Political Friendship and Degrowth

An Ethical Grounding of an Economy of Human Flourishing

Areti Giannopoulou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• eBook ISBN: 9781000531022
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Developing a contemporary account of political friendship and synthesizing it with the radical movement of degrowth, this book provides the ethical grounding and the rationale of an alternative economy which serves human flourishing.

The Aristotelian political friendship embodies active concern for the others' well-being that contemporary societies lack; the crucial problems of ecological destruction and global poverty illustrate this friendship deficit. Arguing for the need for re-embracing a friendly civic ethos and re-aligning the economy with moral objectives, the author updates the Aristotelian idea and identifies it with democratic-autonomous political-economic praxis that ensures citizens' self-actualization. Degrowth movement questioning economic growth and productivism, and privileging a simpler life with less material goods, favours political friendship precisely because it nourishes its unconscious substratum namely human instinctual sociality. The call for genuine democratic political praxis that political friendship implies could enable the degrowth movement to retain its radical character and accomplish the shift to an economy which serves life.

The book is worthwhile studying by students and researchers across social sciences and especially by scholars in the fields of sociology, philosophy, and politics, but also a broader readership sensitive to the issues of social and environmental sustainability will find this work extremely interesting.

PART I The Aristotelian tradition of the political friendship

1 The Aristotelian political friendship

DOI: 10.4324/9781003164050-3

The notion of friendship signifies a two-way relationship. It involves the sense of reciprocity, of communication and implies equality. A friendship is a relationship between two parties who contribute equally or almost equally to this relationship by supporting one another. This idea of mutual help between mature agents when applied to the public domain entails the forging of social bonds and leads to social cohesion. Citizens adopting a friendly attitude and organizing their agency on the basis of this friendly ethos can enter into mutually beneficial relations that can function precisely because they possess this reciprocal character. The conception of social actors as friends can be traced back to Aristotle’s notion of political or civic friendship (politike philia) between the members of the political community. Aristotle referred to political friendship as a variety of the general moral phenomenon of friendship on which he elaborates mainly and explicitly in his Nicomachean Ethics and in his Eudemian Ethics. However, he approaches friendship also in his Politics and in his Rhetoric. In this chapter, I shall delve into the Aristotelian concept of friendship, into its basic components and its main kinds. Also, friendship’s correlation with happiness (eudaimonia) will be illuminated, and then it will follow an analysis of political friendship as the actualization of friendship in the city context. The feature of reciprocity that characterizes friendship will be examined in its relation to political friendship, and it will be argued that it constitutes its core which requires the equality of citizens.

Aristotle’s concept of friendship

Aristotle conceives friendship (philia) ¹ as a relationship in which both parties wish each other well for one another’s sake and are inclined to confer benefits on one another, and also are aware of these features of their relation:

We may describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return. Those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends.

(Rhet. 2.4.1380b36–1381a2)

This conceptualization of friendship occurs not only in the Rhetoric but also in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle stresses the mutuality of goodwill, namely, of wishing good to a friend for that friend’s sake, the mutuality of the affection between friends, and finally the mutuality of the recognition of that reciprocal goodwill and affection (NE 8.2). Aristotle clarifies that mere goodwill is not identical with friendship since it can be felt towards people whom we might not know and without their knowing it (NE 9.5 1166b30–32). Goodwill is regarded as friendship on the condition that we know well the person whom we wish well, we feel an intense friendly feeling for him, we share activities with him, thus spending time together, and we perform a deed for his sake (NE 9.5). Consequently, we infer that people are friends in so far as they wish one another good for one another’s sake, they are mutually disposed to bring about that good and undertake a deed in order to benefit the other, they feel affection for one another and are aware of that reciprocal active goodwill and of that mutual affection. We see that Aristotelian friendship is characterized by mutuality; the two parties provide their share to the relation and recognize each other’s contribution. Moreover, it is informed by respect for the friend’s individuality. Specifically, the concern for the other is accompanied by respect for his individuality since the goodwill and the well-doing by the loving person are determined as such by the loved person’s needs and wants. The loving person seems to be open to the other’s subjectivity; it attends to his needs and acts accordingly in order to provide for the meeting of those needs. So it can be observed that Aristotle conceives friendship as a sensitive hearing of the other subjectivity, a positive disposition towards it, and as an active expression of the concern for it. The object of friendship is a being with a separate good and is not a possession or extension of the self. Friends, for Aristotle are separate and independent, and see one another as “distinct centers of choice and action” (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 355).

