Coalition Warfare Under The Duke Of Marlborough During The War Of The Spanish Succession

LTC Frank J. Gehrki III

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781782899587
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Coalition warfare is an important area of military study for today. During the War of the Spanish Succession, the Duke of Marlborough successfully led a coalition of over twenty nations and states against the armies of Louis XIV of France. During the war, he waged ten campaigns applying military brilliance to defeat French military pre-eminence on the continent. His victories propelled England to a position of power in Europe. He achieved his many successes despite being crippled by the myriad problems incumbent in coalition warfare. This study examines Marlborough's prosecution of the War of the Spanish Succession, focusing on the aspects of coalition warfare. It examines how the Duke of Marlborough dealt with the challenges presented by his coalition partners. It concludes with potential lessons for those who might wage coalition warfare today.

BACKGROUND

John Churchill was born in 1650, the third child of civil servant, Winston Churchill, and Elizabeth Drake. Little accounting remains of his early years. However his penchant for the martial is clear in what is available. His rector at St. Paul’s school noted in 1664 that he learned the elements of the art of war from Vegetius’ De Re Militari,{1} He made a name for himself early as he moved into the inner circle of England’s royalty under King Charles II. During these early years, he developed a close, personal relationship with Princess Anne, the daughter of King James II and the future queen. He married her best friend and closest confident, Sarah Jennings.

At age 18, he sought service with the admiralty in the war against the Moors at Tangiers. In 1672, he served again with the navy at Sole Bay. In 1674, he received a colonelcy from Louis XIV and commanded an English regiment in the service of the French! He served under the great French general, Turenne, at the battles of Sinzheim and Enzheim, earning distinction at every turn.

In 1685, he continued his distinguished service as head of the Household Cavalry in putting down the Monmouth Rebellion in England. By the time of the Glorious Revolution in 1688, he had attained the rank of brigadier. At the conclusion of the revolution, William III made him the commander in chief of the reconstituted English army and appointed him the Earl of Marlborough. He served with distinction under the Dutch general, Waldeck, in 1689 as part of the League of Augsburg, an earlier coalition against France. Political intrigue and conflicting loyalties led to a blot on his illustrious career in 1694. He was accused of plotting with the deposed James II against King William. Because of these charges, he was removed from command, and imprisoned in the tower of London. The charges were never substantiated, and he eventually returned to the good graces of the king and was restored to his post.

Throughout his early years, Marlborough had ample opportunities to develop the skills necessary to work in a coalition environment. His military experiences on the continent were usually as part of a coalition. When in the service of the French from 1672–1674, his military contemporaries included Prince Eugene, later to be his staunchest military ally, and Counts Boufflers and Villars, both of whom would be his opposite commanders during the War of the Spanish Succession. Between 1675 and 1678, he served as a representative of the court of England, where he gained repute for his diplomatic work. By 1678, he was acting with King James’ authority in coordinating with the Dutch and Spanish alliance against France. His duties included diplomatic arrangements as well as the strength of forces and the military details for cooperation.

His lessons in coalition warfare and diplomacy served him well as he ascended in rank. As an example, during the battle of Cork in September 1690, Marlborough faced a diplomatic conflict with the Duke of Württemburg over command of the forces opposing the Jacobite rebellion. Using his full diplomatic skills, Marlborough proposed that the rival generals should exercise command on alternate days, an unpleasant but acceptable expedient. To cement acceptance, he proposed that the password for the troops on the first day be “Württemburg.”{2} This gallant gesture satisfied bruised feelings and ensured the success of the battle. This is but one example of the acute skills Marlborough acquired, skills that would serve him well as leader of the Second Grand Alliance.

In short, Marlborough spent 28 years of his public life learning and honing the craft of military leadership and the skills of diplomacy. His travels brought him in contact with those who would be his allies and his adversaries during the War of the Spanish Succession. These talents would serve him well, first in forming the Second Grand Alliance, and then in leading its soldiers in battle. On the eve of the war, Marlborough quickly became the natural choice of King William and of the allies to lead the coalition army.

The Second Grand Alliance was formed in 1702 to wage a war that Europe did not want. The Second Partition Treaty of 1699 had partitioned the Spanish kingdom between the two legitimate claimants, Louis XIV’s grandson, Philip of Anjou, and Archduke Charles, son of Emperor Leopold I of the Austrian Empire, upon the death of Charles II of Spain. However, at the last minute Charles startled the world, particularly the British, the Dutch, and the Austrian leadership, and changed his will, leaving the Spanish throne to Philip, the grandson of Louis. This arrangement was totally unacceptable to the Austrian Empire, the Dutch, and the British. The resultant union of the French and Spanish thrones would give France continental dominance and seriously jeopardize the interests of the other nations.

