As the worldās largest electoral democracy in terms of population, India not only symbolizes the democratic potential of developing and post-colonial states, but also serves as a crucial test case for assessing the global influence of neo-authoritarianism. As Indiaās current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has pointed out: āIndia is the largest democracy on earth. If you add up the next forty democratic countries you will just about reach the total of the electorate in Indiaā (quoted in Price 2015: 14).
Within the Indian context, with its proud democratic heritage dating back to independence from British rule in the mid-twentieth century, the idea of authoritarianism is generally associated either with foreign countries, the pre-Independence colonial raj under which India was under the control of the British Empire, or the Emergency Decree of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1975ā77). While the period of Congress Party dominance in Indian politics over much of the period from the 1950s to the mid-1990s was seen by its critics as a one-party monopoly (and even a one-family monopoly), the rise of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) as the major opponent of Congress on the national stage since the 1990s has ushered in an era of increased political competition. However, the BJP itself has an ambivalent relationship with democracy. As Amrita Basu (2013: 81) notes, āthe BJPās relationship to democracy has been double edged. While it has deepened democracy in some respects, it has also undermined it through its explicit commitment to Hindu majoritarianism, its periodic engagement in anti-minority violence, and its close ties to non-elected undemocratic civil society organizations.ā The leadership style of Narendra Modi has also been characterized as āauthoritarian populismā which āseeks to harness popular discontent against elite corruption with majoritarianism to create an antagonism between the āHindu peopleā and a ācorrupt eliteā that panders to minoritiesā (Chacko 2018: 1).
Addressing these claims, this chapter examines whether neo-authoritarianism is truly on the rise in India or whether this is merely a claim made by critics. This chapter proceeds as follows. After first exploring the concept of neo-authoritarianism, it then focuses on media coverage of Narendra Modiās centralizing leadership style, his control of other government institutions, relationship with civil society, and the transformation of stateāmedia relations with attention to his rule as Chief Minister of Gujarat state, the transition period in 2014 when Modi first became Indiaās Prime Minister, and Modiās re-election to that post in 2019. Noting how a sizeable number of democratic deficits were already present under previous Indian governments, the study nevertheless concludes that since 2014 neo-authoritarianism has been not only a critical discourse but also a growing force in India.
Neo-authoritarianism
Although multi-party elections are still regularly held in India, critics have questioned the democratic credentials of a country whose governing practices look increasingly authoritarian. To take just one indicator, Indiaās low ranking on the 2019 World Press Freedom Index (140th out of 180 nations) is hardly suggestive of a strong commitment to democratic flows of information and communication (Reporters Without Borders 2020). But does this reflect a more systematic shift towards neo-authoritarianism? Answering this question requires us to unpack the concept of neo-authoritarianism. While traditional authoritarianism has been around for centuries and has legitimated its rule via historical myths and traditions, neo-authoritarian regimes are marked by the following four elements.
Firstly, they seek public legitimacy through ādevelopmentā and ānationalismā (Sahlin 1977). The concept of neo-authoritarianism itself first emerged alongside decolonization in the 1970s from analyses of dictatorial regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, but this idea soon became prominent during the 1980s and 1990s in post-Maoist China where neo-authoritarianism was conceptualized as a vehicle for modernization under which single-party rule and limits on political pluralism could accompany a focus on rapid economic growth and industrialization for an interim period of time in order to later set up a foundation for establishing a functioning democracy (Petracca and Xiong 1990; Perry 1993). By emphasizing state authority over society plus political stability while seeking to advance āthe simultaneous construction of a free enterprise system and centralized state powerā (Sautman 1992: 76), neo-authoritarianism is politically conservative on the one hand yet economically market-oriented on the other hand (Fu and Chu 1996).
A second component of neo-authoritarianism is the role of strong leadership. As Chinese scholar Wu Jiaxiang has argued, āneo-authoritarians do not stress political structure, but the political leaderā who is an āauthoritative,ā ābrilliant,ā and āfar-sightedā strongman who takes āresolute and decisive actionsā to āenhance capital accumulation, dispose of resources effectively and provide the law and order necessary for commodity tradeā (Sautman 1992: 79). Leaders of this ilk embrace scientific and technological modernization while simultaneously resisting intrusions of Western cultural norms by identifying with traditional values āas the foundation of national spiritā (Petracca and Xiong 1990: 1106). To achieve these goals, the leader works to strengthen the bureaucracy and military and the leader applies severely coercive means to suppress crime and corruption and to mute political opposition (Sautman 1992: 86).