Aristotle maintains that there are three kinds of friendship, since there are three things because of which people feel affection and wish well to one another. Thus people become friends because of utility (διά τό χρήσιμον), of pleasure (διά τό ηδύ), and of virtue (δι’αρετήν)² (NE 8.3.1156a6–10). However, in utility and pleasure friendships both parties like each other and wish well to each other not for themselves but because of a good and a pleasure they gain from each other (NE 8.2.1156a10–19). Goodwill and affection exist as long as the others are sources of utility and pleasure; when they cease to function as such, friendly ties are dissolved (NE 8.2.1156a19–20). Therefore, utility and pleasure friendships are incidental and unstable.

In contrast, the friendship based on virtue is considered to be perfect, since its parties are good people and alike in virtue; they wish well alike to each other for that other’s sake, because they recognize and approve each other’s goodness, and because they are good in themselves (NE 8.3.1156b8–10). Their goodwill derives from their virtue and is oriented towards the other on account of that other’s virtue. And because virtue is something that endures, virtue friendship is stable (NE 8.8.1159b4–5). Virtuous people “being steadfast in themselves hold fast to each other” (NE 8.8.1159b4–5).

Aristotle does regard utility and pleasure friendships as friendships but he gives them a lower value, stating that they are friendships through their resemblance to virtue friendship (NE 8.4.1157b36–39). Utility and pleasure friends wish well to each other, as noted, so long as the other provides them with something useful or pleasant. Their goodwill is of a derivative kind since they do not wish well to the other for his sake absolutely but in so far as the latter’s good can furnish them a benefit. In addition, utility and pleasure friendships resemble virtue friendship, since virtuous people too are useful and pleasant to each other (NE 8.31156b13–14). However, in the case of virtue friendship, that usefulness and pleasure are not incidental as in the other two sorts of friendship but substantial because they spring from the substantial goodness of the friend’s character.

In virtue friendship, people bear goodwill to one another not in order to receive an incidental gain but because they endorse one another’s good character, one another’s virtue. They are good without qualification and want to be friends with people who are equally good without qualification. So, virtue friendship is the par excellence friendship, since as Cooper aptly argues:

although there is unself-interested well-wishing in all three types of friendship it is both broader and deeper in a character friendship than in the other two. For it is only in this case that the conception of the other person under which one is his friend and wishes him well for his own sake is a conception that corresponds to what he himself essentially is.

(Cooper, 1980, p. 315)

In other words, the quality of friendship and the quality of goodwill is determined by the friends’ quality; a virtuous person’s goodwill is unqualified and completely for the other’s sake but a bad person or less good person’s goodwill is limited and dependent on the incidental goods derived from the other. Utility and pleasure friendships are incomplete instantiations of the archetype of virtue friendship and they approach the latter to the extent that the utility or pleasure motives achieve the engendering of unqualified goodwill and affection.

Virtue friendship is infrequent since virtuous people are rare (NE 8.3.1156b25–26). Also, virtuous people do not have many friends because as liking is an intense friendly feeling it cannot be felt but towards one person (NE 8.6.1158a12–13). Moreover, virtue friendship requires time and familiarity since people need to know each other well in order to realize they are alike in virtue and to feel goodwill, as well as to act in the interest of one another. This familiarity and knowledge are achieved through living together and this latter can only be the case with few people. In contrast, Aristotle claims, utility and pleasure friendships can involve more people, for “these services take little time” (NE 8.6.1158a16–17).

