Introduction
âEurope arose when the Roman Empire crumbledâ (quoted by Le Goff 2007: 2). This provocative statement, taken from a review written by Marc Bloch in 1935, opens an enlightening debate on the relevant issue of the birth of Europe, one that remains ongoing among historians of various disciplines.
The vast majority of leading historians have maintained that Europe is a cultural union of peoples born during Medieval Christendom. Some have asserted that this unity occurred in the High Middle Ages with the rise of Charlemagneâs empire. According to Febvre (1944â1945 [1999]: 82, my translation from Italian), âCarolingian Europe is the heart, it is the yeast that made European dough ferment. It is around Carolingian Europe that our Europe was builtâ. In Dawsonâs (1956: 202) view, several elements comprising European identity merged at that time:
Other leading scholars have asserted that cultural unity emerged only in the Late Middle Ages. According to Halecki (1950: 17), âEurope is the community of all nations which ⌠accepted and developed the heritage of Greco-Roman civilization, transformed and elevated by Christianityâ. This occurred in the first five centuries of the second millennium and also involved East-Central regions. Europe was not a Western invention:
Le Goff deems the Carolingian world an âaborted Europeâ (this is the title of chapter 2 of his The Birth of Europe) because âCharlemagneâs vision was a ânationalistâ one. The empire that he founded was first and foremost Frankish and was inspired by a truly patriotic spiritâ (Le Goff 2007: 29). According to Le Goff (2007: 198), Europe was born in the Late Middle Ages when the entire society was embedded in religion, and there were no threats âeither from the emergence of nations or from the religious dissentâ.
In this chapter, I will try to sketch the influence of medieval economic ideas on the birth of Europe.1 The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I outline the long conception of Europe from the very beginning to 1250 (a symbolic year). In the second, I summarise, in light of the valuable literature on the topic, some of the teachings of medieval economic thought. In the last part, I illustrate the prevailing forces that led to the âbirth of Europeâ in the symbolic year 1453. In the concluding section, I sketch the influence of significant medieval economic ideas on the making of Europe in the late Middle Ages by discussing the main theses provided by leading historians.
The Long Conception of Europe Until 1250
In the course he delivered in the 1944â1945 academic year, Lucien Febvre (1944â1945 [1999]: 30) stated, âGreece invented Europeâ (my translation from Italian).
At the very outset, Europe was a mere mythological figure: the daughter of Agenor, king of Phoenicia (now Lebanon). The Greeks adapted a Semitic word that for Phoenician sailors meant âWestâ. For them, Europeans were thus the inhabitants of the Western end of the Asian continent (Le Goff 2007: 8â9). Later on, âEuropeâ came to indicate a continent as well. Herodotus, in his Histories, divided the world into three continents: Asia, Libya (or Africa) and Europe. Lastly, and above all, Europe became a cultural identity: a land inhabited by free men. Freedom, for the Greeks, was the hallmark of Europeans: it was, on the one hand, what made them similar and, on the other, what made them feel different from Asians, which were seen as subjects of despotic regimes. Some years ago, Federico Chabod posed a historical question Ă propos cultural identity:
Chabod (1964: 21, 23, my translation from Italian) replied,
According to Chabod, freedom was therefore the identity of Europe, an identity strengthened by comparison to Asian despotism. But what was freedom for the Greeks?
Even today it is difficult to formulate a clear and shared idea of freedom. However, following the studies initiated by Isaiah Berlin (1958 [1969]), we can say that true or full freedom is the possibility, guaranteed to any person, to âactâ and âwantâ. A person is free to act when, in her actions, she is not prevented by others, and is free to want when, in her decision, she is not forced by others. The first is also called ânegativeâ freedom and is substantiated by the defence of civil rights against unjustified coercions and interferences by people and authorities. The second is also called âpositiveâ freedom and is embodied in the recognition of political rights of participation in collective deliberations. True or full freedom is both negative and positive, that is, as Bobbio (1978 [2009]) points out, without one the other falls (simul stabunt vel simul cadent), because without civil rights, such as freedom of opinion and of the press, popular participation in political power is a deception, while, at the same time, without popular participation in political power, civil rights can hardly endure.
From Benjamin Constant to Quentin Skinner, an intensive debate arose around the real meaning of the two freedoms in the ancient and modern eras.
