Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th Psyop Group In Vietnam

Major Michael G. Barger

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781782896876
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Military and civilian agencies conducted Psychological Operations on an unprecedented scale during the Vietnam War. Emphasis on PSYOP from MACV and the U.S. Mission resulted in the creation of an interagency organization providing direction to the overall PSYOP effort. The military PSYOP force supporting MACV underwent a series of organizational changes over seven years as the force struggled to meet ever-increasing demands, but never reached their full potential in Vietnam. Difficulties in measuring effectiveness combined with a lack of understanding of PSYOP techniques and capabilities more often than not resulted in the relegation of PSYOP to supporting "sideshow" status rather than the full integration into supported unit planning necessary for success. However, the evolution of the PSYOP force and reports from participants provide numerous lessons learned applicable to current operations under the aegis of the Global war on Terrorism.

CHAPTER 1 — LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a wide array of published source material that covers combat operations in Vietnam and many works focus on operational and tactical-level military operations. Many of these discuss psychological operations (PSYOP) in passing, noting how PSYOP supported a particular project or operation, but few concentrate on PSYOP. In fact, only seven published works examine a significant issue related to PSYOP in depth, only three of those are studies devoted specifically on PSYOP, and only one of those three concentrates on the military portion of the PSYOP effort in Vietnam. All seven of the sources mentioned generally agree on the effectiveness of specific aspects of the overall PSYOP effort in Vietnam, although the authors sometimes offer different causes of success or failure. More importantly, most of the seven principal works draw from generally the same primary sources. However, some primary sources not available to these earlier works are now in the public domain. These new sources do not change what seems to be a consensus on PSYOP effectiveness in Vietnam, but they do provide additional depth to the search for reasons explaining the success or failure of the overall PSYOP effort in general and military PSYOP in particular.

The one available source that focuses on military PSYOP is a general history of U.S. military PSYOP by Stanley Sandler. Cease Resistance{1} devotes one long chapter covering PSYOP in Vietnam and as the most recently published of the seven works mentioned, cites most of the primary sources currently available. Sandler’s overall conclusions regarding PSYOP effectiveness follow the consensus of other sources, generally concluding that some PSYOP programs were highly effective, some met with mixed success, and others were of only limited value. However, like most other authors, Sandler does not address the problems of PSYOP integration into tactical combat operations. He also does not evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of General Westmoreland’s emphasis on PSYOP, which resulted in a large PSYOP effort focused on the means of delivering messages that were marginally effective but easily measurable. The resultant dispersion of effort and an over reliance on leaflets and other print products is evident in other primary and secondary sources either not considered or not available to Sandler.

Two other works concentrate on PSYOP in Vietnam, but they differ from Sandler in placing more emphasis on PSYOP efforts by the United States Information Service (USIS) and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and less emphasis on purely military PSYOP efforts. In War of Ideas,{2} Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Chandler balances his treatment between military and civilian PSYOP, giving a better picture of the integration of USIS, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and military PSYOP officers as well as the direction of the overall PSYOP effort by JUSPAO. Like Sandler, Chandler clearly shows examples of the shortcomings of JUSPAO in coordinating the enormous and varied countrywide PSYOP effort. Sandler draws from declassified source material not available to Chandler, whose work was published more than ten years earlier. However, Chandler’s work actually has more depth because his work is devoted entirely to PSYOP in Vietnam, while Sandler’s is a more general long-term history of military PSYOP.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Latimer’s U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam{3} focuses exclusively on civilian PSYOP, primarily because he was one of the military PSYOP officers assigned to JUSPAO. While his work provides insight into the inner working of JUSPAO, the omission of detail regarding the military PSYOP effort limits his work’s usefulness. However, Latimer’s account provides balance to the criticisms leveled at JUSPAO by Sandler and Chandler and provides insight into the role of JUSPAO in providing overall direction to the PSYOP effort in Vietnam.