While parties in virtue friendship are of a good character, in the other two sorts of friendship, friends are either bad men or of different character qualities (NE 8.4.1157a16–18). And while among virtuous friends there is trust and the feeling that they will not be deceived, in the friendship of bad men there is nothing to prevent suspicion and insecurity (NE 8.4.1157a20–25). It is seen that the awareness of a friend’s good character is what renders him worthy of affection and trust, and what makes friendship a secure environment for both friends.

Finally, utility friends do not live much alongside each other because each other’s presence is not necessarily pleasant, and pleasure friends, though they enjoy their living together, change their friends easily because their tastes alter quickly (NE 8.3.1156a27–1156b5), whereas virtuous friends delight constantly in living together since they enjoy the same things (NE 8.51157b24). They have chosen one another to be friends because of their character, and by extension, because of their criteria about things. Their mutual liking derives from their character and is not a passion but a state, since mutual liking among good people incorporates choice and choice emerges from a state (NE 8.5.1157b30).

Friendship and happiness

According to Aristotle, happiness (eudaimonia) is the chief good which constitutes a complete end, an end “which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” (NE 1.7.1097a34–35). Happiness is the ultimate end towards which every particular end is oriented and in essence is “an activity of soul in conformity with excellence” (NE 1.7.1098a15), namely virtue. Now, friendship is a virtue or implies virtue (NE 8.1.1155a4). Therefore, friendship for Aristotle is an inherent feature of a good and happy life.

Even rich and powerful people, Aristotle claims, need friends because “what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends?”(NE 8.1.1155a8–9). The assistance towards a friend seems to be a complement of wealth. The sharing of that wealth confirms it and ascribes to it the status of happiness. Benefiting a friend is an action in accordance with the virtue of friendship. Consequently, a rich man using the resources he possesses for conferring a good to a friend of his can transmute his material prosperity into happiness. The exercising of friendship, to Aristotle, reflects a man’s attitude towards himself (NE 9.8.1168b5–6). Wishing well and doing good for a friend’s sake, and sacrificing his own interest, a man shows that he likes himself (NE 9.8.1168a30–34). He does not like himself in the sense that the majority of people do, namely, by striving for a greater share of wealth and honour, and bodily pleasures, obeying thus the dictates of the irrational element of the soul (NE 9.8.1168b15–20). He is “a lover of self” because he likes his intellect and functions in conformity with it since “this is the man himself” (NE 9.8.1168b29–36). The actions imbued by his reason belong to him and count as voluntary ones (NE 9.8.1169a1). Doing good to his friend out of concern for the latter’s good and generally devoting himself to the performing of virtuous actions for the common good, he obeys his intellect and secures virtue for himself (NE 9.8.1169a10–11). So, a person who is a good friend, who likes his friend, likes himself too and aims at his happiness since, as mentioned, happiness is activity harmonized with virtue.

