1 A new way of seeing: Mimetic theory
The major historical events in the Australia-East Timor relationship that saw so much violence and suffering are interpreted in this book through key concepts within René Girard’s ‘mimetic theory’: ‘the scapegoat’, ‘texts of persecution’ and ‘conversion’.
A fundamental premise of Girard’s theory concerns desire and the often violent rivalry that can follow in its wake. Not only do humans imitate each other in diverse, intense and sophisticated ways but we also imitate other people’s desires. Girard states that we desire according to the desire of others.1 This imitative desire is not readily recognized, however, as we misperceive ourselves as the autonomous originators of our desires. Mimetic desire is neither autonomous nor spontaneous; rather it is the attraction to an object because of another’s possession of it or desire for it.
Girard maintains that the desiring person imitates the desire of another – the model or mediator – who possesses or desires an object. Paradoxically, the desire of a person for another’s object signals to the other that the object is indeed desirable, thus enhancing its desirability in the eyes of that other. With both subject and model desiring the same thing, each becomes a ‘model’ for the other. An appreciation of this contagious nature of human desire throws light on conflict and violence, although Girard acknowledged that positive mimesis also exists, where people embrace their better selves through imitation of worthy models. However, shared desire – such as for possessions, position, a love match or power – is prone to result in rivalry. Not only does each party model desire to the other but each can become an obstacle to the other’s attainment of the object of that desire. They are harnessed together in mimetic rivalry. Hence, unless there is some form of peaceful resolution, capitulation or withdrawal by one or both parties, violence is inevitable. Imitation, desire, rivalry and violence are observable on personal and public levels.
Girard developed mimetic theory over the course of an academic career that ranged across a number of disciplines, beginning with history and literary criticism and moving into anthropology, psychology and biblical studies. Criticisms levelled against his theses include that they are too ambitious, attempting to explain all aspects of human nature, culminating in a far-too-elaborate theoretical system. It is said his theses are not verifiable by scientific controls and thus lack scientific rigour.2 As there are no means of testing or refuting them, they become meaningless theories. Girard is said to discard larger methodological frameworks in favour of historical particularities and references to a relatively limited range of literature to construct his proposals.3 Such a concentration, some claim, leads him to ignore other plausible explanations of the matters he considers. Others criticize Girard’s theories as being too religious, lessening the possibility of scientific explanation. He is accused of being indulgent towards the Bible, especially the New Testament, and of proposing an unmerited uniqueness to Christianity.
It is to be expected that a theory so new and so comprehensive would attract criticism and argument. However, it is evident that recognition of the value of mimetic theory in a variety of fields is increasing, for example, in psychology, literature, theology, business and neuroscience.4 This book demonstrates that mimetic theory is a valuable means of developing an intriguing and satisfying interpretation of political and moral choices that formed the relationship between Australia and East Timor. Thus it would be a worthy tool for analysing Australian relationships with first peoples, cultural history and regional neighbours and to illuminate a broad range of global affairs.
Major questions arise before a discussion of these aspects can begin. How can a theory that deals with essentially personal human categories such as ‘desire’ be applied to relations between nations, or in the case of Australia and East Timor, between an established nation and one in the process of becoming? Girard himself applies the theory to political situations only rarely and in relatively few articles and interviews, although he is reported to have said that the 2001 attack on the United States was ‘mimetic rivalry on a planetary scale’.5 However, the growing interest in mimetic theory has seen the establishment of bodies through which scholars engage internationally to discuss its richness, development and applications. Journal articles, conferences, websites and books applying Girard’s theses to the wider world are multiplying.6 While he may not have commented extensively on mimetic theory in relation to concrete political matters, others are successfully mining its depths.
As will be discussed, mimetic theory proposes that innocent people are often victimized – scapegoated – to maintain order and security in the face of violent social collapse. Wolfgang Palaver refers to Girard’s belief that the origins of political institutions can be found in the practice of scapegoating, the genesis of all types of violence, including that practised in political circles.7 Mimetic theory has the capacity to identify the scapegoating process in both personal and wider relationships, such as those dictated by a nation’s foreign policy.8 In his last book (in which he warns about the dire necessity to refrain from violence) Girard states: ‘Politics is part of violence, not violence part of politics.’9
Fundamental political questions about authority, law and the nature and origin of the state are continually asked in societies. They generate an incessant ebb and flow of ideas, challenges and often violence. In the application of mimetic theory to such political situations, it becomes political theory. Paul Dumouchel states that Girardian theory does not have to explain everything in the domain of politics, but it does have claim to relevance within that domain.10 Application of mimetic theory to the relationship between Australia and East Timor entails discussion of historical, social and political realities. The particular aspects of the scapegoat, texts of persecution and conversion that are used in this book to throw light on the relationship – an arena which spawned so much violence – are now discussed.
