Praxiology and the Philosophy of Technology

Wojciech W. Gasparski, Timo Airaksinen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781138513532
• eBook ISBN: 9781351497190
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Technology is a crucial feature of the modern world, and human beings are necessarily technological creatures. Our goal must be to use technology effectively, efficiently, and ethically. We have hands that are adept at using tools, and intelligence that guides our actions. We also have desires and emotions that motivate us to achieve more and more, never allowing us to stop.From the viewpoint of praxiology, technology does not exist merely to satisfy the human need in an effective and efficient way. The problems of the modern world and the questions we must ask with respect to technology and how it is used are complicated and demanding. They may initially seem mysterious, perhaps even partly subconscious. In this fifteenth volume of a distinguished international series, contributors address essential questions about the philosophy and ethics of technology. Their intention is to point out the road not only to its better applications but also to its greater understanding.The first part of the book addresses general questions about the theory of technology. The second part of the volume focuses on special topics like information and communication technologies and work systems, as well as the foundations of problem solving and the history of innovation in the age of enlightenment. The third part of the book is on ethical judgments. It emphasizes the importance of ethics in the application of technology and, especially, when we commercialize it in order to meet the needs of the people in a free market society. This volume offers its reader a balanced picture of the state of the art of theoretical and applied issues in technology research--emphasizing the praxiological perspective that characterizes the entire series.

PART ONE

Technology and Praxiology

Problem Areas of the Philosophy of Technology

Ladislav Tondl
Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences Prague Czech Republic

1. Essential Features of the Technological World

When asked to specify more precisely the actual nature and function of the environment in which contemporary man lives, creates and accomplishes most of his goals, intentions and lifelong ambitions, we come to realize that this environment is composed – to a large extent – of objects, processes and conditions which have been created by man himself and which we sometimes collectively call the technological world. (Many languages and cultures prefer using the attribute “technological” consisting of two original Greek terms, i.e. “techne” expressing man’s capacity, skills and also the art of coping with or solving a given problem situation or reaching a defined goal, and “logos”, a term denoting not only word but also an idea, knowledge or learning. Seen in this light, when required to translate this particular attribute in the Anglo-Saxon but also Frenchspeaking countries adequately, we should rather use the term “technological”.)

The technological world can hardly be characterized or simply defined by a single criterion. The main difficulty also lies in that this particular world or, as some thinkers say, this “other nature” is not homogeneous, encompassing a multitude of considerably incongruous units, namely those of ideate, energy as well as material nature, which are intertwined in a highly variegated fashion. With this in mind, we shall attempt here to outline at least the most significant characteristics and criteria.

1. The technological world is primarily something that may be associated with the term “artificial”, i.e. something that is created by a goal-directed human activity, based on knowledge, skills or ascertained and verified experience. The attribute “artificial”, as a substantial trait of the technological world, has already been emphasized by H. Simon, one of the leading pioneers of the so-called artificial intelligence.

2. The technological world creates and also partly supplements or replaces the current nature around us by what is sometimes referred to as the “second nature”. Having said that, we also mean that the technological world in no way changes the rules or laws disclosed by the natural sciences, on the contrary it must fully respect them. To put it in other words, the “second nature” is subject to the same principles and rules as those disciplines studied by contemporary natural sciences. After all, it was F. Bacon who spelt out the well-known principle that nature may be utilized and controlled only if we respect its laws (Natura nil nisi parendo vincitur.)

3. A substantial part of elements and components of the technological world may be viewed as different forms of utilizing or applying knowledge. (Due to these reasons, one of the current trends in the philosophy of technology, whose leading representative is primarily M. Bunge, regards technological and engineering branches as applied natural sciences.) Engaging one’s knowledge is, undoubtedly, an essential constituent of all the major spheres of technological activities covering both intellectual and information preparation of technological solutions as well as the implementation and utilization of all the forms of the results of technological activities. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the process of engaging one’s knowledge, namely knowledge of different forms and provenances, never proceeds in a vacuum, but always in specific technological, social, economic and knowledge-related situations, in a climate of certain acknowledged or recognized values, patterns and preferences. Therefore, as a rule, this invariably involves the application and involvement of certain complexes of knowledge, namely the knowledge of not only positive features of technological solutions but also of their negative aspects, risks and potential hazards as well as the engagement of specific patterns, certain value attitudes and preferences, namely values relating to different areas of value structures.

