Doctrine And Fleet Tactics In The Royal Navy

James J. Tritten

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786252302
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The U.S. Navy was characterized by a recent RAND study as being "the supra-national institution that has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval supremacy." Given the legacy of the traditions that have passed from the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy, one cannot consider naval doctrine in the U.S. Navy without first conducting an analysis of how navy doctrine evolved in Great Britain. This paper reviews and analyzes doctrine in the British Navy. It concludes with an assessment of the doctrinal process in the Royal Navy and with potential lessons for us today.

DOCTRINE AND FLEET TACTICS IN THE ROYAL NAVY

By James J. Tritten{1}

The U.S. Navy was characterized by a recent RAND study as being “the supra-national institution that has inherited the British Navy’s throne to naval supremacy.”{2} Given the legacy of the traditions that have passed from the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy, one cannot consider naval doctrine in the U.S. Navy without first conducting an analysis of how navy doctrine evolved in Great Britain.{3} This paper reviews and analyzes doctrine in the British Navy. It concludes with an assessment of the doctrinal process in the Royal Navy and with potential lessons for us today.

First Stirrings: the Navy Royal and Private Enterprise{4}

The Royal Navy’s entree into the world of written doctrine commenced with King Henry VIII who took a great interest in the development and enhancement of a fighting “Navy Royal” in addition to a merchant fleet. Henry was aware of the Spaniard Alonso de Chaves’ first written substantive navy doctrinal work, Quatri partitu en cosmogrqfía practica, also known as Espejo de navegantes [Seaman’s Glass], published in 1538.{5} Henry issued a set of written fighting instructions to develop the combat performance of his fleet. Based upon the Spanish model, they made improvements in the concept of the use of artillery and of the taking of the weather gauge, or the upwind side, during battle.{6} This doctrinal principle lasted until the end of the age of sail. Henry’s instructions were reissued in 1544 and provided for the integration of sailing ships and rowed galleasses in a combined arms battle fleet.

During the reign of Henry VIII, the embryonic navy developed the concept of the “capital ship” with smaller supporting ships and auxiliaries, and an industrial base. During the reign of subsequent monarchs, this navy slowly acquired many of the characteristics of a modern composite fleet—one designed to perform a variety of tasks and command local waters. With this fleet, England was given a tool that allowed her to enter the international conflicts of the early 16th century.

The development of the Navy Royal was enhanced by the experiences of English privateers and semi-pirates who experimented with the use of artillery at sea to engage larger ships and convoy escorts. In subsequent engagements the navy broadside was perfected. There were signs of some development of an informal line ahead as doctrine as early as the Armada Battle (1588), but generally coherent navy doctrine had to await the formation of a truly modern fleet during the Commonwealth. Generally commanders of this era did not act as components of an integrated fleet but rather as individual entrepreneurs whose primary motivation was the pursuit of prize money.

Anglo-Dutch Wars

The army-dominated English Commonwealth government followed the Dutch lead in mandating navy escorts for merchant ships. The Convoy Act of 1650 established a requirement for navy protection of shipping which eventually resulted in confrontation with French and Moslem privateers and Holland. During the subsequent Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-1674) many of the navy engagements were fought against Dutch convoys.

Three of Oliver Cromwell’s best army colonels were asked to serve as sea-going generals to lead the navy. Cromwell distrusted the monarchist tendencies of existing serving navy officers and, of course, he himself came from the army. The massing of so many cannons at sea{7} allowed for new tactical opportunities, recognized in revisions to tactical procedures of the day. Early cannon were notoriously inaccurate, hence the earliest doctrine was to amass offensive firepower close together in line-ahead so that a devastating broadside could be delivered. If artillery became the “king of battle” ashore, the broadside became the sine qua non of battle afloat. Just as firepower bred linear tactics ashore, it led to similar developments at sea.

In addition to tactical improvement, the seagoing generals also recognized the need to improve battlespace management. They were to provide some degree of order to the general chaos of early privateering sailing ship tactics—essentially “mimic the leader” where captains watched and mimicked the maneuvers of the leader (e.g., if he closed to engage, they all did). The English seagoing generals developed the ideas of a well-developed plan to manage as many as a hundred ships in battle, many of which were still privateers, as well as the need to experiment with tactics and the overall battle plan before engaging in combat. The context for most battles was defense and attack of convoys.

This period also marked the introduction of a new professional officer corps in England and a centralized organization for the administration of the fleet. Cromwell’s reform efforts were supported by England’s gentlemen, since they would result in emphasis placed upon maritime forces rather than the already powerful army.{8} Local seagoing commanders began to issue written instructions for their subordinates starting in 1636.{9} Parliament issued comprehensive articles of war in 1652. In 1653, the first comprehensive written doctrine was promulgated by a fleet commander. This written doctrine combined both sailing instructions and fighting instructions in separate but companion volumes. The fighting instructions portion was much shorter than the sailing instructions.