Richard A. Hunt’s Pacification,{4} while not a direct study of PSYOP in Vietnam, focuses on a number of programs inextricably entwined with the PSYOP effort. Hunt extensively covers the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, but treats it as one of the many Pacification programs aimed at winning the loyalty of the rural Vietnamese population. Since the Chieu Hoi program targeted Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) combatants, it was a separate program from the Pacification effort. Hunt also fails to consider Chieu Hoi as a psychological operation in and of itself although his description of the program makes it clear that Chieu Hoi was an effective psychological action. Like other authors, Hunt does not highlight the relationship between the effectiveness of PSYOP supporting Chieu Hoi and the effectiveness of the program itself. In other words, if Chieu Hoi had not actually accomplished what it set out to do, Chieu Hoi appeals from PSYOP teams would never have been credible among those they sought to influence.

Of the four works already mentioned, all allude to the importance of a thorough understanding of PSYOP target audiences. However, only Chandler and Sandler explore the cultural differences between Vietnamese and Americans, and these do not go to any great depth. Michael Lanning and Dan Cragg’s Inside the VC and the NVA{5} provides additional insight that highlights some of the reasons why Chieu Hoi was effective. Douglas Pike’s PAVN{6} also provides detail in this area, but Lanning and Cragg’s work is more useful in describing the Vietnamese cultural traits that Chieu Hoi exploited as well as the measures VC and NVA leaders took to counter the effectiveness of Chieu Hoi appeals. This may be due in part to the fact that Lanning and Cragg draw heavily from interviews conducted with Chieu Hoi returnees.

Ron McLaurin, editor of Military Propaganda,{7} provides much information but his analysis yields no new insights not covered by other authors. McLaurin has drawn for this work from his earlier The Art and Science of Psychological Operations,{8} a two-volume set published by the Department of the Army. Both works are collections of essays on general and theoretical PSYOP topics as well as a few specific essays on Vietnam. While useful, there is much extraneous data of little value, essays lack extensive documentation, and the organization of both works makes finding useful information difficult.

Periodical sources available provided information on the Chieu Hoi program and on Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Political Warfare (POLWAR) organization and activities. Military Review published the bulk of these between 1967 and 1972. While useful, the articles, by their nature, lack the depth of analysis available in published works. Therefore, their usefulness is primarily to confirm facts covered with better depth elsewhere, especially in primary sources.

Beyond the seven works focusing on aspects of PSYOP already mentioned, there is much secondary source material that addresses PSYOP in the context of other operations. While this information lacks the context of the wider PSYOP effort, it does provide insights into PSYOP force employment. Also, when secondary source treatment is compared to primary source material such as reports from units in the field, it gives indication of how PSYOP rarely integrated fully into military combat operations until the later years of the war. Therefore, the usefulness of secondary source materials such as the Vietnam Studies series is primarily as a counterpoint to primary source materials from PSYOP units and the tactical units they supported. By comparing these sources, it becomes clear that PSYOP was often under-utilized or misused by combat commanders.

Vietnam is unique for the exceptionally large scope of PSYOP activities in comparison to previous conflicts. It is also unique in the number and quality of studies undertaken to measure PSYOP effectiveness. Numerous small-scale studies were undertaken during the course of the war, along with two large-scale studies of which the second is the most significant. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) conducted the first large-scale study between 1 December 1968 and 31 March 1969{9}. The ACTIV report was significant in that they found the then-recent expansion of the PSYOP force structure from a battalion with four companies to a group with four battalions to be barely adequate to meet all of the tasks PSYOP was required to complete. In addition to their recommendation for further expansion of the PSYOP forces in Vietnam, the ACTIV team came to the unusual conclusion that the lack of standardization of PSYOP staff organizations across the country was a good thing. Acknowledging the difficulties in organization, cooperation, and duplication of effort experienced by PSYOP commanders, the ACTIV team report did not recommend any solutions and downplayed the difficulties of PSYOP command structure and mission planning such as focus on spurious tasks and lack of commander’s emphasis. Their report also deferred a detailed examination of PSYOP effectiveness for later, citing the difficulties involved in measuring effectiveness.

