The Troubled Triangle

US-Pakistan Relations under the Taliban's Shadow

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000515961
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Relaciones internacionales

This book is a comprehensive analysis of the Taliban, and how it has affected post-9/11 U.S.-Pakistan relations. It analyzes the genesis of the Taliban, the rationale behind their emergence and how they consolidated their rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. It examines the U.S. policies towards the Taliban in the post 9/11 era and Pakistan's role as an ally in their efforts towards dismantling Taliban rule in Afghanistan—from Obama's 'fight and talk' policy to the Doha peace agreement in 2020. It also discusses the outcomes of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), as well as the Taliban's response to the U.S.-led ISAF and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The volume brings into focus Pakistan's policies vis-à-vis the Taliban following the start of GWoT and how it pushed the U.S.-Pakistan relations to its lowest ebb; and then its role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table which resulted in the U.S.-Taliban deal in Doha in February 2020.

The author introduces a 'new balance of threat' theory and expands on its applicability through the Taliban case study. The book will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of U.S. foreign policy, international relations, peace and conflict studies, strategic studies, history, diplomatic studies and South Asian politics.

1

THE U.S.-PAKISTAN TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP

A historical overview

DOI: 10.4324/9781003157670-1

In the seven decades since World War II, few countries have frustrated American diplomats and policy makers more than Pakistan.

— Robert M. Hathaway (The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States)¹

Post–World War II scenario

During World War II, the United States (U.S.), Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), being allies, had a common interest: to defeat the Axis Powers. Nonetheless, the leaders of these three powers, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, adopted different policies to influence the post-war world order, which led to differences and conflicts resulting in the Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR.² In post–World War II period, the U.S. was confronting two prominent challenges as a leading power: building post-war economies and waging Cold War, a tug-of-war with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, due to ideological differences. The first objective was a means for achieving the second one. Besides, communism was a threat to democracy — the very founding principle of the U.S. Containment strategy and Truman Doctrine guided the U.S. foreign policy for more than four decades; containing communism remained one of the top U.S. foreign policy goals.³ Both these foreign policy goals that Washington was persuading were intertwined.

In post–World War II period, the threat to the fall of governments in Turkey and Greece through the Soviet-influenced rebels compelled the U.S. to support these countries in sustaining their governments. Thus, on March 12, 1947, U.S. President Harry S. Truman presented his doctrine by stating, “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure.”⁴ Truman Doctrine was a means to implement the containment policy formulated by George Kennan, a career diplomat in 1947. Kennan’s ideas first appeared in the Foreign Affairs journal by a pseudonym ‘X Article,’ stating, “The main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”⁵ The U.S. was planning to extend military and economic aid to the countries facing the communist threat to curtail the geopolitical expansion of the communist USSR. During this period, the South Asian map got changed, following the British withdrawal from India and Pakistan in August 1947, and the countries gaining independence.

Pakistan’s two-front threat matrix

The Sub-continent underwent a bloody partition according to the two-nation theory. It was argued that the Muslims and Hindus were two different nations. This notion provided an opportunity for creating a new Muslim state, but on the other hand, it divided the populace of Sub-continent and left them with hatred for one another. The deep-rooted differences among Congress and Muslim League were joined by mass hatred for each other. Thus, from the very start, relations between the two states were acrimonious. The Indo-Pak war over Kashmir further exacerbated the situation in 1948. Therefore, relations with India had overshadowed Pakistan’s foreign policy in the early years. However, Pakistan’s relations with its north-western neighbor, Afghanistan, were not smooth either. The only country that voted against Pakistan’s United Nation membership was Afghanistan. Furthermore, they raised voice and support for ‘Pashtunistan,’ which was to be carved out of Pakistan’s north-western part. Hence, Pakistan, being a weak nascent state, had a two-front threat: India, and Afghanistan — which was fueling the irredentist cry of Pashtunistan and did not recognize the Durand Line they had signed three times with British India. The threat from the Afghan side was also a strategic concern after India. The Indian factor, in the first place, pushed Pakistan closer to the U.S., while the Cold War compelled the U.S. to engage with Pakistan — a country having a vital strategic location.

Following its independence, Pakistan was in a dire need of military assistance to equip its defense forces. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s governor general, stated in a cabinet meeting held on September 11, 1947, “The safety of the North West Frontier [is] of world concern and not merely an internal matter for Pakistan alone.”⁶ Jinnah’s indication was towards the Pashtuni-stan issue, raised by Afghanistan and backed by the USSR. Thus, the notion that Pakistan’s efforts to get closer to the U.S. was solely an Indian factor is less plausible.

