Seward's Folly

A New Look at the Alaska Purchase

Lee A. Farrow

• Publisher: University of Alaska Press
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781602233034
• eBook ISBN: 9781602233041
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The Alaska Purchase—denounced at the time as "Seward's Folly" but now seen as a masterstroke—is well known in American history. But few know the rest of the story.
            This book aims to correct that. Lee Farrow offers here a detailed account of just what the Alaska Purchase was, how it came about, its impact at the time, and more. Farrow shows why both America and Russia had plenty of good reasons to want the sale to occur, including Russia's desire to let go of an unprofitable, hard-to-manage colony and the belief in the United States that securing Alaska could help the nation gain control of British Columbia and generate closer trade ties with Asia . Farrow also delves into the implications of the deal for foreign policy and international diplomacy far beyond Russia and the United States at a moment when the global balance of power was in question.
            A thorough, readable retelling of a story we only think we know, Seward's Folly will become the standard book on the Alaska Purchase.
 

CHAPTER I

Some Mysterious Sympathy: The Foundations of the Russian-American Friendship

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russia and the United States had a significantly different relationship than the one future generations would come to know. During this pivotal period in American and Russian history, the two great nations were on friendly terms, and many in Europe worried that they might become allies. Situated on opposite sides of the globe, they were an unlikely pair in many ways—one was a conservative monarchy, the other a young republic—yet over the course of a century the bond had developed from hesitant and uncertain beginnings to a mature and complex friendship that both countries sought to protect and expand. Repeated encounters in trade, diplomacy, and technological matters had brought the two countries closer, while events on the international scene—war, trade disputes, and the shifting balance of power in Europe—often pushed them together as well. To a large extent, this unusual friendship must be understood in a broader diplomatic context; since the end of the eighteenth century, Russian-American relations were both a reaction to and a facet of other interactions, particularly those between Great Britain and Russia and Great Britain and the United States. The constant, if sometimes dormant, tension between these nations over maritime power, fishing rights, and territorial expansion repeatedly drove Russia and the United States into one another’s arms. The end result was that by the time those two nations exchanged that stretch of wild territory in North America, they already had a surprisingly long and active relationship, much of which was built at the expense of and in opposition to that imperial powerhouse of the nineteenth century, Great Britain.

It was during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–96) that the earliest foundations of the Russian-American relationship were laid. The first recorded contact between Russians and “Americans” came in 1763 when the ship of a prominent Boston merchant, loaded with rum, sugar, sassafras, mahogany, and indigo from the West Indies, landed outside of St. Petersburg at Kronstadt and returned home with linen, hemp, and iron from Russia. This began a period of active trade, though the connection remained exclusively a commercial one. The spirit of the Enlightenment and ominous international events eventually tested the strength and sincerity of that early relationship. Catherine considered herself an enlightened monarch, embracing many of the ideas of the Enlightenment and even corresponding with a number of the philosophers, but when these same ideas inspired the American revolutionaries to action, Catherine was unwilling to offer support to the rebels. Instead, she issued the famous Declaration of Armed Neutrality in March 1780, which avoided direct involvement but effectively aided the colonies by pronouncing the right of neutral ships to enter American ports.

Catherine’s declaration also encouraged leaders in the American colonies to consider a formal mission to Russia. In 1781 Francis Dana, accompanied by fourteen-year-old John Quincy Adams, traveled to St. Petersburg. Though the complexities of the war and Catherine’s hope of convincing Britain to accept her mediation prevented Dana from being received in any official capacity, he did meet with important Russian and foreign diplomats and tried to alleviate concerns that an independent United States would be harmful to Russian commercial interests, specifically its trade in naval stores. Dana’s efforts at persuading Russia to assist the colonies were a failure, and it would be twenty years before the United States could establish an official representative at St. Petersburg. Nonetheless, the American Revolution did have an impact in Russia. Educated Russians enamored with the ideas of the Enlightenment were intrigued by the American colonists’ establishment of a new nation based on republican values. Though none traveled to the United States, several Russian writers made reference to America, including Alexander Radishchev, the proto-revolutionary and author of one of the earliest condemnations of serfdom, Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow.

