Synchronizing Airpower And Firepower In The Deep Battle

Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum

• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Year: 2015
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781786256034
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization, Colonel Lauchbaum proposes five modifications to current joint doctrine.

CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

“Modern combat resources allow the attack to be mounted in such a way as to strike the enemy simultaneously over his whole depth and to delay the movement of his reserves to the threatened sector. We now have at our disposal resources like aviation...which can make these deep sallies [raids]. In this way the enemy should be pinned down over the entire depth of his dispositions, encircled and destroyed.”—Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevski, Marshal of the Soviet Union, 1934

During the 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle. Their objective was to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of his ground force to induce a catastrophic failure in his defensive system.{1} Soviet deep-battle theory was driven by technological advancements and the hope that maneuver warfare offered opportunities for quick, efficient, and decisive victory. The concurrent development of aviation and armor provided a physical impetus for this doctrinal evolution within the Red Army. Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevski stated that airpower should be “employed against targets beyond the range of infantry, artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft should be employed in mass, concentrated in time and space, against targets of the highest tactical importance.”{2}

The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) captured much of Tukhachevski’s intent for airpower in Europe during the last year of World War II. American airmen were not familiar with the term deep battle, but they were well acquainted with air interdiction (AI) in support of battlefield operations. AI operations prevented the movement of German armor during the D day invasion and subsequently shaped the battlefield for the Normandy breakout. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower claimed that it was US airpower’s ability to intervene in the land battle that made the Normandy invasion possible.{3} To ensure close coordination between airpower and ground forces during the subsequent campaign, a tactical air command was paired with each field army. An example was the close relationship between Maj Gen Elwood “Pete” Quesada’s IX Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley’s First Army that developed during the battle for France. The following description of Operation Cobra, the Normandy breakout, draws an excellent illustration of American airpower applied to the battlefield near Saint-Lô:

“On the morning of 25 July waves of American Thunderbolt fighter-bombers swept over the [Panzer Lehr] division, every two minutes, fifty at a time. They dropped high explosive bombs and napalm incendiaries. They were followed by four hundred medium-bombers carrying 500-pound bombs. Then from the north came the sound every German soldier dreaded, the heavy drone of the big bombers— 1,500 Flying Fortresses and Liberators. From their swollen bomb-bays 3,300 tons of bombs obliterated almost everything on the ground. Finally the German line, or what was left of it, was pounded by three hundred Lightnings carrying fragmentation bombs and more of the new incendiaries....One survivor remembered that everything shook so much ‘it was like being at sea in a force 10 gale.’“{4}

In 1982 the US Army (USA) introduced AirLand Battle doctrine. AirLand Battle was developed specifically to counter the Soviet armor threat facing western Europe. The doctrine’s precepts are partly traceable to pre-World War II Soviet military theory. AirLand Battle emphasized the importance of the operational level of war. The new doctrine claimed initiative, agility, synchronization, and depth as tenets. The tenet “depth” led to deep battle’s official introduction into USA war-fighting doctrine.

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (1993), describes deep battle as “operations designed in depth to secure advantages in later engagements, protect the current close fight, and defeat the enemy more rapidly by denying freedom of action and disrupting or destroying the coherence and tempo of its operations.”{5} Historically, the Army has relied on the Air Force to prosecute the deep battle. This was certainly the case when AirLand Battle doctrine was originally published. Regarding deep battle, Gen Donn Starry, USA, claimed “the air commander must concentrate on this task, for the ground commander hasn’t the organic resources either to find or to fire at the second echelon.”{6}

Many in the Air Force, especially fighter pilots within TAC and US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), embraced airpower’s role in AirLand Battle. Since airpower was solely responsible for executing deep battle when AirLand Battle was introduced, the air commander naturally accepted responsibility for synchronizing deep missions. The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally set at maximum artillery range, served as an unofficial boundary between Air Force and Army battlefield operations.

The Army began procurement of organic deep-battle weapon systems in the mid-1980s, including the AH-64A Apache and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The acquisition of these weapons, and the Army’s intention to use them at battlefield depths previously reserved for airpower, generated conflict between airmen and soldiers. The position of the FSCL and the interpretation of its definition were initial sources of debate between the services. Equally divisive was the issue of ultimate authority for synchronizing deep firepower. The Army describes synchronization as

“arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. Synchronization includes, but is not limited to, the massed effects of combat power at the point of decision. Some of the activities that commanders synchronize in an operation might occur before the decisive moment. They may take place at locations distant from one another. Though separated in time and space, these activities must be well synchronized if their combined effects are to be felt at the decisive time and place. Synchronization seeks to gain overwhelming combat power.”

“Synchronization usually requires explicit coordination among the various units and activities participating in any operation. In the end, the product of effective synchronization is the maximum use of every resource to make the greatest contribution towards success.”{7}

The Air Force claimed that the deep battle was best prosecuted through air interdiction, and that all airpower must be controlled by an air commander. The Army asserted that the deep battle was just a portion of the land battle, and the responsibility for synchronization of the deep battle should reside with the ground force commander.