Another reason why a happy man cannot be a solitary one is because: “man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others” (NE 9.9.1169b18–19). Consequently, friendship is a natural predicate of humanity and as the perfect form of human sociality reflects Aristotle’s ideal of the good life. Aristotle elaborates more on the significance of true friendship in a happy life, maintaining that a virtuous friend helps a virtuous man to become aware of his virtue and that the virtuous friend’s presence multiplies the pleasure that human existence generates (NE 9.9). In particular, he says that happiness consists in living and being active (NE 9.9.1169b31). The essence of living, of life, is perception or thought of our actions, of our simple, biological functions like walking or hearing, and our virtuous activities (NE 9.9). Life by its very nature is good and pleasant and thus desirable (NE 9.9.1170a14–27). This quality of life is perceived and felt by the virtuous man whose actions are good (NE 9.9.1170b20–22). So, we could say, the natural goodness of life can be realized through virtuous action. Virtue is the presupposition of the realization of life’s natural goodness, since virtuous action resonates with natural goodness. The awareness of individual virtue derives from the conception of a friend’s goodness which occurs through the contemplation of his worthy actions since the friend is another self and his doings count as our actions (NE 9.9.1170a36–39). In the Magna Moralia, Aristotle elucidates his idea of a friend as a second self who as a mirror reflects our character. He claims that a friend enables us to form an objective picture of ourselves, to attain self-knowledge because we observe and judge his actions which resemble ours, being free from the favour and passion that hinder us from being impartial towards ourselves (MM 1213a10–26). Precisely because a friend is another self, the virtuous man apart from his existence which is desirable because of the pleasant perception of his own virtue needs to be conscious of his friend’s existence and virtue as well. It then follows that this will be accomplished in their living together and sharing in “discussion and thought” (NE 9.9.1170b6–13).³ Therefore, the existence of a friend, Aristotle seems to say, increases the delight and fulfilment that comes from the perception of a virtuous life because the enrichment of life with a plethora of virtuous actions and insightful thoughts (ours and those of our friend’s, who is our second self) enhances our capability to receive the natural goodness of life.

The presence of virtuous friends is a constituent of a happy life also because it stimulates virtuous activity and provides training in virtue, and in parallel keeps a person from error (NE 8.1.1155a15; NE 9.9.1170a11; NE 8.1.1155a12). Further, it sustains virtuous activity: “for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier” (NE 9.9.1170a5–8). Aristotle here seems to say that people might cease engaging in an activity that they find pleasant or which is pleasant in itself since solitude does not furnish us with the motive and the energy in order to stay active. In contrast, it could be claimed, the sharing of activities renders them more interesting and enjoyable. Furthermore, when we are active towards others we feel a sense of responsibility towards them and this feeling of responsibility, of duty, may sustain our interest and motivation for our activity. In short, when our action is addressed to someone who will react in a certain way to it either by endorsing it or by being benefited by it or even by criticizing it, seems like a snapshot of a conversation and thus ceases to be a boring monologue.

The arguments which Aristotle uses to bolster his thesis that friendship is a constituent of a happy life, namely, that friends provide the knowledge of the goodness of one’s life and that they maintain our commitment to fundamental virtuous and intellectual activities reveal, for Cooper, human weakness. As he notes:

We cannot, if left each to his own devices, reach a secure estimate of our own moral character; nor by ourselves can we find our lives continuously interesting and enjoyable, because the sense of the value of the activities that make them up is not within the individual’s power to bestow.

(Cooper, 1980, p. 331)

I think Cooper interprets aptly Aristotle’s conception of human nature though with a nuance of pessimism about the finitude of human capabilities. Aristotle recognizes the finite and incomplete nature of human beings but he does not invest this inference with disappointment. His view is the result of an empirical and scientific observation. He states, in effect, that human nature is social; every person is complementary to another person because human nature presupposes and dictates this complementarity. The human being is considered unable to be self-sufficient, not because s/he is finite but because s/he is social, in other words, is naturally preordained to need the others in order to acquire self-awareness and self-knowledge, to be happy and to find life worth living. However, the other, the friend, is not an instrument for implementing the above ends. He is a separate person, loved for his own sake and recognized as valuable in himself; he has been chosen to be a second self in order for the two friends-selves to function as an enhanced consciousness, an acute cognizance.

Friendship, as a virtue and non-ultimate end, is exercised for happiness’ sake, since the latter is the ultimate and complete purpose of human actions and the cardinal good in human life. However, it is exercised for its own sake too, since it contains or is identified with its purpose (NE 1.7.1097b2–5). People enter friendly relations not only in order to become happy but also because they like another person on account of his character and they want his good for his own sake. Liking a person is a connotation of the social nature of the human being and simultaneously an attitude and an activity deriving from human reason. Doing good to a friend entail...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• PART I The Aristotelian tradition of the political friendship
• PART II Modern readings of political friendship
• PART III Founding human flourishing
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index