Pre the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the intended premise of this chapter was that it would analyse the relationship between the overdetermination of virtual reality (VR) and neo-liberal smart city rhetoric, outlining the limitations and potential of these spatial ideologies and their supporting epistemic foundations; in particular, critiquing the entrepreneurial solutionism enmeshed with technocratic rationality, namely the abstracted information-processing paradigms of both a priori and machine-learnt modelling, which are present in both the overdetermination of VR technology and the neo-liberal smart city. These paradigms are irreconcilable with equality or social justice, they are entangled with a narrow, normative, a-systemic, uncritically entrepreneurial construct of subjectivity and agency. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the connection between information-processing paradigms, technological overdetermination and smart city rhetoric increasingly clear, not least, in the failure of the smart city and its mechanisms (a-systemic modelling, the internet of things, pervasive surveillance and a bedrock of entrepreneurial hackathon culture) to provide equality of access to health care and key resources within (and without) the pandemic. In light of these failings, how might we formulate alternative imaginaries for technology and its relationship to wealth and resource distribution, to support a lasting reimagination of cities and of âsmartnessâ? Taking the example of the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission, the Design Justice Network, Data for Black Lives and Our Data Bodies (ODB), the chapter explores both the failings of the smart city project while highlighting alternative constructions of smartness and smart subjectivity.
Introduction
This chapter was written before and during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. It was largely written while âlocked downâ in London, between 24 March and May 2020. A lockdown or mass quarantine, in this context and at this point (late April 2020) means that the state has enforced an emergency protocol to prevent the spread of disease, in which citizens cannot leave their homes except to exercise once a day, shop for essentials or travel to seek urgent medical treatment. Universities, schools (except for key workers), non-essential shops, pubs, restaurants and other spaces have closed or moved their services and communities online. How then do the technologies and ideological constructs that form the smart city play out in the day-to-day lived experience of a pandemic and UK (and indeed worldwide) lockdown?
While it is also important to write and research significant events with a âlong viewâ and with the benefit of hindsight, there is an urgency to this situation that has surfaced many key aspects and failings of the smart city concept, as well as surfacing different forms of âsmartnessâ, which this chapter will discuss. It is arguably both contrived and impossible for me to focus on anything else whilst in the midst of such a crisis, in which a-systemic technologies have largely failed to support equality of access to key resources.
This chapter analyses the failure of the neo-liberal smart city, which, under the crisis of a pandemic, has become viscerally prescient. However, as Tyler (2020: 2704) reminds us, since 2010, the austerity state has been characterized by
The COVID-19 crisis is exacerbated by both austerity and the privatization of infrastructure that was tethered to it. The rise of hackathons and competitions to address the pandemic, in the midst of the crisis, as well as the escalation of virtual spatiality and an upturn in the VR hype cycle, are analysed and connected here, while alternative ideas and practices of âsmartnessâ are proposed. The chapter evaluates the hyperbole and abstracted framings of what constitutes a city by the likes of Intel, Cisco, IBM, Siemens, Amazon and Google, who have benefited from the privatization of services that was key to the austerity agenda. The urbanism modelled by the smart city as supported by big-tech corporations and neo-liberal states, is contrasted here with the city as it is lived, the city of AbdouMaliq Simone, Sun Ra, Design Justice, Data for Black Lives, ODB and the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission; in other words, the city from the ground up, far from the neo-platonic idealizations of technocratic ideology. The data science that underpins the smart city can be understood
Given this âview from nowhereâ, how can the redaction of situated, lived experience implicit in neo-platonic data science hope to deliver equality in the city? Furthermore, it is appropriate to question whether that was ever the intention of the smart city initiative.
Unprecedented efficiency, connectivity and social harmony?
Back in 2017, in the paper âA City Is Not a Computerâ, Mattern (2017: n.pag.) wrote that if we believe in the marketing hype,
At the time of writing in 2020, in lockdown because of the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of us are living in circumstances in which infrastructure becomes visible because it is broken (Star and Bowker 2000: 35); equality, or rather, inequality in the city, becomes, if not more important than ever before, more exposed. In lockdown, a series of systemic interdependencies, from food access, to employment conditions, health care, childcare and transport are now highly visible; likewise, wealth distribution, in terms of access to basic care and services, even to open space and sunlight, make the issue of resource and access inequality salient in more minds and bodies than ever before. Some of us with elderly parents find them making connections between the scarcity of the pandemic and their childhood memories of war-time rationing and disruption, while others, such as Roy (2020: n.pag.), point out that the impact of the pandemic on the affluent is the norm for millions of poor people, that the pandemic âis the wreckage of a train that has been careening down the track for yearsâ.
