Chapter One
How Topics Arise In Our Spontaneous Talking
Topics arise in our small talk by a little-known brain cognition, termed “predicate-equating,” that has been long thought, by both psychologists and psychiatrists, as being limited to, and uniquely characteristic of, delusional schizophrenic thinking. In 1911, the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler first coined the name “schizophrenia” from the ancient Greek word “schizo,” meaning “split,” and “phrene,” meaning “mind.” According to Bleuler, with schizophrenia, one’s mind appears as though it is split into pieces, each piece of which has its own feelings, which very noticeably can contrast with the associated feelings of the other pieces of the mind. This is called “ambivalence” which he felt was a diagnostic sign of, and limited to, schizophrenia. Bleuler also described schizophrenic thinking as being able to perceive two different objects as identical, when they are perceived as sharing a common attribute. He felt this type of thinking was also diagnostic of, and limited to, schizophrenia. Later, it was the Dutch psychiatrist Eilhard Von Domarus (1964) who described this perception as “predicate-equating.” He, too, felt this form of perception was not only a diagnostic sign of schizophrenia, but that it was limited to that illness.
Contrary to what many mental health professionals now believe, we shall see that predicate-equating cognition is not limited at all to schizophrenia, but is a major, yet little recognized cognition of anyone’s mind. With this predicate-equating cognition, two different entities can be seen as identical if they share in common a predicate. An “entity” is any person, thing, experience, act, endeavor, predicament, thought, or situation. A “predicate” is that part of a sentence that describes what the subject of the sentence is doing, or being. As an example of predicate-equating, a delusional schizophrenic might tell us, “Abraham Lincoln had a beard. I have a beard. Therefore, I am Abraham Lincoln, and because I am, you should address me as ‘Mr. President.’” The equating predicate, that makes this person identical to Lincoln, in this person’s mind, is “having a beard.” A person, believing he, or she, is a person of great importance, when he, or she, isn’t, is a delusion of grandeur. Delusions of grandeur are created by predicate-equating.
But predicate-equating is not limited to schizophrenia, as previously thought. It is a universal cognition of the human mind. This is well exemplified by idiomatic figures of speech, which are communicative expressions that present an equality between two different entities, that then greatly heightens the understanding of one of those entities. Figures of speech are common in human communication and they are all based on predicate-equating. Languages are “peppered” with figures of speech. We can suspect that figures of speech go back to the very earliest beginnings of interpersonal communication. The use of figures of speech in human communication depends upon the mental ability to predicate-equate some person, thing, act, thought, experience, endeavor, situation, or any specific well-known perception of reality, with something else, that’s lesser known, that then clarifies a communication. Figures of speech greatly enhance a listener’s level of understanding by equating a lesser-known entity, with another entity, that the listener, or anyone else, knows very well.
As an example of a figure of speech and its dependence on predicate-equating, if you were to tell me something that has just happened to you, and I were to say, “That’s a shot across your bow,” I’m presenting a figure of speech. With that figure of speech, you readily understand that I recognize that you should immediately refrain from what you are doing, because I feel it could be harmful, or even fatal to you, if you were to continue. You would understand the warning if I were to tell you, “He’s saber rattling,” “That’s just the tip of the iceberg,” “That’s a red flag,” or “You’re on thin ice.” Your indebtedness to me, after I prevented what could have been a great calamity for you, is made clear when I later tell you, “Just remember, I packed your parachute!” That understanding of yours is made possible by predicate-equating. Figures of speech provide added clarity for a better understanding of what is being communicated. They make our communications more colorful and entertaining. As an example, I’m clarifying a point I’m trying to make if I were to tell you, “You’ve got a tiger by the tail!” or “You’re kicking the can down the road.”
