When it comes to the international societyâs willingness and ability to deal with genocide and mass atrocities,1 a review of the history of the 20th century is simply depressing. The commission of genocide and mass atrocities has frequently been a recurring phenomenon: Turkeyâs wiping out of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915â1916, the systematic mass extermination of 6 million Jews in Nazi concentration camps prior to and during the Second World War, Indonesiaâs extirpation of 500,000 Chinese and alleged communist Indonesians during Sukarnoâs anti-communist purge in 1965â1966, Serbian attempts to ethnic cleanse Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo (8000 in Srebrenica in 1995 and a total of 100,000 in both territories), the massive slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans by Interehamwe militias in just 100 days in 1994 or the killing of 5 million civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1998. According to one estimate, over 160 million people were victims of genocide and mass killings in the 20th century.2
The fact that far more people were slaughtered by their governments3 in the 20th century than the number killed in all the foreign and internal wars of the century is largely attributed to the founders of the United Nations (UN) and their preoccupation with addressing the problem of states waging war against each other, while paying no particular attention to imposing constraints on how states dealt with their own populations.4 Indeed, the treatment of citizens by their respective governments has consistently been considered as a domestic matter since state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state has been the organizing principle of the modern international society.
The starting point for this book, however, is that against the backdrop of the Yugoslav wars of 1991â1995, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and intervention in Kosovo in 1999, there is evidence of changing expectations and in particular emerging concerns about how to respond to genocide and mass atrocities in a more effective and consistent manner. Of particular importance is what Jennifer Welsh described as âthe Rwanda Effectâ, as this has provided the catalyst for the development of new ways of thinking and new institutional arrangements.5 Arguably the two most significant innovations were the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
At its simplest, the R2P principle emphasizes a stateâs primary responsibility for the protection of its population from four âmass atrocity crimesâ:6 genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The international society has a responsibility to assist other countries in upholding their protection responsibility, and should states be unwilling or unable to protect their populations the international society should respond and take action to protect them. Underpinning this is a âglobal political commitmentâ endorsed by all the UN Member States at the 2005 World Summit to prevent and respond to the four above-mentioned mass atrocity crimes.7
Being the worldâs first permanent international judicial institution, the ICC is mandated to investigate, prosecute and try individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. It holds that it is the primary responsibility of each state to prosecute and punish those accused of committing âthe most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a wholeâ.8 Under the principle of complementarity, the Court can step in to investigate and, where warranted, prosecute and try individuals only when the country concerned does not, cannot or is unwilling genuinely to investigate and prosecute.
On the protection front, R2P is intended to address the needs of the victims by building up âa system of protection involving diplomacy, judicial measures, economic measures, peace operations deployed with local consentâalbeit sometimes coercedâinternational assistance to help build responsible sovereignsâ.9 Conceptually and practically, R2P has provided a new way of (re)conceptualizing humanitarian intervention and âa platform for developing better ways to prevent atrocities and save livesâ.10 On the justice front, the birth of the worldâs first permanent international judicial body does represent a significant advancement in international criminal justice: the institutionalization of the residual responsibility to prosecute.11 With the ICC operating as an independent judicial entity outside the UN system, the Court and particularly the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is capable of deciding when and where to exercise jurisdiction without a need for further Security Council authorization. As such, since the Court came into effect in 2002, the landscape of international criminal justice has undergone dramatic changes over the last two decades: the revival of international judicial intervention12 for the sake of ending impunity, punishing perpetrators and upholding international justice.
Taken together, both R2P and the ICC are focused on the aversion of mass atrocity crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Along with sharing the same commitment to ending mass atrocities, the two are also perceived as sharing a similar historical context, intellectual underpinning and normative inspiration. There has been, hence, a tendency among scholars and policymakers to frame the R2P principle and the ICC as inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Ramesh Thakur, for instance, argued that the duty to prosecute and responsibility to protect are interrelated as simply like âtwin normsâ.13 Both the UN and ICC officials, for instance, hold similar views: the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon treats the ICC as âan essential tool for implementing the responsibility to protectâ,14 while the ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda suggested that the Court should become the âlegal arm of the responsibility to protectâ, as this international judicial body has to be seen as âa tool in the R2P toolboxâ.15 In this sense, synthesizing the international protection and punishment agenda is merely logical, since there is no choice between the protection of civilians and the prosecution of perpetrators as they are two sides of the same coin.16
Yet, as shown in Chapter 4, R2P and the ICC also display crucial differences, especially their different motivating logics, emphases and instrumental logics. In terms of their motivating logics, R2P is motivated by the desire to save lives under imminent threat while the ICC is driven by the mandate to prosecute and punish perpetrators after the fact. In terms of their different emphases, R2P lays the emphasis squarely on mitigating the direct impact of violence on affected populations (in cases where states are unwilling or unable to do so). Given that every human being is entitled to their rights to life, saving lives in immediate danger under the umbrella of R2P, in this sense, entails a moral responsibility and âa duty of careâ.17 The ICC, by contrast, rests primarily on holding perpetrators accountable on the basis of the principle of individual criminal responsibility. Here, the emphasis on ending impunity and bringing perpetrators to justice under the ICC framework is a legal responsibility of every country. In terms of different instrumental logics, reference is made to the international societyâs readiness to save lives and protect vulnerable populations and the ICCâs attempt to deliver âin-conflict justiceâ.18
Despite the similarities and differences between the two, there has been relatively little attention paid to the precise relationship between R2P and the ICC. The core concern of this book, therefore, is how to make better use of international protection and punishment efforts to address genocide and mass atrocities more consistently and effectively. More specifically, this book seeks to answer the following questions with an in-depth study of the relationship between R2P and the ICC: to what extent are international efforts for protecting vulnerable populations from genocide and mass atrocities (characterized by R2P) and punishing perpetrators (encapsulated by the ICC) complementary? If the relationship between the two is not, as many proponents assume, always complementary or mutually reinforcing, what are the principal causes of tensions between ICC and the R2P?
Against the backdrop of changing expectations regarding the international response to mass atrocity crimes, this book contends that the overriding policy issue and the cornerstone dilemma for international policymakers relates to managing the tension between the immediate imperative of saving lives and protecting victims, and the important prospect of punishing perpetrators and preventing future conflicts through deterrence. Of particular importance is issues of timing and sequencing in invoking R2P and ICC actions: upholding justice and providing protection can be either complementary or in tension depending on the context and that the critical determinant appears to be the sequence in which they are used.
My main argument throughout this book, therefore, is that situating R2P and the ICC in a âProtection First, Justice Laterâ temporal sequence is critical to manage the tension between R2Pâs urgent imperative to save lives and the ICCâs efforts to uphold justice and deter future mass atrocities. To situate my line of argument in more a context-specific way, addressing genocide and mass atrocities in Africa via this âProtection First, Justice Laterâ approach tends to be more effective and consistent because: 1) the African intellectual roots of R2P19 enables international policymakers to assume the residual responsibility by providing protection and assistance in the first place. The principleâs strong historical connection with the continent enables R2P to be perceived as promoting responsible sovereignty on the African continent;20 and 2) highlighting the importance of civilian protection (other than just perpetrator punishment) can help mitigate the growing African backlash against the ICC.21 Therefore, simply put, international protection and punishment efforts work best together when R2P precedes the ICC. When the two coincide or ...