In a very broad sense, we can state that in ancient Greece, âpositiveâ freedom prevailed over ânegativeâ freedom: only the citizens of the polis were free, but the right of citizenship was reserved for the select few, and it was a partial and contradictory freedom at that. In the Athens of Pericles, during the fifth century bce, no more than 40â50 thousand people participated in the polis: slaves, women and foreigners were excluded. Free men took care of the res publica and did not work; work was considered a disvalue reserved for slaves. The inhabitants of the polis could take any decision regarding the life of the city. The positive freedom to want could violate the negative freedom to act. According to Benjamin Constant (1819 [2011]: 6): âAmong the Spartans, Therpandrus could not add a string to his lyre without causing offense to the ephors. In the most domestic of relations the public authority again intervened. The young Lacedaemonian could not visit his new bride freelyâ. And Lord Acton (1907: 12) remarked,
Greece was âalready and not yetâ Europe. It was âalreadyâ Europe because it introduced and experienced an ideal of freedom and citizenship. The Greeks felt free because they were subject to the law and not to the will of a capricious despot. The freedom they recognised was the positive one of participating in collective deliberations. But it was ânot yetâ Europe because the positive freedom was reserved for the few, with the exclusion of women and workers (as well as foreigners), and it was a freedom of âwantâ that compressed â to the point of abuse and arbitrariness â the individual negative freedom of âactâ. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Alexander the Greatâs (Hellenistic) empire developed in the East, only partially touching the lands of todayâs Europe.
âGreece invented Europeâ, said Febvre, who concludes âBut the Greek world was not a European worldâ.
In 146 bce, the Roman Republic destroyed Corinth, beginning the conquest and then the transformation of Greece into a Roman province.
The Roman civitas was more inclusive and a rights guarantor compared to the Greek polis. Anyone could become a Roman citizen, even the inhabitants of the provinces, as long as they respected the law, and no citizen could be convicted without first being tried by a Roman court.
The Roman libertas was wider than the Greek eleutheria: it was at once more positive (extension of political rights) and more negative (extension of civil rights). But it was still the freedom of the ancients: manual labour was in fact reserved only for slaves and positive freedom prevailed over negative freedom. Constant (1819 [2011]: 6) wrote: âIn Rome, the censors cast a searching eye over family life. The laws regulated customs, and as customs touch on everything; there was hardly anything that the laws did not regulateâ.2
The cultural and political revolution began with Christianity, and in particular with the words spoken by Jesus during His last visit to the temple: âRender unto Caesar the things that are Caesarâs, and unto God the things that are Godâsâ. They conveyed a new view both of freedom and community and of authority (auctoritas) and power (potestas). âRender unto God the things that are Godâsâ, meaning that every person is worthy of being free simply because she/he is the daughter/son and image of God (Imago Dei) and as such a citizen of a new civil community (communitas) that breaks down the narrow juridical boundaries of both polis and civitas. âRender unto Caesar the things that are Caesarâsâ, meaning that authority is sacred and must be exercised, without violating Godâs space, to promote the good of all individuals.
Saint Paul was perhaps the best interpreter and witness of the Christian revolution. In his Letter to the Galatians, he enunciated a new principle of freedom and equality: âThere is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free person, there is not male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesusâ. In his Letter to Philemon, written between 58 and 60 ce, he affirmed a new idea of authority in asking Philemon, a rich pagan converted to Christianity, to forgive and welcome his own slave, Onesimus, as a brother in faith. Paul did not condemn the institution of slavery (Caesarâs authority) but de facto abolished it by introducing a greater principle of brotherhood (the authority of God). Moreover, he pronounced the famous sentence ânulla potestas nisi a Deoâ (âthere is no authority except from Godâ) that has been interpreted (and can be intended) either as âall authorities come from Godâ or, on the contrary, as âsince authority comes from God, the ruler cannot abuse itâ.
In the third century, the territorial expansion of Rome ceased and a structural economic crisis began. The main cause of the crisis was a reduction in the workforce both internally (due to demographic decline) and, above all, externally, as a result of the reduced influx of slaves. The first effect was a growing insecurity (with barbarians at the gates) and a flight from the cities to the rustic villae. The economy contracted and fragmented into rural, closed, self-sufficient units with too little money in circulation.
Rome responded to the crisis with the extension of the right of citizenship, the division of the Empire into two parts (pars Occidentis and pars Orientis) ruled by two Caesars and the recognition, in 313, of the freedom of religion for Christians and for everyone...