Tufecki (2020: n.pag.), has highlighted the âinability to think about complex systems and their dynamicsâ as a key failing of neo-liberal policies during the COVID-19 pandemic, the failure to âunderstand that complex systems defy simplistic reductionismâ. The accusation that smart cities are simplistic and abstracted, or rather, idealized, is one of Greenfieldâs (2013) main criticisms. According to Greenfield (2013: 273), developers of smart cities âthink of the urban environment primarily as an abstract terrain for business operationsâ. Greenfield (2013: 281) uses the term âpure backgroundâ to describe the abstracted way âdesigners of informatic systems have historically treated the environment in which their products and services are usedâ. Mattern (2017: n.pag.) points out the long historical trajectory of the city as an informational site, but also highlights how âthe idea of the city as an information-processing machine has in recent years manifested as a cultural obsession with urban sites of data storage and transmissionâ.
There are a number of competing definitions of the smart city, ranging from Deakin and Al Waer (2011) to Caragliu et al. (2009), with varying degrees of emphasis for human and cultural factors, but as Shelton et al. (2014: 14) state, the smart city is âa somewhat nebulous idea which seeks to apply the massive amounts of digital data collected about society as a means to rationalise the planning and management of citiesâ. The concept is not new. Jeremy Benthamâs early nineteenth-century vision of technologically mediated colonies or âindustry housesâ, inspired by slavery, envisaged the âenserfment of the entirety of Englandâs poor in a system which would combine the panoptical prison factory with the colonial plantation systemâ to form what Bentham termed âa domestic colonyâ (Tyler 2020: 1113). The connection to the smart city of today is evident in his plans for âintroducing a system of what he termed âidentity washingâ (using chemical dyes to mark the faces of inmates) as a surveillance technology for managing the pauper labour force in his proposed domestic colony of industry housesâ (Tyler 2020: 1128).
Todayâs smart cities are essentially sites of computational and ideological optimization, premised on the idea that its locations, flows and subjects can be understood via the information-processing paradigm that underpins big data and artificial intelligence, âas if they could reduce urban planning to algorithmsâ (Mattern 2017: n.pag.). The COVID-19 pandemic viscerally reveals the wilfully âunseeingâ smart city imperatives of Western, industrialized nations. âUnseeingâ (Roy 2014: 33) is Royâs term for what dominant discourse chooses to omit; for example, the systematic erasure of cast and racist determinism from Indian textbooks. Tyler (2020) uses Royâs construct of unseeing to articulate the normalization of austerity in the United Kingdom, which is systematically disavowed by a government committed to austerity, to tax breaks and privatization of the welfare state.
States and corporations that have financed smart city initiatives are, above all, free-market states, keen to deploy an array of technologies within an entrepreneurial teleology that has benefited from austerity and the decimation of the welfare state, from the privatization of services and infrastructure. Kitchin et al. (2018: 1) identify a strong relationship between the smart city and hackathons, manifest in the âbelief that urban issues are solvable through technological fixes, with hackathons leveraging the innovation capacity of a crowd of talented, technically literate citizens to practice what Morozov (2013) terms âsolutionismâ â. The COVID-19 pandemic, far from being a time for revaluation and reflection on the failings of technology to provide actionable insights and functioning supply chains for citizens in the United States and the United Kingdom, is instead another business or promotion opportunity, evidenced by the myriad hackathons, such as the COVID-19 global hackathon, advertised as follows:
The very corporations that have actively supported climate change denial lobbies (such as Google; see Cuthbertson 2019), and have been slow to act on the dissemination of neo-Nazi hate (Facebook, Google, Twitter), while also supporting Cambridge Analytica to subvert democratic processes in favour of far-right populist politics (Facebook; see Cadwalladr 2018), are at the same time positioning themselves as the providers of âsolutionsâ that will bring positive social impact. The expectation is that the putative âsolutionsâ produced via such hackathons are then âcommercialised and scaled up into marketable products and implemented through the sale/licensing to, or public-private partnerships (PPPs) with, city administrationsâ (Kitchin et al. 2018: 1). But smart cities, as conceived of by big-tech firms, above all, optimize individuals to âreproduce neoliberal and entrepreneurial labourâ (Kitchin et al. 2018: 1) and technocratic rationality, characterized by employment precarity and deregulation. This chimes with Iraniâs (2015: 3) analysis of hackathons as sites of rehearsal for âan entrepreneurial citizenship celebrated in transnational cultures that orient toward Silicon Valley for models of social changeâ. But, as Irani also points out, the prototypes developed during hackathons rarely go beyond the hackathon, they a...