To understand a figure of speech, it’s essential to understand what is being compared. For instance, you might not understand the figure of speech if I told you, “It’s so cold it would freeze the balls off a brass monkey!” and you didn’t know what a “brass monkey” was. It’s not what many people might think with the wrong predicate-equating. In the days of warships under sails, a brass monkey was a heavy brass square plate with indentations on its upper surface that held the bottom layer of a pyramid (note the predicate-equating when saying “pyramid”) of cannon balls, if the ship didn’t rock more than 30 degrees. The brass monkey was kept on deck, close to a ship’s cannon, so that its iron cannon balls would be readily available in times of battle. Brass contracts sooner, and more so, than iron. If the temperature becomes cold enough, the brass monkey’s indentations become smaller, as the brass contracts, and would no longer hold in place a cannon ball so that the pyramid of cannon balls would then collapse and the balls would roll all over the deck where they wouldn’t be readily available in a battle. A “powder monkey” was a young seaman, who could very quickly climb the ladder, from below deck, to the deck above, carrying bags of gunpowder that had been kept dry below deck. Being very nimble, he was predicate-equated with a monkey. Being predicate-equated with an agile monkey, in the name “powder monkey,” probably carried over in naming the brass plate for maintaining a pyramid of cannon balls, a “brass monkey.” A “powder monkey,” and a “brass monkey,” were great assets to a gunner in any battle at sea in the days of sailing warships.
The word “metaphor” is derived from the Latin word “metaphora,” which means “carrying over,” or “transferring.” A metaphor supposedly carries over a characteristic of one entity, to another entity when, in fact, it doesn’t. There is no transferring. What appears as a metaphor “carrying over” a characteristic of one entity, to another entity, is, instead, predicate-equating. A metaphor identifies one entity, as identical to some other entity, when they share in common a characteristic. That identification is based on predicate-equating, and this equating makes the two entities the same. If I overheard someone giving you what I believe is worthless advice, I’d be utilizing a metaphor in telling you, “That’s baloney no matter how you slice it.” I’ve predicate-equated “baloney,” with that advice, where the equating predicate is, “having little if any value to you.” A simile is simply a comparison that utilizes “like” or “as.” I’m using a simile when I tell you, “He’s as unwanted as a skunk at a lawn party,” or “She’s pretty as a picture.” The two entities are compared, but they aren’t predicate-equated. But for me to have made that comparison, unconscious predicate-equating was involved. This might be only in regard to a part, like “Lincoln’s beard” and “my beard” being parts of a person. That’s part-oriented predicate-equating that’s making two whole entities identical.
Predicate-equating is involved in understanding an analogy, which is an extended comparison of the relationship between two different entities. Analogies clarify a concept, or an idea one is trying to present, or they are used to make an impact in regard to something else. Parables are analogies. They explain the unfamiliar, with the familiar. Besides figures of speech, metaphors, similes, and analogies making our communications dramatically more understandable, predicate-equating allows us to empathize, or identify, with something else, as a “whole,” or to empathize, or identify, with only an unconsciously perceived “part” of something else. Predicate-equating is the basis for our understanding a “double entendre,” or the meaning of a certain symbol, such as a “Star of David,” a “cross,” a “swastika,” “KKK,” “AWOL,” “SWAK,” a “skull and cross bones,” or somebody’s “rolled up fist” being shook at us. It may be that we are consciously aware of what is being compared as being the same, or it might be only an unconscious recognition that is based on unconscious predicate-equating. For instance, we might encounter a situation that makes us very fearful and apprehensive. We might not be aware of what it is that makes us feel so wary. There is something about that situation, which might be only a small part of that situation, that is being unconsciously perceived by us, as equated with a very emotionally uncomfortable dangerous past situation of ours, or someone else’s about which we know. Such predicate-equating, even if entirely unconscious and only part-oriented, protects us. Whole-oriented, or only part-oriented, predicate-equating can be the basis for our recognizing, either consciously, or only unconsciously, that, which in our reality, dangerously threatens our safety in some way, causing us to become more wary, and defensive. It’s predicate-equating that can give us the feeling, “This could be a disaster for me!” It is from this that we might conclude that predicate-equating has had an immense survival benefit for humans in our evolutionary history and has been a vital, but little recognized, brain cognition since the very beginning of the human race.