U.S.-Pakistan engagement: inclination-disinclination period

Pakistan’s Founder and Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah said in a cabinet meeting on September 7, 1947, that “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia.”⁷ This statement indicated Jinnah’s leaning towards the West in the Cold War. The newly born Pakistan, in acute need of military and economic aid, had nothing in hand but its strategic location to offer to the U.S. (if the latter provides aid). Husain Haqqani quotes Mr. Jinnah having said in an interview, “Americans need Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America. … Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed … [on] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.”⁸ Likewise, Pakistan’s embassy in a diplomatic note wrote to the State Department on October 18, 1948, stating, “The strategic importance of Pakistan from an international point of view cannot be overlooked or treated lightly. In a period of emergency, Pakistan can form a base both for military and air operations.”⁹ This containment policy remained alive for about 40 years till the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Many other steps were taken to assure the success of the containment policy, of which Pakistan became a part after seven years of its independence when it joined the SEATO and CENTO defense pacts in 1954 and 1955, respectively.

Before Eisenhower became the 34th president of the U.S., Pakistan was keen to have a strong engagement with the U.S. However, it was not reciprocated. The outbreak of the Korean War inclined the U.S. to engage with Pakistan — hoping it would send its troops to fight along the UN forces in Korea.¹⁰ This expectation had come out of the indication and statements of Liaqat Ali Khan during his visit to Washington in June 1950 with an aim to secure U.S. economic and military aid and to gain support on Kashmir issue. Premier Liaqat stated that Pakistan “will give their full support to measures proposed in the Security Council resolutions to stop hostilities,” in Korean War.¹¹ He was of the view that Pakistan could get economic and military aid in response to sending its troops to Korea.

Nonetheless, he backed out from his pledge later due to limited resources and having Indian threat. Liaqat’s cabinet and bureaucracy were seriously divided over the matter of dispatching troops to Korea.¹² A valid opposition was there — if the U.S. did not commit to Pakistan’s security against India, the former should refrain from physically indulging in any war. Liaqat tried his best but could not succeed in mustering the U.S. support or providing any significant aid — either military or economic — during his period. Liaqat was assassinated in a public meeting on October 16, 1951, in Rawalpindi; subsequently, Khwaja Nazimuddin became the new prime minister. Elections in the U.S. were close, and Karachi believed that if the Republican presidential candidate became president, he would seriously consider its economic and military requirements. From October 1951 to December 1952, five Pakistani delegations met U.S. officials in Washington to seek military support but received no positive response on the ground that Washington would face problems in its relations with New Delhi.¹³

Until President Truman was in the Oval Office, Washington kept a balanced relation with India and Pakistan by avoiding taking sides. The U.S. Secretary of State Acheson once added, “The Pakistanis were always asking us for arms and I was always holding them off.”¹⁴ Yet the Americans were inclined towards Pakistan, keeping in view its future role against the communists. On the other hand, India, having a neutral posture, was of no use vis-à-vis countering the Soviet Union. It was evident under the new administration that the Truman Doctrine would become operational and a new aid program like Marshal Plan would be invoked to help Pakistan and the Middle Eastern states that were inclined towards the U.S. against the Soviet Union.

Defense cooperation

Pakistan, for the containment of communism, was strategically very vital to the U.S. The Truman Doctrine had outlined: aid to regimes who were willing to adopt anti-Soviet policies, take the side of its ally France in Indochina, play role in Korean War, and supply arms to Pakistan to acquire bases.¹⁵ Eisenhower in his election campaign had pledged to have a rigorous security alliance — aimed at blocking the Soviet Union. Pakistan, thus, was a natural choice, because of not only its key strategic location but also its willingness to be instrumental in blocking the communist expansion — for exchange of economic and military aid. To make Pakistan a bulwark against the march of communism, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State in Eisenhower administration, advocated Pakistan’s significance vis-à-vis pursuing their strategic interests for exchange of weapons and aid packages to Pakistan.¹⁶ The change in White House brought changes to Washington’s South Asia policy. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, visited Karachi in November 1952 and showed his keen interest in defense cooperation. He was of the view that countries who signed a defense alliance with the U.S. deserved the fullest support by the U.S.

Moreover, Dulles paid a visit to Delhi and Karachi in May 1953 — aimed at close security cooperation. He first went to Delhi and discussed Korean War, China, and most importantly the Cold War — for which he was there to search for staunch allies. Dulles was aware of the Indian intention vis-àvis its future role in the Cold War, yet he wanted to confirm his skepticism and further the business of defense cooperation in his next stop — Karachi. His discussion with Nehru assured him India was not ready to play any role in Cold War along the U.S. Nonetheless...