Overview
Democracy was in global retreat even before COVID-19, and the pandemic shrunk and fractured the global map of democracies still further. The burgeoning of authoritarian governance, actively hollowing out liberal-democratic institutions and eschewing expertise, was turbo-charged by the pandemic, as many governments seized the chance to evade the scrutiny of legislatures, courts, independent media and popular mobilisation. Yet the rollback of democracy and good governance has not been relentless, as Part I of this volume attests. The two thematic commentaries, and five chapters analysing New Zealand, China, the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore, identify grounds to despair, certainly, but also opportunities for a rejuvenation of democratic governance.
In the first commentary, Tom Gerald Daly offers an ambitious global appraisal of institutional and geo-political responses to the pandemic. He detects no single fault-line between supposedly efficient autocracies and democracies hampered from taking decisive action by the need to respect constitutional norms. Nor is there a sharp distinction between the success of the pandemic response in countries in the Global South or Global North, or in younger and older democracies. Rather, Daly detects multiple fault-lines based on statesâ capacity, the presence or absence of effective and rational governance, and levels of public trust in authority. If the pandemic was a âtipping pointâ towards autocracy and âanti-truthâ politics, Daly nevertheless sees grounds for optimism. He points to electoral innovation, hybrid parliaments and an explosion of grassroots activism as providing opportunities to rethink, regenerate and reclaim democracy, both at the national level and in geopolitical alliances and institutions.
Jerome Amir Singh maintains the focus on global governance in his commentary on COVID-19 vaccine manufacture, procurement, disbursement, access and uptake. He identifies four structural factors that vitiate individual autonomy to access vaccines at the grassroots level: geopolitics; corporate self-interest and sovereign fiscal constraints; sovereignty and governance; and protectionism and nationalism. As long as vaccines remain an âintellectual property battlegroundâ and âgeopolitical currencyâ, Singh argues, states will continue to flout their obligation to guarantee the right to the highest attainable standard of health.
In the first country-based analysis, Dean R Knight charts New Zealandâs success at stamping out transmission of COVID-19 through hard and swift lockdowns, border control and other public health measures, while simultaneously forestalling economic dislocation and preserving â and even enhancing â democratic accountability. Knight proffers a ârelationalâ or âdialogicâ conception of accountability. This seeks to understand how the government publicly accounted for its aggressive elimination strategy and use of emergency powers, and how it was âinterrogatedâ by Parliament, the courts, the media and civil society. Knight concludes that the executiveâs use of power was subject to meaningful checks, and documents how lessons were learned and applied from this virtuous cycle of dialogue.
Chinaâs response to the exceptional challenge of COVID-19 was, unsurprisingly, devoid of such democratic constraints, and, indeed, was not âexceptionalâ in the sense that it reflected endemic features of Chinese law and governance. Jacques deLisle and Shen Kui venture that the initial, fatally delayed and dysfunctional response to the pandemic exposed the conflicting and ambiguous allocations of authority and accountability along fragmented functional (vertical) and geographic (horizontal) lines within Chinaâs vast and multi-layered governance system, resulting in decisions made in bureaucratic âsilosâ. Later in the pandemic, the centralised state mustered its formidable capacity to mobilise resources and shape and constrain citizensâ behaviour, creating a narrative of âsuccessâ that looks set to stifle any calls for transformative reform to prevent or prepare for future pandemics.
Although on a less monumental scale, fragmentation was also a feature of the United Kingdomâs response to the pandemic, not only in the early stages but throughout. Joelle Grogan analyses how COVID-19 exposed fractures in the constitutional settlement of power between government, Parliament and the devolved legislatures. Largely unchecked executive dominance; stop-gap and U-turn policymaking; severe and not always rationally and transparently justified restrictions; and blurred distinctions between law, guidance and advice were all lamentable features of the UKâs response. They amounted to an absence of governance â and the â(un)governedâ UK as a consequence experienced one of the highest per capita mortality rates in Western Europe.
The fatal repercussions of executive action â and inaction â were starkly evident, too, in the United States under President Trump. Mark A Graber characterises Trump as uninterested in science â or in governing. The populist attack on evidence-based politics and constitutional democracy in the US resulted in a policy too often based on ideology, partisanship and wishful or fantastical thinking rather than on scientific consensus. Institutions that might have blunted the populist challenge had been captured before the pandemic or were captured during it, notably the Supreme Court. The election of President Biden restored rationality and kickstarted vaccine distribution. But, Graber argues, the health of Americaâs body politic remains in peril from partisan battles over voting rights, among other issues.
The resilience of Singaporeâs political and legal institutions was tested during the pandemic, especially as it held elections in July 2020. Shirin Chua and Jaclyn L Neo suggest that Singapore escaped the global trend towards democratic regression, as the government rejected the path of unchecked emergency powers and the pandemic presented opportunities for democratic consolidation. These took the form of greater institutionalisation of opposition politics; the deepening of a âshared epistemic articulationâ of constitutional democratic workings; and stronger civil society engagement with the state. Chua and Neo urge vigilance, however: democratic gains may be fragile and Singaporeâs low-wage migrant workforce continues to live precariously and under disproportionate restrictions. If the pandemic is to catalyse true democratic renewal, they argue, the most marginalised must share the fruits and everyone must â[interrogate] what it means to live together and what we owe to one anotherâ.