The Pakistan Army

Composition, Character and Compulsions

Rana Banerji

• Publisher: KW Publishers
• Year: 2014
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9789385714573
• Subtopic: Arms Control
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Pakistan Army has always occupied a dominant position in Pakistan. It has been customary to refer to the '3 As' governing power equations in Pakistan – "Allah, America & Army, " of which certainly the Army has proved most omnipotent. This monograph traces the historical influences which shaped the Army's functioning. It delineates how the Army is adapting its doctrinal moorings to new priorities, both in respect of its arch-enemy – India and newly emerging domestic terrorism threats. A critical view is taken of how the Army has tried to balance peace negotiations with selected 'Good Taliban' in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with use of newly learnt military tactics of counter-terror operations. It studies ethnic factors which influenced initial recruitment, imparting a predominantly Punjabi character and more recent efforts to change the Army's ethnic profile. It also examines the impact of Islamic conservative ideas as the Army grappled with the war against terror after 9/11. An effort has been made to examine mistakes made in domestic and foreign policies while the Army remained at the helm, the ISI's evolution to its dominant position seen through the Afghanistan prism, the setback to the Army's image after Osama bin Laden's killing by American special forces in Abbottabad in May 2011, which cumulatively dimmed its lustre in the perceptions of people in Pakistan. The monograph also looks at compulsions of the civil-military relationship even as Pakistan seems poised for the next phase of a democratic political makeover, which if allowed to happen smoothly, may well herald a process of gradually sending the Army back into the barracks. Even if this happens, the Army is unlikely to easily relinquish control over key areas of geo-strategic policy-making extending to India, Afghanistan and the nuclear policy. It may not, however, be averse to let the civilian political transition proceed as long as it is allowed to have a controlling veto over these issues from behind the scene.

1.Introduction

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The Pakistan Army has always occupied a dominant and powerful position in Pakistani society. Modern analysts have compared Voltaire’s comment on Frederick the Great’s Prussian Army to Pakistan, observing ‘that where some States have an army’ the Pakistan Army ‘has a State’. In view of the sheer size, effectiveness and wealth of the Pakistan military and associated institutions, much the same could be said of Pakistan.¹ It has been customary also to refer, in colloquial parlance, to the ‘3 As’ governing power equations in Pakistan - ‘Allah, America and Army’, of which certainly the third ‘A’- the Army has proved most omnipotent.

Partly due to the early demise of the charismatic Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the unsolved assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali and inordinate delays in Constitution framing, politicians in both parts of Pakistan became discredited. They began to be seen in contempt by civil bureaucrats and Army officers. This led to successive Martial Law takeovers in subsequent years. Though Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as a charismatic politician, he treated senior Defence Service officers with contempt. Though adequate checks and balances were present under the 1973 Constitution, the circumstances of Bhutto’s arrogation of absolute powers in governance led to his downfall in 1977.

The subsequent chapters trace these historical influences which shaped the Army’s functioning and delineate how ethnic factors influenced recruitment. Recent efforts to change the Army’s ethnic profile, the impact of Islamic conservative ideas in reaction to Pakistan’s aligning with USA in the war against terror after 9/11, the setback to the Army leadership’s image after Osama bin Laden’s killing by American special forces (‘Seals’) in Abbottabad in May 2011 have been discussed.

The mistakes in domestic and foreign policies made while the Army remained at the helm since then may have dimmed the lustre of the institution somewhat, at least in current perceptions of civil society in Pakistan.

An effort has been made to examine how the Army is adapting its doctrinal moorings to new priorities, both in respect of arch-enemy, India including responses to threat perceptions regarding ‘Cold Start’, as also in its evaluation of domestic terrorism threats. A critical view is taken of how the Army has tried to balance peace negotiations with selected ‘good Taliban’ in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with use of newly learnt military tactics of counter-terror operations (COIN).

The Army’s military equipment profile is eclectic but remains quite dependent on its two main suppliers, USA and China. The latter is not too flush with funds or generosity while the relationship with the United States has seen turbulent ups and downs in the last few years, as angst against its perceived duplicity in delivery on the war against terror has troubled US lawmakers questioning continued high commitment to both civilian and military aid packages to Pakistan.

