PART ONE
REFLECTIONS ON A JUST CAUSE
This chapter is specifically intended for readers accustomed to the idea that the Palestine question is the problem of a people under occupation and dates from the Israeli seizure of control over the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. The problem is much older and deeper. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how the origins and the fuller dimensions of the Palestinian cause reside in the Nakba (calamity, catastrophe), an Arabic term, the term denoting the catastrophic consequences of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. During the 1948 War, the majority of the Palestinians, who had until then accounted for the bulk of the population in historic Palestine, were systematically expelled from their homeland. The stark contrast between Israelās independence and the Palestinian Nakba is not only the most appropriate entry point to the topic, but also an opportunity to examine some Zionist myths and the underlying ideological contradictions in dominant political culture in Israel. This chapter starts with the birth of Israel and ends with the birth of the PLO.
Independence
Israelās founding is celebrated in accordance with the Hebrew calendar. This has created a symbolic disjuncture between two dates: the date of Israelās āIndependence Day,ā which the state marks on 5 Iyar, in line with the Hebrew calendar, and the date of the Nakba, which Palestinians commemorate on the day the state of Israel was declared, albeit on 15 May, in accordance with the Gregorian calendar. The resultant temporal gapāthe two occasions are usually about a week apartāserves as an appropriate metaphor for the distance between two irreconcilable narratives concerning the same historical event, that of the coloniser and settler, and that of the colonised and the dispossessed refugee.
On āIndependence Day,ā the celebratory fervour in Israel far exceeds that of any other country marking its independence, let alone Arab states where such celebrations are comparatively feeble. In Israel, Independence Day constitutes the main holiday that includes some of the chief rites of the nationalist religion. No religious holiday surpasses it in terms of public participation except perhaps Yom Kippur, which is not festive, but rather a day of fasting, repentance and religious atonement.
Independence Day celebrations are not just official but also social and community events. Families attend local festivities with their children while patriotic songs and films dominate the airwaves. People visit military museums, and listen with rapt attention to accounts of different battles. State-run and commercial television stations air a panoply of documentaries, panel discussions, and personal interviews, reiterating various aspects of the Israeli narrative of the forceful occupation of Palestine and the Zionist project. Parents visit army units in military camps and organise picnics and day trips in the countryside (or whatās left of it) and to historic battle sites. All this feeds into the broader construction of an Israeli collective memory centred on the āWar of Independenceā of 1948.
It is no coincidence that the official Holocaust Memorial Day is also set according to the Hebrew calendar, on 27 Nisan, about a week before āIndependence Day.ā The intended message is clear: the latter is the answer to the former. But the Zionist project to move to Palestine to create a Jewish state was launched long before the Holocaust. In fact, decades after its inception, Zionism was still a marginal phenomenon among European Jews, the primary victims of the Holocaust, and almost non-existent among Mizrahi (Oriental) Jews. Most Jewish Holocaust survivors departed for the US and the majority of those who ended up in Palestine had no other choice, either because of closing immigration doors or due to lack of financial means.
In the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century, an increasingly steady flow of Jewish immigrants made their way from Europe to the US, with numbers peaking in 1905ā6. Between 1907ā9, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased, but absolute numbers remained very low in comparison. The total number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine from 1905 to 1914 represented only 0.95 to 4.27 per cent of the number of US-bound Jews (a few thousand to Palestine vs tens and hundreds of thousands to the US). Other places, such as Argentina, were also popular destinations for Jewish immigration. After the US recovered from its 1910 economic crisis, the number of immigrants to the US increased and immigration to Palestine and Argentina declined. Between 1911ā14, the rate of immigration to both the US and Palestine increased, and continued to rise until World War I.1
However, in 1921, the US took measures to limit immigration by imposing quotas based on country of birth.2 The Immigration Act of 1924 further tightened and codified these limits.3 In mid-1924, following the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine and after the US shut its doors, Jews started to immigrate in greater numbers to Palestine. But they also migrated from Palestine. Liebmann Hersch stated that āconsidering the whole period 1922ā29, Jewish emigration carried off from Palestine 30 percent of the immigration. This is all the more striking since the Jews entered Palestine [ā¦] with the intention of staying, and since this enormous rate of return is found in Palestine just when immigration elsewhere was made excessively difficult for the Jews.ā4
Table 1.1: Jewish Immigrants to the United States and Palestine (1899ā1939)
Source: | Liebmann Hersch | Gur Alroey5 | The American Jewish Year Book |
Year | Jewish Immigrants to the US6 | Jewish Immigrants to Palestine7 | Jewish Immigrants to the US | Jewish Immigrants to Palestine | Jewish Immigrants to the US8 | Jewish Immigrants to Palestine9 |
