Military Strategy in the 21st Century

The Challenge for NATO

Janne Haaland Matlary, Rob Johnson, Janne Haaland Matlary, Rob Johnson

• Publisher: Hurst Publishers
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781787383913
• eBook ISBN: 9781787386426
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

What is military strategy today? In an era when European states seek to de-escalate and avoid armed conflict, and where politicians fear the consequences of protracted operations or tactical hazards, does military strategy have any relevance?

This is the first volume to examine current military risks and threats for NATO from a military strategy vantage point. Which strategies are needed? Is ways—ends—means thinking possible as a strategic template today? The contributors probe the relative importance, utility and options of military strategy across NATO as it confronts a variety of challenges old and new, as hybrid threats, new nuclear risks and conventional force combine in complex ways. They also examine what military strategy and military integration really mean, when NATO’s multilateral framework is being weakened by degrees of self-interest. They analyse the USA’s political and military role in Europe, and assess military strategic responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Middle East. Moreover, they study the role of member states’ military strategy set against Article 5 and non-Article 5 risks and threats, and explore how European states devise and implement military strategic options.

This book makes a clear assessment of political level strategy and its implications for military integration.

1

INTRODUCTION

MILITARY STRATEGY: MISSING IN ACTION?

Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary

In 2006, Professor Sir Hew Strachan lamented the loss of meaning of strategy, showing that it had, in essence, become a catch-all term and thus deprived of its real purpose.¹ As if to underline the point, a decade later, Sir Lawrence Freedman, a participant in the United Kingdom’s review of the Iraq War, noted that there had been a plethora of ‘strategies’ before and during the conflict. The UK was not alone in this confusion.² There was a contentious debate over the strategy during the war in Iraq. Over the less controversial campaign in Afghanistan, even though one might expect a degree of friction in aligning the various interests and agendas of a coalition, the states that participated also struggled to define their strategy. Many of the Europeans justified their missions as a ‘contribution’ and a demonstration that they supported the NATO Alliance and the United States in particular. The moral pressure to contribute a military component was not just a case of treaty obligation, however. It was a sense that terrorism and aggressive dictatorship must be resisted by force, not least for humanitarian reasons.

The difficulty was that most Europeans would have preferred not to use the military instrument at all. In this respect, coining the sentiment of a popular book, Robert Kagan thought the Americans might be ‘from Mars and the Europeans from Venus’.³ Under US leadership, NATO’s success in deterring a major war on the continent of Europe through hard power had been forgotten. Even though this capacity to avert war, while maintaining capability and readiness, had been extended long after the Cold War to the benefit of its member states and their economies, in the 1990s there was an expectation of a peace dividend.⁴ Military strategy was subordinated, perhaps to the point of irrelevance, in the haste to assert a new agenda in international affairs. Military strategy had, perhaps, gone ‘missing in action’.

But by 2014 the situation had clearly changed and there were new threats and challenges which required a reworking of military strategy fit for a new international context. Put simply, NATO was shocked by Russia’s willingness to use force to first seize and then annex sovereign territory in Crimea, then wage a war by proxy against Ukraine. Its imprecise use of airstrikes and willingness to operate alongside the ruthless Syrian regime brought to a sudden end the halcyon assumption of the 1990s, that Russia might become a partner for peace.

This volume offers a range of ideas, themes, and models for thinking about military strategy for the 21st century, supported by empirical examples. In the spirit of a strategic dialogue, not all of the authors agree with each other. That is as it should be. Nevertheless, there are several unifying threads that run throughout this work.

The first is the new strategic situation facing the NATO Alliance. By a series of actions from the early 2000s, Russia postured itself to confront and coerce Western states and its own neighbours, from Finland to Georgia. The emergence of a tangible threat by Russia, which threatened the interests or altered the policy of the member states (and which therefore was not primarily a threat to ‘territory’), required a new approach.⁵

While Russian aggression and interference are the central issue for Europe, it is clear that NATO and its partners cannot afford to neglect the global and regional instability, which either affects its collective interests (in energy supply, migration, humanitarian crises, or post-Covid-19 economic conditions) or which will be exploited by Russia and other rival powers (resulting in proxy attacks on members’ interests that demand out-of-area operations).

It is clear that ‘wars of choice’ which characterized the first two decades of the century are over, so the complaints one heard about NATO in the Afghanistan War, such as the commitment of forces outside Europe, are less valid, but NATO does face, potentially, more stabilization missions in its neighbouring regions, and perhaps even insurgencies in Central America, North Africa, and the Middle East. The rise of China adds to NATO’s ‘portfolio’ in Asia as well.

The second question is how to resolve the various forms of strategic questions that militaries and governments will face. The range of challenges NATO and its partners must tackle in military strategy is now wider than the conventional threat of another major power, and includes nuclear weapons in the hands of aggressive state and state-proxy actors, damaging cyber activities, armed confrontations short of war, state threats which are existential or coercive, and strategic shocks (exemplified by the sudden end of the Cold War or the mass casualty terrorism of 9/11). It is therefore crucial to examine the responses of the Alliance and then specific national responses (which illustrate the variation of context, policy, and response) in how to make best use of the military instrument.

