In an exclusive post-conflict Buenos Aires interview never previously published, the Argentine Foreign Minister, Doctor Costa Mendez, said Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands Islands was meant only to force negotiations. General Galtieri never wanted to fight a war and intended twice to withdraw the invasion force. Here are the Foreign Minister’s own words as a unique retrospective contribution to the debate:
Harold Briley: When did you first learn that the military chiefs wanted to take the Falklands?
Dr Costa Mendez: On February 13th, 1982, President Galtieri in one of our routine weekly meetings said not that they had made any decision on invading or occupying the Islands but that they were making military preparations just in case the government may need to occupy the Islands, as a contingency preparation. I asked whether that meant I should make some diplomatic preparations or I had to study the case to see whether it was possible from the legal or diplomatic point of view. He said, ‘No.’
HB: When did you know an invasion was to take place?
CM: I won’t ever forget. It was exactly on the 26th March. I was given strict orders not to communicate this news to anyone on the civilian side, in order to keep the secret for two main reasons, because of security and because of success. I said it can be if it is done just to occupy the Islands and immediately begin negotiations under the United Nations or the Organisation of American States or any other mediator. We thought that occupying the Islands would press Britain to negotiate or press the international organisations to intervene and try to obtain a peaceful end of a quarrel and a conflict. We wanted to speed up negotiations. We thought Britain was procrastinating. The plan did not work because of its success. When the government occupied the Islands, the enthusiasm in Argentina was tremendous. The occupation was a great success. The government was a prisoner of its success and was not free enough to negotiate and follow its original plan which was to withdraw the troops and call for United Nations troops to occupy during the negotiations. That was the original plan.
The problem of the success of the occupation – peaceful with no blood being spilt – changed the plans. We had no desire of fighting a war against Britain. The negotiation had been stalled for so many years, something should be done to speed up and show Britain it should pay attention to this problem, otherwise it would run out of control.
HB: So the war was a mistake really?
CM: The war was a mistake. I do not want to pass judgment on foreign governments. But Mrs Thatcher precipitated things when she took too early the decision to send the fleet. That decision, given the tensions and general spirit in Argentina, provoked a harder, tougher attitude in Argentina.
HB: What else could she have done at that stage?
CM: She could have delayed that decision for some days and tried to see if Argentina’s original idea could have been worked out and so let the United Nations troops take over.
HB: She did not know that. She thought the Argentines had taken the Islands with the intention of keeping them.
CM: This is not what we publicly said in the junta’s declaration. It was a surprise that the British government took a definite decision and reacted with the last possibility, the ultimate option, the last resort. I am sure Britain would not have lost anything by waiting. War is tremendously complicated and every government loses control over a war from its beginning. There are so many things involved in a war. One was the internal situation of the British government. Argentina’s government was trying to obtain some support from public opinion. And Mrs Thatcher was at the lowest point of her popularity. I think she reacted so toughly because she thought, and thought right, that reacting that way would rally around her public opinion.
Argentina wanted UN Resolution
CM: The United Nations’ resolution was, in a way, what we wanted, a very compelling invitation to negotiate. We presented a written note agreeing to a resolution.
HB: If you had withdrawn your troops, would it not have achieved what you wanted in the first place?
CM: Yes, but we wanted some assurances before withdrawing the troops, assurances that the discussions would be quick, that a resolution would be obtained by the end of the year. I was asked on a United States TV programme, Face the Nation, is recognition of Argentina’s sovereignty a condition of negotiations? I very clearly said, ‘No.’ Argentina is ready to begin negotiations without prejudices and without prejudgment. We wanted to negotiate sovereignty. We did not say we wanted to negotiate recognition. We did not say it was a precondition that Argentina must have sovereignty.
HB: What was your view of the United States’ attempt to mediate, particularly Secretary of State Al Haig.
CM: It was a move we thought, before the occupation, an expected move by the American government. I think we were unlucky in the choice of [General Al Haig as] the mediator. Perhaps [Vice President George] Bush or Mrs Kirkpatrick [US ambassador to the United Nations] could have been better negotiators.
HB: Mrs Kirkpatrick was very pro-Argentine.
CM: Mrs Kirkpatrick and most of the staff of the State Department were in favour of trying to reach an agreement and not giving full support to Britain.