1881ā1898 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 10533,478 | ā |
1899 | 37,000 | ā | ā | ā | 11829,244 | ā |
1900 | 61,000 | ā | ā | ā | | ā |
1901 | 58,000 | ā | ā | ā | | ā |
1902 | 58,000 | ā | ā | ā | | ā |
1903 | 76,000 | ā | ā | ā | | ā |
1904 | 106,000 | ā | ā | ā | | ā |
1905 | 130,000 | ā | 129,910 | 1,230 | | ā |
1906 | 154,000 | ā | 153,748 | 3,450 | | ā |
1907 | 149,000 | ā | 149,182 | 1,750 | | ā |
1908 | 103,000 | ā | 103,378 | 2,097 | 656,397 | ā |
1909 | 58,000 | ā | 57,551 | 2,459 | | ā |
1910 | 84,000 | ā | 84,260 | 1,979 | | ā |
1911 | 91,000 | ā | 91,223 | 2,326 | | ā |
1912 | 81,000 | ā | 80,595 | 2,430 | | ā |
1913 | 101,000 | ā | 101,330 | 3,050 | | ā |
1914 | 138,000 | ā | 138,051 | 2,182 | | ā |
1915 | 26,000 | ā | ā | ā | 79,921 | ā |
1916 | 15,000 | ā | ā | ā | | ā |
1917 | 17,000 | ā | ā | ā | | 18,88512 |
1918 | 4,000 | ā | ā | ā | | |
1919 | 3,000 | ā | ā | ā | | |
1920 | 14,000 | ā | ā | ā | | |
1921 | 119,000 | ā | ā | ā | 119,036 | |
1922 | 54,000 | 7,844 | ā | ā | 53,524 | 7,844 |
1923 | 50,000 | 7,421 | ā | ā | 49,719 | 7,421 |
1924 | 50,000 | 12,856 | ā | ā | 49,989 | 12,856 |
1925 | ā | 33,801 | ā | ā | 10,292 | 33,801 |
1926 | ā | 13,080 | ā | ā | 10,267 | 13,081 |
1927 | ā | 2,713 | ā | ā | 11,483 | 2,713 |
1928 | ā | 2,178 | ā | ā | 11,639 | 2,178 |
1929 | ā | 5,249 | ā | ā | 12,479 | 5,249 |
1930 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 11,526 | 4,944 |
1931 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 5,692 | 4,075 |
1932 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 2,755 | 9,553 |
1933 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 2,372 | 30,327 |
1934 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 4,134 | 42,359 |
1935 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 4,837 | 61,854 |
1936 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 6,252 | 29,727 |
1937 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 11,352 | 10,536 |
1938 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 19,736 | 12,868 |
1939 | ā | ā | ā | ā | 43,450 | 16,405 |
There is a noticeable correlation between the increase in Jewish immigration and waves of antisemitism in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Europe. Even before the Holocaust, most Jews seeking refuge during waves of discrimination and persecution or economic hardships immigrated to the US, much like other Europeans at the time. Few Jews chose Palestine as a refuge. As for the relative handful of Zionists that did go to Palestine, they were still akin to a fringe cult. Unlike Jewish religious communities that settled in Palestine over the centuries in order to be in close proximity to the āgraves of the ancestors,ā the new Jewish colonists were motivated by a different zeal. They saw themselves as the vanguard of a national movement intended to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. The early Zionist discourse, in general, disparaged and derided the character and image of ādiaspora Jews,ā and scorned the Jews who chose not to join the settlers in Palestine. Diaspora Jews were expected to at least support the Yeshuv)13 and, later, the state of Israel and to lobby for it abroad.
The national āIndependence Dayā celebrations and other festive seasons were carefully designed, since 1951, to create rituals filled with symbols, codes and emotive memory triggers, the ultimate aim of which was to construct a nation. By nation, here, I mean not a nation state, but a nation for whom the state must be created; a nation whose diverse histories are re-imagined as an indivisible monolithic history, a single nationalised history that, ānecessarilyā, yes, even teleologically, leads to a Jewish state. This type of creation or foundational myths gives rise to a political culture centred around a proprietorial relationship between an ethnic group (or, in this case, ethno-religious group) and the state and that prioritises ethnic affiliation (or ethno-religious affiliation) as a criterion for the acquisition of rights. It is little wonder, in such cases, that the poorest and most underprivileged tend to stress their ethnic identity, which is identical with that of the state, as a means to demand equality.
Israelās āIndependence Dayā is an ideal opportunity to reproduce many of the stateās founding myths and narratives, starting with the āWar of Independenceā as a war of the few against the many. Others are the ārebirthā of the Jewish state in Palestine, the narrative of the secular-nationalist construction of the ānew Jewā who carries weapons and tills the earth in Eretz Israel, and the āNegation of Exileā (shlilat hahgula), the myth of the apolitical existence of diaspora Jews without a nation. This negation, which is essential to Zionism, is performed by turning the Jews into a ānation like all nationsā14 by establishing a Jewish state15 and by repudiating the āweakā minority status and character of ādiaspora Jewsā who could not own and cultivate land or protect themselves. This is all to say that, not only were many Jews against Zionism (those willing to participate in European secular society as integrated citizens, and others wanting to preserve their perceived Jewish exilic uniqueness), but also that Zionism was against many Jews. Zionism openly despised the exilic existence, ways of life and general character of diaspora Jews.
Zionist ideology underwent some transformations since it first fused some indispensable religious myths (the eternally promised land and the promise of return) with a secular settler colonialist drive and a militaristic creed in order to found the Jewish nation and establish its link with Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). Under the combined forces of nation-building nationalist propaganda, ongoing territorial and settler expansion and growing militarisation, the secular myths would grow sacred and the sacred (religion) would become more...