We might surmise that other mammals, as well as other animals, utilize predicate-equating, not only in searching for food and mates, but also as a survival benefit as well. They too may owe their survival, through their long evolutionary history, to predicate-equating. It’s predicate-equating, which may be only on an unconsciously perceived part-oriented basis, that is the cause for our feeling that, which in our newly observed reality, has a potential for making us emotionally uncomfortable, or may threaten our very existence. And it is predicate-equating, which also may only be on an unconsciously perceived part-oriented basis, that can be the cause for our pleasantly feeling that, which in any newly observed reality, has a potential for making us more emotionally comfortable than we presently are. We consciously, or only unconsciously, and again, perhaps only on a part-oriented basis, utilize predicate-equating in selecting a mate. Humans have undoubtedly done this through-out the history of the human race. And our preceding hominids probably did too, to their advantage.
Predicate-equating cognition is widespread, and can take place on an entirely unconscious part-to-part basis. This part-to-part form of predicate-equating is the very basis for an unrecognized, but universally present, dimension of human communication, first identified by this Author, that has an immense psychological importance, as we shall soon see. It is this very dimension that creates the unrecognized reason for the “cure” in any psychotherapy or counseling endeavor. We’ll see that this part-to-part predicate-equating is the cause of anyone becoming more emotionally comfortable, and much less so from any counsel, in talking at length to any perceived interested listener.
The predicate-equating of humans can initially affect any relationship, or situation, in a positive or negative way, even before any communication takes place. As an example, love, hate, or apprehension, at first sight, may be entirely based on unconscious part-oriented predicate-equating, which might make us now unexplainably more emotionally comfortable, or more uncomfortable. We can feel more apprehensive, and become more wary, from what we might observe, but not know why, just as we might feel attracted to some person, situation, or subject about which others are talking, and not know why.
Predicate-equating is the basis for “pareidolia” which is a psychological term for hearing sounds, or seeing images, that are being equated with something very meaningful for the observer but are, in fact, random. Through unconscious predicate equating, pareidolia can cause people to see meaningful shapes in their observations of their reality. With unconscious predicate-equating, one can see a man’s face in the clouds, in a mountain outcropping, or in the moon. People have seen Mother Teresa on a cinnamon bun. The face of Jesus on a grilled cheese sandwich recently sold for $28,000. It’s the mind, unconsciously predicate-equating what is seen or heard, with something else of greater emotional significance. For instance, several years ago a water stain on the wall of the Sumner Tunnel in Boston was predicate-equated with Mary, Mother of God. If one stared long enough at the stain, one could see a likeness. People began to place a single flower at the base of the stain. Later, bouquets of flowers appeared, which then became larger and more numerous. Then people began lighting candles in front of the bouquets. This eventually began to impede traffic, so the highway department removed the stain. This caused hundreds of people to write to the Boston newspapers, that those who removed that image of Mary, Mother of God, were sure to “burn in Hell for eternity.” A woman in Tennessee had a stain on her freezer chest that she felt was the face of Jesus. When she told others about it, increasing numbers of people began knocking on her front door, wanting to see the image. So many people began doing this, that she moved the freezer to her front lawn, and, according to her, over three thousand people came to view it. But some said it was not the image of Jesus, but was definitely Willie Nelson. Another example of pareidolia was an image of “Baby Jesus” in a car wash window. The “Miracle of Fatima,” that occurred in Portugal on October 13th, 1917, was an observation of the sun seemingly dancing amongst the clouds, that was felt to be, by over a hundred thousand people, a message, specifically to them, from God.