When Charles died in 1700, Louis had a choice. He could honor the Partition Treaty, divide the Spanish holdings and keep the peace. The alternative was to honor the will and install his grandson. He chose the latter. The result was not unexpected. The allies protested loudly and initiated preparations to contest the claim. In a preemptive strike, Louis occupied the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands, threatening Dutch security.

King William III appointed Marlborough commander-in-chief of the English forces and appointed him Ambassador Extraordinary to the United Provinces. Unable to deter the French, Marlborough’s first task was to forge an offensive and a defensive alliance among the three great powers; England, the United Provinces (Holland), and the Austrian Empire. He also drew in Prussia, Denmark, and several of the German states. He negotiated the quota of troops, the military precedence of officers, and the myriad details of putting together a coalition. Finally, he organized, trained, and commanded the British army assembling in Holland.

Having developed the background for the War of the Spanish Succession, it is now important to focus on the primary purpose for this study, an analysis of coalition warfare waged by Marlborough during his tenure as Captain-General of the allied army from 1702 to 1711. To do this, it is convenient to look at coalition warfare at the three levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. The study will review some of the coalition’s tactical successes from the four great battles (Blenheim 1704, Ramillies 1706, Oudenarde 1708, and Malplaquet 1709) that Marlborough fought during the ten years he led the coalition army. To analyze the operational challenges, the study will examine the ten campaigns that Marlborough planned, organized, and conducted. Finally, the paper will look at the strategic coalition environment, both national and international, that overarched the war and analyze its impact on Marlborough’s plans. Because of the nature of warfare in that era, particularly the blurred boundaries between the tactical, the operational, and the strategic levels, there will be some inevitable overlap between the areas.

COALITION WARFARE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

To adequately look at tactical coalition warfare, one needs to explore how battles were fought, how commanders commanded, and the essence of the soldier himself.

The allied soldier during the War of the Spanish Succession was not the military professional that serves in many armies today. Soldiers in that period can be classified in four basic categories. First, some were recruited from the dregs of society or were impressed from debtor prisons, and given no choice about whether to join. Factors such as patriotism, national pride, and political or religious ideology were irrelevant. A second category of soldiers included the hirelings or mercenaries. In Marlborough’s armies these were usually Danes, Prussians, Hessians, and Hanoverians, authorized and paid for by the British government and specifically hired for a period. The third category of soldiers included members of units that were provided by allied armies, and partially paid for by the British. These forces were negotiated for as part of the planning for the upcoming campaign. The last category of soldiers was the refugees and enemy deserters. These fighters were rather transient on the battlefield and made only sporadic contributions. The above description applies equally to the armies of all the alliance nations.{3} Hence, we see armies that were not bonded in the classical sense. These were soldiers who were willing to fight for whoever paid them and provided for their needs. Even the so called “regulars” were delighted to not be in jail, or worse.

Within the British and the Dutch armies there were elements that displayed nationalist tendencies. For some of the British, fighting was a “combination of instinctive reaction and training, to praise God, honour the Queen, stand by the colors, and chase the Frenchies.”{4} Thus, the coalition soldiers did not present any unique or dividing problems to leaders on the battlefield. They faithfully executed what they were trained and ordered to do.

On the battlefield of his day, Marlborough faced a different command and control challenge than presented on today’s battlefield. The formations, though massive, were confined to a relatively small piece of terrain. Limited weapons ranges, the need to mass infantry fires to achieve decisive action, and the requirements to maintain positive command and control kept soldiers virtually shoulder to shoulder. All of his famous battles were fought on frontages that were extremely narrow by today’s standards. For example, at Blenheim, he deployed 56,000 allied soldiers on a 4 mile front. At Malplaquet, he employed over 100,000 allied troops on a 4 mile front. The frontages at Ramillies and Oudenarde were 3 miles or less.

Marlborough usually stationed himself at a vantage point from which he observed the entire battle. He frequently moved across the entire battlefield to critical points to attend to tactical details. At Blenheim, Ramillies, and Malplaquet, he stationed himself at the point of the critical attacks. He transmitted orders through a group of competent, well-schooled aides who rode directly to subordinate commanders with Marlborough’s instructions. These subordinate commands were led by his most trusted subordinates from any of the several alliance nations. At Blenheim, for instance, the renowned General Leopold I of Anhalt-Dessau led the entire Prussian contingent under Prince Eugene.{5} Lord Cutts of England led a composite brigade of 20 allied battalions in the critical attack on Blenheim village.{6} At Oudenarde, the Dutch General Overkirk, led the main attack with a force composed primarily of Dutch. At Malplaquet, Marlborough had multiple subordinate commanders leading their national forces. Additionally, most officers were at least bilingual. Hence, transmitting battlefield instructions was not inhibited to any significant degree by national differences or language barriers.