Fighting instructions cannot be studied without concurrent consideration of sailing instructions. The fighting instructions attempted to mass firepower. The commander now had a different command and control problem, since his captains would no longer simply mimic his own behavior—they were required to place their ships in precise positions which required a system of communications for command and control. The signal book was incomplete by itself, however, since if the captain merely acted upon receipt of orders, he might fail to take advantage of a tactical opportunity in the absence of a signal or when signals could not be sent or seen. Doctrinal fighting instructions, thus, served as the understanding of what to do in the absence of other more tactical directives.

The new standing orders were immediately put to the test during three Anglo-Dutch Wars in which: (1), strategically England replaced the Dutch at sea essentially throughout the world; (2), operationally England executed a series of campaigns including several devastating convoy battles, blockades, and the bombardment of the Dutch shoreline; and (3) the seagoing generals more then held their own against the Dutch fleet led by the greatest admirals of the world. The English success was generally due to the massing of superior firepower and refusing to let the Dutch close for boarding. The defeated Dutch, on the other hand, continued to rely on the mêlée and had not yet accepted the primacy of artillery.

The Cromwell-era fighting instructions and other reforms were not repudiated with the dissolution of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the return of the monarchy under Charles II had a beneficial effect upon the essentially untainted fleet which was now commissioned the Royal Navy and provided with a new benefactor at the direct expense of the army. This Royal Navy may have had its origins in the need to protect convoys, but with the combat-proven opportunities provided by artillery and massing, doctrine began to shift to the offensive form of warfare. Simply put, the fleet could be used for other than defensive tasks.

Doctrinal sailing and fighting instructions were issued in various forms by several different fleet commanders. These instructions were anything but inflexible and were issued as guides for action unlikely to be scrupulously followed in the heat of battle. Revisions to the fighting instructions and new instructions reflecting combat lessons learned were repeatedly issued during the wars in 1654, 1655, 1666, 1672, and for the first time as an integrated whole in 1672-73.{10} These revised fighting instructions allowed for tactical flexibility on the part of the local commander—to include mêlée tactics and the breaking of the line. A frequently overlooked, but important, function of the fighting and sailing instructions was to ensure that commanders acted more as components of an integrated fleet whose purpose was political rather than as entrepreneurs whose motivation was the pursuit of prize money.

Commanders-in-Chief Sailing and Fighting Instructions

Following the Anglo-Dutch Wars, newly revised fighting instructions were issued in 1678, 1688, 1690, 1691, 1695, 1702, and 1703. Many of these revisions allowed for additional initiative on the part of the local commander. The first fleet-wide sailing and fighting instructions were issued during the reign of William and Mary (1689-1702). The actual date of their publication is not precisely known. These first fleet-wide instructions generally followed those previously issued in 1672-73.

During the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), the French managed to unite their Toulon and Brest fleets into one fighting unit. The numerically inferior English initially elected to maintain a “fleet-in-being” until detached units could return to bolster their defense. This concept of a fleet-in-being was for a numerically inferior force to remain in port where they would threaten to sortie against the enemy. Since they did not seek engagement, the effectiveness of the effort would depend upon the enemy’s perception of their combat capability—they served more as a deterrent than a true fighting force. If the French could be deterred from invading England by the presence of the fleet-in-being, then it would have been a successful use of assets. The Crown disagreed with the concept and a combined English and Dutch fleet sortied under Admiral Lord Herbert Torrington, who was promptly defeated at the Battle off Beachy Head [Bévéziers] (1690) by Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville. Fortunately, the French were unable to capitalize upon their tactical victory.

Following successful experiences by a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet obtained at the 1704 Battle of Malaga using the line-ahead formation, the English attitude toward doctrine may have split into two camps.{11} The first camp emphasized the ability of the line-ahead to bring the maximum number of guns to bear on the enemy. Malaga had demonstrated that victory was possible with a well-disciplined battle line and it naturally followed that defeat would result when this doctrine was not followed. This first group is referred to by some historians as doctrinal “formalists.” The second group placed more emphasis on independent maneuver and is referred to by some historians as the “mêléeists.” The maneuver-oriented mêlée doctrine attracted some of the more dashing English commanders who did not want to be as bound by rules and had the skills to master the freedom of maneuver warfare.

The first version of what eventually came to be known as the Permanent Sailing and Fighting Instructions was issued during the reign of Queen Anne (1702-1714), probably about the time that the A...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• DOCTRINE AND FLEET TACTICS IN THE ROYAL NAVY