The third central theme of this volume is how military force can achieve strategic ends. The utility of force in strategy has become vague, and there is, understandably, a reluctance to use force because of the risk of escalation. More than that, there is a fundamental paradox for the West. While there is a need for the clear direction of force to achieve its objectives, the actual use of force creates political dilemmas. Force is a political instrument of last resort, subject to necessary ethical constraints and pragmatic, potentially damaging political considerations. The political culture of the West would rather consign the use of force to the past. Yet Russia makes greater use of force, risk, and escalation, knowing that its weaknesses compel it to gamble on a slow or disunited response by rivals in the West. Managing Russia’s cavalier approach to force suggests a sophisticated role for the West’s military, one which is integrated with other levers of national and Alliance power, such as diplomacy, finance, commerce, sanctions, cyber attributions, indictments, UN warnings, and intelligence work for early warning.

A major conclusion of this book is that military strategy suffers from a general lack of political direction: politicians who shy away from taking responsibility for their obligation to specify the ends for which they use force are a common occurrence. Commanders complain that they do not know what the political-strategic goal of an operation is, or that their aspirations are too general to be operationalized. They believe some goals simply do not lend themselves to the use of force. ‘Nation-building’, ‘democracy promotion’ or ‘protection of civilians’ as the political ends of a military operation hardly give direction to the officer who must interpret a vague mandate while facing lethal force or violent civilians. This is also a complaint made by American officers. In his book on leadership, Call Sign Chaos, General Jim Mattis remarks that the political goals of both the Iraq War and the NATO campaign in Afghanistan were underspecified. He did not know what, exactly, he was going to accomplish, once deployed.⁶

In this introductory chapter, we introduce the themes listed above with a view to their strategic implications and challenges. Since this volume is a blend of theory and pragmatism, we first offer a working definition of military strategy.

Strategy has been a subject of intense discussion, in part because its meaning and priorities have changed over time. Civil primacy over strategy is accepted in the West, but political leaders are wary of straying too far into the realm of operations and prefer to leave that to military officers. Military officers are, for their part, all too aware of the need to seek political direction at regular intervals. But the boundaries overlap, and the solution is to establish trust through dialogue, for it is at the interface between the civilians and their military officers that military strategy is made.

Military strategy in the 21st century: Working definition

The limitations of available space in this volume preclude a full exposition of what military strategy is, although it is helpful, perhaps, to offer definitional guidance on our approach. First, NATO’s military strategy has resembled a form expressed by Sir Julian Corbett, the naval historian of the 20th century, namely, that of a ‘fleet in being’: the potential of a vast force, possessed of a strategic capacity greater than a fleet compelled to go into action, where destruction would reduce its great leverage, even in the event of an operational victory.⁷ The existence and readiness of NATO’s military force are therefore its first strategic utility.

Secondly, there is further strategic value for military force in NATO in the formulation of objectives and plans. This complements the idea of capacity, capability, and readiness, with highly trained forces able to deploy in all terrain and climates, and able to meet a variety of different challenges, from the consequences of a humanitarian crisis to conventional war-fighting in contaminated environments.⁸ NATO planners have addressed the wide range of threats that have emerged in recent decades, including cyber operations, and are focused on those of the future. But NATO’s strategy is not solely about ‘rapid reaction’, despite having this capability. It is also the ability to conduct the ‘long game’: playing for time and making use of the vast potential within NATO in a more substantial economic and material struggle. Russia could only achieve short-term success in localized areas but would pay too substantial a price to make it worth it in the long run. It is the strategic principle of costs always falling below the benefits.

Thirdly, strategy is also an opportunity to develop a policy which generates options and retains freedom for choices, as a consequence of a civil–military dialogue.⁹ It is clear, in the early decades of the 21st century, that military forces alone struggle to generate strategically advantageous outcomes in international affairs. A combination of political, diplomatic, military, economic, and informational means and ways is vital. Historians have long identified this fact, but the new international context of this century has created particular pressures, not least because international institutions and instruments tend to depend on clear (often legal) definitions. Those who wish to challenge or change the international order seek deliberately to obscure their actions and policies, subverting international law or ignoring its precepts except where they can themselves derive some advantage.

Fourthly, a more accepted definition of military strategy for the 21st century is the potential or actual use of military force in pursuit of policy (including the policy of deterrence) as a subset of national strategy or alliance strategy.¹⁰ Along with this is the idea that military strategy includes a broad range of military tasking which produces qdeterrence, deployments, security force assistance, stabilization, capacity-building, and interventionist campaigns. Military strategy is therefore not limited to ‘campaigning’ or operational guidance, but includes the ability to operate on multiple fronts and respond to a variety of threats, and a degree of ‘signalling’.