4. A technological solution and, consequently, the outcome of such a solution, i.e. a technological artefact, can be comprehensively summarized by the term “interface”, i.e. a system of links and the interface of the inner structure of this solution or artefact and its outer structure, i.e. its external environment, outside circumstances or conditions, including the human and social milieu, authors and users, and – generally speaking – all the other subjects who are somehow affected by the situation resulting from the involvement of a given technological solution. (This particular description, essential for the creation, function and utilization of information technologies, has been formulated by H. Simon). Such a characterization is vital not only for the resultant technological artefact itself, such as its descriptions, properties and functions, but is equally important for the intellectual, information and knowledge-related preparation of the resultant technological solution or technical work. This also concerns all the forms and shapes of assessment during which not only the technological perfection of the given work but also its human-friendliness or rather analogous criteria should be respected.

5. As for the main components of the technological world, its major characteristic lies in what can be called the “teleological dimension” (in the sense this particular term was used by N. Wiener) or the “technological deal” (a term used by J.-J. Salomon). This primarily involves the fact that goal-directed thinking, reasoning, topics, plans and projects, and also the technological changes made, the technological processes introduced as well as finished technical works have to serve a purpose or give some benefit, that they are, indeed, human constructs primarily focused on human goals, on the task of satisfying human needs and requirements. Furthermore, application of this teleological dimension in the given sense creates not only new goals, claims and requirements to seek and generate new and ever more perfect alternatives in attaining the outlined, accepted and acknowledged objectives, but also spawns new problems and previously unconsidered or completely unknown headaches, difficulties and risks. It can, therefore, be claimed that different elements or units of the technological world have their own destiny or – if we can modify the ancient Latin saying – “habent sua fata instrumenta humana”. Nor can we ignore that these fates have their specific rhythm in time, that many of those destinies may be viewed in terms that are usually described as biological metaphors. This means that, metaphorically speaking, we may consider the birth, youth and heydays as well as ailments, ageing and also the demise and death of most types and forms of technical works and, subsequently, also projects, intentions, implemented processes and fully functional technical works. Similarly, we are justified to talk of a technological time, its directions, rhythms or cycles. In parallel with the direction of time, with the fates of technical works and their developmental cycles we may also follow the rhythms and cycles of technological changes, their nature and level, the sources and motivation of such changes. This is also bound up with discussions concerning the possible typologies of those changes, the role played by technological paradigms, the correctness of analogies with T. Kuhn’s well-known concepts concerning the two types of scientific changes etc. At present, there is a view claiming that such an analogy is rather limited, that we may also consider changes at the different levels of hierarchic structures. When analyzing and considering different technological fates and changes, it is absolutely legitimate – and often very important – to ask to what extent are the different cases of technological changes more or less conditioned by knowledge-related changes and to what extent these changes are also more distinctly reflecting the social, political or religious changes, and also changes in value concepts or value orientations.

