The Macedonian Front, 1915-1918

Politics, Society and Culture in Time of War

Basil Gounaris, Michael Llewellyn-Smith, Ioannis Stefanidis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN:
  9781032196084
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000571493
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The 'Macedonian question' has been much studied in recent years as has the political history of the period from the Balkan Wars in 1912-13 to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. But for a variety of reasons, connected with the political division of Greece and the involvement of outside powers, the events at and behind the Macedonian front have been side-lined. The recent commemorations of the centenary of the end of the First World War in the UK illustrate how by comparison with the enormous and moving emphasis on the western front, Macedonia has been not wholly but largely ignored. This volume illuminates this comparatively neglected period of Greek history and examines the strategic and military aspects of the war in Macedonia and the political, social, economic and cultural context of the war.

Part I The context

1 The Salonika campaign An overview

Ian F.W. Beckett

DOI: 10.4324/9780429331084-3

The Salonika campaign was a product of the tangled political (and territorial) legacies of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, which made the military participation of as yet uncommitted Balkan states significant for both the Entente and the Central Powers. It was as much a result of internal Entente coalition politics and strategy as it was of circumstance in 1915. Just as the Great War was triggered in the Balkans by the events at Sarajevo in June 1914, so it has been argued (Stevenson 2016: 509–10) that it ended effectively in the Balkans with Bulgaria’s collapse in September 1918.

Georges Clemenceau famously suggested in 1917 that, given the lack of military activity beyond digging vegetable plots, the Entente forces should be characterised as the ‘gardeners’ of Salonika (Palmer 1965: 71). The Germans referred to the Entente forces as occupying their largest prisoner-of-war camp. Indeed, the long periods without military activity meant that the campaign was also known for its diversions, be it the archaeological and ethnographical investigations catalogued in the chapters in this volume by Richard Clogg and John Horne (see also Shapland and Stefani 2017); fox hunting by British officers; a variety of other sports; and even notable pantomimes (Lipton 2014: 28–57; see also Richardson 2014).¹ Yet this should not detract from the difficult campaigning conditions in Macedonia, and the loss of in excess of 374,000 lives on all sides.

Bulgaria epitomised the self-interested approach of the Balkan states to the war. Its strategic position contiguous to Serbia, Greece, Romania, and Ottoman Turkey – and across the route between the latter and Austria-Hungary – made it a useful prospective partner for both the Entente and the Central Powers once Turkey entered the war on the German side in October 1914. Moreover, Bulgaria had lost out to its former allies in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Together with Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, Bulgaria had forced Turkey out of much of its remaining European territory in the First Balkan War in 1912, but the allies had fallen out over the division of the spoils. Greece and Serbia defeated Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War in 1913 and Romania and Turkey both intervened to seize disputed territory from Bulgaria. In the process, Greece increased its population by some two million and its territory by 70% while Serbia doubled its size and increased its population by 1.5 million (Beckett 2007: 25, 110). Greece was compelled to surrender some of its additional gains through the post-war treaties of 1913–14 but Bulgaria was still left humiliated, with Macedonia divided between Serbia and Greece, and South Dobrudja falling to Romania. Bulgaria’s finance minister, Dimitar Tonchev, remarked that either the great powers would have to change the settlement, ‘or we ourselves will destroy it’ (Hall 2000: 215). Bulgaria, therefore, was highly susceptible to blandishments especially from the Central Powers.

The Entente was prepared to try to force Serbia to make territorial concessions to the Bulgarians in Macedonia (Robbins 1971: 560–85), but it had less to offer beyond Turkish territory, since the Entente wished to bring both Greece and Romania into the war as well. In any case, King Ferdinand – a German from the house of Saxe-Coburg Gotha – and his prime minister, Vasil Radoslavov, were sympathetic towards the Central Powers. Nonetheless, Bulgaria was mindful of the progress of the respective sides. The Entente failure at the Dardanelles and the success for German and Austro-Hungarian armies on the Eastern Front in 1915, together with the possibility that Romania would later join the Entente, tilted the balance in favour of the Central Powers. Accordingly, in return for the promise of all of Macedonia, the return of the Maritsa valley from Turkey, access to the Adriatic, and a corridor between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary along the Danube, Bulgaria attacked Serbia without a declaration of war on 5 October 1915. Britain declared war on Bulgaria on 15 October and France on the following day (Damianov 1985: 157–69; Hall 2003: 389–414). Italy and Russia both declared war on Bulgaria on 19 October 1915.