During the Persian Gulf War these disagreements were apparent during both the planning and execution of the deep battle. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) organized the deep operations during the war and was harshly criticized by US Army leadership for target selection and use of the FSCL. An Army report of Gulf War lessons learned stated that “the lack of commonly understood joint fire support doctrine and the parochial interpretation of fire support coordination measures caused significant problems in fire support coordination.”{8}

This paper examines deep battle in US war-fighting doctrine. Chapter 2 traces the development of the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and historical Air Force perspectives on the deep battle. Additionally, it examines the evolution of the FSCL. Chapter 3 investigates deep battle during the Gulf War, with particular emphasis on targeting and the use of the FSCL. Chapter 4 analyzes service and joint doctrine produced since Operation Desert Storm. After developing the deep-battle requirements and disagreements illuminated in the previous chapters, chapter 4 determines if current joint and service doctrine effectively synchronizes deep operations. In chapter 5, the author makes recommendations to improve US war-fighting doctrine.

The contentious issues between the services surrounding the deep-attack weapon mix are not addressed. The acquisition and balance of weapon systems for the deep battle have already received intense focus within the Department of

Defense (DOD) through the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review.

The deep battle is waged in an area where both Air Force and Army firepower can attack the enemy. Ideally, deep operations are synchronized and seamless. The ultimate aim of this paper is to better synchronize the deep battle through superior doctrine. Doctrine must grow, evolve, and mature.{9} According to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, doctrine “provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists a commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.”{10} Trust and cooperation are cornerstones of joint doctrine. If our services fail to work together effectively, a tear will appear in our joint fabric. Future adversaries will search for and exploit such weaknesses.

CHAPTER 2—EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE DURING THE COLD WAR

“Gen Creighton Abrams, US Army chief of staff, in his 1973 letter to Gen William E. DePuy, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, opined that “I have long believed that since there exists in the Army and Air Force a unique complementary relationship to conduct warfare on the landmass, it is absolutely essential that a close relationship exist, at all levels, between the two Services.”“{11}—Evolution of AirLand Battle Doctrine

As the US military scaled back combat operations in Vietnam from 1970 to 1973, Army leadership was able to devote more attention and resources toward preparing for war in Europe. Although war against the Warsaw Pact was the least likely possibility among the potential armed conflicts around the world, such a war was also the most dangerous in terms of American national survival. The Soviet Union, already at nuclear parity with the United States, was also improving its extremely powerful conventional military forces at a rapid pace. Soviet doctrine, equipment, and training significantly changed emphasis, from a principally defensive focus in 1968 to an offensive orientation by the early 1970s. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Central Region, Warsaw Pact ground forces were poised to attack from two echelons in depth, initial and reinforcing. The initial attacking units were expected to attempt to penetrate NATO defenses, while the follow-on echelon forces would exploit the breakthrough. According to the European Command deputy commander in chief (DCINC), the Soviets had a significant advantage in nearly every quantitative measure of military power.{12}

During this time period, the US Army was suffering physically and psychologically. The last years of the Vietnam conflict had been particularly difficult for the Army, which was burdened with discipline problems, demoralization in the officer corps, a sense of inferiority, and an overall absence in direction.{13}

To address the Soviet conventional threat in Europe, the Army published a new version of FM 100-5 in 1976. It was the Army’s capstone war-fighting doctrine document. General DePuy was the driving force behind the creation of the new doctrine. This doctrine, unofficially nicknamed active defense, placed importance on heavy firepower and the massing of forces to win the first battle along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).{14} Active defense recognized the reality of fighting outnumbered in Europe. The new doctrine suggested that a Warsaw Pact invasion could be blunted by using terrain as a defense multiplier, employing new antitank weapon technology, and fighting the Soviets as part of a combined effort with the Air Force. When asked how the United States would respond to a massive Soviet conventional attack, General DePuy said that while ground forces rushed to the attack location “we would hope that the US Air Force was working on the second echelon. It is doubtful that the Air Force would eliminate the second or third echelon. It is highly desirable that they do it a lot of damage.”{15}

The 1976 publication of FM 100-5 spurred great doctrinal debate within the Army. Critics claimed that active defense overemphasized firepower and attrition and did not focus sufficiently on maneuver warfare. The new doctrine was also viewed by many as defensively oriented, and many believed it should have focused more on winning a war’s last battle rather than the first clash.{16} On the other hand, the Air Force found the active defense doctrine mostly satisfactory. The Army’s claim that it could “not win the land battle without the Air Force”{17} was perceived by airmen as a clear indication of the Army’s desire to fight as a member of a joint team.

General Starry replaced DePuy as commander of TRADOC in 1977. General Starry recognized the apparent weaknesses in active defense and led the effort to produce the 1982 version of FM 100-5. The Army’s 1982 capstone doctrine emphasized maneuver warfare as well as the concept of Auftragstaktik—the ability of battle leaders to act independently as the situation required based on thorough training...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• FOREWORD
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER 2-EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE DURING THE COLD WAR
• CHAPTER 3-DEEP BATTLE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
• CHAPTER 4-DEEP BATTLE TODAY
• CHAPTER 5-CONCLUSION
• GLOSSARY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY