The earliest seeds of Liberia’s civil war are to be found in the wake of the American Revolution (1775–83) when a new liberal climate led to a rapid rise in the number of liberated slaves. The failure of those promoting emancipation to embrace the freed slaves as social equals led in subsequent years to large numbers of unemployed and impoverished Blacks whose poverty and exclusion led to disruptive and, increasingly violent, behaviour. In 1820 outrages against wealthy Whites led the Virginia State Legislature to propose the repatriation of freed slaves, of which there were then estimated to be some 250,000.1 The idea of repatriation was not new. Early in the 18th century Quaker and Protestant missionaries proposed it as a form of restitution for enslavement or in the hope that the returnees might be a civilising and Christianising influence for Africa. But now, in the 19th century, less worthy motives became evident. There was still a religious and philanthropic dimension which took concrete form in 1816 with the foundation of the Society for the Colonisation of Free People of Colour (ASC). However, it is unlikely that the ASC would ever have made an impact without the financial support and active involvement of important politicians and citizens of the Union, most notably in the South, who were driven by a determination to remove the menace of rampaging freed slaves in their midst. It was largely due to their influence that the U.S. Congress of 1819 passed a bill for assistance in financing and implementing such repatriation schemes.2
The first actual attempts at repatriation dated from 1820 and were inauspicious. However, over the following decades, a number of settlements established firm roots, despite strong resistance from local tribes. In 1837, with tribal hostility intensifying, it became necessary for the settlements to band together, forming the Commonwealth of Liberia. By this time, also, support from the U.S. had diminished. Those Americans who had hoped repatriation might solve the problem of unsocialised free slaves now began to look elsewhere for solutions, while others who had intended the settlements to exercise a civilising and Christianising influence, despaired at the way in which settlers copied the system of privilege which had operated for so long in the Southern States. Denied the level of U.S. financial and military assistance previously enjoyed, and in danger of losing territory not only to the tribes but to their European colonial neighbours,3 the settlers became convinced that a more formal and independent political status was required. Thus, in 1847 all legal connections with the U.S. were severed. A year later Liberia declared itself an independent Republic with a U.S.-styled Constitution and immediately set about seeking international recognition. Few countries responded but late in 1848 Britain and France acknowledged Liberia’s sovereignty, thus giving the Republic a welcome measure of stability. The U.S. withheld recognition until 1862.
The declaration of a Republic was followed by two decades of economic progress. This came from trade to which Americo-Liberians took with enthusiasm and no mean skill. The commodities traded were produced in privately-owned plantations, and included coffee, palm oil, rice, cinnamon and rubber. It is recorded that by 1870 Liberia had built some 50 small ships to trade overseas. A year later, with a view to enhancing commodity production, President Roye (1870–71) obtained, on very reasonable terms, an international loan of half a million U.S. dollars. But by the mid-1870s global production and greater overseas competition caused prices of the aforementioned commodities to drop sharply, while the emergence of large steamships rendered Liberia’s entire fleet redundant. In addition, it transpired that the value of President Roye’s loan was reduced by almost a half because of deductions and clauses stipulating advance repayments. Henceforth, well into the 20th century, repayments of the loan remained a heavy burden on Liberia’s exchequer.4
From this time, unable to raise taxes in tribal districts and receiving only a trickle of the income previously available from philanthropic agencies, Liberia’s parlous economic situation was compounded by the settlers’ unwillingness to engage in agriculture, which was regarded as a symbol of their former servitude. Henceforth Liberia teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and relied on small loans, mainly from Britain and the U.S., to keep afloat.
Ultimately Liberia’s poor economy and lack of development was a function of its social and political policies.5 In 1930 its population was estimated as 12,000 of settler origin* and 1.2 million tribal.6 Investing in the indigenous population remained anathema to the ruling elite, which saw loss of control over the tribal majority as tantamount to the Republic’s destruction. Thus, it was that during the next 100 years Liberia witnessed the rigorous application of a double standard whereby the indigenous population was ruthlessly kept in its place, while Americo-Liberian families lived off whatever fat the land possessed. Tribal Liberians lived under a socio-legal system very different from that of the Americo-Liberians, in relation to taxation, land tenure, residence and movement, marriage and divorce, legal jurisdiction, and access to education and medical care. Neither could they vote or stand for election. The system also included the imposition of penal exactions, such as unpaid services to local authorities and forced labour for export. There were also extra-legal exactions of money, food (rice) and ‘services’ which included unpaid work for government officials and Americo-Liberian families. Among abuses perpetrated was the system of ‘pawning’, whereby native children became part of the colonial household until they came of age. In many cases the children came to occupy the status of slaves, and slave-concubines in the case of females. This repressive social and economic structure was entrenched by the last quarter of the 19th century.7
* The Liberian settler population was not entirely homogeneous. It included Africans who had been rescued by the U.S. Navy, while aboard U.S.-bound slave ships, and brought to Liberia (‘Congoes’). There were also oppressed Blacks from the British Caribbean colony of Barbados who migrated to Liberia with the assistance of the ACS (‘Barbadians’). Arthur Barclay, a Barbadian migrant was to become the 15th President of Liberia (1904–12).
The maltreatment of the indigenous population attracted international attention in 1929 leading, during the next five years, to a crisis which threatened the very existence of the Republic. The practice of slavery within the territory and the transport of slave labour overseas were among accusations levelled against Liberia. The League of Nations responded by establishing a Commission of Inquiry under Dr Cuthbert Christy. Its findings, published in 1930, confirmed that forcible transportation of labour was taking place. It also declared that while slavery did not exist in its classic form, it was being widely practised under a different institution, namely ‘pawnism’ or ‘domestic servitude’.
The Commission’s report provoked an outcry for the abolition of the Republic, particularly among philanthropic and humanitarian organisations in the U.S. and Europe. There were others who proclaimed that Liberia proved beyond doubt that Blacks were incapable of governing themselves. In the event, Liberia’s President, Edwin Barclay, managed to stave off the Republic’s demise by dismissing officials and politicians (including his own Vice President) implicated in the Christy Commission’s report. Barclay also indicated Liberia’s intention of carrying out the recommendations of the Commission, while appealing for expert advice from the League. During the following three years a ‘Plan of Assistance’ drawn up by ‘Experts’ gave a comprehensive blueprint as to how Liberia might be financed and administered.8
In 1932 calls for the suppression of the State were renewed when an uprising on the Kru Coast was said to have been caused by widespread reprisals taken against those who had given evidence to the Christy Commission. A League Commission was sent to investigate, after which there was further unrest, claimed again to have been caused by the further victimisation of witnesses. Meanwhile in May 1934, the League of Nations declared that its ‘Plan of Assistance’ had been rejected by Liberia. This led the U.S. and Britain to withdraw diplomatic recognition and, together with Germany., urge the League to take control over the Black Republic. It seemed probable that if Liberia was found guilty of reprisals against witnesses to Commissions, action might at last be taken. However, the League was unable to prove conclusively that reprisals had taken place and Liberia (albeit with some refinements so as not again to incur international wrath) gradually resumed its traditional social, political and economic policies towards its indigenous population.
During its first half-century Liberia’s defence against internal and external enemies had been spearheaded by an unpaid settler’s militia, part-time and compulsory for certain age groups. However, in 1908, when it became known that the British and French had further designs on Liberia’s territory, a permanent military force was established, ‘the Liberia Frontier Force’ (LFF). Defence of the realm was not the only goal of this new body. Its remit also extended to pacifying the unruly tribal majority within its boundaries and collecting tax. The LFF was officered by Americo-Liberians with the assistance of seconded U.S. officers. The rank and file was drawn from the smaller tribes. The force was to discharge its military responsibilities with distinction. Threats from external forces were countered, while the hinterland, interior and troublesome coastal regions were largely subdued and made tax compliant by 1920.
It has been observed that while the LFF officer corps sought to mirror the approach of European colonial forces, the enlisted men were driven by the African tradition which ‘conceptualised warfare as a raiding system that aimed to collect booty, to exact revenge, or to liberate pawns from servitude’.9 It is probable that without the latter the pacification campaign would hardly have succeeded, as Liberia simply did not possess the resources to conduct a campaign according to the colonial model. What it meant in terms of relations between tribal communities and their Americo-Liberian masters was to deepen the already existing resentment. The ruthlessness of the unpaid, unfed soldiers, who had to live off the land, whose poorly trained officers were unable to exercise control,10 left a deep imprint on tribal consciousness. Nor did this oppressive behaviour cease with pacification but continued unabated during the first half of the 20th century.
Liberia’s economy changed little during the Republic’s first hundred years.11 The involvement of international firms in the exploitation of Liberia’s rich resources of iron ore and land, was introduced under the Tubman regime (1944–71), although there had been one notable arrival in 1926, namely the Firestone Rubber Co...