From the outbreak of the war, Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos had looked for a way to bring Greece in on the side of Britain and France, even offering to join the Entente in August 1914. This early offer was turned down for fear that accepting it would provoke Turkey into joining the war, and because Greek claims would clash with Russian regional ambitions and with those of Italy. However, by the autumn of 1915 matters had moved on. Turkey had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Italy had joined the Entente in May 1915. It was in these circumstances that, at the invitation of Venizelos, British and French forces landed at Salonika on 5 October 1915.

The ostensible aim of the invitation was to deter Bulgaria from acting against Serbia. Greece was obliged to assist Serbia under the terms of the Greek-Serbian defensive treaty of May 1913. The extent of Greece’s obligations to Serbia under this treaty became a major component in the disagreements between Venizelos and King Constantine that precipitated the ‘National Schism’. Knowing the King’s views, Venizelos, nevertheless, had issued his invitation to the British and French on 24 September 1915, Bulgaria having started to mobilise three days earlier. Constantine, who Venizelos claimed had initially approved the invitation, changed his mind on 3 October and insisted on Venizelos’ resignation. Thus began the great schism of the Greek nation. But by then the die was cast, and German and Bulgarian forces confronted the Entente on Greek soil.

The Central Powers’ offensive against Serbia resulted in the fall of Belgrade on 9 October, compelling the Serbs to retreat through Albania to the sea and to evacuate their remaining troops to the Greek island of Corfu, which the French occupied. Ultimately, a pro-Venizelos coup was mounted at Salonika in August 1916, in the name of a National Defence Movement. Venizelos declared a provisional government on his native Crete, moved to Salonika, and declared war on Germany and Bulgaria on 23 November 1916. With Constantine’s enforced departure from Greece at the insistence of the Entente, Venizelos returned to Athens in June 1917, and officially declared war on behalf of all of Greece on 27 June. Accordingly, Greek forces participated in the Salonika campaign thereafter (for an overview see Leon 1974, 1990).

The French components, the largest element in the Entente forces, included colonial formations. The British forces included medical staff from the Dominions and they were supported by Maltese and Indian Labour Corps and the, largely Cypriot, Macedonian Mule Corps. Italian and Russian forces also served in Macedonia with the Entente. Ultimately, more than 645,000 men served with the Entente forces between 1915 and 1918 (approximately 228,000 in the British Salonika Force). The Bulgarian and German defenders were supplemented by some Austro-Hungarian units, though Vienna’s focus was always more on the Adriatic and the Italian front. From 1917, Ottoman forces also arrived, the Central Powers deploying around 600,000 men.

Those who fought at Salonika represented the most diverse participants in any World War I campaign. This was true even of the combat formations within the British Salonika Force, commanded initially by Major General Sir Bryan Mahon and, from May 1916, by Lieutenant General Sir George Milne. They eventually comprised six divisions: the 10th, 22nd, 26th, 27th, 28th and 60th. The 10th, 22nd and 26th were ‘Kitchener’ New Army divisions raised from the citizen volunteers of 1914, the 10th (Irish) Division additionally reflecting some of the conflicting loyalties of Irishmen in 1914, since between 30% and 40% of its initial rank and file were not from Ireland at all (Beckett, Bowman and Connelly 2017: 109). The 27th and 28th had been formed from regular troops brought back from imperial garrisons in 1914. The 60th (2/2nd London) Division was a second-line Territorial division. All had served on the Western Front and the 10th had additionally been at Gallipoli. Similarly, of the nine French divisions eventually represented, only the 30th Division was an active pre-war formation, with the remainder formed in 1914. Three of the latter – the 11th, 16th and 17^th – were colonial divisions; the 17th had also been at Gallipoli.