There were other contacts during Catherine’s reign as well. In 1788 the famous American seaman John Paul Jones secured an appointment in the Russian navy and served in the Black Sea under one of Catherine’s favorites, the talented soldier Prince Grigorii Potemkin. Jones’s period of service, however, did not go well. He did not speak Russian or get along well with the British officers in the Russian navy, and in the spring of 1789 he was accused of raping a twelve-year-old girl. Whether or not the accusation was true, Catherine took the opportunity to get rid of Jones; he was given leave and made his way as far as Paris, where he died there three years later. Despite this rather disastrous episode, Russian-American ties continued to grow, particularly in the commercial sphere. At the end of the eighteenth century, at least four hundred ships from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and other American ports brought goods to Russia, and “most New England houses and ships were put together with Russian nails, and it would be a rare vessel that did not have sails, tackle, and anchors of Russian origin.” More formal commercial relations were hindered by the lack of an official diplomatic relationship. Catherine’s own fears about the radicalization of the French Revolution, which had begun in 1789, also slowed such a development, as she became wary of republican ideas and sought to draw closer to Britain. Her son and heir, Paul I (1796–1801), a true conservative, proved even less inclined to pursue concrete ties with the young republic.

Russia and the United States finally established full diplomatic relations under Catherine’s grandson, Alexander I (1801–25). When Alexander became tsar, he and his small circle of liberal advisors were more receptive to establishing a diplomatic friendship with the United States, despite its very different political system. There were strategic diplomatic reasons, as well. When President Thomas Jefferson proposed the idea of an official minister in 1807, both the United States and Russia had become increasingly isolated as France under Napoleon Bonaparte proved its superiority on land and Great Britain dominated the seas. In June 1809 the U.S. Senate approved the nomination of John Quincy Adams as minister to Russia; Alexander I had already selected Fedor Pahlen as the first Russian minister to the United States. This new diplomatic bond was strengthened when, in 1813, Alexander I offered to mediate an end to the war between the United States and Britain. Britain refused and so it was not until the Treaty of Ghent in early 1815 that the war ended, but the Russian offer of assistance impressed the American government as a sign of goodwill.

In the following years, however, a series of small complications threatened the developing friendship. In November 1815, in an episode oddly reminiscent of the John Paul Jones affair, Nikolai Kozlov, the Russian consul-general in Philadelphia, was accused of raping a twelve-year-old girl. A Pennsylvania court denied Kozlov’s claim of diplomatic immunity and decided that crimes by foreign diplomats fell within the purview of federal courts. In response, Andrei Dashkov, who had become Russian minister in 1811, demanded that Kozlov be cleared of all charges, and when this did not happen, he ceased all communication with the U.S. government. The Russian government retaliated by declaring the American chargé d’affaires in St. Petersburg, Levett Harris, to be persona non grata, though he was permitted to carry out his official duties. The crisis settled in late 1816 when Alexander I and his cabinet, eager to maintain good relations with the United States, accepted the argument that diplomats were answerable to the laws of the country where they resided at the time of the offense.

There is one other major point of contact between Russia and America during this period, of course—the birth of that territory called Russian America, what would eventually come to be known as Alaska. Even as the Russian and American governments were taking the first steps toward building an official diplomatic relationship, there were other contacts and conflicts between traders and settlers in the Pacific Northwest that created challenges to that fledgling friendship. As Russia tried to establish a sound footing and stake its claim to Russian America and its commercial possibilities, it repeatedly ran afoul of American traders of various kinds eager to exploit those same natural resources. These disagreements went on for decades and contributed to the later conversations about the future of Russian America. Russia may have gotten there first, but the persistent intrusions of American traders made it a difficult road with an uncertain outcome.

Russian presence in the Pacific Northwest had slow and tentative beginnings. By the mid-1660s geographical information of some kind had reached Moscow, suggesting that beyond the farthest reaches of Siberia one would find the northwestern tip of North America, but at the time no one knew if the two continents were one. In the eighteenth century, through a combination of government-sponsored exploration and individual entrepreneurship, Russia established a presence, not only on the islands leading up to the mainland, but on the North American mainland itself. As early as 1741, Vitus Bering’s expedition made Russians aware of the rich possibilities of the seal and sea otter fur trade, and this discovery fueled the increase in Russian traffic in the second half of the century, which eventually led to the establishment of a Russian trading company. The Russian-American Company evolved over a period of roughly twenty years as one private trading company transformed into another. Though these early iterations of the Russian-American Company received some assistance from the Imperial government, the company’s ultimate success can largely be credited to the efforts of the merchant Grigory I. Shelikhov, who recognized the potential for the fur trade in Alaska in the 1770s. Shelikhov continuously agitated for government support and a permanent settlement in North America, and he proposed the organization of a trading company along the lines of the British East India Company that would have a monopoly on the fur trade. Though he did not live to see his plan come to fruition, he did establish a permanent settlement on Kodiak Island. Finally, in 1799, Paul I granted the Russian-American Company a charter and a monopoly on all hunting, trading, and mining of the northwest coast of North America from 55 degrees latitude north, just north of present-day Prince Rupert, British Columbia, to the Bering Strait and including the island approaches, such as the Aleutians. The company was also permitted to sell its stock. That same year Alexander Baranov, who had served as Shelikhov’s assistant and then manager of the company in his own right, founded a permanent settlement to serve as his headquarters and named it Novo-Arkhangelsk (later, Sitka). Over the next seventy years, the Russian-American Company would serve as the primary representative of Russia’s commercial interests in the Pacific Northwest.

