objective which promised definite results. The plan required faithful execution. Had General Schérer shown any willingness to undertake it he would have been entrusted with the task.

But this he refused to do. Naturally the general who conceived the plan could be relied upon to carry it out with the most ardor. When we consider also his ...