Thirdly, while the advent of neo-authoritarianism is often associated with ex-totalitarian regimes softening their degree of authoritarianism as in post-Communist Russia (Becker 2004; Umland 2012), neo-authoritarianism can also emerge in reverse fashion when democratically elected leaders introduce creeping centralization and strong-armed measures to neutralize opponents (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Either way, the primary legitimation of neo-authoritarian governance rests on prospective economic outcomes as opposed to a democratic procedural basis and it often appears to be driven by a logic of late industrialization since it is difficult for post-colonial states to enter the ranks of āfirst worldā nations given intense international competition vis-Ć -vis a large number of already advanced economies (e.g., Kohli 2004). For example, Rodanās (1989) study of Singapore found its leaders were incentivized to adopt an economic strategy reliant upon high levels of state autonomy, civil servant loyalty, inducements to foreign capital, control over labour unions, and minimization of welfare expenditures. Yet, while economic objectives may be its primary drivers, a neo-authoritarian political state is compatible with either neo-liberal or developmental state approaches to capital accumulation.
A fourth significant feature of neo-authoritarianism is that the stateās prioritization of rapid capital accumulation inhibits its commitment to competitive political pluralism. Thus, neo-authoritarian regimes allow some space for civil society associations to organize independently and occasionally critique the government but they also use an array of direct and indirect means to limit the political capacity of autonomous organizations from being able to dislodge or challenge the ruling clique or coalition (Petracca and Xiong 1990). This involves both muting domestic rivals and going after foreign-funded non-government organizations who are depicted as āagents of influenceā and portrayed as interfering in domestic politics (Umland 2012: 30). When it comes to the media, neo-authoritarian states also tend to use drift-net laws, libel and defamation suits, denial of press credentials, intrusive auditing, and condoning or tolerating violence against opposition journalists and editors to bring about āself-censorship, the most common and important limit on journalistic activityā (Becker 2004: 150). Neo-authoritarians also usually place stronger controls over electronic and broadcast media than print media which may be independently owned as well as ārelatively autonomous, accessible to the population and highly critical of the regimeā (ibid.: 150).
To sum up, neo-authoritarianism is a system that combines media management and intimidation, civil society curtailment, centralization of state power, and prioritization of market-based economic growth over the promotion of social equality. Under this system, there is a limited degree of political pluralism combined with an unbalanced playing field as common under hybrid regimes featuring āelectoral authoritarianismā (Schedler 2006) or ācompetitive authoritarianismā (Levitsky and Way 2010). The neo-authoritarian justification for this imbalance, however, is that a meaningful democracy requires āa high standard of living and experienced officialsā and that neo-authoritarianism is a means to eventually achieving this state (Sautman 1992: 94).
Chief Minister Modi
We now begin to address the question of whether neo-authoritarianism is on the rise in India under Narendra Modi by examining his leadership style during his long tenure from 2001 to 2014 as the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat. Modi, a career politician who earned correspondence Bachelorās and Masterās degrees in political science from Delhi University and Gujarat University respectively, had been involved with the stateās politics dating back to the 1970s. Formerly a full-time missionary (pracharak) for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which is one of the most important organizations promoting Hindu nationalism in India, Modi ended up developing a reputation as a formidable behind the scenes political organizer. For instance, during Indira Gandhiās 1975 Emergency decree, when
Continuing his work as a key operative for the BJP, Modi developed a āgrowing reputation as a back-room geniusā (Price 2015: 37) and in October 2001 was appointed interim chief minister of Gujarat. A few months later in early 2002, Gujarat became engulfed in massive rioting and violence after a train with Hindus aboard was set on fire resulting in about two thousand people (mostly Muslims) being killed in retaliatory communal violence across the state of Gujarat (see Yagnik and Sheth 2005). Modi was repeatedly blamed by NGOs, politicians, and the media for not taking swifter and more decisive action to stop the violence and prosecute the perpetrators. As a result, for the next 12 years he āwas refused entry to the United States as a religious extremist and frozen out diplomatically by Britain, the European Union and many other western countriesā (Price 2015: 1). Yet, despite heightened controversy over Modiās role during the carnage, a reputation for being anti-Muslim, and a perceived willingness to condone communal violence as a strategy to gain political popularity, Modiās charismatic leadership style brought him repeated electoral victories in 2002, 2007, and 2012 sustaining him in the position of chief minister.
Whereas a growing number of supporters viewed him as a champion of vikas (development) referring to improved standards of living, Modi was labelled an authoritarian ruler and schemer by critics who alleged that under his rule land was being āsold to industrialists at throwaway pricesā with life āa daily struggle for many Muslims still living in closed, segregated communities twelve years after the riotsā (Marino 2014: 210, 223). In response, Modiās supporters sought to reframe him not as a demon but as demonized. As one of his biographers noted,