The Development of the German Air Force, 1919-1939

Prof. Richard Suchenwirth, Harry R. Fletcher

• Publisher: Valmy Publishing
• Year: 2017
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781787205727
• Index: History

The Development of the German Air Force, 1919 to 1939, first published in 1968, written by Professor Richard Suchenwirth, and revised and edited by Mr. Harry R. Fletcher, is one of a series of historical studies written for the United States Air Force Historical Division by men who had been key officers in or outstanding authorities on the German Air Force during World War II.
The overall purpose of the series is twofold: 1) To provide the United States Air Force with a comprehensive and, insofar as possible, authoritative history of a major air force which suffered defeat in World War II, a history prepared by many of the principal and responsible leaders of that air force; 2) to provide a firsthand account of that air force's unique combat in a major war, especially its fight against the forces of the Soviet Union.
This series of studies therefore covers in large part virtually all phases of the Luftwaffe's operations and organization, from its camouflaged origin in the Reichswehr, during the period of secret rearmament following World War I, through its participation in the Spanish Civil War and its massive operations and final defeat in World War II, with particular attention to the air war on the Eastern Front.

Chapter I — GERMAN MILITARY AVIATION FROM THE ARMISTICE OF 1918 TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REICHS AVIATION MINISTRY, 1 MAY 1933

The End of the Old Air Force and the Beginning of a New Era

Part V of the Versailles Treaty, signed 28 June 1919 and put into effect on 10 January 1920, prohibited Germany from undertaking any activity whatsoever in the field of military aviation and in the manufacturing of military aircraft, including weapons and equipment. Article 198, Part V, stipulated:

“Germany is forbidden to maintain either land or sea forces....She will not be permitted to retain any dirigibles.”{1}

Article 202 of the Treaty specified that Germany had to surrender:

“...all her land and water aircraft, including any which may be in the process of manufacture, development, or construction.”{2}

This surrender order also covered:

“...aircraft engines, ballonets, and wings, armaments, ammunition, airborne instruments, wireless equipment, photographic equipment (including movie cameras).”{3}

These demands meant the end of the German Air Force.

During World War I, in the face of steadily increasing American, British, and French air superiority, the German Air Force had challenged the enemy to the very end in the airspace over the front, and the bomber squadrons of the Army High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) had penetrated deep into enemy territory. At the same time, the German Air Force had provided effective protection for the German homeland area. In the end, if the Armistice had not intervened on 11 November, the dissolution of three German armies during the occupation of the Meuse-Antwerp line would have provided Generalleutnant Ernst von Hoeppner,{4} Commanding General of the German Air Force, with the opportunity of “assigning more than adequate air forces to the divisions and groups.”{5}

This air force had proven itself in a total of 7,425 aerial victories, at a cost of 3,021 officers and 3,809 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. Even in 1918 (the summer of which cost the lives of so many German airmen) the German Air Force reported the destruction of 3,732 enemy aircraft, with a loss of 1,099 of its own aircraft in the period from January through September.{6} The young American Air Force, in particular, whose pilots attacked with such death-defying courage, suffered heavy losses at its hands.

In his final order of 21 January 1919, on the occasion of the demobilization of the Imperial German Air Force, General von Hoeppner praised his force in the following words:

“The air units, the antiaircraft artillery forces, and the zeppelin groups, supported by their reliable weather service, have established an outstanding record at the front, a record whose brilliance increased more and more as the war progressed. The home air defense units, often in tiresome routine patrols, have spared those parts of the homeland which were threatened by enemy air attack from heavy losses in human life and devastating destruction of property.”

“All this has been possible only because of your incomparable courage, your alertness, and your devotion to duty. You were often hard-pressed in the unequal fight against a numerically stronger enemy, and yet you have proven yourselves to be superior to him.”

“Undefeated, the German Air Force complies with the Armistice. You may be assured of the gratitude of the Army and the Fatherland.”{7}

Following the demobilization, a small number of pilots were transferred to the Reichswehr (National Army), which was established on 6 March 1919, and whose nucleus consisted of volunteer units. By virtue of their membership in the Reichswehr, Air Force personnel took part in the crushing of rebellions in northern and central Germany as well as in border patrol actions set up to meet the Polish threat and the Bolshevist assault in the Baltic.{8}{9} But these last remaining pilots also fell under the Treaty of Versailles, which had in the meantime been ratified. Thus, on 8 May 1920, after only ten years of existence, “a brave young arm of service silently and proudly laid down its arms.”{10} {11} A number of other air units, which had transferred bodily to the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) prior to the demobilization order, suffered the same fate. Only the police units lasted until 1920, when they were permanently disbanded at the time of the kapp putsch.{12}

Early Stages in the Rebirth of German Aviation{13}

The Army Command (Heeresleitung) in charge of the National Army, which had been brought into being by the law of 6 March 1919 and subsequently modified to comply with the peace terms, was, until 1926, guided by the keen intelligence and firm determination of Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt.{14} The Army Command was far from being a mere military adventure, as would have been the case under the prevailing circumstances if it had occupied itself with the reconquest of Germany’s lost territories in the east or with an overt rearmament program. Instead, what was uppermost in the minds of von Seeckt and his staff was concern over a possible Polish invasion and annexation of East Prussia or Silesia, in other words a problem which was purely defensive in character and thus fully in keeping with the task of the National Army, which was, after all, the defense force of the Reich.{15}

