Transformative Learning Theory and Praxis

New Perspectives and Possibilities

Effrosyni Kostara, Andreas Gavrielatos, Daphne Loads, Effrosyni Kostara, Andreas Gavrielatos, Daphne Loads

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• eBook ISBN: 9780429834196
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Transformative Learning Theory and Praxis examines the multi-faceted nature of transformative learning and transformation theory including its merits, restrictions, and possibilities, and presents carefully chosen international case studies and theoretical approaches that enrich the application of the theory within a wide variety of educational settings.

By including new approaches to transformative learning theory, this book provides examples and teaching approaches coming from a variety of disciplines, including higher education, arts, classics, new technologies, and academic development. It bridges the gap between theory and practice to help teachers and adult educators embed potentially transformational techniques in the curriculum. Based on in-depth research, this key title provides a means of measuring and documenting transformative outcomes in qualitative studies of high impact learning experiences, and raises new questions and opportunities for the future development of the field.

Transformative Learning Theory and Praxis is a must-read text for anyone interested in the research behind, and applications of, transformative learning and transformation theory, including researchers, students, and policy-makers in the field.

PART I

Theory: social dimension of transformation

DOI: 10.4324/9780429450600-1

1

Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning

In dialogue with Honneth’s critical theory

Ted Fleming

DOI: 10.4324/9780429450600-2

The field of adult education has been enriched by significant contributions from Paulo Freire and Jack Mezirow. Both have contributed from within the field and wrote for the field of adult education. Mezirow’s theory grew out of an empirical study of women returning to college. Its impact is due to the way it speaks directly to the experiences of students who identify with Mezirow’s understanding of adult learning. Mezirow was careful to ground his theory on the theoretical ideas of Freire and Dewey. From Jürgen Habermas he borrowed the concepts of critical reflection, emancipatory learning, and the kinds of discussions (discourses) that were part of the pedagogical process leading to transformative learning.

There is a persistent critique of Mezirow’s theory that says that it is both too individualistic in its understanding of learning to the detriment of the social dimension and that his understanding of critical reflection is too abstract and rational (Clarke and Wilson, 1991; Collard and Law, 1989). The critiques continue in Arends (2014) and Cranton and Taylor (2012) but a number of European colleagues have moved beyond the critiques and respond by developing the theory of transformative learning (Eschenbacher, 2018; Mälkki, 2010, 2012).

The critiques will be addressed in this chapter by moving beyond Habermas and looking for solutions in the critical theory of Axel Honneth. Honneth is the leading figure in what is generally known as the third generation of the Frankfurt School. Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, and others were the first generation of critical theorists followed by Habermas (Müller-Doohm, 2014) and others of the second generation. These ideas have implications for transformation theory. Honneth moves beyond the communicative action of Habermas to explore its intersubjective basis and present his ideas on struggles for recognition.

Transformative learning

According to Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning, one’s ways of making meaning, which are usually built on a set of unquestioned assumptions, through transformative learning become clarified, assessed, and new more open and integrative sets of assumptions are sought, integrated, and acted upon. For Mezirow (2000: 7–8) transformative learning is:

the process by which we transform our taken-for-granted frames of reference (meaning perspectives, habits of mind, mind-sets) to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, emotionally capable of change, and reflective so that they may generate beliefs and opinions that will prove more true or justified to guide action.

Mezirow relies on the theory of communicative action of Habermas (1987) which involves particular kinds of conversations (discourses) that are free, open, and participatory. These discourses rely solely on the reasonableness of the arguments being made; the only force in play is that of the most reasonable argument (Fleming, 2002). Habermas and his ideas have served Mezirow’s work well but if the connection between critical theory and transformation theory is to be maintained then the next generation of critical theorists, i.e. Honneth, have interesting insights that will enhance our understanding of adult learning and at the same time address some of the critiques of transformation theory.

Axel Honneth

Axel Honneth, a student of Habermas, is now Director of the Frankfurt School and Professor of Humanities at Columbia University, New York. He resets critical theory by interpreting the distorted communications of Habermas as disrespect. When one is denied recognition, the resulting indignations and shame drive social struggles for recognition and the search for social freedom (Honneth, 2014). He continues the social critique of the Frankfurt School by asserting that the living conditions of ‘Modern capitalist societies produce social practices, attitudes, or personality structures that result in a pathological distortion of our capacities for reason … They always aim at exploring the social causes of a pathology of human rationality’ (Honneth, 2009: vii). He brings to the fore a theory of intersubjectivity and the ‘struggle for recognition’ as the key ideas for critical theory today. He argues that ‘the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual recognition’ because one can only develop a unique identity when ‘one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social addressee’ (Honneth, 1995: 92).

The task of critical theory is to identify experiences in society that contain ‘system-exploding energies and motivations’ that motivate the pursuit of freedom and justice (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 242). He offers ‘a link between the social causes of widespread feelings of injustice and the normative objectives of emancipatory movements’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 113). Honneth re-writes critical theory so that damaged recognition is the pathology to be overcome, rather than the distorted communication of Habermas. The pathologies of subject formation (how we developed as children and adults) in late capitalism are expressed in struggles to be recognized by significant others, that can only be achieved through interpersonal relations.

