The Common Law
The common law system developed in the thirteenth century.1 When the English feudal system began to weaken and modern cities began to develop, the king sent royal judges to decide controversies in his name. This was done primarily to increase the kingâs power and authority as the power and authority of his feudal lords waned. Each feudal manor had its own customs, and the judges would weigh their own perceptions of fairness, the existing customs, and the political repercussions in reaching decisions. As we might expect, the decisions were often based on unclear reasoning, and cases that appeared similar might be decided in completely contradictory ways. The clerks accompanying the judges began to record decisions and reasoning; congregating back in London they compared notes, and gradually judges started to refer to the decisions of their colleagues as another basis for decisions. Eventually, recording decisions became routine, and judges were required to set out their reasoning for the formal record. Any deviation from precedent had to be justified. In this way the common lawâthe system of law common to the entire countryâwas established.
Today we take the English basis of our legal system for granted. In the early days of the republic, when the former colonies did not have their own cases to determine the precedents for judicial decisionmaking, judges drew on the same English law that had governed their decisions prior to the American Revolution.2 At the time of the Revolution, there was debate about whether the new country would follow the English tradition; in some quarters feelings were very strong that a complete break from England was the only correct approach. The legal system that was suggested to replace the common law tradition was the civil law approach that prevailed on the continent of Europe and was used by allies such as the French. The French colonies had retained the continental legal system, and even today Louisiana, a former French possession, is still governed by such a system.
Despite the radical proposals to change the law, the English system prevailed. Colonial lawyers and judges were trained in the common law, and contracts, property transfers, and all forms of legal transactions were already in the English style. Besides, despite the outpourings of anti-English sentiment immediately following the Revolution, most colonists still thought of themselves as English in spirit. Edmund Burke, the English statesman and philosopher, excused the American Revolution on the grounds that good Englishmen should rebel when treated unfairly. Common sense and common law prevailed, and the American legal system was based upon the English one.
One of the earliest environmental cases resting on common law traditions appeared before the United States Supreme Court in 1842. Martin v. Waddell originated with the contention by a New Jersey riparian landowner, Waddell, that he had exclusive rights to take oysters from the Raritan River. He based his assertion on a grant made by King Charles in 1664 to the Duke of York, which gave the Duke âall the powers of government.â Waddell claimed that his rights to the mudflats were directly descended from property rights transferred by the Duke of York and his managers. Waddellâs opponent, Martin, argued that the King held certain resources (among them, mudflats) in trust for the people, and that the Kingâs grant to the Duke of York required the Duke to hold these resources in trust as well. Thus, he argued, despite language that might be interpreted otherwise, the Duke did not have the power to transfer the mudflats to private ownership any more than the King did. The Supreme Court agreed with Martin that the original grant did not include the exclusive right to fish the adjacent waters. Of course, in the interim since the grant had been given to the Duke of York, the State of New Jersey had formed a new government, so the second question before the Court was whether New Jersey was similarly prohibited from granting private, exclusive rights to lands that under common law were public trust lands. Justice Taney (the same justice whose decision in Dred Scott helped precipitate the Civil War) found that the public trust doctrine had survived the Revolution:
[W]hen the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government, and took into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before belonged either to the crown or the Parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested in the State.3
Although Martin v. Waddell is not the only case in which courts articulated the continuance of English traditions, it is one of the clearest. Of course, the changing social and economic situations in the United States led to many and frequent diversions from the English law, but the basis was firmly established.
In addition to the common law, which continues to develop, statutes, rules and regulations, and the Constitution are rich sources of American law.
Statutes and Ordinances
Statutes are the formal acts of legislation passed by Congress or the state legislatures. Similar enactments passed by county and city governments are often called ordinances or local laws. Sometimes statutes are very specific, for example, setting time limits on Superfund damage claims or the maximum permissible automobile emission levels. At other times, however, legislatures establish broad guidelines and leave the details to the executive branch.4 This is done for several reasons. First, the legislators have neither the time nor the expertise to hammer out the details of implementation. Second, the legislative process is slow and cumbersome; it is designed that way so that the decisions are as free from circumstantial pressure as possible. Administrative actions are comparatively speedy, as will be seen in chapter 5. Finally, by passing the responsibility for detailed implementation to the executive branch, the legislature avoids much of the political repercussions of unpopular decisions. For example, when the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed raising the cost of federal-land grazing permits to market levels, the resulting firestorm engulfed the BLM bureaucrats and not the Congress that had given them the authority to raise fees.
Rules and Regulations
Another source of American law is the rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies. Technically, under the Constitution only the legislature has the authority to make laws. However, in the American system, the legislature has delegated some of its law-making authority to the executive agencies. From the late nineteenth century through the middle of the New Deal, the constitutionality of legislative delegation of authority was questioned, and even today some commentators argue that the Congress in particular cannot give rule-making powers to the executive branch without very clear and restrictive guidelines. In practice, however, federal and many state agencies have the power to make rules and regulations that have the force of law. These rules must meet two constitutional standards: procedural due process (Did the agency follow the legal requirements of notice and hearing?), and substantive due process (Is the agency operating within its designated policy boundaries?). This will be discussed more fully in chapter 4. It is, however, important to note that any rule or regulation that is formulated with the proper procedures and is within the statutory authority of an agency has the same legal status as legislation passed by the legislature and signed by the executive.
CASE DISCUSSION 1.1
Cover Crops
In 1938, the federal government created the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) to provide a safety net for farmers who suffered losses from âunavoidable causes, including drought.â In February 1945, the FCIC published its wheat regulations in the Federal Register. The following month, Merrill and others applied for insurance for their wheat crop in Bonneville County, Idaho. The County Agricultural Conservation Committee was the FCICâs agent in Bonneville County; Merrill and friends told the Committee that they were planting 460 acres of spring wheat, 400 acres of which had previously been seeded with winter wheat. The Committee told them the entire crop would be covered and recommended that the FCIC office in Denver accept the application. The written application did not mention that any of the acreage was reseeded. In May, the insurance application was accepted.
The summer of 1945 was very dry, and in July, drought caused most of the crops to fail. When Merrill and friends filed their insurance claims, they were told that under the February regulations, reseeded wheat was not covered, and that portion of the claim was denied.
- Under Idaho state law, a private insurance company in similar circumstances would be bound by the agentâs word.
Should the crop losses of Merrill et al. be covered?
(Source: Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill et al., 332 U.S. 380 [1947])