The tactics and the weapons for the day were remarkably similar within the allied army. All soldiers carried the flintlock or matchlock musket. The basic infantry formation was the tight rectangular formation of battalion and regimental size. The regimental commander controlled these compact formations, easing execution of basic tactics. By 1700, the British and the Dutch had adopted improved tactical firing techniques, which were quite similar.{7} Hence, national troops and hired formations were trained the same way. The Imperial troops had not adopted the same tactics, but this did not seem to cause any major problems.

Marlborough demanded well-drilled formations and his units were schooled in basic drill, regardless of nationality. The professional armies spent as much as six months of the year on the parade ground, learning and practicing maneuvers.{8} The line formations that Marlborough employed demanded excellent drill and strict discipline. Marlborough laid great store in fire drill and individual marksmanship and made his troops practice strenuously while in winter quarters. Thus, we find soldiers of different nations using the same basic tactics and receiving similar training, greatly lessening interoperability problems.

Marlborough’s demonstrated care for the well-being of his coalition troops greatly enhanced his ability to lead them He consistently demonstrated an “uncanny ability to inspire trust and confidence among his men of many nations.”{9} He was careful with their lives. The aftermath of the battle of Blenheim gives us a good example of his concern. One of his first priorities was to bring medical help forward to care for the wounded, both allied and French. While not charismatic, he nonetheless was effective. As one author states, “the flame of his spirit served for light, not warmth.”{10} While these traits are recognized today as “good leadership,” that was certainly not the case in 1700 Europe. It is little wonder that soldiers who came from the dregs of society responded most favorably to Marlborough’s leadership style. His exhibited concern did much to break down any barriers that might be a part of coalition warfare at the tactical level.

In summary, coalition warfare at the tactical level succeeded under Marlborough. Part of the reason lies in the personal traits and leadership qualities of the Duke. Part of the reason comes from the multinational aspects of fighting forces during the War of the Spanish Succession. Part of the reason lies in Marlborough’s insistence upon well-drilled formations, coupled with competent subordinate leaders. All the above factors contributed to the continuous tactical successes that the coalition forces enjoyed.

Capt. Frederick Maycock, in assessing Marlborough’s coalition army, wrote:

“Surely it is one of his greatest triumphs that he welded this cosmopolitan army into one harmonious force, actuated by an intense spirit of esprit de corps, and bound together by their great personal affection for their leader”{11}

COALITION WARFARE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Having considered coalition warfare at the tactical level, the discussion now turns to the operational level of war. While Marlborough experienced frequent tactical success, at the operational level the problems of coalition warfare manifested themselves greatly. Marlborough faced constant challenges in coalescing the coalition to his campaign plans. He was not always successful. As a result, the allies lost many opportunities to bring the French to the peace table.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, Marlborough planned and organized a total of ten campaigns. As the commander-in-chief of the allied armies, he planned aggressive campaigns, designed to attack France’s center of gravity—its highly professional, well-trained army. In this age when many wars but few battles were fought, Marlborough proved an anomaly. His traits in this regard were typical of later great leaders, but in this era it was anathema. Not since the days of Gustavus Adolphus had Europe seen a leader so hungry for the fight. In this “Age of Reason,” generals fought using maneuver warfare, with a “strategy of evasion.” Human resources were too valuable to be wasted needlessly on the battlefield. A successful general maneuvered his enemy out of position to his own advantage. Most fighting involved siege warfare.

This total reluctance to fight was the crux of the problem with which Marlborough dealt. His biggest challenge in executing plans was obtaining the cooperation of the Dutch. Under the arrangement of the coalition, deputies chartered by the States-General of the United Provinces accompanied Marlborough on all campaigns. They held the right of veto over his plans and, in the interests of the coalition, he was bound to abide by their judgment. Time and again this proved to be the undoing of well-conceived operations.

From the beginning the allies clashed over how to employ military force. Marlborough wanted to take the war into France, but the Dutch refused to go on the offensive. They were concerned with recapturing fortresses in order to better secure their borders. Marlborough acquiesced to their reluctance, and the campaigns of 1702 and 1703 were classic maneuver exercises where, by threatening invasion along unsecured routes, Marlborough enticed the...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• INTRODUCTION
• BACKGROUND
• COALITION WARFARE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
• BIBLIOGRAPHY