Mr Reagan made a great mistake in thinking that as Mr Haig was a general; he could talk to the Argentine generals in a very special professional language and by that way reach agreement. Mr Haig proved to be a very awkward mediator. He tried to resemble his great master, Mr Kissinger, but he resembled him only in his flights around the world … shuttle diplomacy.
HB: I thought you meant flights of imagination.
CM: No, he had no imagination whatsoever. He was not what we expected – an honest broker.
A different mediator could have avoided the war. It was not easy. He was acting in good faith. The problem is he did not understand the problem. He did not know how to manage the problem.
HB: He did not have the right qualities and attitude? He found, after all, that as a general, he was not able to communicate or understand the Argentine military?
CM: There was no rapport. He was a very tough critic of the Argentine generals. I should have fought more for peace and negotiations and pressed the government to avoid or postpone the invasion and to try every means to end the conflict in a peaceful way. With hindsight I did not do enough. I did not fight for a peaceful solution to the conflict more.
HB: Once that quick victory had been obtained, the invasion so easily without bloodshed, you were then a prisoner?
CM: In a way yes. President Galtieri saw very clearly that. On two occasions, General Galtieri called me and said I think we should withdraw from the Islands, the first time by the end of April. He called me in New York and the second time was around May 15th.
HB: Why did that not happen?
CM: In the first place, precisely because the bombardment of the Islands on the first of May prevented his decision being carried out.
HB: If that had not happened, you might have withdrawn?
CM: He called me and told me to prepare everything in order to announce to the Security Council that Argentina would accept the Council’s decision and withdraw from the Islands.
HB: That is amazing. That has not been revealed before, has it? And the second time – why did it not happen?
CM: The second time there was more opposition within the military in Argentina.
HB: By that time, there had been a fair bit of fighting. What about the initiative by President Belaunde Terry of Peru?
CM: That was an excellent initiative. We were on the verge of accepting it when the sinking of the Belgrano occurred. I am sure that any of the three great initiatives could have succeeded – Haig, Belaunde Terry and Perez de Cuellar [UN Secretary General].
But the big stumbling block on the road to peace was the problem of self-determination of the Islanders, because Britain said there was no way of resolving the problem without respecting fully the self-determination problem, the wishes of the Islanders to stay British. If Argentina said yes, if we accept that proposition, we would accept that legally the British are entitled to have the islands. There was no way – it was catch-22.
HB: You have democracy now in Argentina. Was there not some strength in that argument, that there should be self-determination? Don’t you think that the Islanders should have had some wish or say in this?
CM: They should have every possibility of publicly expressing their points of view. We were ready and we are still ready – and every [Argentine] government has ratified this, that we are ready for the Islands to be governed under British rules, that the rules on laws, on marriage, on divorce, on education and the language should be maintained, and to give the largest possible participation to the Islanders in the Islands’ institutions, organisations and so forth. I think the greatest idea on the Malvinas problem was given by Lord Chalfont in 1968. A charming man, very intelligent, very shrewd, who knew the problem. He proposed to us the lease-back solution.
HB: Which Nicholas Ridley proposed later on.
CM: He failed in one of the greatest failures in the history of the Malvinas.
HB: Why did he fail?
CM: There were many backbenchers in the Conservative Party who were against. And very intelligently, very ably, moved by the Falklands lobby, an excellent lobby. The greatest problem now is economic and should be solved in economic terms. I do not fully understand why Britain is so interested in keeping those Islands so far from home, so uninteresting from the point of view of world politics, with no strategic meaning today, with no military significance. It is still a mystery why Britain has fought so furiously for those islands.
HB: They are home to the Islanders. They have been afraid of the military in Argentina, as some Argentines have been.
CM: I believe that if Lord Carrington and myself could have spoken just a few words before the invasion, the invasion could at least have been postponed. [Harold Briley later put this view to Lord Carrington, who disagreed.] I think that some joint ventures could have been created that could have perhaps created a better climate to negotiate. The opening of the communications did not work [an initiative by Ted Heath’s 1970 government]. Seduction: yes. Rape: no. We still want sovereignty.
HB: Argentina has secured democracy. Now that you are democratic, don’t you see a case for the Islanders to be democratic?
CM: A full case. To respect Argentina’s sovereignty, having all their rights to live in peace.
HB: But not the Falkland Islanders to have their wishes and rights and self-determination?
CM: We are the owners of the land.
HB: There is dispute over ownership of the land.
