John Rawls and the Common Good

Roberto Luppi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367697518
• eBook ISBN: 9781000529593
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The chapters in this book analyze the relationship between core concepts of the common good and the work of American political philosopher John Rawls.
One of the main criticisms that has been made of Rawls is his supposed neglect of central aspects of collective life. The contributors to this book explore the possibility of a substantive and community-oriented interpretation of Rawls's thought. The chapters investigate Rawls's views on values such as community, faith, fraternity, friendship, gender equality, love, political liberty, reciprocity, respect, sense of justice, and virtue. They demonstrate that Rawls finds a balance between certain individualistic aspects of his theory of justice and the value of community. In doing so, the book offers insightful new readings of Rawls.
John Rawls and the Common Good will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political, moral, and legal philosophy.

1

Community

Daniel A. Dombrowski

DOI: 10.4324/9781003143086-2

Introduction

Perhaps the safest characterization of John Rawls’s view of community (or social union) is that his stance is a moderate one between two extremes. At one extreme is a weak sense of community found in Hobbesian stances wherein there is a modus vivendi established between contesting parties that do not share a sense of justice. This is merely an expedient truce that is meant to halt hostilities among the contesting parties, hence it is an inadequate basis for stability over time in that if one of the contesting parties got the upper hand, the truce could be broken and the party with the greatest threat advantage could, in effect, ram its views down the throats of everyone else. At the other extreme are Aristotelian stances that prescribe a unity constituted by widespread acceptance of a particular conception of the good life or of what Rawls calls a comprehensive doctrine. These views can be called weak and strong communitarianism, respectively (see Nickel 1990).

The moderate stance found in Rawls is that of a political community wherein there is widespread acceptance by the population of a certain conception of justice (contra Hobbesian views), but where there is not widespread acceptance of any particular view of the good or of any particular comprehensive doctrine (contra Aristotelian views). This political community in PL comes about through an overlapping consensus regarding justice among people who affirm (very often uncompromisingly) different conceptions of the good. This means that Rawlsian political community may very well be affirmed by people for somewhat different reasons. But Rawlsian community is indeed affirmed for moral reasons in contrast to the reasons of expediency that characterize Hobbesian views.

One consequence of this Rawlsian view is that Aristotelian or strong communitarianism (often in popular discourse referred to simply as communitarianism), which has a state-endorsed conception of the good life, should be abandoned in a condition of pervasive pluralism regarding the comprehensive doctrines that citizens affirm. Comprehensive doctrines apply to many topics other than political justice. Rawls is happy to affirm a consensus regarding the latter only, given the wide array of comprehensive doctrines: utilitarianism, various types of perfectionism, various (and sometimes contentious) religious conceptions of the good, Marxism, hedonism, etc. The hope is that we could attain a political community that could accommodate diversity by removing many difficult philosophical/religious issues from the political agenda.

The task of political philosophy in such a community is to analyze and give a coherent linguistic formulation to popular culture in constitutional democracy. In periods of turmoil political philosophy may be highlighted more than when there is a stable concept of justice at work in political institutions and in popular culture, when the work of politicians, journalists, and others comes to the fore. One is reminded here of Thomas Kuhn’s famous distinction between revolutionary and normal science (see Kuhn 1970). The important thing is that toleration on the ground be widespread and a matter of intuitive conviction on the part of citizens, given the fact of pervasive pluralism. That is, one need not have general agreement about the good life in order to have political community and agreement about justice.

The thesis of the present chapter is that the aforementioned moderate Rawlsian view of community is worthy of explication and defense. This explication and defense will occur over several stages in that I will first deal with the topic of individuation through community in Rawls and then move to the complementarity among citizens that characterizes a just society. The communal virtues in Rawls will be considered along with the importance of the difference principle for the concept of community. Contemporary critics like David Hollenbach, Louis Dupre, and Michael Walzer will be considered, as well as historical thinkers who are often assumed to offer resistance to Rawlsian views, like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. We will see that justice as fairness is by no means opposed to the importance of community in Rawls; nor is the concept of goodness. The chapter ends with a consideration of the relationship between communal love/benevolence and Rawlsian justice.

