Russia in the Indo-Pacific

New Approaches to Russian Foreign Policy

Gaye Christoffersen, Gaye Christoffersen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000470222
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Relations internationales

This volume zones in on Russia's relations with the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of theoretical pluralism, presenting alternatives to the mainstream Realist view of Russia as a major power using geopolitical strategies to establish itself.

Russia in the Indo-Pacific is an understudied topic that needs a fresh perspective. Contributors to this volume are based across Russia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the USA, drawing on a range of multinational perspectives and theoretical approaches encompassing realism and liberalism, constructivism and the English school of international relations. Reflecting a trend of internationalization in the Russian study of IR, such theoretical pluralism could facilitate Russian contributions to emerging global IR theory.

Russia in the Indo-Pacific contributes towards a more intelligible common discourse in the Indo-Pacific, of interest to students and scholars of Sino-Russian relations, Indo-Pacific international relations, and international relations theory. It will also be of interest to policymakers and general readers following foreign policy and economic trends in the Indo-Pacific who want to better understand Russia's role.

Part 1 China, Russia, and US: triangular relations

1 China–Russia relations in times of crisis A neoclassical realist explanation

Alexander Korolev and Vladimir Portyakov

DOI: 10.4324/9781003178002-3

China–Russia relations have progressed consistently since the end of the Cold War and recently reached what has officially been designated “a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” (Xinhua 2019). At the same time, the two countries display growing assertiveness in their external behavior and are faced with increasingly tense international situations that put their “friendship” to the test. The most salient issues, in this regard, have happened in Russia’s and China’s areas of strategic interest. Thus, the political ramifications of Russia’s behavior in the Ukraine crisis of 2014 extended far beyond the region of the actual conflicts and generated a level of mutual antagonism between Russia and the West rivaling that of the Cold War era. In turn, China’s handling of the South China Sea (SCS) territorial dispute and the subsequent Hague Tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines in July 2016 have aggravated the geopolitical complexity of the Southeast Asian region, triggering speculation about the danger of direct military clashes between China and the United States (Auslin 2015; Steward and Brunnstrom 2015). Both China and Russia found themselves in relative diplomatic isolation as very few, if any, countries supported their behavior.

In this context, China and Russia displayed a rather ambivalent stance toward each other’s behavior. With regard to Russia’s policies in Ukraine, China never openly criticized Russia and never took a decidedly anti-Russia stance, which sharply contrasts with the reactions of US and European leaders. However, China did not align with or openly support Russia either. The same ambivalence characterizes Russia’s reaction to the issue of crucial importance for Beijing—the SCS dispute. Unlike the United States, Russia has never publicly questioned the legitimacy of China’s nine-dash line, but at the same time, Russia has never openly supported China’s behavior or position over the disputed territories. Similar to China’s reluctance to side with Russia with regard to the post-Soviet space, Moscow has been unwilling to spend its political capital on supporting Beijing in Southeast Asia.

This reaction pattern is not something one would expect from two strategic partners who promise to “render mutual support on the issues related to each other’s core interests” (President of Russia 2008) and who claim that their positions on most international issues are “similar or identical” (Portyakov 2015, 143). What are the major factors shaping China’s and Russia’s reactions to each other’s crises? Why did China not join the West in response to Russia’s actions with regard to Ukraine? Why did Russia not do the same with regard to the SCS dispute? In turn, why did China and Russia not unequivocally support each other in times of crisis? Can we discern a common pattern in the two countries’ reactions?

Answering these questions is important for a number of reasons. First, it can help us understand the state of contemporary China–Russia relations, which the existing literature has so far failed to reach a consensus on, as captured by titles such as “Rapprochement or Rivalry?” (Garnett 2000) or “Rivalry or Partnership?” (Bedeski and Swanström 2012). Related studies are divided into those that are doubtful about the durability of the China–Russia partnership (Brenton 2013; Lo 2009; Menon 2009; Swanström 2014; Wilson 2016) and those that believe it has strong foundations or at least that the existing bilateral hurdles are not insurmountable (Ambrosio 2017; Kaczmarski 2017; Korolev 2019a; Odgaard 2017; Wilkins 2008; Wishnick 2017). Second, understanding China’s and Russia’s reactions can help envisage the limits the two countries’ further geopolitical resurgence is likely to face. Because the West is likely to resist either country’s geopolitical projects, or even punish them by sanctions (as is the case with Russia), it is the mutual China–Russia support (or lack thereof) that may predefine how far the two countries’ geopolitical ambitions can go. Third, given that Russia and China play a significant role in each other’s rise (China in Russia’s—by extending economic cooperation in times of sanctions—and Russia in China’s—by being a source of much-needed energy resources, especially natural gas, and crucial military technologies necessary for modernization of the People’s Liberation Army) and positioning in the international arena, understanding their mutual reactions to each other’s critically important events can provide insights into how close they actually are and how likely they are to form a joint challenge to US hegemony.