A more detailed examination has been undertaken of postings and transfers during the tenure of Gen. Asfaq Parvez Kayani as COAS and the impact, both of the Osama bin Laden debacle at Abbottabad as also of the rather unprecedented extension of tenure given to him in 2010 by a besieged civilian leadership, and how these events may have impacted on relations with his peers.

Since the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) holds such an omnipotent perception in the average Indian’s mind, an effort has been made to depict the ISI’s historical evolution to its present position, through the Afghanistan prism, emphasizing albeit how it remains essentially an instrument of the Army, reporting directly to the Army chief

The recent revival of judicial activism has implications both for democratic processes to take root and to bring about a gradual re-definition of the Army’s role in Pakistan. The Army’s senior leadership may not have taken too kindly to the Judiciary’s new found zeal to hold military agencies to account for ‘disappearance cases’ in Balochistan or for that matter, its enquiry into old cases of the Army’s misdemeanours arising from the revival of hearings and a quick decision in the long pending Asghar Khan petition on the funding and backing of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) in the 1989 elections and after. As one of Army Chief Gen. Kayani’s recent public and rather candid admissions of ‘mistakes in the past’ indicated, there is recognition within the Army senior leadership that this approach of the Judiciary may have found some resonance in civil society at a time when some doubts were being voiced about its one-sided persecution of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leadership.

Finally, an effort has been made to look at the compulsions of the civil-military relationship, even as Pakistan seems poised to enter into its first ever normal transition into the next phase of democratic political makeover, which if it is allowed to happen smoothly, may well herald a process of gradually sending the Army back into the barracks.

The Army is unlikely to give up its predominant position in Pakistani society easily and may like to retain control over key areas of geo-strategic policy-making, extending to India, Afghanistan and nuclear policy at the very minimum. It may not however, be averse to let the civilian political transition proceed as long as it is allowed to have a controlling veto over these issues from behind the scene.

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1.Anatol Lieven, “Understanding Pakistan's Military,” National Interest, No. 94, April 2008.

2.	Historical Background

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Historical Influences

The Pakistan Army is one of the largest and most professional armies in South Asia with an estimated strength of 5,50,000 personnel with nine Corps, two Armoured (Armd) Divisions, seven Independent Armd Brigades, two Mechanised Brigades, 18 Infantry (Inf.) Divisions and six Independent Inf. Brigades – one Area Command (South) is already deemed functional, with Headquarters at Quetta coterminous with XII Corps, while another – a Central or Northern Area Command is under formation. There are nine Artillery (Arty) Brigades attached, one to each Corps as well as five Independent Arty Brigades. There is also an Army Strategic Forces Command (SF) with 12,000-15,000 personnel, deployed under overall operational control of the National Command Authority (NCA).²

In addition, over 2.05 lakh Para-military personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), Pakistan Rangers (PR), Ansar and Mujahid Battalions assist the Army and provide avenues for deployment on deputation of Army Officers in supervisory roles at different levels.

It was not always so. The strength of the Pakistan Army immediately after Partition was only around 1,50,000. It came into existence as ‘largely the Muslim rump of the British Indian Army.’³ There were only 12% Muslims in the British Indian Army. Not all were from what was then undivided Punjab. The majority of those who opted for Pakistan had come to the conclusion that they could lead a better life in the new State, meant for Muslims. The Officer class which opted to go to Pakistan in 1947 was predominantly Mohajir (refugees migrating mostly from Awadh or Bihar). Almost 500 British Officers, in different ranks, went to Pakistan and stayed there for between two to eight years after Partition. The first two Chiefs of the Pakistan Army were Britishers - Generals Frank Messervy (then General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Command, Rawalpindi) and Douglas Gracey (who took over from Messervy on 10 February 1948).

Insecurity vis-à-vis India

From the very outset, the Army’s top leadership remained obsessed with visions of insecurity vis-à-vis the Indian Army. Partly, these feelings were justified as there were several glaring inequities in the division of assets at the time of Partition. The shortage of officers and stores were shared in a ratio of 36:64 distribution between the Pakistan Army and Indian Army. The division of assets was done on the basis of population and Pakistan got six armoured regiments, 8 artillery and 8 infantry regiments, compared to India’s 12 armoured, 40 artillery and 21 infantry regiments.