Military strategy is also to some extent the preparedness and investments that ensure a modernized force, ready for any eventuality and therefore able to support the defence of its members. Even investment decisions, such as whether to adopt the latest American F-35 fighter or a Russian- or Chinese-built surface-to-air missile system, or whether to sell certain types of armaments and ships to other nations, are, to a large extent, considered to be military strategic ones, especially when new systems come with training and implementation assistance requirements.

There are specific challenges in military strategy raised by the conditions of the information age. This has three elements. The first is that networks are vital parts of military activity, offering access, greater speed, connectivity, and surveillance for situational awareness. Armed forces that are not ‘net-centric’ stand little chance of success in conventional operations today.

The second element is the global nature of the information space, since to strike, conduct surveillance and establish a presence is now world-wide. The implication for NATO is that its strategy cannot be limited to regional defence. Since information activity gives every member state proximity to cyber threats and a range of adversaries all of the time, so it follows that its defences and capabilities must be able to operate in the e-environment constantly. It is a situation that is transforming the military strategy of NATO, as exemplified in the establishment of the NATO cyber defence pledge in 2018.

The third element is the participation of the public in war, in terms of their opinions and voting power, their benign support for the Alliance and their governments, their willingness to uphold Western values as a whole, their susceptibility to or involvement in disinformation, cyber insecurity and fear of terrorism, the problematic application of the law, or in terms of civil resistance. Military strategy in the 21st century is therefore a net-centric, informational and public effort against malign actors.

Finally, military strategy might simply incorporate all of the existing definitions and be brought together in the idea of a military presence or activity which will deny the fulfilment of an adversary’s ends, or compel the adversary to make a choice, which allows one the freedom to fulfil one’s own interests.

The historian Jeremy Black posits that there has been a changing relationship historically between purpose, force, implementation, and effectiveness.¹¹ Rather than condemning political or military leaders for not grasping military strategy, it is worth bearing in mind that decision-makers are faced with a number of factors which are constantly changing. There is no single set of factors that offers a neat calculus, but rather an evaluation, and balance, of domestic and international pressures set in a specific context. In addition to this constant weighing up, military strategy is an articulation of purpose, designed to convey to military personnel what must be achieved and the priorities. The long-term elements of strategy may reflect historical experience, geography, constraints, and an enduring set of interests and values. By contrast, so-called emergent or design strategy is formulated based on events, often because of a disruptive enemy strategy or the development of an unforeseen crisis.

There are also contextual challenges for NATO, which include the utility of force in a nuclear world, the use of the military in counter-terrorism, or displaced proxy warfare. Furthermore, there is the management of the risks of WMD use, including contamination, or escalation and a resulting major war. Strategy remains the task of achieving one’s interests (ends) without the cost of catastrophic loss. It is about deterring the most significant threatening actors and remaining credible as a force in all domains.

This volume does not dwell on all the possibilities of the theory of military strategy, but instead focuses on this working definition and the utility or application of military means and ways in various forms to fulfil strategic interests. In essence, it explains military strategy as the implementation of, or response to, planning or a form of net assessment. We discuss doctrine, defence capability, or defence concepts in the various chapters, and this includes military procurement decisions (such as new BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) programmes or counter-offensive cyber capabilities). The authors also include joint operations and joint effects in strategy, the Enhanced Forward Presence model, the NATO Centres of Excellence, maritime cooperation, air operations over Syria, Iraq and Libya, retrospection on the Bosnia–Kosovo conflicts, and similar issues. There is an honesty and robustness about where there are problems, but there are also indications of where opportunities for improvements exist, and even where best practice can be found.

The changed geostrategic environment for NATO

NATO is more than an alliance: it is a strategic success story.¹² Through its high readiness, capability and capacity, it has prevented a major, costly war in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, NATO actually reduced the risk of war and use of nuclear weapons through deterrence. Then and since, it has maintained balanced forces, providing a conventional deterrent against regional hostile actors. It can field nine corps on land, several fleets at sea, a nuclear arsenal, several air armies, and now a large cyber capability. It has promoted education, skills, and training as it embraced new military technologies in its own member states and overseas among partner nations. It has ensured state resilience.

NATO has adapted as Europe and the world have changed, and has done so with remarkably little use of military force: it has embraced new members in Central and Eastern Europe; it has flexed to conduct peace enforcement missions, and it has repurposed to fight out-of-area campaigns, to ensure, for example, that the Afghan National Army could be built up, trained, expanded, and consolidated. In an unstable world, NATO has in many ways provided certainty and consistency. Its ability to contain the inefficient and militaristic Soviet system ensured that it enjoyed success and won the Cold War without the armed conflict that so many had feared...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Contributors
• Preface
• 1. Introduction: Military Strategy: Missing in Action?: Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary
• Part 1 Politics And Military Strategy
• Part 2 The Parameters Of Military Strategy
• Part 3 Military Strategy In Nato States
• Notes
• Index
• Back Cover