The Russians were not alone in their pursuit of the lucrative fur trade, however. At the end of the eighteenth century, Boston merchants began to send ships to the area hoping to acquire sea otter furs from Natives that would then be taken to the port of Canton in China. Within a few years a trading route from Boston to the Pacific Northwest to Canton to Boston was well established, and by 1801 sixteen American vessels were enjoying the profits of the sea otter trade. Beginning in 1803 this desire for a secure supply of pelts led American sea captains to strike deals with the Russian settlement in Alaska; in these arrangements, the Russian-American colony would supply the Americans with furs in exchange for supplies and the occasional manpower when needed. Since Russian vessels were not allowed in Chinese ports, the deal seemed to benefit both parties.

For the most part, this system worked well for several years, but in reality Russia had already been looking for a way to cut out its American middlemen. In 1805 Nikolai Rezanov, a Russian nobleman and longtime supporter of the trading company, arrived in Sitka as an inspector for the Imperial government. Rezanov was troubled by American encroachment in the sea otter trade, but Baranov pointed out that it was better to work through the Americans than simply have them strike their own deals with the local hunters. Nonetheless, Rezanov urged the Russian-American Company to build a settlement on the Columbia River. Baranov took Rezanov’s concerns seriously and during the next few years tried to extend Russia’s control over the sea otter trade in the Pacific Northwest. In addition to a failed attempt to establish a trading post in the Sandwich Islands, Baranov also sent a vessel to Northern California to find a Russian base for hunting and agricultural production that could then be used to support the Alaskan settlements. First established at Bodega Bay, the base was later relocated to the north and named Fort Ross. The settlement, situated eighty-five miles north of present-day San Francisco, served as the headquarters of Russian California for thirty years.

Meanwhile, in response to complaints from the Russian-American Company about the intrusion of American fur traders, Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Nikita Rumiantsev wrote to Levett Harris, the American consul in St. Petersburg, in May 1808 asking that American traders use only Russian-American Company agents at Kodiak and refrain from trading firearms with the locals, a practice that had enabled the Tlingit uprising that had destroyed Sitka several years earlier. It was partly this ongoing conflict over the sea otter trade that made Russia realize that it was necessary to place a permanent representative in the United States. Alexander I appointed Fedor Pahlen as the first Russian minister in 1809, and he selected Andrei Dashkov to serve as the Russian consul-general in Philadelphia. Dashkov arrived in the United States months ahead of Pahlen, however, and so it was he who served as Russia’s representative on all matters initially. When Dashkov, arrived in Washington in the summer of 1809, one of his first challenges was to tackle the problem of American vessels illicitly trading with local tribes in the Pacific Northwest, referring to it as a violation of Russian territorial rights. When Secretary of State Robert Smith asked Dashkov to specify the boundaries of what Russia considered to be its territory, Dashkov had to admit that he could not, making it easy for the American government to ignore the complaint for the time being. But the issue was far from settled, and in subsequent years, the debate continued. While Russia attempted to claim territory down to the mouth of the Columbia River, both Secretary of State Smith and President James Madison realized that signing any convention with Russia on this subject would be tantamount to recognizing Russian rights over territory in North America.

