Peeling The Onion: The Iraqi Center Of Gravity In Desert Storm

Major Collin A. Agee

• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Year: 2014
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781782896609
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This monograph examines the concept "center of gravity" as applied by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Center of gravity is an integral part of operational art and figures prominently in current U.S. doctrine.
It begins by tracing the concept's inception in Clausewitz's On War, finding several competing definitions in various sections of that landmark work. Current U.S. doctrine reveals that time has done little to alleviate the confusion. The U.S. Army definition of center of gravity as a strength is significantly and irreconcilably different from the Marine Corps' treatment as a weakness. The Air Force offers yet another slant.
Given those inconsistent definitions, it is little wonder that various participants and analysts suggest differing centers of gravity during Desert Storm. From various sources, the monograph compiles a list of a dozen contenders for the title "Iraqi Center of Gravity." It next examines coalition planning and actual combat action in search of a de facto center of gravity, concluding that the Republican Guard was the true Iraqi center.
The monograph then suggests The Onion Model as a unifying representation of the concept. Adding the terms Protectors, Connectors and Sustainers to the Center of Gravity, it graphically portrays the relationship of the other eleven contenders to the true center of gravity.
The study concludes that the center of gravity remains a valuable, if misused, concept. In Desert Storm, this misapplication of doctrine was overcome by an abundance of combat power; the center was hit because everything was attacked. In the future, U.S. forces may not enjoy the same luxury of time and resources. A future doctrine based on overwhelming force must be tempered by the Law of War's requirements for military necessity, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary suffering.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Author’s Interviews and Correspondence

Cerri, LTC Anthony, Desert Storm ARCENT liaison officer. Interview 8 January 1992.

Purvis, COL Joseph H., Desert Storm CENTCOM planner. Correspondence dated 13 January 1992.

Purvis, COL Joseph H., Desert Storm CENTCOM planner. Correspondence dated 3 February 1992.

Briefings

AirLand Battle Future briefing to SAMS students by LTC Ricky Rowlett, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 August 1991.

Government Publications

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Newsletter 90-8 : Winning in the Desert II: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Maneuver Commanders. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Activity (CATA), 1990.

Department of the Navy, HQ U.S. Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989.

Department of the Navy, HQ U.S. Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1 (FMFM 1-1), Campaigning. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990.

Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1: Joint Warfare of the United States Armed Forces. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991.

Strategic Studies Institute. Campaign Planning. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5B: AirLand Operations: The Evolution of AirLand Battle for a Strategic Army. Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 13 June 1991.

US Air Force. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1984.

US Army. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, July 1956 with change 1 dated July 1976.

US Army. FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, March 1990.

US Army. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 1989.

US Army. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 1986.

US Army. FM 100-5. Operations (draft). Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2 March 1992.

US Army. FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations (coordinating draft). Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 24 December 1991.

Books

Allen, Thomas B., F. Clifton Berry Jr. and Norman Polmar. War in the Gulf. Atlanta, GA.: Turner Publishing, 1991.

Blackwell, MAJ James (U.S. Army, Ret,). Thunder in the Desert. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.

Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: McMillan, 1966.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: The Free Press, 1990.

Dupuy, COL Trevor N. (U.S. Army, Ret.), Curt Johnson, David L. Bongard and Arnold C. Dupuy. How to Defeat Saddam Hussein. New York: Warner Books, 1991.

Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory. Ann...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• I. INTRODUCTION
• II. CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY
• III. DOCTRINE
• IV. THE IRAQI CENTER (S) OF GRAVITY
• V COALITION ACTIONS
• VI. A PROPOSED MODEL: THE ONION
• VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
• APPENDIX A - JOMINI’S DECISIVE POINTS
• APPENDIX B - WAR COLLEGE STUDY
• APPENDIX C - INITIAL TARGET LIST
• APPENDIX D - HOW TO DEFEAT SADDAM HUSSEIN
• APPENDIX E - CAMPAIGN PLAN, 10 OCTOBER 1990
• APPENDIX F - THE ONION MODEL
• APPENDIX G - THE IRAQI ONION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY