What Lies Ahead? Canada’s Engagement with the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinians

Jeremy Wildeman, Emma Swan, Jeremy Wildeman, Emma Swan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781032190624
• eBook ISBN: 9781000533606
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited volume explores Canada's foreign policy relationship with the Palestinians and broader Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Canada was intensively involved from 1992 to 2000 in peacebuilding as a mediator in the multilateral part of the MEPP, as chair of the Refugee Working Group, and sponsor of Track II negotiations. This all changed after a significant mid-2000s discursive and policy shift when Canada withdrew from the politics of Israel-Palestine peacebuilding and took a strong partisan stance in favour of Israel.

Through 10 chapters by current and former government insiders and academics with extensive field experience, this unique edited volume offers insight into decades of evolution in Canadian policy toward the Palestinians, MEPP and the Middle East. It arrives at an important time when the international community is reconsidering how it views Israel's entrenched occupation of the Palestinians, after three failed decades of United States-led efforts to find peace through a negotiated two-state model. Today, peace may never have appeared further away after the Trump Administration adopted policies directly contradictory to the MEPP. This proved a test to Canada's own official policy toward Israel and Palestine, its longest running and most important region of engagement in the Middle East.

The chapters were originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, guest edited by Jeremy Wildeman and Emma Swan.

Talking with the PLO: Overcoming political challenges

Andrew N. Robinson

ABSTRACTUntil 1980, Canada had only very occasional dealings with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and often viewed the latter as an illegitimate body or terrorist organization. However, in 1980 the Department of External Affairs, recognizing that the PLO represented an important body of Palestinian opinion, and had become a major actor in Lebanon, assigned an officer (this author) to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut with instructions to develop dialogue with the PLO on political and security matters. This policy commentary briefly describes the evolution in Canadian policy toward fully accepting the legitimacy of the PLO as the Palestinian representative in the Middle East peace process. It describes the factors influencing the change in Canada’s position, including the views of the international community, PLO acceptance in 1988 of Israel’s existence, and Arafat’s renunciation of terrorism. As a result, in March, 1989 Canada lifted remaining limits on official contacts with the PLO and accepted the Palestinian right of self-determination, thereby adopting a more balanced foreign policy. This led to Canada being accepted as a significant player in the Multilateral Peace Process, the chair (Gavel) of the Refugee Working Group and a member of the Multilateral Steering Committee.

RÉSUMÉJusqu’en 1980, le Canada n’avait que des rapports très occasionnels avec l’organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) et considérait souvent cette dernière comme une entité illégitime ou une organisation terroriste. Cependant, en 1980, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères, reconnaissant que l’OLP représentait une part importante de l’opinion palestinienne et était devenue un acteur majeur au Liban, a affecté un agent (cet auteur) à l’ambassade du Canada à Beyrouth, avec pour instruction de développer le dialogue avec l’OLP sur les questions politiques et de sécurité. Ce commentaire politique décrit brièvement l’évolution de la politique canadienne vers la pleine acceptation de la légitimité de l’OLP en tant que représentant palestinien dans le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient. Il décrit les facteurs ayant influencé le changement de position du Canada, y compris les points de vue de la communauté internationale, l’acceptation de l’existence d’Israël par l’OLP en 1988 et la renonciation d’Arafat au terrorisme. En conséquence, en mars 1989, le Canada a levé les dernières restrictions aux contacts officiels avec l’OLP et accepté le droit des Palestiniens à l’autodétermination, adoptant ainsi une politique étrangère plus équilibrée. Cela a permis au Canada d’être accepté comme un acteur important dans le processus de paix multilatéral, comme président (Gavel) du groupe de travail sur les réfugiés et comme membre du comité directeur multilatéral.

Introduction

Canada’s support for the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian people was reiterated in a vote at the UNGA in 2019 (and again in 2020), in what was characterized in the Canadian media in 2019 as a “significant” change of vote (Csillag 2019) – even though Canada had voted for a similar resolution between 1989 and 2006. So it was really just a reversion to form. But the first time Canada voted in favour of that resolution in 1989 was a real change, one which reflected a significant development of Canadian policy towards the PLO and the Israel-Palestine issue.

Although the subject of Canada’s attitude towards the Palestinians and the domestic political influences on it has by no means been ignored in the literature on Canadian Middle East policy (Goldberg and Taras 1989, Lyon 1993), this policy commentary fills in details about two significant elements of the process: firstly, the beginning of a working-level dialogue with the PLO in 1980 and secondly, Canada’s acceptance of self-determination and the subsequent lifting of all restrictions on contact with the PLO in 1989. The author draws on his personal experience as an officer in External Affairs (now Global Affairs) directly involved in the development of Canada’s policy towards the PLO over the period 1980–1992. During this period Canadian policy moved from timid and limited contact, considered politically sensitive within Canada because of the PLO’s terrorist links, to one of recognition of the Palestinian right of self-determination. The role of the PLO in the civil war in Lebanon justified the posting of an officer to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut in 1980 to open up a dialogue on political and Embassy security issues, a dialogue which proved useful to Canada.

During the 1970s the world had begun to move towards seeing the PLO as the relevant representative of the Palestinians, but Canada moved on this file more slowly than most, mainly because of partisan electoral considerations and also fear that recognition of a “right of self-determination” for the Palestinian people might be seen as reinforcing the arguments for Quebec independence. However, as the decade moved on, Canada’s reluctance to move further on the question of Palestinian national rights left it more and more isolated, until the 1988 statement by the Palestine National Council recognizing UN Security Council resolution 242 – which includes recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace in the region – gave Canada an excuse to catch up to its usual international partners, including the United States. As a result of this change, Canada re-established its credentials with the Arab side as a fair-minded party on the Arab-Israeli issue, to the extent that at the Moscow Multilateral Conference in 1992, the PLO and Israel both accepted that Canada should assume leadership of the highly contentious Refugee Working Group in the Multilateral component of the Middle East Peace Process.

Growing recognition of the Palestinian cause

In the 1960s and into the 1970s, for the most part, Canada did not have any substantive official dialogue with the PLO. There was a PLO representative attached to the Arab League Information Office in Ottawa from 1972, but the representative (Abdullah Abdullah) did not have any official contact with the Department of External Affairs. Canada’s reluctance was mainly due to the fact that the PLO was still seen primarily as a terrorist organization, and indeed in the 1970s and even into the 1980s the PLO did not accept Israel’s existence and continued to support a policy of “armed struggle” in various forms. This included high profile aircraft high-jackings and terrorist attacks by Palestinian organizations affiliated with the PLO, such as the attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. However, the international community increasingly saw the PLO as an organization with a legitimate political role, and indeed the only Palestinian organization with the power and credibility to be the Palestinian party in an eventual peace process. In 1974, the PLO was accepted as a full member of the Arab league, and that same year the UNGA voted in favour of recognizing the PLO as an observer. Gradually, western European and like-minded states moved in the same direction. Indeed by June, 1980 the EU, traditionally somewhat ahead of Canada on these issues, was already calling in its Venice Declaration for recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to self-determination, and for the association of the PLO in eventual negotiations (Venice Declaration, 1980).

In Canada during the 1970’s there was increasing recognition at the political level of the necessity to take into account the issue of Palestinian national rights as a group, not just individual human rights. However, the whole issue of Canada’s policy stance respecting Palestine remained highly contentious (Bones, 1985; Noble, 1985). This was demonstrated, inter alia, by the decision (following a significant public outcry in Canada) to request postponement of a UN Conference scheduled to be held in Toronto in 1975, rather than to allow a PLO representative to attend (Bones, 1985), and by the 1979 promise of Joe Clark, leader of the Progressive Conservative party, to move the Canadian Embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a promise whose timing was largely motivated by electoral considerations (Flicker, 2002). (See also Wildeman’s contribution to this special edition of the CFPJ).

Meanwhile, after being driven out of Jordan in 1971, the PLO leadership and armed forces transferred mainly to southern Lebanon. This upset the rather fine power balance which had existed in Lebanon between the various religious communities and contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1975. Meanwhile, Canada was serving on the UN Security Council in 1977–78, and thus was very involved in the international response to Israel’s 1978 invasion of southern Lebanon which amongst other things led to the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Ironically, although the Progressive Conservatives were able to form a minority government after the May 1979 election, Mr. Clark’s electoral promise respecting Jerusalem was to result in much more public attention to the actual situation in the Middle East. There was a significant outcry by Arab states and by Canadian business sectors, which led to Prime Minister Clark commissioning the Hon. Robert Stanfield to find a face-saving response to criticism of his Jerusalem embassy promise.¹ Mr. Stanfield was asked to address not just the Jerusalem embassy issue but the whole question of Canada’s relations with the Middle East and North Africa. He and his team travelled extensively in the Middle East and also listened to presentations in Canada. In his report Mr. Stanfield noted that the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people was a sine qua non for a negotiated solution, and that internationally the PLO was increasingly perceived as the only spokesman for the Palestinian people which enjoyed the support of a large and significant body of Palestinian opinion. He recommended therefore that despite the PLO’s ambiguous attitude towards Israel and terrorism, Canada should broaden contacts with it on issues affecting negotiations and the peace process, with a view to encouraging that organization towards greater moderation (Stanfield, 1980).

Mr. Stanfield’s final report was presented just two days after the February 1980 election. Its recommendations included:

• Canada should support the Palestinians’ right to a homeland as well as their rights to be heard and participate in the determination of their own future;
• Canada should broaden contacts with the PLO on issues affecting negotiations and the peace process; and
• To encourage moderation and conciliation we must be regarded as fair minded by the parties. (Stanfield, 1980, pp. 7, 10, 14).

On March 3rd Prime Minister Clark resigned and Pierre Trudeau was appointed Prime Minister. The new government did not see a need or political advantage to comment upon the report. Nevertheless, Mr. Stanfield’s realistic appraisal of the situation in the region would help influence the tone and content of Canadian policy towards the Middle East region, including towards the PLO in the coming years.

The value of dialogue

Encouraged by Mr. Stanfield’s recommendation on broadening contacts, the Department of External Affairs decided to assign an officer (this author) to the Canadian Embassy in Beirut whose responsibilities would include liaising with the PLO. This meant that Canada could now speak directly and officially to the PLO, and Canadian policy respecting the Middle East could be informed by first-hand input from the Embassy in Beirut on the implications of PLO policy and developments, in addition to what was available from other sources.

The dialogue was valuable in broadening the sources of information provided to Canada. The Embassy obtained information directly about PLO views and so was better able to analyze and comment upon developments in Lebanon, including on what was going on in PLO-controlled southern Lebanon, and indeed in the broader Middle East region. It also provided the PLO with an opportunity to express its views directly to Canada. For example, in July 1981, during a Canadian Parliamentary delegation’s call on PLO Chairman Arafat in southern Lebanon, the PLO Chairman expressed directly to the Embassy representative at some length his dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Trudeau’s political summary at the 1981 G7 Summit in Ottawa issued just a few days earlier (UofT, G7 Information Centre, 1981). Arafat was especially (and justifiably) displeased with the statement’s failure to condemn Israel for its air raids against Palestinian locations in west Beirut and south Lebanon the previous month, which had killed over 100 people and injured hundreds more. Such direct lines of communication did not exist previously, hampering Canada’s ability to assess reports of Palestinian statements.

The assignment of an officer to Beirut to talk to the PLO had been approved on the grounds that it was desirable not just for political reasons but for reasons of embassy security. At that time Canada’s embassy was located in west Beirut, as were the residence of the Canadian ambassador (T.J. Arcand) and the living quarters of the 14 or so Canadian staff. Although the worst period of fighting in the Lebanese civil war was over, the government of Lebanon, such as it was, had basically no control over west Beirut, and instead different sections of the city were controlled by a variety of militia groups. The militias did not necessarily have good relations with each other, but of one thing people could be sure – no Lebanese militia wanted to mess with the PLO, which controlled the southern part of the city and much of southern Lebanon. So, quite apart from any broader political benefits, on the very practical issue of security for the Embassy and its personnel, talking with the PLO was not only desirable but necessary, as two examples will show.

On one occasion, it was learned that an individual convicted in connection with the murder in 1976 of the United States ambassador to Lebanon carried out by agents of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had just been released after serving a very short sentence. Canada had played a role in getting this individual returned to Lebanon so he could be tried, and while in custody he had issued threats to “get even” with Canada. So his release, especially after serving such a short sentence, immediately raised questions at the Canadian Embassy as to the implications for security of the Embassy and its staff. Would this individual carry out his threats to retaliate against Canada? Accordingly, when he was released, the Canadian Embassy immediately contacted the PLO to express concern about this individual’s threats. A few days later, the responsible Embassy officer was called back to the PLO headquarters to get the reply. It was somewhat (but only somewhat) reassuring, “The individual concerned was acting on the instructions of a PLO member organisation. He will not take any action against Canada unless he is instructed to do so.”² Not the best of reassurances, but at least the Embassy had registered its concern, and no doubt the individual or his masters had been spoken to.

There was always a degree of crime in Beirut, including car theft, but over a period of just a few weeks in 1981 a number of vehicles belonging to the Embassy were stolen. The thefts had not occurred in the area of Beirut the PLO controlled, but knowing the PLO’s influence with Lebanese militias the responsible Embassy officer went to see the PLO and explained the problem, asking for help in getting the vehicles returned. “Let us see what we can do” was the answer. A week later...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction: What lies ahead? Canada’s engagement with the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinians
• 1 Talking with the PLO: Overcoming political challenges
• 2 False start: the 1956 Palestinian refugee movement to Canada
• 3 Has President Trump killed the Middle East Peace Process?
• 4 Assessing Canada’s foreign policy approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, 1979–2019
• 5 The international community’s role and impact on the Middle East Peace Process
• 6 Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• 7 “The personal is political!”: exploring the limits of Canada’s feminist international assistance policy under occupation and blockade
• 8 Canada’s economic assistance to the OPT: ideology, politics, and flawed responses
• 9 Normative Canadian foreign policy towards consensus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Index