Pakistan Army

Institution that Matters

Ashish Shukla

• Publisher: KW Publishers
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9789386288844
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Pakistan Army is the most organised, powerful and influential institution in the country. It proclaims to protect not only the territorial frontiers of the state but the very ideology of the nation as well. The institution, through various means and mechanisms, controls Grand National Narrative (GNN) in Pakistan and strongly resists any attempt on part of other stakeholders to introduce changes having potential to weaken its hold in the system. It has fairly penetrated almost all sectors of Pakistani society and institutions of any significance including mass-media and academia. Its linkages with various indigenous extremist/terrorist groups is well-known and documented. Despite a severe blowback at home in the form of deadly terror strikes, the army refuses to discontinue its policy of using terror outfits as strategic assets to achieve foreign policy objectives. Against this background, the study traces the evolution of army, from scratch to the most potent force, and critically analyses the institution and its role in the country.

ONE

INTRODUCTION

Analysing the behaviour of an institution has always been a difficult task. It becomes even more complex while dealing with the institution of army.¹ Field Marshal Helmut Graf von Moltke, the great strategists of 19^th century and former Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army, once stated that “The Army is the most outstanding institution in every country, for it alone makes possible the existence of all civic institutions.”² S. E. Finer considers army a “purposive instrument” with a centralised command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, spirit de corps and an analogous isolation and self-sufficiency.³ For any outsider the army appears to be quite a simple formal institution with clear cut responsibilities, yet in most of the cases it proves to be complicated when one tries to ponder about it. As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, despite its secretive⁴ nature and often unpredictable behaviour, it is the most organised, powerful and influential institution in the country. It has a cohesive and task oriented profile with a strong spirit de corps. It sees itself as a breed apart and proclaims to protect not only the territorial frontiers of the state but the very ideology of Pakistan as well. Some of the functions of the Pakistan Army appear to be in direct conflict with the state resulting in a peculiar relationship between the state and its strongest institution. A Chatham House report captures this complex relationship in these words:

The relationship between the Pakistani army and the state is a very delicate and extremely complex subject. It can be compared to a strong creeper growing on a rotten tree, until it becomes difficult to say which is holding up which. Is the tree holding up the creeper or is the creeper holding up the tree? Creepers are of course parasites on the tree, but at a certain point we also begin to wonder whether if the creeper was taken away, might the tree fall to pieces? We can partly blame the creeper for that, but it is fairly obvious if we look at the Pakistani political system that the tree also has severe problems of its own, that exist quite independently of the creeper. In other words, it is no good blaming the Army for all the weaknesses of Pakistan’s civilian political order.⁵

Like other professional armies of the world Pakistan Army too considers itself and the country interchangeable. While, contrary to armies of most of the countries, every attempt on part of the civilian leaders to exercise some sort of civilian oversight is considered within the army as a threat to the “national interest.”⁶ In order to fully understand this institution and its behaviour, it is imperative to look into the history and trace the evolution of Army in Pakistan.

With the partition of British India into two dominions—India and Pakistan—the Armed Forces were also divided between the two countries in 1947. Since, most of the fixed installations and stores were located on the territories which were to become independent India, Pakistan Army had to start from what is most commonly referred by Pakistanis as “scratch.” To begin with, there were severe shortages of officers and soldiers in all categories. It is worthwhile to note that instead of broadening the recruitment base to deal with the initial shortages of personnel, Pakistan relied heavily on the myth of “martial races”⁷and continued recruiting men primarily from Punjab and erstwhile North West Frontier Province (NWFP)—the favourite area of recruitment of the British Indian Army.⁸ Lord Roberts, former Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the erstwhile British Indian Army is stated to be the biggest proponent of the idea of martial races. In order to make British Indian Army a perfect fighting machine, he wanted to substitute Hindustani (Indian) Sepoys from Bengal, the Tamils and Telegus from Madras, Mahrattas from Bombay with Gurkhas from Nepal and similar “warlike races” from Northern parts of India.⁹

The theory of martial race that they are more brave and committed soldiers as compared to other natives does not hold any truth in modern times and has been challenged by many scholars. Recent research shows that the idea of a “martial race” was a deliberately constructed theory by the British for political and administrative reasons. In the wake of the mutiny of 1857, the British suspected those communities which took active part in the revolt. They were able to bring the situation under control only with the deployment of troops from other areas. The British wanted to recruit more and more men from those communities that proved their loyalty towards the British. This led to the theory of martial race with the objective to give preference to the loyalists.

