Explaining Morality

Critical Realism and Moral Questions

Steve Ash

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9780367531034
• eBook ISBN: 9781000568370
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Adopting a critical realist approach to morality, this book considers morality as an aspect of social reality, enquiring into the nature of moral agency and asking whether we can legitimately argue for a specific moral position and whether moral positions can be understood to apply universally. Drawing on the thought of Bhaskar, Collier and Sayer, it explores a series of ontological questions about morality, shedding light on the ways in which critical realism can be used to address them, ultimately responding to the question of whether critical realism and the moral theories that have been produced through its use can provide an explanation of morality as a feature of reality. Through a synthesis of realist thought, the author develops a comprehensive theoretical understanding of morality that can be tested for its explanatory power through subsequent practical research. As such, it will appeal to scholars of philosophy and social science with interests in critical realism, ontology and meta-ethics.

1 The Legitimacy of a Moral Argument

DOI: 10.4324/9781003080442-2

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.

(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein, 1922: Prop.6.421)

What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein, 1922: Prop.7)

When we decide upon a specific course of action or position – or try to persuade others of the importance of a specific course of action or position – we will often use the process of a logical argument. What Wittgenstein expresses in the previous quotation is the view that when we are considering moral issues, it is not possible to use a logical argument. The reason for this is the distinction between facts and values. Facts can be defined as statements of what is; they are statements that are verifiable. Values are statements of what we ‘ought’ to do. These two types of statements are generally held to be logically separate (e.g. Hume, 1896; Ayer, 1952), in that you cannot reason from one to the other.

Bhaskar holds an opposing view. It is his contention that this logical separation cannot be maintained, so it is possible to use and develop moral arguments, and therefore norms and values are not beyond reason. In this chapter, I consider the difficulties that the fact/value distinction has created for the use of moral arguments and describe the theoretical development of the metatheory of basic critical realism (Bhaskar, 19751, 1979, 1986). This description shows why the metatheory, and specifically the concept of explanatory critique, is held to overcome these difficulties and also introduces the aspects of the metatheory that are used in subsequent chapters to critically assess the moral theories that build on this breach of the fact/value divide.

The Logical Divide Between Facts and Values

The assertion that the fact/value distinction creates difficulties for the legitimacy of moral arguments can be illustrated by considering any example of an argument that contains a moral position. One such example is Hyland’s argument for the importance of research and evidence to support the fight against modern slavery that is found in the introduction to Modern Slavery Research: The UK Picture (Bales et al., 2017). While the main focus of his argument is the importance of research and evidence, he starts by providing a background premise on why action needs to be taken to eradicate modern slavery, stating that ‘Modern slavery is a brutal abuse, denying people their dignity, safety and freedom’ (2017:5). The work that this statement is intended to do is to show that modern slavery is wrong, and so action, specifically research, ought to be taken to prevent it. However, this conclusion is considered illegitimate by those who assert the existence of the logical separation of facts and values. To consider why this is the case, the key aspects of this statement have to be considered separately.

Hyland’s statement explicitly contains facts and values and assumes a common acceptance of those values. When Hyland states that ‘modern slavery is a brutal abuse’, the word ‘abuse’ is being used as a noun that can be defined as either ‘the improper use of something’ or ‘cruel and violent treatment of a person’. The adjective ‘brutal’ indicates that Hyland is using it in its latter form. As such, what Hyland can be understood to be saying is that modern slavery is the cruel and violent treatment of a person. This component of his statement is a value judgement. Hyland also states that modern slavery denies people their dignity, safety and freedom. These three nouns all denote separate aspects of a definition of slavery: that if someone is enslaved, they are not free, and their safety and sense of self – which are vital to the concept of dignity – are of a lesser consideration then their labour potential. Therefore, what Hyland could be understood to be offering here is a definition of modern slavery, which is made up of a series of factual statements, joined with a value statement. However, it can only be seen to do the work that Hyland is expecting it to do – that of motivating research – if those who are reading the report already – for other reasons – value freedom, safety and dignity and are against the violent treatment of people. What Hyland’s statement cannot do is persuade somebody who does not share his valuing of freedom, or sees nothing wrong with violence against other people, to act as he would wish.

While this is a problem for persuading those who are not inclined to accept Hyland’s values to act as he would wish, it is also a problem for any argument for why freedom should be valued, why violence is wrong, or any other argument for a moral position, as those who argue for the logical divide assert that all value statements are separate from and therefore can never be justified by reference to any facts. This distinction was first made in 1739 by Hume, who in his Treatise of Human Nature argues that:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.

(1896:319)

This argument is known as Hume’s law – and it is important to recognise how Hume’s argument is given by its supporters this status of a law, in the same way gravity and thermodynamics have laws – as this position, and its law-like status, has over a period of almost 400 years had a fundamental impact on the question of the legitimacy of moral arguments.

Hume’s law is interpreted in two different ways. The weaker interpretation (e.g. MacIntyre, 1981) is one that holds that it is possible for one value conclusion to be supported over another by recognition of the relevant value premises. For example, it may be possible to argue that the goal of removing forced labour from fishing fleets requires the regulation of supply chains, as this is a more effective way to reduce modern slavery than the education of consumers, as long as it is recognised that such a conclusion is not just dependent on if it is factually true but also on accepting the premise that the violent treatment of people is wrong. This interpretation allows for the evaluation of the outcome of specific activities with reference to the wider values that they are supposed to promote but would insist that no wider conclusions can be drawn on the legitimacy of those underlying values.

The stronger interpretation is one that contextualises Hume’s law within Hume’s overall approach to knowledge and causation. This is an approach which considers that all possible objects of knowledge are either matters of fact – which can only be derived from sensory experience – or the relation of ideas. In this interpretation, no value judgements can ever have any empirical justification, so no value premises can ever be used in any argument. This interpretation leads to the position that no arguments are possible within moral philosophy (e.g. Ayer, 1952) and, as discussed by Sayer (2011), the view that social science, to be scientific, must be value free.

Both positions have the same consequences for the wider considerations of morality. For if no arguments are possible in morality without value premises, or our initial value premises cannot be justified, all morality is equally valid or invalid. This inevitably leads to moral scepticism (e.g. Mackie, 1977) – a position where no moral claim can be held to be true – or moral relativism (e.g. Nietzsche, 2013) – a position where value conclusions can be justified as being aligned with the underlying values of a particular specific socio-historical culture but where those values are equally valid as the underlying values of any other specific socio-historical culture.

The practical implications of this can be considered by returning to the example of slavery. A moral sceptic would question the legitimacy of any statement that ‘slavery is wrong’, whereas a moral relativist would argue that slavery is not wrong, it is just disapproved of in our society. The sceptic’s position allows for no discussion of slavery, whereas for a moral relativist, some discussion is possible, for if a society values freedom from violence for its members, then it is possible within that society to argue that slavery is wrong; however, if freedom from violence is not valued as highly as, for example, economic output – and it can be factually demonstrated that slaves have a higher level of economic activity – then the moral relativist could determine that an argument regarding the wrongs of slavery may not be compelling in that society.

While this appears to be a fundamental problem for the legitimacy of moral arguments, the position that there is an unbridgeable divide between facts and values is not universally supported. There are several arguments advanced against Hume’s law (e.g. Foot, 2001; Putman, 2002), which all seek to refute the fact/ value distinction. One approach to this problem is to contextualise this dualism within the other dualisms of classical empiricism that have arisen from Hume. This can be understood as an approach to questioning the absolute logical separation of facts and values by first exploring and questioning the underlying premises of the nature of reality and how we gain explanatory knowledge of that reality. This is the approach that is taken by Bhaskar and is explored in the next section.

The Approach of Critical Realism

Bhaskar’s motivation in developing critical realism is an interest in ‘the potential of reason and science for human emancipation’ (1994:x). As such, the fact/value distinction is of fundamental concern. Bhaskar argues against the position that there is an unbridgeable divide between facts and values and so facilitates the legitimacy of moral arguments. He does this through his concept of explanatory critique. This is the third component of the metatheory of basic critical realism and so builds on the first two aspects. These are transcendental realism– which is his original argument regarding the nature of reality and how science can gain knowledge of that reality – and critical naturalism, which is concerned with the nature of social reality and how knowledge of society can be developed. In this section, I explore Bhaskar’s argument against the logical separation of facts and values by positioning it within a discussion of his approach to the philosophy of science and causation. This section has three parts, with each covering one aspect of basic critical realism.