Predicate-equating allows one to enjoy the humor in: “Atheism is a non-prophet organization,” “She’s a door knob because anybody can take a turn,” and “She was only a whiskey-maker’s daughter, but he loved her still.” It’s predicate-equating that allows us to distinguish a swimmer’s dive into a swimming pool as a “belly flopper,” a “swan dive,” a “cannon ball,” or a “jack-knife dive.” Predicate-equating is reflected in the name of many things, like a “duckbill speculum,” a “pony-tail,” a “pigtail,” a “dust-up,” a “busy-bee,” a “welcome mat,” a “wind sock,” a “bucket list,” an army “foxhole,” a military “dog-tag,” or a baseball “home plate.” The partial carpeting on a flight of stairs is a “runner.” People may see “blessings from Heaven,” and “works of the Devil.” A bulky cork life preserver in WW2 was called a “Mae West,” and later, a “Dolly Parton,” where what was being predicate-equated is obvious. We know what is being predicate-equated in calling infants, all born about the same time, in a town, very heavily snowed-in nine months earlier, where the population was confined to their homes, “blizzard babies.” It’s predicate-equating calling a woman, “a foxy lady,” or calling a Civil War general, “Kill-Calvary Kilpatrick,” or an Indian chief, “Crazy Horse.” Predicate-equating is involved in giving a newborn girl a first name of “Laurel,” “Daisy,” “Rose,” “Lily,” “Violet,” or “Poppy.” It’s involved in names of endearment like, “Sunshine,” “Honey,” “Sugar,” or “Sweetie Pie,” or in sayings such as “You be my honeysuckle and I’ll be your honey bee.” We can see evidence of predicate-equating on the trucks of local businesses such as, “The Lawn Ranger,” or “Mr. Mow It All,” for grass mowing companies, or “The Tree Wise Men” for a tree trimming company. One might see, “We can take a lot of s**t” on the back bumper of a truck of a company that empties septic tanks, where “s**t” in that saying, is being predicate-equated with anything very much not wanted.
It’s predicate-equating that can give an immense emotional significance to a toddler’s stuffed toy, that can then rival the emotional significance of the toddler’s mother or father. This occurs when what has met well the emotional need of the toddler to be comfortable, in the toddler’s relationship with its parents, is unconsciously predicate-equated with the stuffed toy, so that the stuffed toy attains an immense emotional significance, or “greatness.” Where a parent might appear to the toddler as sometimes uncaring, or too preoccupied with someone, or something else, the stuffed toy is never predicate-equated with anything, or anyone, in “whole,” or in “part,” that might appear, even but briefly, as uncaring, neglecting, ignoring, restricting, reprimanding, or punishing. Nothing that has frustrated, or emotionally hurt the toddler in any way, is predicate-equated with the stuffed toy. That special toy is predicate-equated only with that which has made the toddler emotionally comfortable, or very happy. It’s because of this, that the toddler wants that stuffed toy close by every minute of both day and night. The toddler then feels “not alone,” and is much less fearful of the unknown when in the presence of the stuffed toy. The toddler feels comforted and protected because of the immense emotional significance that was created by predicate-equating. It’s that same conscious and unconscious part-oriented, and whole-oriented, predicate-equating that can give a toddler’s stuffed toy such an immense emotional significance, that then creates a desire in the toddler to have that stuffed toy always close by to talk to, even though the stuffed toy doesn’t talk to the child. The stuffed toy is perceived as an interested, understanding, and caring listener, of great emotional significance. In our understanding this, we might suspect it’s this same predicate-equating that gives the many past and present deities of the different religions of the world their immense emotional significance, and creates a human desire for their continual emotional closeness.
Predicate-equating is involved in treasured keepsakes, whatever they might be. A newly discovered Civil War telescope can have an immense emotional significance, from the predicate-equating of its owner, if that owner is a Civil War history buff. It may have little, if any, emotional value to someone else who has no interest in the Civil War. It’s a person’s conscious and unconscious, whole-oriented, and part-oriented, predicate-equating that can give the Confederate flag an immense positive emotional significance to one person, and an immense negative emotional significance to someone else. What is predicate-equated by one person is often not the same as what is predicate-equated by another person. It can be the exact opposite. What is very much wanted by one person, but very much unwanted by another person, depends on what is being consciously, or unconsciously, predicate-equated.
