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China’s emergence as an important actor in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) brings to mind a piece of dialogue from Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises. When asked how he went bankrupt, a character replies, “Gradually, then suddenly.” Those of us watching China’s growing presence in the region have seen a gradual expansion of China’s influence and interests over the past decade, but those not paying attention would understandably be surprised by the apparent sudden depth and breadth of its presence. When I started my PhD analyzing China’s relations with the Gulf monarchies1 in 2011, it was still possible to stay on top of the existing literature on China–MENA relations; now it is a constant challenge, with new work constantly being churned out, including the excellent recent publications by contributors to this volume.2 This book describes and explains how and why China has made this transition from a far-off country of marginal influence to an important extra-regional power, and to offer insights into what we can expect to see in China–MENA relations in the future.
Not long ago, China was seen as a potentially important actor in the MENA, but one with limited aims. In their 2008 book Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East, Garver and Alterman described China’s MENA role as “simple” and “shallow,” with a regional policy guided by its need for energy, “with other commercial, military and diplomatic interests playing a subsidiary role.”3 This was an accurate description of the limitations on China’s power and influence in the region, and could have been applied to many other regions as well. Even as recently as 2013, Shambaugh described China as a “partial power”: a global trading superpower that had a broad yet shallow footprint in other indicators of international power such as global governance, security, economics, culture, and diplomacy.4 Writing this chapter in early 2021, there are few if any global issues where China’s interests are not an important consideration, and the Middle East is no exception. While China is not interested in challenging the United States as the preeminent extra-regional power in MENA, its influence has increased significantly over the past decade and this will likely continue to be the case.
China’s previously modest foreign policy was influenced by a combination of systemic opportunity and domestic pressures. American post-Cold War preponderance shaped China’s international role, as the US-led international order provided a relatively stable environment in which China could focus on internal issues while building a positive global presence. This was especially important given the myriad domestic considerations demanding the attention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While speaking with President Bush in 2006, President Hu reportedly told him that “fighting corruption, rural unrest, the widening wealth gap, and severe pollution consumes nearly all his time and puts China in a position in which it has neither the will nor the means to challenge American dominance in world affairs.”5 These problems, combined with a constant need to deliver growth and jobs in order to justify a closed political system, largely explain China’s predominantly inward focus of the Reform Era.
Given the opportunity to focus on development, China pursued a set of priorities that Nathan and Scobell described as a set of concentric circles. The first circle, China’s sovereign territory, is the dominant security concern for the CCP, evidenced by the fact that it consistently budgets more for domestic than external security. The next circle is those 20 states that share borders and maritime boundaries with China. The third circle consists of six regional orders (North-East Asia, continental South-East Asia, maritime South-East Asia, Oceania, South Asia, and Central Asia) that are home to direct Chinese security-related interests. It is only when we get to the fourth circle – the rest of the world – that we find the Middle East.6 In this model, the Middle East is not at – or near – the core of Beijing’s primary interests, a point that many have made, and that Shichor and Niblock continue to press in their contributions to this volume.
While China remains in the second tier of external powers in MENA, its international role has moved beyond the confines of the Reform Era’s “hide and bide” dictum, embracing President Xi Jinping’s exhortation to “be proactive in seeking achievements.”7 This begs the question: What changed? Why did China leave the relative ease of a partial power to develop a greater international role and the increased scrutiny and expectations that accompanies it? Its changing relationship with the United States and a resulting reconceptualization of global order was one factor. The policies of successive US administrations contributed to a perception that China’s rise would be challenged. The George W. Bush years signaled a dramatic recalibration of US foreign policy with the Iraq War and global war on terror shattering norms that underpinned global order. China’s resilience in the face of the global financial crisis also contributed to China’s “new assertiveness,” a period that began during the second half of Hu’s administration.8 The Obama administration’s plan to pivot or rebalance to Asia also played a part. Strategically sensible from an American perspective, it looked like a containment policy in Beijing and confirmed suspicions that the United States was trying to slow China’s path to power.
