The Egyptian Army and the Muslim Brotherhood

Contemporary Political Power Dynamics

Sarah Tonsy, Sara Tonsy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781032027753
• eBook ISBN: 9781000509281
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

This book provides an analysis of the relationship between the Egyptian army and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). This is at times of cooperation, collaboration, rivalry, and enmity, offering a vivid perspective as to how the similarities of both political actors bring them together after decades of invisible presence in the Egyptian political field.

Using ethnographic material that includes interviews, observations, and other forms of expression, both political actors' common trajectories are analyzed in terms of power dynamics. The study allows an insight on the understanding of the differences between madani (civil), 'askari (military), and dini (religious), how they are used and projected on the Egyptian political field. Finally, the book provides a dialogue simulation of the discourse of the MB and army, starting 2011, while analyzing the meaning of this exchange in terms of symbols, power, and mobilization.

In highlighting similar elements to their respective governmentalities, this book outlines a new analysis of the rivalry, making it an important contribution for scholars and students interested in collective violence, civil–military relations, and political Islam in the Middle East.

1 Elements of governmentality, social rituals, and mobilization of the Egyptian army and the Muslim Brotherhood

DOI: 10.4324/9781003185123-1

There are elements that are specific to the existence and continuity of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and army as political actors and power anchors in the Egyptian political field. Unlike other resilient political actors, parties, and groups, the MB and army have specifically common characteristics. These elements that are outlined in detail in this chapter provide an insight on the internal governmentality of each political actor in their own organization. The existence of the MB and army's parallel governmentalities within society and the attempt to institutionalize them to include the state apparatus as well and entire population after 2011 represent one facet of the situation that led to the authoritarian restoration in Egypt today.

The main elements of these two entities, the army and the MB, comprise six ideas, from which stem all other aspects and sub-elements, which are as follows: (1) absolutism, (2) secrecy, (3) hierarchy, (4) obedience, (5) otherness, and (6) order. These elements are present within both examined political actors, the army and the MB; they are not concrete or traceable in other political actors or their institutional support in Egypt.

First, the idea of the absolute is different from totalitarianism or absolutism. The concept of totalitarianism as used by Hannah Arendt might be of relevance here, but it does not give the exact conception of an absolute.¹ Here, the idea of the absolute is taken in its subtle domination of a group of people through discourse, symbols, and rituals. It is higher than the construction of an imaginaire politique, but it includes this construction. While the imaginaire politique is also present in the other elements mentioned previously, it is most vibrant in the ideas of absoluteness, secrecy, and obedience. “Absolute” refers to locating a figure, actor, or institution and defining it as an absolute, like al-zaim (the leader) or a nabi, which literally translates as “prophet” but, in this context, is more of an emissary of God. Moreover, the absolute and/or nabi are untouchable. The use of a religious term such as nabi contributes to that point; however, army figures develop an absolutism that is comparable without the necessity of using this term. The term nabi was historically used for figures like Hassan al-Banna² and, more recently, for Mohamed Morsi and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which will be covered later in detail when covering both political actors’ rituals.³

Further, in taking one of Youssef al-Qaradawi's publications as an example, Fi fiqh el awlaweyat: derasah gadida fi do’a al-quran wal sunna, entitles that he uses the Quran and Sunna in his study about priorities in Islam – not the MB but Islam in general, the religion. However, al-Qaradawi refers to the “calls of the reformers” among whom is Hassan el-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, radical Islamist persecuted and executed under the Nasser regime and referred to among MB members as al-shahid (the martyr). This example takes the idea of ghalaba (absolutism) of the ikhwan over both the Muslim and the Islamist scenes even further. In that it takes for granted that the MB provides the image and representation of Islam while maintaining that they carry out, alone, the task of safeguarding the da’wa (call to God). The idea of absolutism or ghalaba in el-Banna came in two folds. The first is in the portrayal of el-Banna and his qowa rawHeya khareqa (extraordinary spiritual power); second, in the recurrent reference to him as a martyr and the maker of contemporary moderate Islam. It is necessary to stress that in this book reference to religion is to the cult that the MB created and adopted throughout its years in the Egyptian sociopolitical sphere and not the Islamic religion itself as free from varied interests. In this book, the reference to the MB's version of Islam is distinct from the Muslim religion itself. The Brotherhood's use of the Quran, Hadeeth (prophetic teachings), and Shariah (Islamic Law) is to provide an interpretation of religion: “the Islam of the Muslim Brothers.”⁴ The cult-like interpretation of religion that the MB created and adopted throughout its years in the Egyptian social and political spheres is that of through their “instrumentalization of the shariah.”⁵ Based on this instrumentalization, the “ethical conduct” was created to create a disciplinary society.⁶

The second idea is secrecy. Secrecy here refers to the undergroundness of both political actors and their functioning as related to governmentality in Egypt. As Marie Vannetzel explains, the MB was considered a “secret” but a known-by-everyone secret, a public secret.⁷ The army, on the other hand, might be regarded as a “secret” or as politically “underground” with difficulty; mostly, because the army is a recognized state institution that is responsible for the safe keeping of the country from external threats. In his book, Ruling but Not Governing, Steven Cook outlines how the Egyptian army ruled Egypt for decades but didn’t interfere in daily calamities.⁸ In his explanation, Cook concentrates on the transitions from Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–70) to Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011) and the changes that occurred (like having fewer army personnel in government, etc.), which made it seem as if the army had returned to the barracks but in reality secretly ruled and hegemonized in the background. The army's behind-the-scenes, puppet-master status and discreet budgetary and/or economic endowments play a great role in this aspect's explanation and comparability. These economic and budgetary aspects’ ambiguities are significant in their historical relevance as well, since this characteristic dates back to the times of Muhammad Ali.⁹