I. Individuation Through Community

There is a communitarian strand to Rawls’s theory of justice due to the fact that the very constitution of the individuals who are sometimes pitted against the concept of community requires cooperation and a sense of mutuality and reciprocity. Members of the Rawlsian community as a result must share in the distribution of benefits as stipulated in his famous two (actually, three) principles of justice. Far from endorsing the “unencumbered self” so often ascribed to his theory (especially by Michael Sandel), Rawls emphasizes the individual’s membership in a family and various associations that form the individual’s character, for good or for ill. It comes as a surprise to some readers that Rawls thinks of the social basis of self-respect as the most important primary good. A person’s endeavors need to be at least implicitly appreciated by others in a shared community of interests in order to confirm such self-respect. Self-respect involves not merely (and not primarily) one’s own norms, but also (and primarily) the norms that are anchored in familial or communal bodies (see Alejandro 1993).

It is a mistake to depict the famous liberalism-communitarianism debate as a conflict between an individual’s judgment and society. This is because the ends an individual chooses are already intertwined with others’ approval. Perhaps an Emersonian self would be willing to stand up for its moral independence regardless of what a community of shared interests might think, but this is not the Rawlsian view (see Emerson 1885). It is true that Rawls defends vigorously political autonomy, but not a comprehensive autonomy that is destructive of associative ties. A community of shared interests provides standards of worthiness that are crucial to the primary good of self-esteem. It is membership in a community of shared interests that fosters self-esteem, not the other way around (Alejandro 1993, 81). That is, the issue of whether the self is prior to its ends or vice versa involves a blurred distinction. A developed sense of justice requires the presence of (familial and associative) others (TJ, 462–479). In this regard we should not exaggerate the alleged difference between supposed Rawlsian (“Western”) individualism and the communitarian self that is found, say, in various African cultures (see Nnodim 2020).

Before individuals choose the sort of persons they want to be, they have already been shaped by communal values. In this regard even the Rawls of TJ had anticipated Sandel’s critique. We are historical individuals who are parts of some social tradition such that only in social union is an individual complete (TJ, 525). Community is not a mere attribute of an individual but is partially constitutive of the process of individuation. If the social basis of self-respect is secured, it is more likely that citizens will engage in genuine mutuality and be willing to reciprocate with others in a system of mutual benefit. In turn, such willingness makes it more likely that society can be organized in such a way that the demands of the two (really three) principles of justice will actually be met.

Given what has been said thus far, a sketch of Rawlsian responses to strong communitarian critiques can be seen. Sandel seems to miss altogether Rawls’s moderate communitarianism largely because it is not the strong sort that Sandel himself defends (see Sandel 1998). That is, Sandel assumes a definition of “community” that is too restrictive. Alasdair MacIntyre worries that without strong communitarianism Rawlsian justice cannot be sustained, in which case there is not much hope for contemporary democracies, given the fact that there are competing concepts of the good and comprehensive doctrines that citizens affirm, but democracies do thrive in the contemporary world, even when threatened by autocrats like Donald Trump. This continued success of liberal democracy should call into question the assumption that strong communitarianism is a necessary condition for democracy to flourish (see MacIntyre 1984). And Charles Taylor contends that liberalism itself is a conception of the good, thus implying that Rawlsian justice itself is a comprehensive doctrine (see Weinstock 2015; Taylor 1989). But the qualities stipulated of the parties in the Rawlsian original position are not intended as clues regarding a comprehensive view of human nature any more than the need for political autonomy is an implicit way of sneaking in comprehensive autonomy. Rawls is doing something very specific in his political philosophy and is not trying to replace the wider aims of comprehensive doctrines, which are tolerated in a condition of reasonable pluralism.

