Forensic Mental Health Assessment in Criminal Contexts

Key Concepts and Cases

Noah K Kaufman, Shane S Bush, Nicole R. Schneider, Scotia J. Hicks

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9780367645083
• eBook ISBN: 9781000539448
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Criminal Law
• Index: Psychology

This valuable compendium advances the understanding of mental health case law, making it highly accessible to practicing forensic professionals. Divided into two parts, the first section focuses on explaining important topics related to forensic psychological and forensic neuropsychological assessment, while the second section stands on its own as a collection of fascinating legal cases with high relevance to mental health and legal professionals interested in how mental health disorders impact criminal behavior among juveniles and adults.

The book begins with an accessible primer on abnormal behavior, exploring the links between criminal behavior and mental health disorders. It goes on to thoroughly describe what goes into forensic psychological and forensic neuropsychological evaluations, including discussion about the Federal Rules of Evidence, as they pertain to evidence-generation during the mental health evaluation process. The book also focuses on psychometric concepts, including reliability, validity, sensitivity, and specificity, as well as an exploration of 'science' and 'the law' which includes a discussion about the difference between science and pseudoscience, the different sources of law (constitutions, statutes, and case law), and how the intellectually competitive practice of law is similar to the enterprise of science. Ethical issues faced by the forensic mental health worker are also addressed. The second section of the book, Legal Cases for the Forensic Mental Health Professional, is an alphabetical summary of important and interesting legal cases with relevance for mental health professionals. These cases offer real-world significance while summarizing complex legal decisions through a neuropsychological sieve, to allow both legal and psychological communities to better understand each other's professions.

This book will be an invaluable resource for forensic psychologists, forensic neuropsychologists, forensic psychiatrists, and other mental health professionals whose work brings them into contact with the juvenile justice and adult criminal justice system. It will also be of interest to legal professionals, criminal justice departments, and law schools.

Section II Legal Cases for the Forensic Mental Health Professional

Case Summaries

DOI: 10.4324/9780367645090-102

Ake v. Oklahoma 470 U.S. 68 (1985) U.S. Supreme Court

Case Facts

Mr. Glen Burton Ake was an indigent defendant charged with first degree murder who was acting so bizarrely that the judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation sua sponte. The evaluator assessed that Ake was psychotic, rendered a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and opined that he was incompetent to stand trial. He was subsequently committed to a state hospital where he spent six weeks and eventually was found to be competent to stand trial (as long as he was given Thorazine). While the issue of competence was seemingly resolved, Ake’s attorney requested that the court arrange a psychiatrist to conduct a sanity evaluation or provide funding for the defense to arrange it, but the trial judge denied the request. The sole defense at trial was insanity. The state hospital psychiatrists testified about dangerousness but not about the issue of sanity. The jury found Ake guilty, the state requested the death penalty, relied on the trial testimony provided by the state hospital psychiatrists about Ake’s dangerousness, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, he argued that, as an indigent defendant, he should have been provided the services of a psychiatrist to evaluate his sanity. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his argument and stated that the state had no responsibility to provide psychiatric services to an indigent defendant charged with a capital crime. Certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed.

Main Issue

Does the U.S. Constitution require that an indigent defendant have access to a forensic mental health examination and the legal assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense, when sanity at the time of the offense is in question?

Court Holding

Yes. When a defendant in a criminal matter makes a showing that sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the U.S. Constitution requires that the state provide the defendant access to a qualified forensic mental health professional if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. A defendant is similarly entitled to the assistance of a forensic mental health professional at a capital sentencing proceeding regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness; and the defendant’s sanity was a significant factor at both the guilt and sentencing phases and the denial of psychiatric assistance constituted a deprivation of due process.

Court's Reasoning

The court focused on the protections of the 14th Amendment due process rights, specifically that a defendant cannot be restricted from a fair defense simply due to poverty. Indigent defendants must be provided “basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal.” The court made it clear that the indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to choose an expert of their personal liking or to receive funds to hire their own but that one must be provided at no cost to the defendant so that they can mount a relevant and fair defense.

Quick Summary

Indigent defendants have the right to be evaluated by a qualified mental health professional at no cost if sanity at the time of the offense is a significant factor at issue and if such an evaluation could affect the verdict or the sentencing.

Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304 (2002) U.S. Supreme Court

Case Facts

Daryl Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and was sentenced to death by a Virginia jury. During the penalty phase of the trial, Atkins was evaluated by a forensic psychologist who concluded that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded” with an IQ of 59. The jury nonetheless decided on the death penalty. Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because it had used a misleading verdict form. The forensic psychologist again testified regarding IQ, and the state presented an expert rebuttal witness who testified that Mr. Atkins was not “mentally retarded” (although no testing was administered) but rather was of “average intelligence, at least” and had antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). The jury again sentenced Mr. Atkins to death. On appeal, Atkins contended that he was mentally retarded and could not be sentenced to death. The court was unwilling to convert his sentence to life. When two Virginia justices strongly dissented, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Issue

Is the execution of “mentally retarded” individuals considered “cruel and unusual punishment” and, as such, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution?

