Bataan Uncensored

Col. Ernest Miller

• Publisher: Barajima Books
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9781839741951
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

Bataan Uncensored, published in 1949, is the first-hand account by U.S. Army Colonel Ernest Miller of his experiences in the battle for Bataan, his subsequent surrender and participation in the infamous "Death March, " followed by imprisonment at Camps O'Donnell and Cabanatuan, and finally transfer to a labor camp in Japan on a cramped, fetid "Hell Ship." Upon their arrival in the Philippines, Miller, commander of an armored National Guard unit from Minnesota—the 194th Tank Battalion—and his troops are soon thrown into the thick of the fighting in a desperate attempt to slow the Japanese take-over. The U.S. And Philippine armies, grossly unprepared for the massive Japanese invasions, do not have a chance of victory, compounded by their obsolete equipment, lack of fuel and food, and a chaotic command structure. Once in captivity, the struggle to survive begins, hindered by always inadequate food, no medicines to treat raging diseases such as malaria and dysentery, and beatings at the hands of sadistic guards. As the author states, by war's end, 75% of his battalion did not return to the United States. Unlike other works dealing with the U.S. military in the Philippines in the Second World War, Bataan Uncensored realistically portrays the experiences of the soldiers but also identifies critical weaknesses in American policy and tactics that greatly affected the outcome of the battle. Included are 11 pages of maps.

Chapter 1 — Why?

I stood in the searing Philippine sunshine, wiped away the sweat with a grimy hand, and prepared to look at something which was to foreshadow the bleak months and years ahead.

We were the 194th Tank Battalion guarding the vital, strategic Calumpit Bridge and it was December 31, 1941. Tomorrow was to start another year—a year of defeat, of disgrace, of despair, for us and the American people.

Elements of the South Luzon Force had been withdrawing over the bridge on their way to Bataan. It trembled with the movement of vehicles choking the long stretch of highway which was the main road leading to San Fernando.

The one road to Bataan led out of San Fernando.

The famous Orange Plan (WPO-3) was in effect. The last Quartermaster units from Manila and the Port Area were moving into the areas destined to become the Philippine defender’s last stand.

A young Tanker, his face expressing bewilderment, was speaking words never to be forgotten. They still ring in my ears and they constitute one of the reasons for the story I am telling.

“Hell—they’re empty!”

I looked—and saw what I had seen before. The Tanker was calling attention to rumbling trucks moving through. Trucks that were empty!

There they were—trucks rolling toward Bataan that should have been crammed with life-sustaining food and pertinent equipment procurable only in Manila. My men counted between 100 and 150 empty supply trucks. They rattled like the bare skeletons which most of those watching Tankers were destined to become.

Food and equipment would have given us a fighting chance against overwhelming Japanese war power. But we were helpless—because someone had failed.

This was not the final shock—nor the first withering dismay we had felt since the campaign started. Each day and night had been filled with blundering, lack of planning, inefficiency. We had experienced it as a National Guard Tank Battalion ever since we were mobilized in February, 1941. It was our destiny to become the first Armored Force unit ever to leave the continental limits of the United States; we were destined to sit out the bombing of our grounded planes at Clark Field—to cover the withdrawals of our forces into Bataan.

Bataan! We didn’t know it then, but Bataan’s memories were to haunt us for years to come:

Good Friday—April 3, 1942—when the Japs launched their second invasion force in the all-out attack. Holy Saturday with its deluge of Jap bombs and shells and bullets....Positions of the pitiful, starved and diseased defenders literally blown out of the ground....Hell itself....But even then a hope that would not die....Help must come!

Easter Sunday....The skies black with bombers and strafers—not ours—we didn’t have any....Services held by chaplains of all faiths amid the inferno of a one-sided war....Services constantly interrupted by the merciless and unceasing pounding of the overwhelming, vicious Jap hordes.

Monday....Tuesday....Wednesday....Days of agony and torment....On the receiving end....Nothing to throw back.

Black Thursday—April 9, 1942—the day the siege of Bataan became a flaming page in history.

The ragged, starved, disease-ridden expendables shuffling and stumbling into the March of Death—many to die on that march—many to die later in Japanese prison camps or on the hell ships—and the rest, a pitiful minority, destined to a living death of starvation, disease and abuse for three and one-half years in the hands of a nation which knew no code of ethics...human footballs that also wanted to live...the sickening realization always clawing at the mind that help had failed to arrive.

That knowledge was burned indelibly in our memories and also the knowledge of a faltering, staggering America subjected to terms of surrender not only through the all-out attack of a powerful enemy but also through the blundering stupidity of its own leaders—aided and abetted by a politically-minded Congress and an apathetic majority of the American people during the pre-war years of a smug and oily peace when the stake was human life.

Why? Why?