We show that there are similarities between China’s reactions to the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and Russia’s reaction to the SCS dispute. We apply a neoclassical realist framework, which combines systemic and unit-level causal variables, to explain the identified reaction patterns. The main value of the chapter is that it highlights the complexity of China–Russia relations in times of crisis while grounding the two countries’ reactions to the crises in each other’s areas of strategic interest in international relations theory. While the Ukraine crisis has been making headlines, there is no methodical conceptualization and explanation of China’s reaction to this crisis. The same applies to Russia’s reaction to the SCS dispute. Among the rare publications providing commentary (Mu 2014; Wishnick 2016), it is hard to find theory-grounded analyses of these issues, which would provide a systematic understanding and help identify important, non-ad hoc causal factors one must consider to better deal with the issue.¹ With this chapter, we attempt to fill this gap.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, we review the basic tenets of neoclassical realism and develop a neoclassical realist framework that helps to explain the ambivalence of China’s and Russia’s reactions. In the second section, we define the dependent variable of the analysis—the official reactions of China and Russia to the crises in each other’s salient geopolitical environments. In the third section, we explore the impact of the international system (the independent variable) on the formation of Russia’s and China’s policies and how it is refracted and counteracted by each country’s unit-level circumstances (the intervening variable). We demonstrate that in the cases explored the variables of different levels created counteractive incentives that simultaneously pulled each country in different directions, causing ambiguity in their foreign policy positions. We conclude with a review of our findings and discuss the future trajectory of China–Russia relations. Throughout the analysis, we draw on both Chinese and Russian sources, including publications, official documents, and media reports.

Analytical framework: neoclassical realism

For a framework capable of explaining the case at hand, we refer to neoclassical realism (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016; Rose 1998).² Structural realism, due to its parsimony and monocausality, cannot, and does not claim to, explain specific foreign policy episodes. Constructivist theories, in turn, would predict that post-Soviet Russia will continue to attach greater importance to its relationship with the EU, which is seen as the epitome of “Europe” and to which Russia has been looking for recognition as a state adhering to “Western” norms (Splidsboel-Hansen 2002). However, Russia has displayed a striking defiance toward the EU, which resulted in fundamental disagreements and the war of sanctions, so there is not even a hint of alignment between Russia and the West. By contrast, neoclassical realism can combine variables from different levels that can causally push in different directions and, therefore, is particularly promising for handling ambivalent behavior patterns, such as the ones described below.

The key explanatory target of neoclassical realism is the actual foreign policy behavior of states. Neoclassical realism concurs with structural realism in considering the anarchic international system the primary independent variable that sets the context and general parameters of state behavior (Waltz 1979). However, neoclassical realism adds a critical layer of unit (state)-level intervening variables that fall between the parameters of the international system and the states’ actual foreign policy and modify the impact of the former on the latter (Rose 1998; Schweller 2004). Neoclassical realism stresses that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities,” but, at the same time, that “the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level” (Rose 1998, 146). Neoclassical realists do not consider the traditional neorealist model to be wrong but do consider it insufficient for explaining given foreign policy behaviors (Rose 1998, 165).