While this was taking place, Chinese leaders began adopting a more confident rhetoric regarding China’s place in the world. In a 2012 speech, President Xi Jinping articulated the China Dream:
While long in platitudes, the confidence Chinese leaders have been displaying over the past decade while describing China’s achievements are indicative of a country that sees itself as having lessons in governance and development to share with the much of the world, including the Middle East.
For the purposes of analyzing its relations with the Middle East within the context of this more activist foreign policy, however, one of the most significant factors was the introduction in 2013 of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).10 The BRI began as a series of infrastructure construction and investment projects crossing Eurasia and the Indian Ocean region under two large umbrellas: the overland Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). Since then it has come to include the Digital Silk Road Initiative, the Space Silk Road, and the Health Silk Road. To emphasize the importance of the BRI in China’s foreign policy ambitions, the CCP enshrined it in its constitution in 2017. The SREB and MSRI components began as an extension of China’s Going Out policy of the 1990s, when the PRC determined that its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would have to transition from domestic to international markets and as a result, SOEs began to develop a presence in states and regions where they previously had not operated. The Middle East is one such region; trade between China and the GCC countries alone has grown from just under $10 billion in 2000 to nearly $180 billion in 2019.11 Not surprisingly, this deeper commercial engagement has led to an increased political presence, as discussed below. In terms of the BRI, the Middle East is geopolitically situated, linking states and markets from South Asia to Africa and Europe, making its stability and prosperity a Chinese concern.
An important diplomatic tool that China has used to enhance its presence in MENA is the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), a multilateral organization established in 2004 as a means of coordinating relations between China and the 22 Arab League states. China appoints an ambassador as its representative to the CASCF.12 Every other year the CASCF holds a Ministerial Meeting, attended by foreign ministers and alternating between China and an Arab capital city. These meetings are useful indicators of the trajectory of Sino-Arab relations, as they lay out the cooperation priorities for the coming years. The 2014 CASCF Ministers’ Meeting was notable for having introduced the “1+2+3 cooperation pattern” in an opening address from President Xi titled “Promote the Silk Road Spirit, Strengthen Sino-Arab Cooperation,” in which he claimed, “To develop the Belt and Road, the two sides need to be both far-sighted and down-to-earth. To be far-sighted, we need to produce the optimum top-level design, identify our orientation and goals, and establish a ‘1+2+3’ cooperation pattern.”13 In this equation, each number represents a different cooperation priority. The number 1 represents energy, 2 is infrastructure and trade and investment, and 3 is nuclear energy, space satellite, and renewable energy. This pattern was re-emphasized in the 2016 China Arab Policy Paper, released to coincide with Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia.14 While this equation includes all Arab League member states, it is clear that some are better positioned than others to capitalize on Chinese initiatives – a common theme across MENA. Those states with greater wealth and political stability, as well as the resources and/or geopolitical advantages, naturally find greater opportunities to work with Chinese SOEs on these types of projects.15
The 2018 meeting was of particular significance. The banner headline was in the big numbers, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced $23 billion in loans, aid, and investments: $20 billion in loans for states with reconstruction needs; $3 billion in special loans for the region’s financial sector; nearly $150 million to support social stability; and $90 million in humanitarian and reconstruction aid for Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.16 The bigger story was buried beneath the lead, however, with the introduction of the “Industrial Park – Port Interconnectivity, Two Wings and Two Wheels Approach.” This gave form to what previously appeared to be a series of unconnected projects, linking them under a framework that enhances China’s regional presence without a significant military presence, with the exception of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Supply Base in Djibouti.17 The set of commercial projects is based on investment into industrial parks and ports, connecting supply chains and building business clusters from the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea, and connecting to the Mediterranean Sea. The “two wheels” are energy cooperation (conventional oil and gas, and low-carbon energy), and the “two wings” are cooperation in technology (artificial intelligence, mobile communications, and satellite navigation) and investment and finance.18 This set of ports and parks is a logical extension of existing trade routes; the shipping route from Tianjin to Dubai had become the busiest between East Asia and the Middle East by 2015.19 Dubai’s Jebel...