A later study undertaken by Ernest F. and Edith M. Bairdain{10} from September 1969 to January 1971 delved more deeply into several of the topics the ACTIV report did not cover. This 16-month study of both military and civilian PSYOP in Vietnam involved numerous researchers, analysts, and data processors and resulted in an interim report, a two-volume final report, and twenty special-purpose reports covering specific topic areas. This study is the standard reference cited by all later authors examining the effectiveness of PSYOP in Vietnam. Further, this study provides key supporting data for the assertion that combat unit staffs in Vietnam often failed to integrate military PSYOP forces into tactical operations. The Bairdains’ study, for example, shows that it took on average two years of exposure to Chieu Hoi appeals to convince a VC soldier to rally while appeals combined with combat operations produced immediate results. That this did not routinely happen until later years of the war is an important indicator that combat commanders saw PSYOP as more of a sideshow than a valuable combat multiplier.

Another study, completed by Andrew D. Sens and Joseph M. Macrum in 1965 for the Special Operations Research Office (SORO),{11} is not a study of PSYOP effectiveness but rather is an argument for employing PSYOP in Vietnam. This study provides context for the buildup of PSYOP forces begun in 1965. A study conducted after the war by BDM Corporation{12} lacks the level of detail on PSYOP of other reports, but provides evidence that some PSYOP programs were effective while others were not. However, the ACTIV and Bairdain reports have stronger evidence value than the SORO and BDM reports because the former were conducted with the participation of the military PSYOP forces themselves as they were in action.

Possibly the most persuasive documents alluding to the effectiveness of particular PSYOP programs were those captured from VC and NVA forces during combat operations{13} and the transcripts of interrogations conducted with prisoners of war and ralliers{14} who returned under the Chieu Hoi program. Similarly persuasive and useful evidence is available in the form of lessons learned and debriefing reports written by PSYOP commanders.

PSYOP headquarters of battalion or larger size submitted quarterly Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OR-LL) through MACV for distribution at Department of the Army level. Sandler considered a few of these reports but no other author had access and even Sandler did not have access to all of the reports available today. The wealth of detailed information in these reports ranges from trivial to crucial and supporting facts for every significant assertion regarding PSYOP effectiveness can be found here. The largely untapped reports from PSYOP commanders reinforce similar reports from the 1st Infantry Division{15}and 5th Special Forces Group,{16} providing additional data supporting the assertion that PSYOP was overwhelmed by demands for easily measurable actions but handicapped in effectively integrating into combat operations.

In addition to PSYOP and combat unit OR-LL reports, some end-of-tour debriefing reports from senior officers departing Vietnam provide their perspectives and some of the knowledge they had gained in their assignment. Debriefs from two commanders of 4th PSYOP Group{17} and one commander of 7th PSYOP Group{18} provide the unique perspectives of PSYOP commanders, while debriefs from general officers commanding from separate brigade to corps provide the perspective of these officers as to what PSYOP was doing in support of their units and their emphasis on PSYOP in planning for tactical missions.

While lessons learned and debriefing reports provide insight into PSYOP and tactical unit procedures, the best source for information on the decisions made regarding PSYOP at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) are the annual Command History reports now available in declassified form. Other MACV documents provide useful details, for example the handbook providing every conceivable detail on the employment of Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Teams.{19} As important as the MACV command histories and other documents are to understanding decisions made at that level, the many guidance documents published by JUSPAO are crucial to understanding some of the constraints placed on military PSYOP forces. Consolidated copies of all early and most later guidance documents are availabl...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ACRONYMS
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• TABLES
• CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW
• CHAPTER 2 - SETTING THE STAGE: 1954-1965
• CHAPTER 3 - PSYOP GROWTH: 1966-1967
• CHAPTER 4 - PSYOP TRANSITION AND ACTIVITIES 1968-1972
• CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS
• GLOSSARY
• APPENDIX A - CHRONOLOGY OF PSYOP IN VIETNAM
• APPENDIX B - PSYOP DOCTRINAL ORGANIZATION
• APPENDIX C - PSYOP TASK ORGANIZATION
• APPENDIX D - MAP OF PSYOP UNIT LOCATIONS
• BIBLIOGRAPHY