Introduction
Despite the overwhelming need for a flexible, yet conceptually sound system for categorising types of combatants, at present none exists. Across the spectrum of conflict studies, the problem of a lack of common nomenclature persists, as well as a conceptual basis from which to understand, explain, or categorise different types of fighters. An armed group that may be considered a militia in one conflict may be a paramilitary in another, or a terrorist in a third.
Drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz, this chapter presents a framework consisting of a series of ideal types (professional, praetorian, insurgent, mercenary, and militia) as a solution to this issue. Clausewitz is an exceptional proponent for the utility and necessity of theory:
In On War, one of the central themes is the importance and relevance of politics and policy2 to the theory of war. This is most often cited in the now popular adage âwar is politics by other meansâ3. By this, Clausewitz meant that political elements do not stop when violence starts; rather that war is an instrument of politics. The political nature of warfare is a fundamental characteristic of every war, in that it cannot be separated from political life.4 Although other, more outward aspects may change the appearance of war, the centrality of Politik does not, according to Clausewitz; the basis of this interpretation of warfare rests on a tripartite or trinity relationship, a wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit or âfascinating trinityâ of passion, chance, and reason.
Passion, especially violent emotion and enmity, is said to be primarily the preserve of âthe peopleâ, or society. Chance and random probability in warfare allow for a degree of âcreative spiritâ and is more an aspect of the military. The aspect of politics and policy, of which warfare is an instrument, brings a quality of pure reason and rationality to the conduct of warfare. This final aspect is the preserve, mostly, of the state. The three elements form three points of attraction in an interactive relationship that forms the basis of understanding the underlying forces, which change the nature of war and its outward appearance. The traditional interpretation of this trinity places the military in a three-part system with society and the state.
Unfortunately, Clausewitz died before being able to describe this theory in full. As discussed in more detail within this chapter, the unfinished quality of On War has led to numerous interpretations and counter-claims of misreading Clausewitz ever since it was first published posthumously in 1832. In part, these misreadings stem from some translation issues in the Anglophone literature. They also stem from what can be termed as a âlevels of interpretationâ error, by ascribing the Clausewitzian Trinity to the army, state, and people, rather than passion, chance, and reason. What is generally understood, however, from this theorising of Trinitarian relationships is that conflicts are comprised of the people, the military, and the state. The military is drawn from and protects the people but takes its instruction from the state. The state has authority over the military and the people but is reliant on the military for protection and draws its authority to govern, i.e. legitimacy, from the people.
The point of departure for the theory presented here is that Clausewitz framed his theory within the specific instance of a particular type of state â an autocratic monarchy with a subservient parliament â with a singular interpretation of the military. Such a state system we would now call Weberian, in that the state had the sole authority to exercise a legitimate use of force. Some authors, such as Bassford,5 Honig,6 Duyvesteyn,7 and Waldman,8 have noted that there is nothing in Clausewitzâs theory to preclude the same political understanding of warfare from being extended to other forms of war other than inter-state war and other forms of armed forces than the military. Thus, although Clausewitz framed his theory using such a perspective, he was also mindful of other forms of military and state structures â the nomadic Tartars, for example. With that in mind, there is far more flexibility inherent in Clausewitzâs theory than critics such as Keegan9 and van Creveld10 would suggest. For different combatant types, the same Trinitarian relationship with the state and society can be applied to analyse distinct dynamics. In addition, the argument can also be advanced that most categorisations of combatant types rest on a binary interpretation of state/non-state, largely missing the interactive relationships with society, i.e. how the relationship between the state and society can change depending on the relationships with different armed forces. For example, when analysing mercenaries, most discussions focus on the relationship between them and the state. Yet, a fundamental aspect of mercenaries is often their lack of, or greatly compromised, legitimacy, which stems from their minimal to non-existent relationship with society.
Samuel Huntington first elaborates that the civil-military relations of any society:
However, contrary to the arguments of Clausewitz, Huntington stresses that the aim is to find equilibrium among and between the three elements. Clausewitz was emphatic in his theorising that equilibrium could not be reached and that dynamism was inherent in the system. Nonetheless, what is important is the dynamic effect each of the three elements has on the others. Furthermore, whilst Huntington noted the importance of the role of society in terms of civil-military relations (CMR), he did not include society in his formulations, thus his theory largely misses the interactive relationship with society.
The chapter first provides the historical context for On War, detailing the conditions and changes to warfare that Clausewitz sought to explain.12 Second, an outline of Clausewitzâs broader theory and the specific instance of the Trinity is explained. Third, a particular political interpretation of the Trinity is then advanced as a pretext for the subsequent advancement of a new theory of type using the relationships delineated by Clausewitz in the final section.
The first delineated ideal type is that of the modern or Professional Soldier that can be extrapolated from On War. This type demonstrates that the military acts under authority of the state, which gains its legitimacy from the people in exchange for delivering security through the military.
Subsequently, the second ideal type is militaries especially prone to coups dâĂ©tat, and involvement or interference in political life: Praetorian-type militaries. In such situations, the military has usurped political authority from the state, thus complicating the relationship with society. The state, captured by the military, then no longer necessarily needs to draw on the people for authority to govern (i.e. legitimacy), which complicates the legitimatising relationship with the people, as the military can govern through the use of force alone.
Third, militias receive comparatively little mention from Clausewitz,13 although he does discuss their important defensive capabilities. Drawing from some historical examples and debates, it is demonstrated that militias have a closer relationship with the people, based primarily on legitimacy due to their close recruitment and central duty to protect specific communities. For the militias, their authority relationship is split between society and the state, and orders can be taken directly from both. As such, if the state turns against the society, the primary relationship of the militia with society takes precedence, and the militias can act in defence of the society against the state.
Somewhat similar to the Militia Soldier, the Insurgent Soldierâs primary relationship is with the people, and necessarily in opposition to the state. The Insurgent seeks to replace the peopleâs legitimacy relationship with the state with their own form of legitimacy. Distinctions can be made between those who wish to replace only the state versus those who wish to additionally fundamentally alter the society. The former is akin to political revolutions where the aim is a change in government, while the latter is more akin to social revolutions where the entire socio-economic basis of the state is subje...