Von Seeckt was keenly aware of the potential significance of the air forces which were denied Germany by the Versailles Treaty. Thus, “in defiance of the wishes of the 100,000 Man Army and of the serious objections voiced by the Army Personnel Office, von Seeckt ordered that 180 pilot officers, veterans of World War I, specifically selected by the commanders of Germany’s former Air Force, be accepted into the National Army.”{16}Neither Colonel Hermann (Hans) von der Lieth-Thomsen,{17} organizer and actual commander of the German Air Force (who since 11 March 1915 had served as Chief of Field Flying Forces [Chef des Feldflugwesens]), after the Air Force had been officially separated from the Communications Forces, and since 8 October 1916 as chief of staff in the office of the newly created Commanding General, Air Force, nor Lieutenant-Colonel Wilhelm Siegert, Air Force Inspector (Inspekteur der Fliegertruppen) since 31 July 1916, both extremely capable officers, joined the National Army.

Von Seeckt’s alert intelligence and his farsighted evaluation of the potential significance of the air force—he was so firmly convinced of its importance that he recommended that it be organized as a separate, independent branch of the armed forces—rendered a great service to German military aviation.{18} Under the conditions laid down by the Versailles Treaty, to be sure, the National Army could do no more than to try to maintain interest in military aviation by establishing agencies which could at least keep up with developments in the field of aviation. These agencies soon became centers for aviation enthusiasts. Originally introduced as a stop-gap measure, they gradually developed into the nuclei and the cadres of a new German air force. In the words of General der Flieger Wilhelm Wimmer, “Seeckt used all of his influence and authority to protect his group of fliers against attacks all the way up to Cabinet level.”{19}

On 1 march 1920, the following agencies were established:

a) An Air Organization and Training Office (TA L) within the Troop Office (Truppenamt){20} of the Reichs Ministry of Defense. This office was directly subordinate to the Chief of the Troop Office, and remained so even after von Seeckt’s retirement.{21} In reality the central office for all questions pertaining to military aviation, this office bore the official designation “Air Defense Office”, which was all the more appropriate after 1926, when the National Army was permitted an air defense branch (ground-to-air defenses only). It was under the command of Major Helmut Wilberg, who was assisted by a sergeant and a civilian administrator.

b) The “Foreign Air Office” (one officer), within the Foreign Armies Department (T-3) of the Troop Office. Its task was the compilation and evaluation of information concerning foreign air forces.

c) The “Air Technical Office,” within the Office for Weapons and Equipment in the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt). The officer in charge was Captain Kurt Student, and his mission was to follow aeronautical developments abroad in the field of technology. During the first few years of its existence, the Air Technical Office was purely a center for the compilation of information, restricted to preparing summaries of significant foreign publications and experiments for study by appropriate agencies of the National Army. Besides its primary mission, the Air Technical Office very early (1921) began to take an interest in the sport of gliding in the Rhoen{22} and did a great deal to promote this activity.{23}

d) The “Air Armament Economics Office” (Fliegerruestung-wirtschaftliches Referat) or WaWiL, whose task it was to compile and evaluate information pertaining to developments in the sector of armament economy abroad. This office was under the direction of Captain Wilhelm Vogt.{24}

e) A procurement office was also planned, but, understandably, never came into being.

With the title of Special Duty Consultants, Air Consultant Offices consisting of one officer and two assistants, one of them an aerial photography officer, equipped with an archive of aerial photographs, were assigned to the seven Military Area Headquarters (Wehrkreiskommandos) and, after 1929, also to the staff headquarters of the three cavalry divisions, where they did their best during training exercises, war games, and maneuvers, to see that both officers and troops were made aware of the potential uses of flying forces and air defense units. In addition, the 3rd Company 2nd (Prussian) Motor Transport Battalion, was assigned to carry on the tradition of the Prussian air units, and the 1st Company, 7th (Bavarian) Motor Transport Battalion, that of the Bavarian air units. Both companies remained in close contact with civilian aviation associations.{25} The German Navy also created agencies to deal with aviation matters.{26}

Still there was no way for the National Army to procure even reconnaissance or liaison aircraft. Only on one occasion, at the time of the French march into the Ruhr District in 1923, was a fairly large sum of money approved for this purpose, and then only after von Seeckt had personally requested it in an interview with Reichs President Friedrich Ebert. The money was spent on 100 Fokker D-XIII aircraft (with 450 horsepower Napier “Lion” engines), which were purchased from the Netherlands.{27}But these aircraft were delivered very late. Fifty or them (the older model) were sold to Rumania, while the other fifty were sent to Lipetsk in Russia for future training purposes.{28}

“Paragraph 201, Part V, of the Versailles Treaty specified that:

“For a period of six months after the present Treaty goes into effect, Germany is forbidden to manufacture or to import aircraft or aircraft parts.”“{29}

The Paris Agreements, which were announc...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• LIST OF FIGURES
• Chapter I - GERMAN MILITARY AVIATION FROM THE ARMISTICE OF 1918 TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REICHS AVIATION MINISTRY, 1 MAY 1933
• CHAPTER 2 - THE GROWTH OF THE TOP LEVEL COMMAND APPARATUS
• CHAPTER 3 - THE BUILD-UP OF THE LUFTWAFFE
• CHAPTER 4 - THE AIR ARMAMENT INDUSTRY IN GERMANY
• CHAPTER 5 - LUFTWAFFE PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR
• APPENDIX I - BIOGRAPHICAL SECTION
• LIST OF CHARTS
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER