Qatar

The Practice of Rented Power

Diana Galeeva

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781000569988
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica mediorientale

This book explains the parameters of Qatar's political growth by developing an alternative theory of power – 'rented' power.

The author demonstrates how Qatar's emergence as a regional power can be solely explained by its capacity as a gas-rich rentier state. By using Qatar as an empirical case study of the 'rented' power theory, readers will gain insight into Qatar's engagement with non-state actors (political Islam, tribes, media, sports, and others) to wield its power, allowing Qatar to 'rent' the well-established influence of non-state actors due to their transnational nature. The Qatari case demonstrates a state's ability to establish a patron-client relationship with non-state actors, overcoming limitations set by size or military strength to gain international influence.

This book is accessible to a wide readership: it will be of interest of scholars, postgraduates, journalists, policy experts, and a general audience whose interests include the politics of the Middle East and the GCC states particularly

Part IRented powerMain features

1Introduction to the concept of rented power

DOI: 10.4324/9781003269045-2

1.1 Introduction

Qatar is one of the states in the Arabian Peninsula that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) along with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Today, Qatar is the richest state in the world, mainly because the country ‘is endowed with major hydrocarbon reserves, especially in relation to the size of its population’ (QNB, 2018:2). In 2020, its population totalled nearly 2.9 million (The World Bank, 2020), but of these, only approximately 300,000 were deemed Qatari citizens (Wright, 2016). Qatar’s economy relies on the hydrocarbon sector, it has the world’s largest gas reserves, and is the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, as well as oil (Krane and Wright, 2014). This vital power resource became a key driver for Qatar’s political growth. Due to its size and population, enormous wealth has led to national prosperity and the growth of Qatar as a regional power.

Qatar was not always as we see it today. It was politically weak and in the shadow of neighbouring countries, especially Bahrain, the Ottoman Empire and Saudi Arabia. Qatar was viewed as ‘Bahrain’s little sister’ (Crystal, 2016:38), as Qatar’s modern history emerged from the late 18th century when the al-Khalifa family, with other families, migrated from Kuwait to Qatar’s west coast, Zubarah. At the time, Doha, Fuwayrat, Huwaylah were small fishing villages on the east coast. It was only after settling in Qatar, in 1783 that the al-Khalifa conquered Bahrain and established a new ruling dynasty. Al-Khalifa continued to control Zubarah and small settlements in the west of the country, even though they were based in Bahrain (Crystal, 2016). These historical developments are the roots of the complex modern relations between Qatar and Bahrain, supplemented by the relations between the two ruling families of al-Khalifa of Bahrain and al-Thani of Qatar.

Qatar’s al-Thani are ‘relative newcomers as a ruling family’ (Zahlan, 1989:84), and at the beginning of their emergence as such, the al-Khalifa family maintained control over the Qatar Peninsula. 1868 was a formative year, a milestone for the emerging Qatar ruling dynasty. In the eastern villages of Doha and Wakrah, away from Zubarah, Bahrain was challenged by intermittent opposition from the people of Qatar. In 1867 a Bahraini naval force attacked Wakrah, aiming to undermine al-Khalifa rule. The Bahrainis had disrupted British treaty regulations by embarking on the naval expedition, and therefore Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, openly opposed combatants on both sides. He went to Bahrain and afterwards to Wakrah. Mohammad bin Thani, the founder of the dynasty, acted on behalf of the people of Qatar, because al-Thani were officially acknowledged as Chiefs of the Ma’adhid tribe, consequently as Chiefs of Doha (Al-Arayed, 2003:45). As a result, two documents dated 6 and 12 September 1868 were signed with Shaykh Ali bin Khalifa, ‘Chief of Bahrain’, and Shaykh Mohammad al-Thani, ‘Chief of Qatar’ and with Great Britain (International Court of Justice at The Hague, 2001:488). Moreover, the historical events were cited at the judgement of the merits of the case at the International Court of Justice at the Hague (ibid., 2001:488):

On 13 September 1868, again through the mediation of the British Political Resident, tribal chiefs residing in the province of Qatar, solemnly agreed to pay to Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah, Chief of Bahrain, the annual sums previously paid by them to the Chiefs of Bahrain; these sums were paid to Mohamed Al-Thani of Doha, who was in turn to transmit them together with his own contribution to the political Resident for delivery of the total to the agent of the Chief of Bahrain.

The interpretations of these events differ in modern Bahrain and in Qatar. Qatar’s position is that the 1868 Agreement formally recognised for the first time the separate identity of Qatar because the agreement treated the Ruler of Bahrain and the Ruler of Qatar as equals. Moreover, this was also confirmation of the British recognition that the authority of the Shaykh of Bahrain did not spread to the territory of Qatar (International Court of Justice at The Hague, 2001:488). Zahlan (1989:85) accepts this interpretation, arguing that the agreement signed on 12 September 1868 by Mohammad al-Thani alone, explicitly recognised Mohammad bin Thani and the people of Qatar as ‘being independent from Bahrain’. By contrast, the Bahrain view is that the events of 1867–1868 illustrate that Qatar was not independent from Bahrain. Moreover, the ratification of the taxes payable by the dependent tribes of the Qatar Peninsula to the al-Khalifa, in the way allowed for by the Agreement of 13 September 1868 between the Shaykh of Qatar and the Shaykh of Bahrain:

confirmed the latter as the sovereign authority on the peninsula; Sheikh Al-Thani of Doha had thus acknowledged the continuing authority of the rulers of Bahrain and their right to claim taxes from him. In Bahrain’s view, until 1916, there was thus no State of Qatar possessing attributes of sovereignty over the whole of the peninsula of Qatar.

(International Court of Justice at The Hague, 2001:488)

Scholars also take this view: al-Arayed (2003:45–46), for example, while examining the second agreement signed on 13 September 1868 by all the local chiefs, considers this agreement in ‘undertaking to return to the practice of paying taxes and tribute to the Ruler of Bahrain, the tribal chiefs of the Qatar peninsula formally recognized the continuing authority of the Ruler’. Al-Arayed concludes, that al-Thani, along with other leaders in the region, recognised ‘that they remained subject to the Al-Khalifa’. Moreover, this agreement also demonstrates that al-Thani were held responsible only for the conduct of their subjects in Doha, and not for those of other chiefs (Lorimer, 1908). This explains the complex historical background between Bahrain and Qatar, to which layers of multifaced and difficult relations have continued to the present day. From any of the different interpretations of these events, from the perspective of the development of the State of Qatar and the establishment of its ruling family, Fromherz’s (2012:55) quote might be useful, as viewing it as ‘a milestone of the political evolution of Qatar’, as the first formal recognition of Qatari independent sovereignty by the British. However, it was not a formal recognition: it would not be until 1916 that the Anglo-Qatar treaty would be signed and recognised as giving British protection to Qatar.

Consequently, Qatar had less protection (in comparison to other Gulf states) from the British Empire, and the rise of the Ottomans in al-Hasa and their rivalry with al-Saud of Riyadh over this territory was also a threat to Qatar as well. At the same time, it was competition between the British and the Ottomans that led the Ottomans to establish a new policy in 1869 (one year after the signed aforementioned agreements were signed with Britain) to unite Ottoman land control over the Gulf. The Ottomans exploited a split between father and son: Mohammad bin al-Thani rejected recognition of Ottoman rule and maintained his agreement with Britain; while his son Jasim accepted the Ottomans and in 1872 Qatar was recognised as a Kaza, or a small district, under the Sanjak of the Najd. Initially, this situation only benefited al-Thani’s rule. However, from 1878 onwards the Ottomans started to request more open use of Qatar to balance Britain. At the battle of Wajbah between the Ottoman Wali, Mehmed Hafiz Pasha, and Shaykh Jasim and his forces, the latter emerged victorious and received the status of ‘founder of the country’ (ibid., 2012:61).

Future threats from the Ottomans disappeared as their Empire declined, while in contrast the ambitions of Abdulaziz bin Saud increased, threatening the Qatari leadership. As a sign of a political, symbolic act and a pre-emptive recognition of influence by al-Saud, in 1902 Shaykh Jasim formally became a Wahhabi (though Wahhabism had already been present for years). However, particularly by 1913, Wahhabi expansion under Ibn Saud started to openly threaten Qatar’s viability. For this reason, Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin Jasim signed a formal treaty with Britain in 1916, the legal foundation of Qatar’s protectorate status. The significance of the treaty was that Qatar was afforded ‘the security they badly needed to survive as a fledgling state, against the geopolitical weight of Saudi Arabia in particular’ (Baskan and Wright, 2011:107). Fromherz (2012:73) analyses some outcomes of this treaty and importantly states: ‘More substantively, the treaty not only further assured the stability of Abdallah’s position, it also prevented a takeover of Qatar, or at least caused Al-Saud to think twice about such a move’. Nowadays al-Udaid military air base hosts the headquarters of the US Central Command and provides full security for Qataris. So, such relations with external powers (first with the British Empire and later with the US) secured Qatar from military interventions, and boosted, over time, the opportunity for Qatar to conduct its own independent foreign policies, even when contradicting those of its neighbours.

The history of such policies in Qatar is particularly associated with the leadership of Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani who replaced his father, Shaykh Khalifa, as the Amir in a bloodless coup in 1995. The causes for this transition of power remain uncertain. One group of observers believes that Shaykh Hamad saw his father as an obstacle to economic development. Before 1949, due to the collapse of the pearl market and the slowdown in oil exploration and drilling during the World War II, Qatar suffered economic distress (ibid., 2012:66). In 1935 Shaykh Abdullah, by then in power, signed an oil concession with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which became an affiliate of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and was renamed the Petroleum Development Qatar Ltd., the forerunner of Qatar Petroleum (Fromherz, 2012:75–76). In 1972 the son of Shaykh Hamad bin ‘Abdullah al-Thani, Shaykh Khalifa, came to power in a bloodless coup, with Saudi support. He took over the leadership from his cousin Shaykh Ahmad, who was in power after his father Shaykh Ali bin ‘Abdullah al-Thani – Shaykh Khalifa’s uncle. Shaykh Khalifa’s name is associated with the Declaration of Independence of Qatar on 3 September 1971 on Qatari Television, and at that time he was officially recognised as Vice-Amir and Crown Prince in 1960. Under his reign, there was no significant development in Qatar’s economy, although traditional industrial sectors were developed with the launching of the Qatar Steel Company and Qatar National Cement Company. However, in 1988, with the fall in oil prices, the Qatar Petroleum Company and the Qatar Steel Company were running at a loss with a resulting budget deficit for Qatar (ibid., 2012:81).

The key driver behind Qatar’s rapid economic development is Qatar’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) production (although the oil sector in Qatar’s economy has played an important role in the economy for decades). Most of Doha’s gas reserves are located in the offshore gas field, the North Dome (or North Field), which spans the maritime borders of Qatar and Iran (Dargin, 2007). The main gas reserves were identified by Shell in the 1970s, but in order to develop LNG, a market and massive capital investment was needed. Heir Apparent since 1977, Shaykh Hamad had the responsibility for Qatar’s gas and oil development from 1992, and he continued the strategic development of these sectors as Amir (Coleman, 1998:24).

However, it was not without the involvement of foreign powers. A former British diplomat, interviewed anonymously (Interviewee A, 2017), states that when he first met the then Crown Prince Hamad, Hamad asked ‘Can you tell me what [LNG] is, because everyone talks about it, and I have no idea what LNG actually is’. LNG was not further developed for at least 10 years, when the market became sufficiently active to generate the investment. Consequently, since the 1980s the decision to exploit the North Dome was made in phases, led by Qatar Petroleum LNG’s joint ventures with international companies, i.e. as Gray (2013:94) explains, the gas sector was developed differently to the oil sector – more collaboratively and internationally, and with the use of technology to focus on gas exports.

Other studies suggest that another reason for Shaykh Hamad’s coup against his father, Shaykh Khalifa, was Qatar’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. They contend that Shaykh Hamad was unhappy with the international perception of Qatar as a feudal vassal of Saudi Arabia, because of the former Amir Shaykh Khalifa’s payment for Saudi Arabian protection. One anecdote indicates Shaykh Hamad’s intentions to escape the shadow of Saudi Arabia – given Qatar’s history, as noted earlier, of always being under the shadow of other regional players – and to transform Qatar into an important economic and political actor with a global presence. Describing the first time he visited the UK when he found that his passport was unfamiliar to passport control, he determined to ‘put Qatar on the map’. In 2013, current Amir Shaykh Tamim, described his father as the transformer of Qatar ‘from a state that some people could barely locate on a map into a major player in politics, economics, media, culture, and sport’ (Soubrier, 2017:131). For this reason, most scholars ally Qatar’s political rise with Shaykh Hamad.

However, during the interview, the former British diplomat also shared a similar view of Shaykh Khalifa, which might indicate his political ambitions as well:

Most importantly, Mrs Thatcher had developed a close relationship with Shaykh Khalifa […] I arranged for Shaykh Khalifa to be invited on a state visit...