Relying on G.H. Mead he asserts that only by taking the perspective of others towards oneself one can begin to construct a sense of self (Mead, 1934). These perspectives of others, particularly in families and in the close relationships of early life, are shaped by culture and life history. They are internalized by the developing child and it is in this way that the child grows. Later in adult life, one may become reflexive of these inherited values; evaluate and critique them; decide on their justification and adequacy; and change them in the light of reflection. This is exactly how Mezirow describes the process of transformative learning.

Honneth also argues that the struggle for recognition, based on the need for self-esteem and the experience of disrespect, explains social development. Social change is driven by inadequate recognition and the resulting internal (psychic) conflicts lead to social change. In this way we begin to see how the social and personal are connected. This is how I intend to respond to some of the critiques of transformative learning.

Taking the perspectives of others are moments of recognition because it is precisely in taking the perspective of others towards us that guarantees to one the recognition of their own rights. He continues, quoting Mead (1934, cited in Honneth, 1995: 79):

To be a ‘me’ under these circumstances is an important thing. It gives him his position, gives him the dignity of being a member in the community … It is the basis of his entering into the experience of others.

One’s private relationships of love and attachment are a precondition for participation in social life, political discussions, public life, and democracy. Transformative learning and communicative action always involve more than following linguistic rules of discourse (Habermas, 1987) and are built on mutuality and intersubjectivity (Honneth, 1995). Mezirow borrowed these rules for his process of critical reflection on taken-for-granted assumptions. The antidote to being too individualistic lies in critical theory as articulated by Honneth.

Honneth argues that there are three differentiated pathways to the development of identity in modern society. The first is established and developed in relationships of friendship and love most typically in early family life and leads to self-confidence. If one experiences love, an ability to love one’s self and others is developed, and one is then capable of forging an identity. Without a special relationship with another person and the recognition given in these relationships it is not possible to become aware of one’s own uniqueness. If this essential ingredient of development is not available or a negative message about self-worth is given then the outcome is a missing element in the personality that may seek and find ‘expression through negative emotional reactions of shame or anger, offence or contempt’ (Honneth, 1995: 257). This is of course built on the attachment theory of the British child psychologist John Bowlby (see Fleming, 2018).

According to Honneth the second type of relationship to self occurs when one is given recognition as a morally and legally mature person and this leads to self-respect. When a person is recognized at this level one is accepted as an autonomous person who has rights and abilities to participate in the discussions of the institution and organizations of society. Legal rights (e.g. gender equality, disability rights, rights of minorities) institutionalize the recognition that each owes to another as autonomous persons. Without rights there is no respect and these laws and many others symbolize this (Honneth, 1995).

The third form of recognition is provided through work and leads to self-esteem. Relationships of solidarity with others in work and social activities of respect and appreciation enhance self-esteem and one is recognized as having something to contribute to the community. One becomes ‘recognized as a person whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community’ (Honneth, 1997: 30). People with high self-esteem are more likely to reciprocate mutual acknowledgements of each other’s contribution to the workplace and community (Honneth, 1995). These three forms of recognition constitute Honneth’s version of the good life as they provide the conditions for successful identity development. On these experiences rest the possibility of engaging in discourses and critical reflection.

It is not surprising that there are three corresponding forms of disrespect (Honneth, 1995). Disrespect is destructive of self-confidence because it injures people ‘with regard to the positive understanding of themselves that they have acquired intersubjectively’ (Honneth, 1995: 131). If a child is neglected or humiliated, they lose self-confidence. If people are denied rights their self-respect may suffer and finally if one’s way of life is not respected the damage is to self-esteem. For these reasons, abuse, insults, ignoring people are not only an injustice but injure people’s understanding of themselves, their identity (Honneth, 1995: 132).

The third form of disrespect points to cultural norms that ignore or denigrate ways of life. For example, ethnic minorities know denigration blocks the development of a healthy self-esteem. Without rights, their ways of being human are not valued and this impacts on the options for self-relating. These distortions in identity drive and motivate the struggle for recognition and social conflict. This moves the debate about emancipation away from the perceived highly cognitive and rational interest of Habermas toward an alternative theory of intersubjectivity. This has the potential to resolve the problem in transformation theory as to whether learning is an individual or social phenomenon. It implies that not only is the personal political but the political is personal. Transformative learning becomes both personal and social.

The theory of recognition establishes a link between the social causes of experiences of injustice and the motivation for emancipatory movements (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). In this way internal conflicts lead to social change and we begin to see how in his iteration o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Foreword by Knud Illeris
• Preface by Effrosyni Kostara and Daphne Loads
• PART I: Theory: social dimension of transformation
• PART II: Theory: developments and possibilities
• PART III: Praxis: in and beyond education
• PART IV: Praxis: transforming higher education
• PART V: Praxis: further applications
• Index