Why is it—with Congress always holding investigations attempting to place the blame on someone else—there has never been any investigation of Congressional non-action on preparedness during those pre-war years? Why is it that more of the American people have not come forward—willing to share some of that blame?

Time dulls the memory. In some ways that is good. For the lessons we should remember—it is bad.

There are some things I cannot forget and still be a good American. Some of them still flash through my mind like a horrible nightmare filled with scenes that are impossible to comprehend:

Stupid delays in training—obtaining equipment and supplies....The poison of apathy in our people, reflecting its Rip Van Winkleism seven thousand miles away....Foolish snarls of red tape to trap citizen soldiers who had left school, professions, shops and stores—who wavered, appeared to collapse—then struggled to stand again because of their belief in the nation of their fathers....The impossibility of even loading our tanks properly for shipment overseas....No preparation....Refusal to allow test-firing of our guns which had never been fired....The fact that I, as commanding officer of a tank battalion, had no chance to fire a tank gun until the Japanese were actually in sight....No high explosive shells for those guns in all the Philippines....No gasoline for the tanks when gasoline was plentiful....the intense obsession of Major-General “God Almighty” Kenyon Joyce at Fort Lewis, Washington, demanding all-out attention to details of the uniform over and above anything else and to hell with training and organization—his sarcastic reference to “latter day” soldiers which feeling was also displayed in the Philippines....Badly needed parts for tanks and other vehicles which did arrive at Manila—which we could not get turned over to us or even find out where they were stored—and which the Japanese took over....scenes such as these—and many more.

Those were scenes that took place before war. What followed was a succession of nightmares; but they were nightmares as real as the lives of the men they affected.

There is no doubt that other men—both in the Philippines and elsewhere—went through the same agony as I did. But, perhaps because I was a commanding officer, had seen a great deal of service before, and knew a little more than the average of the early stages of preparation—or non-preparation—involving human life—the picture made a lasting impression which will be a part of me as long as I shall have life.

Notes, which I made in Bataan, were thorough and complete, omitting no details. These notes were destroyed by myself just prior to the end. However, they were vivid in my memory and as soon as we were in the first prison camp, I started the notes all over again, taking the testimony of pertinent individuals who had special knowledge and secreting those notes from the Japanese by various ways and means which will be described later on. Those notes were made religiously and accumulated throughout the three and one-half years as a prisoner of the Japanese. They were made on such scraps of paper as I was able to find. Not a single note was lost—not even one day when I felt the breath of a Jap guard on the back of my neck as I bent over my writings. Those notes were smuggled through Japanese sentries—in the Philippines, on the hell ship that took us to Japan, and into the prison camps on Honshu and Shikoku Islands.

The determination to tell this story was made in Bataan. That determination was not born of any desire or intention to besmirch the name of any individual but simply to call attention to why there was a Bataan and to fervently hope that it might help to awaken America.

The blame should not be placed upon any particular individual nor upon the military establishment other than those things which they could have corrected with the means at their disposal. The American people are basically to blame for allowing any such system to exist. The American people, through Congress, by their idealistic and apathetic attitude, allowed our military establishment to decay during the times of peace and did nothing about it, although grim warnings which went unheeded, were issued in plenty—by regular and citizen soldier alike—from the post-war days of World War I to the pre-war days of World War II.

Brave men died needlessly. We felt the red tape and indecision that choked and strangled an American plan of strategy which did not even make use of those things that were available.

Perhaps no one could understand our innermost thoughts without having had the experience—that is understandable—but, surely, every American must understand what happened to us in part.

I promised God Almighty three things if I returned alive: First, to preach and teach Americanism with my whole being. Second, to tell the true story of our fiasco in the Philippines in all its nakedness—pulling no punches—with the hope that it might build a better and stronger America. Third, to attempt to drive home the point that our freedom will surely be lost if we again develop the apathy toward our national defense which we allowed to occur between our two world wars.

If there are those who would say that I am exploiting an issue that should remain untold, I humbly ask that they read with an open mind. Let the facts speak for themselves—remembering that the motive is entirely without malice.

History always asks questions, some of which are never answered. May I ask and humbly answer a few of those questions—some of which were running through my mind even when the enemy first struck?

Major-General George Grunert was commander of the Philippine Department before MacArthur was recalled to active duty which was toward the end of July, 1941. Why was General Grunert sent home to the United States in October, 1941? It was because he differed sharply with MacArthur in the defense plans of the Philippines. This could not be tolerated from a subordinate. It was generally conceded by officers close to the situation that Grunert was realistically sure of what was needed. MacArthur was steeped in the theoretical—and—MacArthur was the high command.

For several nights prior to and including December 5-6, strange aircraft were picked up and traced by our Interceptor Command. These planes operated to within a few miles of Lingayen Gulf. What of those “dry runs”? Was that information evaluated to mean it was all for fun? MacArthur and his staff knew all about the pilgrimages.