Court Holding

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the death penalty is an “excessive” punishment for an intellectually disabled (ID) offender and that the constitution “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life” of such an offender. It’s up to the states to determine what constitutes intellectual disability.

Court's Reasoning

The court reasoned that there is a direction of change toward the prohibition of such executions and, in states that allow them, such executions are very rare. Professional and religious organizations oppose such executions, and data show “a widespread consensus by Americans against such executions.” Retribution and deterrence, the main “basis” for invoking the death penalty, may not be applicable to such offenders based on differences in information processing, communication, and logical reasoning. With respect to retribution, “just deserts” depends on the culpability of the offender and, given that “only the most deserving of execution are put to death,” excluding intellectual disability is appropriate. Regarding deterrence, the same deficits that make intellectually disabled offenders less culpable (e.g., diminished ability to process information and learn from experience) also make deterrence less likely to work. Non-ID offenders will not be negatively affected by excluding ID offenders from this penalty because they themselves are not excluded. ID offenders are at “special risk of wrongful execution” because they are less able to work effectively with counsel, are poorer witnesses, and can come off as lacking remorse for their crimes.

Quick Summary

The Supreme Court in this case concluded that the execution of offenders with intellectual disabilities is excessive and prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.

Mary Berghuis v. Van Chester Thompkins 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) 560 U.S. 370 No. 08-1470. Supreme Court of United States

Case Facts

On January 10, 2000, a shooting occurred outside a mall in Michigan. One victim died. The other victim recovered and later testified. Thompkins, who was a suspect, fled. About one year later, he was found in Ohio and arrested. Two police officers traveled to Ohio to interrogate Thompkins. At the beginning of the interrogation, one of the officers presented Thompkins with a form derived from the Miranda rule. After advising Thompkins of his rights, the officers interrogated him. At no point did Thompkins say that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police, or that he wanted an attorney. He was largely silent, but near the end, he answered “yes” when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting. He moved to suppress his statements, claiming that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that he had not waived that right, and that his inculpatory (incriminatory) statements were involuntary. The trial court denied the motion. At trial on first-degree murder and other charges, the prosecution called Eric Purifoy, who drove the van in which Thompkins and a third accomplice were riding at the time of the shooting. Thompkins' defense was that Purifoy was the shooter. Purifoy testified that he did not see who fired the shots.

The jury found Thompkins guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. The federal district court denied his subsequent habeas request, reasoning that Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and was not coerced into making statements during the interrogation, and that it was not unreasonable, for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), for the State Court of Appeals to determine that he had waived his right to remain silent. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state court was unreasonable in finding an implied waiver of Thompkins' right to remain silent. Thompkins argued that the police were not allowed to question him until they first obtained from him a waiver of his right to remain silent.

Main Issue

Can police interrogate a suspect without first obtaining a waiver of the right to remain silent?

Court Holding

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Police can infer a waiver of the right to remain silent when a suspect knowingly and voluntarily provides information to them.

Court's Reasoning

Thompkins' silence during the interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent. A suspect’s Miranda right to counsel must be invoked “unambiguously.” If the accused makes an “ambiguous or equivocal” statement or no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation. Had Thompkins said that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk, he would have invoked his right to end the questioning. He did neither. Thompkins waived his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police. The court noted that a waiver must be the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception and must be made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Such a waiver may be “implied” through a “defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.” If the state establishes that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver. The record here shows that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. Any waiver, expressed or implied, may be revoked at any time, resulting in termination of further interrogation.

Quick Summary

Police can infer a waiver of the right to remain silent when a suspect knowingly and voluntarily provides information to them. If a Miranda warning was given and was understood by the suspected, the person’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver.

Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238 (1969) U.S. Supreme Court

Case Facts

Edward Boykin, Jr. pled guilty to robbery that also involved the injury of one innocent person, resulting from a bullet that ricocheted off the floor. Boykin pled guilty to all five charges and no effort was made by the judge to assess whether or not Boykin’s guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. After Boykin was sentenced to death, the case was appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, on the premise “that a sentence of death for common-law robbery was cruel and unusual punishment.” While this argument was unanimously rejected, “four of the seven justices discussed the constitutionality of the process by which the trial judge had accepted petitioner’s guilty plea.” In their dissents, three of the justices maintained that Mr. Boykin may not have “intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty.” And a fourth justice wrote that “a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea unless he has determined that such a plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered by the defendant.” On this basis, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Issue

Does a guilty plea need to be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily?

Court Holding

Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the death sentence of Mr. Boykin on the basis that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Court's Reasoning

The Court reasoned that waiving one’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so similar to waiving one’s rights by pleading guilty that “the same standard must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made.” The Court also asserted that “it was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept [Boykin’s] guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary,” thereby emphasizing the importance of an intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights through a guilty plea. The Court also drew attention to the need for judges to actively seek evidence that guilty pleas are made with a full awareness of the consequences:

What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost so...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• SECTION I: Foundational Topics in Forensic Psychological and Forensic Neuropsychological Assessment
• SECTION II: Legal Cases for the Forensic Mental Health Professional
• Index