6. The technological world is sometimes described as the “second nature”. Indeed, this is a nature, even though created by man and human intellect as well as by human values. However, man is an integral part of nature and that is also why the second nature is characterized by the principles and rules of the nature proper. Still, the latter is noted not only for its own paradise on Earth, its beautiful daybreaks, fragrance of its meadows in bloom but also for its wildernesses, inhospitable nooks, its storms and natural disasters. Neither is the second nature only a realm of lasting smiles, it is also a world of mishaps, accidents and major hazards. It is not only a realm of brightness and light but also of shadows and darkness. As early as in the Antiquity, people realized that many new results, discoveries and innovations in the technological world had to be paid for dearly, that they never come on their own and free of charge. After all, this is epitomized by the legendary figure of Prometheus who had to pay a very high price for his courage. (The author of this study has expressed these ideas by referring to the “double face” of technology, or rather the dual face of the ancient Roman god Janus whose one face smiled and the other grimaced, terrifying the onlooker.) The fact that a permanent component of each technological solution and especially of each technological innovation is not only a set of advantages, benefits or otherwise characterized positive values, but also a set of possible losses, dangers, risks and other negative values, has led thinkers to postulating new orientations in the world of technology whose complex is usually called as the postulate of technology assessment. This particular complex covers primarily reasoning in alternatives and weighing the pros and cons of the individual alternatives, laying accents on the “human dimensions” and “human friendliness” of the individual alternatives, complete with evaluation of their feasibility, their economic, technological, environmental, social and health effects, their ethical, cultural and aesthetic values. Therefore, this complex also encompasses what may be termed as an interdisciplinary approach, as an integration of the knowledge of different natural science, technical and humanities disciplines, as an integration of the knowledge – and value – related approaches.

2. Is It Possible to Find an Acceptable Justification of the Philosophy of Technology?

A highly comfortable and basically very cheap explanation may be found to justify the philosophy of technology: There are scholars studying these subjects whose results have succeeded in bringing this discipline a degree of recognition or at least reasonable appreciation. To all intents and purposes, there are fewer of those who are prepared to admit that the results scored in this branch thus far have brought them any major stimuli. Also the kind of argumentation claiming that, after all, there is a philosophy of science, a philosophy of culture and probably also philosophies of other areas of human activities and other analogous forms of reasoning, does not tend to be very convincing either. Actually, it is true that justification of the existence of a phenomenon by merely assuming that such an existence is anticipated by an appropriate type of human behaviour or action may easily call forth many questions and doubts.

When discussing the issue mentioned in the headline of this chapter, we can hardly eschew the question what is, in actual fact, the ultimate goal or meaning of approaching the defined themes we are prepared to perceive as philosophical. Such a query is, doubtlessly, quite meaningful even though answers to it may considerably differ. This also holds true of the analogy to such a question, spelt out in the 1950s by the penetrating thinker and philosopher L. Kolakowski. The question read: “What do the philosophers live off?” While trying to outline at least the main areas of what is the objective or gist of this philosophical approach or the centre of interest of those who regard themselves or are described by others as philosophers, we cannot ignore the following areas in particular:

• – the views, ideas or global concepts of other philosophers, namely those of the present and the past,
• – the explications, interpretations of such opinions, their systematization or explanation, their arrangement in specific wholes or trends,
• – the problems connected with the dissemination of those opinions and ideas, their application to other thematic areas, i.e. with the solution of issues perceived as philosophical “under” certain accepted patterns, schemes or concepts,
• – the generation of new opinions, ideas and global concepts that yield or open up new views of the problem areas falling into philosophy’s sphere of competence.

The problem areas thus characterized undoubtedly include those associated with learning, with the production of knowledge and knowledge systems, founts of knowledge, with the substantiation, justification or confirmation of knowledge, with language and its means of formulating knowledge etc. Viewed against such a backdrop, this involves traditional epistemological issues which, however, cannot omit the subject of knowledge, attitudes to knowledge, to the utilization or application of knowledge within certain social, cultural and value circumstances and situations. Philosophical issues also cover everything that is or can be the subject of knowledge and, therefore, the topics traditionally termed as metaphysical or ontological. Ontological subjects are closely connected with the issues of the world as a whole, with the sphere involving links of the world and nature, including what we have called the “second nature”, man as part of nature and an important subject of the second nature. Seen in this light, this concerns the concepts ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Editorial
• Introduction
• Part One: Technology and Praxiology
• Part Two: Action and Innovation
• Part Three: The World of Technology and Its Ethics
• Notes about the Authors