A neoclassical realist analysis begins with the specification of a structural baseline (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, 114–117), which is understood as an ideal behavior pattern, expected based on the existing systemic circumstances, and then descends to the subsystemic level in search of hurdles that are responsible for distorting the baseline. Neoclassical realism does not strictly prescribe specific sets of unit-level variables to consider when examining individual cases. Nor does it predefine the degree and direction of those variables’ impact. Such variables may comprise various domestic characteristics of states as well as their geopolitical features or circumstances in proximate geopolitical environments that may go beyond the domestic politics realm but are not directly related to the pattern of polarity within the international system. In any form, unit-level factors can either strengthen or weaken the influence of system-level forces on states’ behavior, and the power of distortion they generate may vary (Rose 1998, 147; Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, 4).

A neoclassical realist framework is particularly relevant to the analysis of the case at hand. Both China and Russia are great powers with structural positions within the international system (there are, in fact, building blocks of that system), which justifies the inclusion of system-level variables in the analysis of their relations. At the same time, both have complex borders and immediate geopolitical environments that, while not an outcome of system-level pressures, figure highly in their foreign policy considerations. This combination of systemic and nonsystemic variables justifies the relevance of neoclassical realist frameworks because taking either level separately, as alternative explanations would suggest, would be insufficient.

To explain China’s and Russia’s reaction patterns, we explore how the systemic push toward a closer China–Russia alignment has been countervailed by immediate geoeconomic and geopolitical considerations that stem from the two countries’ domestic circumstances. As demonstrated below, given the power configuration of the international system, one would expect closer strategic cooperation and stronger, more unequivocal mutual support between China and Russia in times of crisis. However, the two countries acted ambivalently because of unit-level (regional and domestic) factors (see Table 1.1). For China, economic interests in Central Asia, and the post-Soviet space more broadly, as well as its own problems of territorial integrity, prevented Beijing from fully supporting Russia. For Russia, in turn, economic and strategic interests in East and Southeast Asia in the context of Putin’s emphasis on the development of Russia’s eastern territories as part of the reorientation to Asia development program increased the complexity of Russia’s regional policies and prevented Moscow from siding with Beijing in the SCS.³ Neither of these unit-level hurdles is systemic as they have little to do with the polarity of the international structure and are predominantly rooted in domestic and regional economic interests. However, they constitute the regional milieu in which the impact of systemic factors evolves.

Table 1.1 Neoclassical Realist Analytical Framework

Independent variable (systemic factors)	Intervening variables (unit-level factors)	Dependent variable (foreign policy behavior)
Systemic pressure of the anarchic international system: post-Cold War unipolarity in the form of US primacy in the global distribution of capabilities	China’s interests in the post-Soviet space and sensitivity to territorial disputes Russia’s economic interests in East and Southeast Asia	Strategic ambivalence in times of the crises

The pattern of China’s and Russia’s reactions

Before exploring the interplay of independent and intervening variables shaping China’s and Russia’s reactions, it is necessary to define the dependent variable of the analysis, that is, the reaction pattern. Although the Ukraine crisis and the SCS dispute differ in many ways, both represent critical geopolitical situations in Russia’s and China’s immediate areas of strategic interest. China’s and Russia’s official reactions display recognizable similarities. In both cases, neither country turned into a devoted supporter of its strategic partner, but at the same time, they never openly criticized each other or joined the criticism of the West. With some degree of variation, China and Russia followed a reaction pattern governed by several seemingly contradictory principles, such as avoiding damaging relations with each other regardless of the circumstances, advocating for a peaceful resolution of the conflict/dispute, avoiding articulating explicit positions on the legitimacy of territorial claims, opposing any interference by extraregional nations, and attempting to maintain the strongest possible ties with each other and with the counterpart’s rivals/disputants.

China’s reaction pattern to the Ukraine crisis

China’s reaction to the Ukraine crisis of 2014 was thoroughly monitored in the Russian mass media and analyzed in academic publications. As follows from the publications (Frolova 2014; Isaev 2014; Kuznetsov 2014; Timofeev 2014), Beijing’s reaction was objectively neutral and even favorable toward Russia. At the beginning of the crisis, Beijing demonstrated a remarkable cautiousness in its assessments of Russia’s actions. Explaining China’s position, the nationally and globally popular newspaper Huanqiu shibao (Global Times) stated that

the conflicting parties are waiting for China to take a clear position in this crisis. However, China does not play a decisive role in the conflict. Whatever side is taken by China, it would not make the other side make concessions.

(Global Times 2014)

As the crisis progressed, Beijing officially and consistently dec...