The scapegoat
Girard wrote extensively that the violence resulting from mimetic rivalry in ancient societies was quelled by means of the scapegoating of one individual or a group.11 The scapegoated victim was killed or expelled, providing a focus upon which violent resolution of social conflict could be heaped. Aiming such responses onto one entity relieved the members of the wider group from attacking each other, thus saving the community from itself. However, scapegoating acts to achieve group harmony had to be repeatedly employed as rivalrous violence or inexplicable natural disaster frequently threw communities into disarray. Girard concluded that the sacrifice of a scapegoated victim was a successful way of dealing with rivalry, internal strife and violence and thus became the basis for religious and cultural measures which enabled communities to cohere. While violent, it also prevented further violence for a time. It ‘contained’ violence, in both senses of the verb. The wholesale violence of ‘all against all’ was replaced with an ‘all against one’ method of bringing peace and calm, however short-lived.12
The word ‘victim’ is used in this book in the technical sense in which Girard defined it and which is central to his work. In this context ‘victim’ means the ‘scapegoat’ – the one sacrificed by killing or expulsion by a crowd for social protection or order. While the scapegoat may well be guilty of a crime or transgression, in Girard’s usage the victim is structurally innocent as it cannot be responsible for all the rivalries and tensions that split a community and lead to mob violence. This structural innocence removes the victim, in Girard’s view, from ordinary notions of guilt or innocence. Osama bin Laden was not innocent in the usual meaning of the word, yet his execution, complete with footage of the US president and important administrators in virtual attendance, functions as an act of scapegoating when seen in the context of the ambiguous and highly questionable response of the United States to the attacks on 11 September 2001. Furthermore, while the word ‘victim’ does not have the pejorative or colloquial connotations of helplessness or passivity usually ascribed to it, Girard does identify how victims are powerless before a mob. However, given the facts of the history yet to be related, it is clear that the more common understanding of ‘innocence’ may also be applied to the scapegoated Timorese people, alongside a strictly Girardian use of the term.
Throughout this book an application of the concept of scapegoating to East Timor as a vulnerable and inconvenient entity within global politics provides a different perspective to judgements based solely on political or economic considerations. Girard’s theories provide material for an analysis that is a more comprehensive way of understanding the reasons behind Australian attitudes, policies and actions in the relationship. In particular, the focus on major events in the light of Girard’s insights reveals key aspects neglected in the general literature. The literary and anthropological resources in Girard’s theory allow for an acutely insightful identification of the status of East Timor in its shared history with Australia and the depths of Australian complicity in its victimization. It illuminates the situation by applying the concept of scapegoating to the reversal of fortunes of a vulnerable people in relation to a rich and dominant neighbour.
There are certain consistent features of ancient scapegoaters and their victims. The scapegoaters needed to be oblivious to the innocence of their victim if the scapegoating process was to provide a satisfactory solution to social problems. In their view, the victim was truly responsible for the social crisis, and they were unable to see how they were uniting to transfer their own guilt, rivalries and tensions onto the substitutionary victim.13 The status of the scapegoat itself depended on its marginality to the dominant group. The scapegoat had to be familiar, but somewhere on the edge and easily made an outsider – similar enough to the group to be an adequate substitution but different enough to uphold a suspicion of guilt. Girard describes the essential vulnerability of the victim as one who can be expunged from society ‘since he lacks a champion’.14 These aspects of scapegoating – levels of unanimity and unconsciousness (or misapprehension) in the scapegoaters and the marginality and vulnerability of scapegoats – are apparent in the shared Australian-East Timorese history, as will be demonstrated in further chapters.
The process of scapegoating as described by Girard included elements that will be employed in this study: a crisis, a corresponding crime, the criteria for the choice of the scapegoat and the violence committed to resolve the problem. Girard also detected in ancient scapegoating a fifth aspect which he termed ‘double transference’.15 The act of killing or expelling the scapegoat brought unity to the group and a sense of peace and relief that the cause of the crisis had been despatched. Order was reinstated, and prosperity could be sought once again. The community then believed that the death of the victim was responsible for the return of social harmony, and thus the victim was seen in an ambiguous light. In the first place, it was worthy of blame and had to be sacrificed, but then because of its death it was credited with reintroducing peace. In Girard’s view, this ‘double transference’ – the status of being simultaneously blameworthy and therapeutic – was recorded in ancient myths in ways that raised victims to the level of gods.
Here can be seen a crucial difference between modern and archaic scapegoating that has bearing on this study. In modern times a scapegoat is not ultimately seen as...