The third idea, hierarchy, is known to be an integral part of the military and other paramilitary groups. The same is true for the Egyptian army and the rest of the security apparatus, which have similar but not identical characteristics when it comes to hierarchy. The colonial armies influenced these hierarchies, starting from the Ottoman Empire, when there were Turks in the Egyptian army, and later under British rule (1882–1936), when British officers were integrated.¹⁰ However, the MB has a strictly rigid hierarchy as well, which is unlike any other social or political institution. MB members often refer to how “organized” the group is as a “social movement.” They mention this not only in member meetings but also in general life while talking about the movement in the media or in public presentations on the MB. The importance of this aspect as a parallel feature of both the army and the MB mainly rests on how the “politicization” of both groups – an alleged social movement and a state security apparatus – is integrated within the hierarchy. So, it is not merely the hierarchy that leads to order and organization within both groups as political actors but the use of this hierarchy to fulfill further politicization and the diffusion of their own discourses.¹¹ Thus, each gathering has a hierarchy, and the implications of the exercise of power through this hierarchy have limited boundaries, as decisions are to be made by the “leader” of the gathering or group. Lieutenant Aziz al-Masri, MB member since the 1940s and army lieutenant, praised the hierarchical and internal organization of the MB, which he claims to be the aspect that attracted him the most, after the religious appeal, about the MB and led to his joining their ranks.¹²

In the fourth idea, every hierarchy requires its subjects’ obedience, whether military personnel or MB members. It could be established that within the army, obedience is as important as a hierarchy; otherwise, the hierarchy would be irrelevant. However, this obedience might be different in social interactions in daily life. Thus, the use of this obedience is only limited to the military context whereby soldiers and their commanders interact. Unlike a military working environment, the MB bases its ideas, strategies, and rhetoric on being a social movement fueled by the willpower of its members. This is partly true, with some twists and turns that are rhetorical and based on the religious cult of the MB. To paraphrase a Hadith, or saying, of Prophet Muhammad that is used by the MB in any gathering: “If you are three, then make one of you a leader.”¹³ The use of this conception of obedience is exercised on the least-knowing and smallest groups of members, which sometimes includes gathering between friends.¹⁴ “They are a big organization and they do not depend on such fallacies that people repeat about them,” a prominent political science professor stated in a conversation discussing the fascist tendencies within the MB as a social movement.¹⁵ However, the same professor later admitted that the MB has fascist elements and that obedience is an integral part of its founding pillars.¹⁶ These elements provide for members’ submission to a certain discourse, rhetoric, and cult, which members believe will take them to paradise.¹⁷ The same aspect was also discussed by Tarek al-Bishri when referring to al-Banna.¹⁸ This submission to the cult is different between MB members and the rest of society. Thus, creating a form of dual otherness does not originate solely from the part of society, as wanting to separate themselves from the MB but also on the side of the MB as a distinctive form of struggle.

The fifth is the aspect of otherness. Both the MB and the Egyptian army regard themselves as an “other,” in some sense. The MB builds its survival and discourse on being underground, secret, and clandestine. This refers not only to its internal discourse among members and fans but also to the public discourse that entails members being “victims” of the political field. The army, on the other hand, has a superior “otherness.” The way Naguib Mahfouz – Egyptian internationally recognized author and Noble Prize in Literature winner (1988) – describes how the main character in The Beginning and the End that walked in the street like a peacock in his military attire is only a light portrayal of this superiority.¹⁹ The context of Mahfouz's novel places the army in its place in society and differentiates between civil and military on a socioeconomic level. The protagonist's joining the army was a step up for him, from his family's extreme poverty that followed his father's death. However, his entry to the army created a rupture in his view of his family members, society, and himself.

Egypt as a “military society,” as referred to by Anouar Abdel-Malek, rightly places the army's otherness from society and any other social group. This aspect will be further illustrated when discussing the economic aspect of both groups, which thrives on the secret budgets of both political actors, hidden by either superiority and/or undergroundness.

The otherness comes from framing the ikhwan as the makers of history, solely, with no exceptions. Mahmoud Abd el-Halim, in his book, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen: aHdath sana’at al-tarikh (the Muslim Brotherhood: Events That Made History), he recounts how the MB made history and always took part in historically significant events.²⁰ The reference to situations of war and national strife, including anecdotes about al-Banna, monopolized Abde el-Halim's argument.

The sixth and final idea is that of order. As a concept, order is general; in political science or the humanities, it is rhetorical and used for a purpose, like most political language. Foucault refers to order in most of his writings, in some form or another, while maintaining that there is always a certain conception of “order” prescribed and acknowledged not only by the state and government but also by society itself.²¹ In this research and analysis about the army and the MB, order depends on each group's discourse and use of order, nizam. The army heavily relied on this concept after the 2011 uprising and Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' (SCAF) coming to power. Moreover, order is attached to the idea of discipline, which is a pillar of both political actors’ existence and maintenance. “The milita...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Prologue
• Introduction
• 1 Elements of governmentality, social rituals, and mobilization of the Egyptian army and the Muslim Brotherhood
• 2 An eternal rivalry: historical tracing of the origins of the rivalry
• 3 Territory, population, and state apparatus
• 4 Collective violence and contention 1.0: Collective violence and failed negotiations
• 5 Civilianization of the noncivilian, governmentality, and a crumbled rivalry: until the Mubarak era
• 6 The 2011 political opening and its repercussions
• 7 Rejuvenation and power struggle: a renewed rivalry
• 8 Revisited aspects and repercussions of the renewed rivalry: coup d’état and collective violence 2.0
• 9 Authoritarian renewal and neo-military society, 2014–21
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index