The War of 1812 disrupted trade in the Pacific Northwest, but by this point the Russian-American Company had grown dependent on American traders for its sustenance and for the shipment of furs to Canton. When the war ended in 1815, the fur trade was revived and with it appeared a number of discussions and resolutions in Congress demanding the protection of American fur interests. Though Russian activity in the area was of great concern, American traders and the politicians who supported them also worried about the British presence in the region. Russia viewed the situation quite differently, of course, and decided to take more aggressive steps to protect its business concerns. In September 1821, Tsar Alexander I issued an imperial ukaz (proclamation) that closed the entire area along the Pacific Northwest coast to trade by anyone other than the Russian-American Company and claimed Russian territorial waters for a hundred miles from the coastline. At the same time, Alexander renewed the charter of the Russian-American Company and reaffirmed the southern boundary of the colony at 51 degrees north latitude, the upper edge of current Vancouver Island. Alexander explained that the ukaz was a reaction to the illicit activities of foreigners along the Russian-American coast. In response, a congressional committee urged the United States to occupy the Pacific Northwest before Russia took it all and proposed a bill to that effect. This bold suggestion found strong support among American traders who stood to lose a great deal if the tsar’s ukaz remained in force.

Ultimately, the United States made it clear to Russia that it could never accept Alexander’s decree and that the presence of American traders in the Pacific Northwest was a permanent reality. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams had long supported the notion of an American continental empire, and in fact believed it to be an inevitability, but one that, in his view, required patience and caution. There was no need to obtain something by force that would eventually be gained by providence. Adams also understood that America’s relationship with Russia could serve as a useful counterbalance to British sea power. In March 1822 Adams informed the Russian minister in Washington, D.C., Pierre de Politica, that the United States could neither accept Russian claims to the Northwest coast nor could it abide by the regulations in the ukaz. At the same time, Adams instructed the U.S. minister to Russia, Henry Middleton, to press American rights in St. Petersburg. Middleton did so, implying the possibility of war between the two nations should the matter not be resolved soon, and the Russian government decided to back down.

As the slow wheels of diplomacy turned, the issue of jurisdiction in the Pacific Northwest became tied to the growing threat of European interference in Latin America to help Spain regain its lost colonies. By the fall of 1823, the U.S. government anticipated the possibility that the European monarchies of the conservative Holy Alliance might tamper with affairs in the Western Hemisphere and said so in a strongly worded note to the Russian minister. Only days later, President James Monroe delivered his famous message to Congress that gave birth to the Monroe Doctrine, stating that any further actions by European nations to establish colonies or interfere with states in North or South America would be perceived as acts of aggression, thus prompting U.S. intervention. The United States had staked out a firm position on spheres of influence. Meanwhile, the Russian government suffered pressure from within. The tsar’s ukaz had been devastating to the Russian-American colony, resulting in an annual average loss of 300,000 rubles. In 1823 Matvei Muraviev, the governor of Russian America, begged the board of directors in St. Petersburg to lay aside the trade restriction with Americans, and a group of stockholders petitioned the Russian government to reopen Sitka to foreign vessels.

Finally, in February 1824, formal negotiations opened between the two governments on the issue, and a treaty was signed two months later that provided that both nations could fish, navigate waters, or trade with Natives along the Northwest coast at points not yet occupied. Consequently, it was expected that both Russian and American citizens would request permission before entering each other’s ports. For the first ten years after this agreement, however, both countries would have free movement in the area, with the notable exception that the trade of firearms, gun powder, and alcohol was prohibited. Finally, the two governments settled on 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude as the dividing point between Russian and American territory. While American officials viewed the treaty as a complete victory, the Russian government believed it had executed a successful maneuver to stop further U.S. penetration into Russian territory. In ten years Russia believed it could rightfully forbid Americans from trading and fishing in the entire area. At the same time, the dispute and its temporary resolution made one thing clear—Russia’s ability to defend its Pacific Northwest colony was questionable, as was the political and economic value of its distant investment.

The temporary resolution of the conflict in the Pacific Northwest was not the only bright spot in this period; there were other positive interactions between the two countries in the 1820s and 1830s. Though there was no official commercial treaty, an impressive number of American ships traveled to Kronstadt and St. Petersburg with a variety of valuable goods, including sugar from the West Indies, and as much as 90 percent of America’s linen imports came from Russia. ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter I - Some Mysterious Sympathy: The Foundations of the Russian-American Friendship
• Chapter II - Evident Advantages: Origins and Objectives
• Chapter III - Seward’s Chimerical Project: Public Reaction and Ratification
• Chapter IV - No Longer Russian America: Taking Possession of Alaska
• Chapter V - Paying for the “New National Ice-House:” Approval and Appropriation
• Chapter VI - Very Uneasy and Vexed: International Reactions to the Purchase
• Chapter VII - That Snowbound Wilderness: From Treaty to Territory
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index