Why did MacArthur believe there would be no war with the Japanese until about April 1, 1942? I cannot answer this and would not raise the question except that it played a decisive role in the events to come. However, I do know this was the line of thinking we encountered when we arrived in the Far East. This is also verified by General Lewis H. Brereton, commander of the Far East Air Forces in the early stages of the war, and by General Jonathan Wainwright. It is denied by MacArthur who stated to the press, when confronted with Brereton’s statement in his recent book, that the date of April 1, 1942, referred to, was the earliest possible date for the arrival of the necessary reinforcements which would make a successful defense of the Philippines possible and was not merely an anticipated date of enemy action! And yet there is no doubt that the mobilization and training schedule of both the Philippine Department and of the Philippine Army was based on the assumption that the Japs would not strike before that time!

Why were American planes lined up on the ground at Clark Field when the Japanese bombed and devastated the area? This was some hours after Pearl Harbor and we were all on the full alert. The fact is—they were waiting for orders—which were destined never to be received until they were actually feeling the impact of the bombs!

Why did our Air Force in the Philippines fail to bomb Formosa the first day of the war, December 8, 1941 (December 7 U.S. time)? Missions had been previously assigned for operations on Formosa and permission had been requested of the high command at 5:00 o’clock that morning to carry out the plan. About December 1, 1941, MacArthur received a message from General George Marshall which alerted him to the true situation—rapidly deteriorating relations with Japan—and that the first overt act to be committed should be by Japan. However, Marshall also stressed the fact that the message should not be construed as meaning that a course of action should be adopted that might jeopardize a successful defense of the Philippine Islands. The overt act had already been committed by Japan when bombs were dropped on Pearl Harbor. B17’s were actually loaded with bombs anticipating, naturally, that bombing orders would come. When those orders failed to arrive, calls were put in to the high command. The result—orders to remove the bombs from the B17’s! The idea seemed to be that no attack would be made until Japan had committed overt acts on the Philippines. MacArthur has also denied the foregoing to the press, stating that no request was made for offensive action by the Air Force against Formosa. However, late that morning orders were received from MacArthur for both reconnaissance and bombing missions with Formosa as the target. The orders came too late. Japanese bombers erased Clark Field!

Why was not the Orange Plan (WPO-3) put into effect until December 23, 1941? This was the plan for the defense of the Philippines and carried the details of not only the scheme for defense but also supply. Why the period of indecision—16 golden days? Perhaps it was because of the pre-war thinking of MacArthur which leaned toward the belief that it would be too expensive in men, money and materials for Japan to invade. Surely it was not because he thought the miserable, inadequate force and equipment available could stop an invasion by such a powerful...

Table of contents

• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Preface
• Chapter 1 - Why?
• Chapter 2 - Prewar Mobilization of Citizen Soldiers
• Chapter 3 - The Team Is Kicked Apart
• Chapter 4 - Secret Orders
• Chapter 5 - Operation “Movement”
• Chapter 6 - The Battle of Supply
• Chapter 7 - There will be No War with Japan
• Chapter 8 - War Comes
• Chapter 9 - The Rice Storage at Cabanatuan
• Chapter 10 - Invasion
• Chapter 11 - The Agno River Rat Trap
• Chapter 12 - Confusion
• Chapter 13 - Empty Trucks-and Death
• Chapter 14 - The Road to Bataan
• Chapter 15 - Behind the “Gates”
• Chapter 16 - The Abucay-Hacienda Line
• Chapter 17 - Between Outpost and Japs
• Chapter 18 - The Battle of January 26th
• Chapter 19 - U.S. Propaganda
• Chapter 20 - Hope-Bataan Airfields
• Chapter 21 - “Help Is on the Way”
• Chapter 22 - The Fall of Bataan
• Chapter 23 - The Japs Take Over
• Chapter 24 - March of Death
• Chapter 25 - Camp O’Donnell-Offspring of Hell
• Chapter 26 - Administration by Remote Control
• Chapter 27 - The Hell Ship
• Chapter 28 - “No Man Has Really Eaten Until He Has Starved”
• Chapter 29 - The Session on Food
• Chapter 30 - “Donald Duck” Becomes Sick
• Chapter 31 - “War” Conferences with the Japs
• Chapter 32 - POW’s Go Over the Fence
• Chapter 33 - Japanese Way of Thinking
• Chapter 34 - Christmas at Zentsuji
• Chapter 35 - Our Chief Is Dead!
• Chapter 36 - The War Is Over!
• Chapter 37 - Freedom!
• Chapter 38 - The Japanese
• Chapter 39 - Who Should We Blame for Bataan?
• Elegy of a Prisoner of War
• Maps