One might speculate that the emotional attraction of a religion’s “promised land” is derived the same way. As such, it can greatly allay someone’s grief after a loved one’s death, but in another situation, it can be someone else’s motivation for suicide, or a jihad mass killing of “infidels.” Predicate-equating a future place, with that which could make anyone want to fearfully dread, can create the antithesis of a religion’s much desired “promised land.” Religions are characterized as having two promised lands. One “promised land” is a very much desired place from following the tenets of the religion, and the other “promised land,” is a very much feared place for not following the tenets of that religion, or belonging to some other religion. Anyone’s conception of such a feared place might have been preceded by predicate-equating that, which in the past, the present, or the anticipated future, is dreaded. In the Fourth Century, Saint Augustine’s very vivid description of a fiery Hell, caused many people to join the Christian church, not only to go to a “promised land,” where all one’s desires are to be fully and continually met, but just as importantly, to avoid the possibility of perpetually burning in “the fires of Hell.” Anyone that has accidentally burned themselves painfully, can predicate-equate that brief experience, with what might be envisioned far worse, and far longer, in Hell.
Why a person prefers a certain color, a certain form of dress, a certain type of house in which to live, a certain make of automobile, or why a person wants to vacation in a certain area, or is initially attracted to a person, may be a result of unconscious part-oriented predicate-equating with what has been greatly enjoyed in the past. Predicate-equating is wide spread. We see the results of predicate-equating in the common names of plants and animals, such as “umbrella trees,” “monkey trees,” “dragon blood trees,” “lady slippers,” “snap dragons,” “black-eyed Susans,” “shepherd’s purses,” “buttercups,” “Indian pipes,” “Jack-in-the-pulpits,” “skunk cabbages,” “fox squirrels,” “hammerhead sharks,” “horseshoe crabs,” “starfishes,” “jellyfishes,” “swordfishes,” “snow-shoe rabbits,” “fire ants,” “snake’s head caterpillars,” “monarch butterflies,” “carpenter bees,” “dragon flies,” “devil’s darning needles,” “bottlenose dolphins,” and “Jesus Christ lizards,” of the rain forests of Central America that seemingly “walk on water,” just to name a few. We see the results of predicate-equating in statements that reflect figures of speech like “He’s a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” “For keeping secrets, she’s a canary,” “He’s a busy bee,” and “He won’t throw away anything because he’s a pack rat.” The Reader may think of many more examples of figures of speech that show predicate-equating.
What is being predicate-equated doesn’t even have to be factual to take place. For instance, a flat-topped mushroom is called a “toadstool.” Apparently, the mushroom is being predicate-equated with a stool that toads sit on. But toads don’t ever sit on stools! This is like the predicate-equating involved in saying, “She’s the cat’s pajamas,” when cats don’t ever wear pajamas, or in the similes, “She’s as fine as frogs’ hair, and cute as a bug’s ear,” when frogs don’t have hair, and bugs don’t have ears. The common name of the Portuguese man-of-war jelly fish is derived from predicate-equating what it looks like, to a Portuguese gunboat in the days of sail. But Portuguese sailing gunboats weren’t called “man-of-wars.” They were called “caravels.” It was the British Navy that had “man-of-wars.” The Portuguese man-of-war jelly fish is also predicate-equated with jelly fish, when it’s not a jelly fish. It’s not even an “it” but a “they,” for there are four different animals that work together to form this very primitive living entity. As such, it is a more ancient animal than a true jellyfish. It’s predicate-equating that’s the basis for believing in the ability of predicting one’s future from “reading” tea leaves, or seeing personal messages from God, in cloud formations. The story is told of a religious farmer, who clearly saw the letters G, P, and C in the clouds, which he interpreted was a specific message to him, to “Go Preach Christianity.” He gave up farming and did start preaching. After doing poorly at this, he decided that he had read the message wrong, and that the intended interpretation was, “Go Plant Corn.”
Why a person commits a copycat crime is based on predicate-equating where the equat...