Transcendental Realism

In A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar argues for the ontological position of Transcendental Realism. His aim is to provide ‘a systematic realist account of science’ which can act as an ‘alternative to the positivism that has usurped the title of science’ (2008:8).2 By positivism, Bhaskar is referring to the position that certainty can only be gained through either direct sense experience of the interpretation of that information through the use of reason and logic, with the purpose of science being the discovery of general laws which govern the operation of the physical world. Bhaskar considers that positivism is an assumption which, far from providing an appropriate account of science, is just an ideology. His argument for an alternative approach is developed through an analysis of how scientific experiments can provide knowledge about the world and concludes with the transcendental realist position on the nature of reality and the question of causation – which is the issue of how we understand the relationship between two events or actions such that the first (x) brings about the second (y). To explain transcendental realism, I first describe the problem of causation, through a summary of the historical approaches to this issue – those of Aristotle, Logical Necessity and Hume. I then discuss Bhaskar’s argument for what scientific experiments reveal about causation and the nature of reality. This leads to a description of Bhaskar’s generative notion of causality. By approaching Bhaskar from an understanding of these other works on causation, it is possible to understand the comprehensiveness of Bhaskar’s account and the consequences of this for the fact/value distinction.

Aristotle considers that when we are discussing what caused y, we are in normal circumstances referring to more than one x. Aristotle subdivided causes accordingly into groups. These groups are material causes, formal causes, efficient causes and final causes (1998). To clarify this classification, consider the making of a pot. If we look at a pot and ask what caused the pot to exist, then the question of the cause would in ordinary understanding refer to the efficient cause, which would be the action of the potter in making the pot on the wheel. Aristotle’s classification allows for causation also to encompass the material cause, the clay of which the pot is made; the formal cause, the plan or diagram of the pot that was used to guide the actions of the potter; and the final cause, the use of the pot as a receptacle for water or the production of pots as a means of exchange for other goods. In this approach, causes are powers that are put to work. This is a notion of causality that allows for a recognition that there is usually more than one cause for any event, but it also recognises that human agents are themselves causes, not just by their actions but also because their reasons qua reasons have effects. What Aristotle’s account lacks is an understanding of why causation can in some circumstances be captured by law-like statements that describe regularities and why in other circumstances particular events do not occur with the same level of regularity. This is the issue of causal necessity.

The issue of causal necessity led to arguments that causal necessity must be understood as logical necessity. Rationalist philosophers, such as Descartes (1996) and Spinoza (1963), argue that the question of causation should only consider the single issue of the efficient cause. This approach is motivated by an attempt to understand how necessity works in causal relationships; as in the example of the pot, all of Aristotle’s other causes could exist, but without the actions of the potter, the pot is not made. This leads to a mechanistic and deterministic approach to causation which understands causal laws as describing a relationship between the cause and the effect such that ‘from a given determinant cause an effect necessarily follows; and on the other hand, if no determinant cause be given it is impossible that an effect can follow (Spinoza, 1963:2). The difficulty of this approach is that while it allows for an understanding of why x necessarily follows y, it cannot account for why in some circumstances y occurs but this does not lead to the effect x.

Hume’s approach to causation was to reject both the belief that what connects causal effects is logical necessity and the claim the causes have some power that brings about effects. This is an understanding of causation that is based on his empiricist understanding of reality – that the objects of knowledge are only matters of fact or relationships of ideas. He argues that causation is when a given impression in the mind of a subject is always followed by another. ‘When two impressions are consistently conjoined, the mind passes immediately from one to the other’. For Hume, this relationship is within our impressions and not in matters of fact. He argues that the idea that the causes are tethered in some way to their effects is simply a misconception based on ‘custom or habit’ (Groff, 2013:13). This radically sceptical approach to causation fails to provide an account of causation that allows us to make sense of scientific and everyday practice and ultimately leads to both the positivist search for constant conjunctions (Kolakowski, 1972) and the alternative of overcoming Hume’s scepticism by reintroducing a conception of causal power (Harre and Madden, 1975). Bhaskar takes the latter approach.

Bhaskar’s argument for the nature of causation, and reality, is developed through an analysis of the logic of scientific discovery. He argues that the positivism that is the dominant metatheory of science is dependent on a theory of causal laws that is drawn from Hume and which considers ‘that laws are or depend upon constant conjunctions of atomistic events or states of affairs, interpreted as the objects of actual or possible experiences’ (1979:124). Bhaskar argues that this is because positivism assumes that the causation that is ob...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The Legitimacy of a Moral Argument
• 2 The Universality of Morality
• 3 The Question of Moral Agency
• 4 Morality as an Aspect of Society
• 5 Explaining Morality
• 6 Combining the Realist Moral Theories
• 7 Developing the Realist Model of Morality
• References
• Index