The Entente was at least morally obliged to assist its Serbian ally when Bulgaria attacked it, but the Salonika campaign was very much a product of conflicting allied coalition objectives. The French commander-in-chief on the Western Front, Joseph Joffre, had unsuccessfully resisted the French government’s desire to participate in the Dardanelles campaign. His reluctance to divert forces from the Western Front was undermined by the political need to find a significant command for the radical Republican general, Maurice Sarrail, whom he had removed from the Third Army in July 1915. In August Sarrail, who would have succeeded Joffre in the autumn of 1914 if the war had not broken out, received the command of an ‘Armée d’Orient’ – its name consciously echoing Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1799 – but Joffre continued to refuse to release men for the Dardanelles (Cassar 1971: 35–40, 151–80; Tannenbaum 1974: 55–74; Dutton 1998: 17–48).

Ultimately, Sarrail’s army was committed to Salonika in October 1915. The failure at the Dardanelles and of Joffre’s own offensives played a part in the fall of the Viviani ministry in October 1915. The Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, initiated the governmental crisis by resigning in opposition to further Balkan adventures at Salonika. Joseph-Simon Galliéni, already senior in the military hierarchy to Joffre, became Minister of War in Aristide Briand’s new ministry. Initially, the attempt by Galliéni and Briand to reduce Joffre’s power by creating an allied co-ordinating council, failed. Indeed, Joffre was elevated to commander-in-chief of all French armies in December 1915, largely to ensure that he took Salonika seriously. Criticism of Joffre persisted during the German Verdun offensive in the course of 1916, and in December he was persuaded by Briand to accept the purely nominal post of technical adviser to the government with the Salonika command once more divorced from that of the armies in France (Dutton 1978: 338–51).

While Serbia had been a diplomatic client of Russia, it was also a military client of France in terms of financial loans and military equipment and training (Prete 2001: 53). However, economic aims were also evident in the French interest in the Salonika expedition, which seemingly offered great opportunities in Asia Minor and Persia. France maintained its interest in Syria and Lebanon. As a result of promises made by her, Italy might become a major economic regional player after the war, necessitating further protection for French trading interests. Thus, Sarrail carefully advanced French economic aims, ensuring that 75% of the imports reaching Salonika’s nearly 200,000 inhabitants were French (Dutton 1979: 97–113, 1998: 143–66).

The British joined in the Salonika campaign because their participation was requested by the French and Russians rather than because there was any confidence that such a venture could assist Serbia. There was recognition of the need to find a worthwhile command for Sarrail, and the British continued to support the venture largely as a means of preserving Briand’s ministry. Britain’s commander-in-chief on the Western Front, Sir John French, was just as opposed to the diversion of troops to Salonika as Joffre. At the same time, just as the French did not trust the British to act alone at the Dardanelles, the British could not afford to allow the French to act alone at Salonika. The Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, was reluctant to see the deployed British troops advance beyond Salonika until such time as Greece formally entered the war. This became problematic with the fall of Venizelos in October 1915.

The British continued to drag their feet (Prete 2001: 59). At the allied conference at Chantilly on 6 December 1915, the British argued unsuccessfully for the abandonment of the expedition. The 22nd, 26th, 27th and 28th Divisions arrived in November and December 1915 to join the 10th but in the end Salonika did not receive significant British reinforcements other than the 60th Division in November 1916, as the campaign was seen in London to serve French rather than British interests (Dutton 1986: 64–78, 1998: 49–115, 143, 197). The 60th Division was withdrawn to Egypt for the Palestine campaign in June 1917, followed by the 10th Division in September, and the other four British divisions lost units to the Western Front amid the manpower crisis in early 1918.

The initial landing at Salonika was made by the British 10th (Irish) Division and French 156th Infantry Division, both withdrawn from the failing Gallipoli campaign. Followed by the British, the French advanced northwards through the Vardar valley and over the Serbian frontier on 15 October 1915, amid deteriorating weather conditions in a difficult terrain of rocky ridges and deep ravines. The Entente forces were critically short o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of contributors
• Editors’ Introduction
• Part I The context
• Part II On and behind the front line
• Part III War of words and ideologies
• Part IV The end and the aftermath
• Index