Since its foundation in 1949 the PRC has demonstrated a number of constant characteristics as well as aspects of change. Let us begin with those of continuity.
Some constant characteristics of the period 1949–76
One of the most pronounced features of the Chinese since 1949, and indeed before, is their strong sense of patriotism and nationalism. This latter concept, which can be defined as sense of nation and national identity, is an offshoot and result of the vaguer and broader idea of patriotism, simply love of country. Neither is an uncommon phenomenon in the modern world but they are possibly even more pronounced in China than in most other countries. Partly because of the extent to which foreign peoples have attempted and succeeded in taking advantage of the Chinese over the past century and more before 1949, the Chinese have found it in their interests to develop rather clear ideas about the nature and uses of nationalism. It is virtually impossible to find a Chinese who would deny being patriotic and their feeling expresses itself in numerous ways. One of them is in the performing arts. The themes of films and plays shown in China since 1949 and before are shot through with love of, and loyalty to, China. The form may vary, resistance to one enemy invader or the desire to adhere to a national leader or economic target, but the sentiment is strong and all-pervading, as pronounced in the performing arts as in real life.
A related feature which has remained reasonably constant over the years since 1949 has been the strength of tradition and, at the same time, attempts to undermine this power. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has striven for social change, and has to a great extent achieved its aim, but it has done so within the knowledge that tradition has remained strong. There is something of a dilemma here for any government, especially a radical one, because the power of tradition is really nothing more than that of the Chinese past. Patriotism would suggest an affection for this past, a desire for social change would lead towards its transformation. The dilemma is a constant one in China. At some stages since 1949 the pressures to change tradition have been stronger than at others but at all times the conflict has remained. As we shall see, it has manifested itself nowhere more clearly than in the value placed on the traditional performing arts. At all times the Chinese have claimed to cherish their traditional culture, but the manner of interpretation, based on the requirements of revolutionary change, has sometimes come closer to contempt for the performing arts of the past than love for them.
Among the most important characteristics of traditional life was the numerical preponderance of the peasantry. This is still the case today, since more than four-fifths of the Chinese people live in villages and away from major cities. The types of houses, the structure of the places where the people live at the most grass-roots level, remain unchanged. The durability of the building materials has improved. The quantities of food have risen. The commune system has resulted in a change in the mechanism of government. Yet the texture of village life shows a great deal still that would have been recognisable centuries ago. It comes as no surprise that the problems of the peasantry have been one of the major interests of playwrights and actors since 1949, even though the extent has varied from time to time, often reflecting government policy, and rural themes do not overall occupy four-fifths of the repertoire of the performing arts.
Whether in the villages or cities, life in China has been dominated by a struggle to produce enough to go round; and production has remained an important theme in the theatre since 1949. China has always been a poor country, and remains so today. The degree of poverty may vary from region to region; it is more pronounced in the southwestern province of Guizhou or the northwestern drought areas of Gansu than in the lower Yangzi Valley, where Zhejiang and Jiangsu are possibly the best endowed provinces in China. Yet even in the most affluent areas it is impossible to escape the impression of great poverty and extremely simple living conditions. Though outright death by starvation does not occur today, as it used to on a horrific scale in the past, it remains a threat which no Chinese government can afford to ignore.
Mao Zedong turned this acknowledged poverty into a positive feature despite the suffering it had caused in the past.
China’s 600 million people have two remarkable peculiarities; they are, first of all, poor, and secondly, blank. That may seem like a bad thing, but it is really a good thing. Poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution.1
Thus it is largely to overcome the problem of poverty that the Chinese have undertaken a revolution, radical social change, or, as Mao has defined it, an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another’.2
From 1949 to 1976 China was undoubtedly a revolutionary nation in which the government and people strove to bring about radical change in society. The people in all parts of China professed an enthusiasm for revolutionary ideology. Within Chinese history this period is one which exhibits great changes from the past. Yet ironically we can still claim that interest in revolution and adherence to Marxist–Leninist philosophy were themselves constant features of those years. To this day the Chinese state and, in general, the Chinese people avow adherence to a revolutionary system of ideas which they describe as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. They claim Lenin to have developed the ideas of Marx, and Mao Zedong to have built on the combined ideas of Marx and Lenin.
Marxism is a materialist philosophy. Materialism means not the love of material things, but that it is matter and the material base which determine the nature and mode of operation of society. Matter is what produces those things which all people need, so the material base implies the means of production: land, factories and so on. Ownership of the means of production is the key to power, and it follows that those groups which own the means of production are the ruling classes. Those classes which possess very little nevertheless work; and because the owners make money from the labour of those who do not own the means of production, Marxists regard the latter as the exploited classes.
