PART ONE
The Purpose and Method of Hegelâs Logic
Hegelâs Science of Logic is a dense and difficult work, but its aim is easily stated: to âclarifyâ or âpurifyâ (reinigen) the basic categories of thought (SL 17 / LS 17). It is tempting to think that simply opening our eyes confronts us with objects. In Hegelâs view, however, the matter is not that simple: opening our eyes merely lets in light and gives rise to visual sensations of colour. Strictly speaking, therefore, we do not actually see objects before us; all we see is a two-dimensional âplaneâ (Fläche) of colours.1 So how do we come to experience objects? We do so, Hegel claims, by understanding what we see (and perceive through the other senses) in terms of general concepts or âcategoriesâ â a term he borrows from Aristotle and Kant (see LL 21, 34 / 25, 42). Such categories, for Hegel, include the thoughts of âsomethingâ, âquantityâ, and âcauseâ. They make the experience of objects possible by enabling us to regard what we perceive as more than just an array of colours â as something, an object, that has a certain magnitude and exercises a causal influence on other things.2
In Hegelâs view, therefore, objects are not simply given to us by the senses. We experience objects because, by means of categories, we understand what we see and hear to be an object. Such categories, Hegel contends, are not themselves the result of sensation but have their source in thought (though, as we shall see, their ultimate ground is the rationality in being itself).3 Our experience of objects is thus the result of cooperation between sensation and thought. Hegelâs claim, however, is not that we first have sensations and then bring categories to bear on them; rather, we understand and âcategorizeâ what we see and hear as we see and hear it.4 According to Hegel, therefore, we never have unconceptualized sensations (at least when we are no longer very young children): we never see colours without understanding them to belong to some object, or to be something in their own right. In this sense, whenever we open our eyes, we do, indeed, âseeâ objects. Yet such âseeingâ is not mere visual sensation, but the âconcrete habit which immediately unites in one simple act the many determinations of sensation, consciousness, intuition, understanding, etc.â (EPM 132 / 186 [§ 410 R]).5
For Hegel, thought and its categories inform all our sensing and perceiving (and, indeed, our imagining and desiring). This, he claims, is what distinguishes human beings from other animals.6 Non-human animals, we are told, remain immersed in unconceptualized sensations: they feel specific pleasures and pains and associate these with what they see, but they do not think of what they see as an object with qualities, magnitude, form and so on.7 In the human being, by contrast, what Hegel calls âthe logicalâ (das Logische) â thought and its categories â âpermeates all his natural behavior, his ways of sensing, intuiting, desiring, his needs and impulses; and it thereby makes them into something truly humanâ (SL 12 / LS 10). All human experience (beyond that of the very young) is thus mediated by categories.8
Hegel notes that the categories or âforms of thought [Denkformen] are first set out and stored in human languageâ (SL 12 / LS 9-10). They are given implicit or explicit expression in words; or, as Hegel puts it in his philosophy of spirit, âit is in names that we thinkâ (EPM 199 / 278 [§ 462 R]). Categories thus inform and permeate our sensing and imagining insofar as language informs them. As Hegel writes,
In all that becomes something inward for the human being, or a representation as such, in whatever he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he transforms into language and expresses in it contains a category [Kategorie], whether concealed, mixed, or well defined. So much is the logical natural to the human being, or rather it is his very nature itself.
âSL 12 / LS 10
Language, however, is something we have to learn. Before we learn it, when we are still very young, we are thus immersed, much like non-human animals, in sensations that are as yet unconceptualized. Instead of experiencing identifiable objects, therefore, âinitially the child has only a sensation of light by which things are manifest to itâ (EPM 56 / 80 [§ 396 A]). As we learn language, thought and its categories then gradually come to inform our whole consciousness; and, Hegel notes, explicit âinstruction in grammarâ also draws the attention of children to âdistinctions of thoughtâ (EL 59 / 85 [§ 24 A2]).9 In this way, although it is not initially true, it comes to be true of human beings that they never have unconceptualized sensations.10
Moreover, as our command of language improves, so the range of categories that permeate our consciousness increases. Individuals at different stages of linguistic development will thus understand the world in subtly different ways. Hegel also believes that whole languages can give expression to basic categories to different degrees and may not express certain categories at all (at least before certain points in their history), so different peoples and civilisations can understand the world in subtly different ways, too. âIt is to the advantage of a languageâ, Hegel writes, âwhen it possesses a wealth of logical expressions, that is, specific and separate expressions for the thought determinations themselvesâ, and in certain languages âmany of the prepositions and articles already pertain to relations based on thoughtâ; âthe Chinese languageâ, however, âhas apparently not developed to this stage at all, or only to an inadequate extentâ (SL 12 / LS 10). Whether this supposition about Chinese is correct, I cannot say; but Hegelâs remark confirms that, in his view, speakers of different languages can experience the world through different categories (or through the same categories conceived in different ways).11
For Immanuel Kant, the twelve categories listed in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 2nd edn 1787) are the universal conditions of the objects of experience (though they must be âawakened into exerciseâ by experience itself) (see CPR B 1, 106, 195-7). For Hegel, by contrast, while the experience of objects necessarily presupposes categories, it does not presuppose that all people and peoples employ precisely the same ones or understand the ones they share in precisely the same way. Furthermore, Hegel thinks that in the course of history human beings can change the categories they employ. Indeed, he claims, âall revolutions, in the sciences no less than in world history, originate solely from the fact that spirit [ ⌠] has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more intimately, and more in unity with itselfâ (EN 11 / 20-1 [§ 246 A]). As an example of what he has in mind, Hegel maintains in the Logic that in early nineteenth-century physics, âwhere the predominant category previously was that of force, it is the category of polarity that now plays the most significant roleâ (SL 13 / LS 11).12 In contrast to Kant, therefore, Hegel does not consider the categories of thought to be straightforwardly universal. He believes, rather, that âthe advance of culture in general and of the sciences in particular [ ⌠] gradually fosters the rise of thought-relations [Denkverhältnisse] that are also more advanced, or it at least raises them to wider universality and consequently brings them to greater noticeâ (SL 13 / LS 11).13
Categories, such as âforceâ and âpolarityâ, are understood by Hegel to belong principally, though not exclusively, to natural science. Many others, however, find expression and employment primarily in everyday language. As noted above, for example, Hegel thinks that categories are expressed â at least implicitly â in certain languages by common âprepositions and articlesâ. (Later we will see the important role that the prepositions in (in or within), an (in or at) and fĂźr (for) play in Hegelâs own account of the categories of Insichsein (being-within-self), Ansichsein (being-in-itself) and FĂźrsichsein (being-for-self).)14 Hegel also points out that categories are expressed in many languages by everyday nouns and verbs. Indeed, he thinks that this is the more important way for categories to be expressed, for they are thereby made more explicit or âstamped into objec...