II. Complementarity

Thus far I have tried to call attention to two points (in reverse order): (a) a citizen’s sense of justice and concept of the good presuppose habituation into some communal values at the familial and associational levels and (b) due to the pervasive pluralism of concepts of the good and comprehensive doctrines in contemporary societies, strong communitarianism can hold sway at the societal level only through the illegitimate use of force. Nonetheless there can be a political community based on a common view of justice, rather than a common view of the good. Rawlsian communitarian justice can more accurately be described as a (just) social union of (particular communal) social unions (TJ, 527, 529; PL, 201, 304, 323). Any social union, including that found in the original position, involves complementarity, which Rawls analogizes to the musical players in a symphony orchestra (TJ, 524; PL, 321). Each player could have learned to play well every instrument in the orchestra, but each becomes proficient on a single instrument due to the difficulty involved in learning them all. The word “symphony” itself literally means to sound together, to harmonize together, despite individual differences among the players. The orchestra metaphor evokes the democratic harmonic resolution of any tension between individual and society. Behind the veil of ignorance, as it were, each participant could theoretically play any instrument, but in reality each has to rely on the other players to complement individual insufficiencies. When the veil – on this metaphor, a curtain – lifts, we can play together in an aesthetically pleasing way (see Love 2003).

As is well known, over time Rawls became somewhat dissatisfied with the shape his theory of justice had originally taken. The principles of justice in TJ were seen as parts of an overarching moral theory. A society based on them would be stable because all reasonable and rational people would agree with them. Rawls came to see that a better concept of stability was needed, which led in PL to the idea of overlapping consensus. We have seen that this idea operates even in a condition of pluralism with respect to comprehensive doctrines yet nonetheless provides a greater sense of community than the weak sort found in a modus vivendi. Overlapping consensus is admittedly not deep, but this is a commendable feature in that overlapping consensus is, as a result of its not being deep but wide, conducive to widespread agreement regarding justice in a democratic society.

Establishing terms for social cooperation for mutual benefit remains Rawls’s primary concern, but the principles of justice are now seen more accurately in PL as political, rather than as comprehensive. These principles function as modules that can be inserted into various comprehensive doctrines with their deeper communal ties. Even if citizens disagree strenuously regarding some particular issue or piece of legislation, they may nonetheless be committed members to political community in that the community in question centers on the basic framework of a just society and on institutional essentials, rather than on various concrete particulars. Stability for the right reasons requires that commitment to this framework not be a mere compromise, but a matter of principled conviction so as to secure political community and the complementarity involved in such community (see Martin 2015; Riker 2015).

III. Communal Virtues

In addition to the criticism of Rawls not being sufficiently committed to community, it is also common to hear that he did not pay sufficient attention to the virtues. However, it is important to note the distinction between two sorts of virtues: political virtues and those linked to the relatively non-political lives of citizens with their separate comprehensive doctrines. Rawls is especially interested in the political virtues: toleration of reasonable differences, civility, a sense of fairness, and reasonableness itself. Further, as we have seen, Rawls notes the importance of the virtues connected with the socialization process of citizens in families and associations (including neighborhoods and sports teams and churches). That is, socialization into a virtuous life of some sort may be needed in order to eventually have mature citizens capable of the political virtues. But a just society cannot...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents Page
• List of Abbreviations for Rawls’s Texts Page
• John Rawls and the Common Good: An Introduction
• 1 Community
• 2 Faith and the Common Good in the Political Philosophy of John Rawls
• 3 Fraternity (and the Difference Principle)
• 4 Friendship: A Familiar Value
• 5 Gender Justice, Rawls, and the Common Good
• 6 Love: The Vices of Love and Rawlsian Justice
• 7 Political Liberty
• 8 Reciprocity and Justification in Political Liberalism: Self-Application Vindicated
• 9 Respect
• 10 Sense of Justice
• 11 Virtue
• Notes on Contributors
• Index