In this view of the world ideas, culture and the arts are the result of the material base of society, not the other way round. In other words, the ruling classes which own the means of production automatically devise ideas and cultural forms and content to suit their own interests and thus hold on to power. Whether deliberately or not, they attempt to persuade the labouring or exploited classes in society to accept ideas which will keep these groups of people in subjection.
Since it is ownership of the means of production which determines how people think, it follows that social forces of a similar kind determine how history develops. It also follows that it is classes and not individual people which are important in shaping history and society. No individual, however great, can influence the course of history, unless as part of a class or social force.
Marxist philosophy argues that no change can take place without conflict. Contradictions are the motor of change in the sense that when classes or forces fight against each other they produce social transformation, and only through tension and conflict does change come about. This notion of dialectics is central not only to Marxism but also to Mao’s thought, in which class struggle is of supreme importance. Mao saw this tension between the classes as something which could never be ignored. It is true that the emphasis which the government of China placed upon class struggle in the period between 1949 and 1976 was not entirely constant. Yet the idea was always in the forefront, and even in those few years when it declined in importance, this slighter significance itself turned out to be a key feature of PRC development, as we shall see in the summary of China’s post-1949 history below.
In the context of Chinese history the main exploited group engaged in this class struggle is the peasantry. Mao Zedong pursues his definition of revolution, quoted earlier, by saying:
A rural revolution is a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the power of the feudal landlord class. Without using the greatest force, the peasants cannot possibly overthrow the deep-rooted authority of the landlords which has lasted for thousands of years. The rural areas need a mighty revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their millions to become a powerful force.3
Himself a peasant, although not a very poor one, Mao from the 1920s on regarded the peasantry as the main bulwark of his revolution. It is this class which, because of its poverty, is the most eager to bring about social change.
The major body within China espousing and propagating the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought has been the Chinese Communist Party. Founded in 1921, when it held its first Congress in Shanghai and later Hangzhou, this body has had a chequered and exciting history, but there has been no period since 1949, with the possible exception of the Cultural Revolution, when its dominance has been seriously questioned. It has grown in size, from 1,210,000 in 1945,4 to more than 35,000,000 in 1977,5 the latter figure being nearly thirty times the former. China may claim to be less elite-ridden than in earlier days, yet the extreme authority of the CCP makes that body the most important of any elite which may exist in China.
Even though Marxism holds that it is not individuals but social forces which determine history and social development, yet there have been several personalities within the CCP so significant that one can claim them as dominating the history of the period from 1949 to 1976. The two most constant and important are undoubtedly Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Mao was the Chairman of the CCP from 1935 until his death on 9 September 1976 and Chairman of the People’s Republic of China from its establishment in October 1949 until April 1959. Zhou Enlai was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1949 until February 1958 and in effect dominated China’s foreign policy all through the period 1949 to 1976. From the beginning of the PRC until his death on 8 January 1976 he was also the Premier of the Government Administrative Council and from September 1954 its successor the State Council. Because these two were the most permanently influential men in PRC history, their deaths in a very real sense signified the end of an era.
Mao’s position as Chairman of the CCP and Zhou’s as Premier of the State Council illustrate another constant feature about the period 1949 to 1976: the dual structure of administration in China. On the one hand there is a party which exercises supreme authority; on the other hand there is the state organisation which is administrative but also influential. Mao it was who dominated the Party, Zhou Enlai the State organisation. This is not to say that Zhou Enlai was not a member of the CCP; indeed his authority derived in part from his senior CCP membership. Nor can it be claimed that Mao Zedong held no authority in the State structure. In fact as Chairman of the PRC until 1959 he was its supreme executive. Yet it remains true that the influence of the two men was primarily seen respectively on the Party and the State level. Zhou Enlai was the man principally responsible for putting into effect the ideas of Mao. The Chinese today also respect Zhou Enlai as the man who helped Mao work out his ideas and in some cases restrained him from excesses.
The dual Party and State structure of administration in China is reflected not only at the national level but also at the provincial and lower. Each province, city and county has its Party and State administration. The dual structure is found at every level, from the highest to the lowest.
This consistent dual administration, and especially the Marxist concept that all society rests on a particular material base, suggest that China sees itself as an integrated society. It is in no sense fragmented into numerous parts. Hence, the performing arts which...