Pakistan could inherit only two major institutions - the Staff College, Quetta and the Army Service Corps School near Abbottabad, which later became the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA), Kakul. Apart from these, only the Regimental Training Centres at Karachi and Chittagong came Pakistan’s way. This created a lot of bitterness and antipathy among Pakistani Army officers.

There were mixed feelings though, combined as it were, with a sense of pride and challenge, about the mission to create a new, vibrant professional force.⁴

Army Casts itself in the Role of the Nation’s Saviour

The Army has always occupied a dominant and powerful position in Pakistan. The early demise of the charismatic Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the mysterious, unsolved assassination of a powerful politician, Liaquat Ali soon afterwards and inordinate delays in Constitution framing saw politicians in both parts of Pakistan being discredited. They began to be seen in contempt by bureaucrats and Army officers. There were rapid changes of Prime Ministers - Khwaja Nazimuddin, Bogra and Suhrawardy. Two Governor Generals, Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza, the former a civilian bureaucrat and the latter having an ex-Army background were brought in as figurehead rulers to oust politicians but were soon eased out, at gunpoint almost, to herald eventual Army control.⁵ This led, in time, to the Army emerging or casting itself in the role of national arbiter or ultimate/supreme defender of the country’s ideology, integrity, security and national interests.⁶

From Sandhurst to West Point

In its initial years, the Pakistan Army retained the basic structure of the old Indian Army as inherited from the British ‘Sandhurstian’ tradition. Most of the new Pakistani officers continued to see their British predecessors as professional role models. However, later with Pakistan’s membership of CENTO/SEATO from 1953-1965, it sought and started receiving generous dollops of US aid under both the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military and Educational Training (FMET) programmes. This resulted in gradual dilution of British influence and increase in impact of US military concepts within the Pakistan Army. A large number of training courses in USA were opened up for Pakistani Defence Services personnel. These helped familiarize middle level, younger Pakistani officers in the study of war tactics having a distinct American flavour, such as guerrilla warfare in the context of Cuba, etc. - as also studies of revolutions in Algeria, Yugoslavia, Vietnam and China - which were different from the Sandhurstian military training profile. A plethora of scholarships were offered for study in USA for children of Pakistani Army Generals first and later, of civilian bureaucrats too.⁷

Jungshahi Plane Crash

The Jungshahi plane crash of 1949 saw the death of the designated Pakistani Army Chief, Major General Iftikhar Khan along with a few other officers. This event marked a watershed changing the course of history as it cleared the decks for the appointment of Gen. Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s next Army Chief, in 1951. It proved fortuitous for Gen. Ayub Khan, who rose from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to four-star General within 4 years. Gen. Iftikhar’s seniority had been fixed just above Ayub by Gen. Messervy (though Ayub disputes this fact in his book⁸). Iftikhar’s peers have held that he would not have used his position as a doorway to political power or allowed the Army to be used for political purposes. There were some conspiracy theories regarding the plane crash but no significant evidence has come to light to substantiate the allegations.⁹

Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case

In March 1951, the first attempt by the Army to interfere in politics came to light in this case. It also brought to the fore the Kashmir fixation of senior Pakistan Army officers. The ring leaders of the conspiracy included two senior officers - Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, then Chief of General Staff (CGS) and Brig. Mohammad Abdul Latif Khan, CO 52 Brigade, Quetta. It also involved two leftist-minded civilians, including the famous poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911-1984), then Editor of Pakistan Times. It so transpired that Akbar Khan nursed grievances against the senior Pakistani political leadership as well as the Army Command from 1947-48 for not being allowed to fully implement his somewhat ambitious, even foolhardy plans to storm into Jammu & Kashmir, with the help of tribal raiders from North West Frontier Province (NWFP - now renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa - KP). He then tried to enlist support from strategically placed Army officers in Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar with the intention to overthrow the government of the day but was betrayed by some of his co-conspirators and arrested pre-emptively.¹⁰ Historically, this case is significant because it provided a telling pointer to scenarios repeated a few times later, wherein coup attempts from below - upwards never succeeded. The only coups which have worked in Pakistan have been those led by the Army Chief h...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Historical Background
• 3. Social Background of the Army
• 4. Military Doctrines and Strategic Compulsions
• 5. Leadership and Internal Cohesion
• 6. Civil-Military Relations
• 7. Conclusion