Like armies of other countries around the world, the Pakistan Army too is largely a male dominated institution. However, Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) started admitting 32 women cadets each year from 2006.¹⁰ At least 330 women cadets have graduated from PMA so far,¹¹ yet compared to male cadets the number of women seems to be symbolic. Until recently most of the women recruited in the army were in the area of health and education. The myth of martial races dominated the recruitment pattern of Pakistan Army for a fairly long period of time which resulted in some sort of ethnic homogeneity and unrepresentativeness of the institution. Other ethnicities in Pakistan such as Sindhi, Mohajir, and Baloch did not only raise the issue of their deliberate and systematic marginalisation, but also termed the institution as a Punjabi Fauj (Army of the Punjabis). The discontent among various other ethnicities on the Punjabi domination in the army poses a question mark on the national character of the institution.¹² In order to apparently give a semblance to be a national institution and to address the question of unrepresentativeness, army launched a ten-year recruitment plan in 2001.¹³

Shuja Nawaj provides some detail about the recruitment pattern of the Pakistan Army which indicates that since the beginning of 21^st century a number of steps were taken to make army appear to be a representative institution.¹⁴ These vital steps include the opening of new recruitment centres in the regions other than Punjab, lowering the educational and physical standards for a while to encourage the recruitment in these areas.¹⁵ These efforts yielded some positive results. As per the latest available data, recruitment of soldiers and officers from Punjab has declined significantly from 63.86 percent in 1991 to 43.33 percent in 2005 and recruitment from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) increased from 20.91 percent to 22.43 percent.¹⁶ Recruitment from Sindh also rose substantially from 8.85 percent in 1991 to 23.02 percent in 2005, while Balochistan witnessed threefold increase from 0.49 percent to 1.52 percent and “Azad Kashmir” and “Northern Areas” also rose from 5.86 percent to 9.70 percent.¹⁷ The new data suggest a policy shift regarding the recruitment pattern, however, one could not be so sure whether the change in the recruitment policy satisfactorily addressed the question of ethnic representativeness. The reason for such scepticism is that the data only discusses recruitment from regional areas and the people being recruited from Balochistan or for that matter Sindh may not be ethnic Baloch or ethnic Sindhi respectively.¹⁸

Pakistan came into being on the basis of “Two-Nation Theory” which emphasised the religious differences and argument that Muslims being a nation deserve a separate homeland. The social contract in the newly created Pakistan was based on the idea that Muslims of the subcontinent constituted a nation. Despite the fact that a large number of Muslim masses preferred to live in India, in post-partition period, and more than half of the population separated from Pakistan in 1971 to establish a new nation called Bangladesh, the primary basis of Pakistan’s existence is still based on Islam and the “Two-Nation Theory.” Pakistani political elite did not try to review their social contract keeping in view these developments. Islam still became the sole source of Pakistan’s identity and ideology has a special place in the society and in various state institutions and works as a powerful motivating force.

For Pakistan, Islam is an integral part of the social fabric and Pakistan’s ideology. The social contract in Pakistan continues to be based on the idea of Islam and despite its several shortcomings and threat to the stability and order in Pakistan, no one from civilian as well as military establishment ever tried to openly challenge it. Almost everyone, when in power, invoked Islam either to gain legitimacy for his/her regime or distract people from more pressing and genuine issues. Since Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam, it could neither disassociate nor reduce its role and influence over the society and the vital state institutions. It is so common in Pakistan, argues Husain Haqqani, that even school children would tell that Pakistan is an ideological state and Islam is its ideology.¹⁹

As far as Pakistan Army is concerned, argues C. Christine Fair, it was born as an ideological army which espoused Islam as its corporate ideology.²⁰ Evidence of faith could be found everywhere, which became more visible after General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation programme, in the army, which also found reflection in the three mottos (Iman, Taqwa, and Jihad-fi-Sabilillah)²¹ of the institution itself. Iman means having faith and trust in Allah and consider oneself a follower of Allah and his messenger. Taqwa signifies three things, first, the fear of Allah, second, guarding ones tongue, hands and heart from evil, and third, righteous, piety and good conduct. Jihad-fi-Sabilillah is the holy war against the evil forces in the name of Allah.

Although, some of the liberal minded Army Chiefs such as Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua and Gen. Jehangir Karamat tried to downplay the role of religion in the armed forces, yet no one could dare to challenge the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. Gen. Pervez Musharraf, while being at the helm, once stated that “Pakistan Islam Ka Kila Hai” (Pakistan is the fortress of Islam),²² then at some other time he gave a call of “enlightened moderation” and emphasised on the liberal face of Islam. He even did not hesitate to court Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)—a coalition of six Islamist parties that won a significant number of seats in National Assembly in 2002—when it was a question of sustaining himself in power and consolidating his position. His successor Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, stated in 2013 that Islam could never be taken out of Pakistan and it should always remain a unifying force.²³ Neither Gen. Raheel Sharif,²⁴ who succeeded Kayani, nor the present COAS Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa so far made any statement about Islam or Pakistan’s ideology. It is no secret that some of the authorities do have a soft corner in their hearts for Jihadists and Islamists. This omnipresence of religion in the institution has put the army in a tight corner in recent times, as the origins of some of the deadly militant attacks have been traced to the very inner circles of the institution itself.²⁵ This is a problematic pattern and if continues will have serious repercussions on the survival of the army as well as the state of Pakistan itself.

Pakistan Army is the self-appointed guardian of the state. As per the provisions of the Constitution, the security forces of Pakistan have been mandated to perform only a limited role in the country. Article 245 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has assigned a limited role to secure country’s frontiers against external threat, and to assist in national emergencies or natural disasters on the request of civilian government.²⁶ However, due to a variety of reasons, the armed forces of Pakistan, particularly the army perform multiple roles such as guarding territorial frontiers, quelling internal turmoil, defending the very ideology of the nation and, of course, protecting their own institutional, corporate and economic interests and position in society.

It is worth noting that the US have had played a significant role in strengthening the army in Pakistan.²⁷ It is an established fact that Washington does not bother about the kind of government—civilian or military—in Pakistan as long as it is cooperating in addressing vital interests of the United States.²⁸ Since the very beginning, Pakistani leaders were very keen to enter into some sort of agreement that could yield economic and military aid. Country’s political and military establishment had always looked at the US for possible help (in the form of economic and military aid, equipment and training of Pakistani officers in the prestigious US military institutions) to modernise and improve the fighting capability of the institution.²⁹

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, had worked hard to secure US support even at a time when the dream of a separate Muslim homeland was yet to be materialised. For this very purpose, in June 1947, he hosted Raymond A. Hare, the then Head of the division of South Asian Affairs in the Department of State, and Thomas E. Weil, the then Second Secretary of the US Embassy in India, at his home in Bombay (now Mumbai) to discuss the possible economic and military aid in exchange of Pakistan’s resistance to the communist expansion in the region.³⁰ Initially US did not show interest but later, when India declined to become a part of the Western bloc in former’s struggle against the Soviet Union and gave a call for non-alignment, it agreed to help Pakistan which substantially improved the health of the institution and boosted the morale of the army.

Almost half of the time, since the inception of Pakistan, army has directly ruled the state and taken major policy decisions on its own. During the periods of civilian rule, by using powerful intelligence agencies such as the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI), it not only influenced major policy decisions but also exercised veto on specific occasions. Pakistan Army deeply distrusts the civilian leadership’s capability to get things done properly in the country without their help. It does not want civilian leaders to interfere in the internal organisational matters, and service affairs on the pretext that such interference would compromise the autonomy of the institution. These are considered as critical components that determine the very nature of the civil-military relations in Pakistan.³¹ Army controls the “Grand National Narrative” (GNN)³² and does not allow any other stakeholder to introduce such changes in GNN that could have the potential to weaken army’s grip over it.

It is not like that the army intervenes in the political domain because it wants to rule over Pakistan directly. Usually, it intervenes and assumes direct control of the state whenever it realises that its institutional, corporate and economic interests, that it fiercely guards, are being threatened or compromised. This could possibly be due to certain steps taken by the civilian leader...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Advance Praise for the Book
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables and Diagrams
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• Acronyms
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Pakistan Army: Basic Structure and Composition
• 3. Islam in the Garrison
• 4. Army’s Institutional and Corporate Interests
• 5. Institutionalisation of Army’s Role in Decision-Making
• 6. Involvement of External Entities
• 7. Conclusion
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Back Pictures