Hegemony

James Martin

• Publisher: Polity
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781509521616, 9781509521609
• eBook ISBN: 9781509521647
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Power rarely works by force alone: it also rules by winning hearts and minds. States, classes, and social groups all seek political dominance by exerting political, ideological, or cultural leadership over others. This idea – hegemony – is a subtle, complex one, which is too often applied crudely.

In this succinct introduction, political theorist James Martin skilfully examines these nuances and shines a new light on hegemony. He introduces its component ideas and critically surveys the most influential thinking about hegemony, from Gramsci's theory of hegemony as a revolutionary strategy and Marxist theories of the state, politics, and culture to the Post-Marxist project of radical democracy. He then considers the concept's critical role in analysing international politics and global political economy, and evaluates the criticism that hegemony is too state-centric to truly capture the dynamics of contemporary struggles for emancipation.

This lucid and accessible guide to hegemony will be essential reading for all students of radical politics and social and political theory.

1
What is Hegemony?

Hegemony describes a form of societal leadership whereby those under its influence give assent to domination by a particular group, class, or state. It is used to analyse the informal recognition achieved by certain agents, ideas or arrangements beyond any official status they might claim. Being ‘hegemonic’ is not merely to occupy power, it is to benefit from widespread acceptance of one’s right to rule. In modern political theory, power is usually discussed with reference to particular concepts and principles – for example, authority, legitimacy, rights, and so on – that formally establish and limit it. Hegemony, however, focuses more on actions and processes than principles. It suggests that, fundamentally, relations of power and domination are precarious and endure only by an active ingredient that ‘leads’ by projecting a unifying purpose and direction.

In recent political theory, hegemony has been something of a ‘dissident’ concept, employed to expose and challenge, rather than justify, power relations. It is a favoured term of radical critics opposed to dominant social structures and unquestioned beliefs. Focusing on leadership puts the onus on the strategies and techniques by which some agent seeks to transform rivals and opponents into supporters. More than just a description of bare power, then, hegemony invites enquiry into unacknowledged conditions – the social alliances and cultural resources of leadership – that help to institute power relations and make them acceptable, perhaps even desirable. That enquiry is usually undertaken with an understanding that the grip of such leadership can be weakened and domination can be dismantled. Hegemony can also name the objective of those who resist power and seek an alternative, fairer or emancipated, society.

This book introduces some of the notable ways in which hegemony has been used in political theory to analyse power relations and to imagine their transformation. These include reflections on revolutionary strategy, examinations of the capitalist state and its cultural underpinnings, Post-Marxist arguments about ‘discourse’ and radical democracy, and analyses of world order. In addition to surveying theories, however, it draws attention to important differences in the perceived scope, application, and implications of the concept. Hegemony has been regularly reinvented, refreshed, and reapplied in new contexts. In the process, new formulations emerge, as do questions and conflicts about what type of enquiry it is and to what ends it might be employed.

In tracing the evolution of hegemony as a form of critical enquiry, I underline its role in helping us to ask questions about the conditions of power and domination. More than simply providing answers, hegemony challenges us to reflect on how people are implicated in structures of domination and how they might realistically challenge them. So, before sketching the content of the chapters that follow, let me return to the basic analytical issues that underpin hegemony.

Domination as Leadership?

The underlying implication of hegemony is a paradoxical notion: namely, that domination can be experienced as leadership – that is, as a situation to which people give approval despite their apparent subordination. But how can this be so? Usually, domination describes an imbalance of power in which people are subject to a rule that constrains their choices without their express agreement. Of course, domination need not always be ‘direct’ (imposed on us personally) or exercised by one group or individual alone: states, economic systems, and social arrangements generally entail structures of domination. But what does it mean to say that people ‘approve’ such constraints?

We might begin by noting that domination is both an objective and a subjective phenomenon. We can speak of it in terms of social conditions that are external to us and independent of our attitudes – the ‘facts’ of material inequality, the disproportionate presence of white men in positions of institutional authority, empirical evidence of prejudice and violence against specific groups, and so on. But how those conditions are perceived and connected, and therefore whether they are experienced as ‘oppressive’, is not an automatic consequence of their objective presence. That requires them to be experienced as unacceptable, exploitative, and realistically open to transformation. Yet one consequence of inequalities and hierarchies in power is that those who benefit from them often have the resources to define how everyone’s circumstances are interpreted. Or, as Marx and Engels famously put it, ‘the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas’ (1996: 145). Thus, conditions of systematic constraint or exclusion – which are usually multiple, interwoven, and layered such that they cannot always be viewed as one thing – are frequently justified, defended, and selectively represented in ways that ‘naturalize’, or at least minimize and isolate, their pernicious effects.

But hegemony is not simply a fictive veneer obscuring naked oppression. Rather than hiding, distracting from, or embellishing an unpleasant reality, it implies something stronger. ‘Leadership’ suggests a sense of inexorable, collective movement towards a common goal. To lead is to provide unforced direction, to inspire people to endorse certain choices over their own, or even as their own. That way, hierarchies and inequalities are perceived not as domination at all, but as acceptable or unavoidable inconveniences. When they are led, people often assume that their ultimate, shared interests are being advanced, that they have a greater stake in what is coming than in how things currently are. Hegemony, I want to suggest, centres on this more encompassing way of understanding the acceptance of domination.

A vital influence here was Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), the Italian Marxist whose ideas on hegemony from the 1930s offer insights into how social classes seek to exercise what he called ‘national-popular’ leadership over society. Before Gramsci, hegemony had described, rather narrowly, the ‘preeminence’ or ‘supremacy’ of one city state, nation state, or group over others in a political alliance (see Lebow and Kelly 2001; Anderson 2016: 1–11). After its incorporation into debates about revolution, however, Gramsci enriched the concept by making leadership a feature of class domination in general. Classes rule, he argued, not always by forcing others to obey them but by cultivating a broad-based cultural and political consensus – an inclusive sense of belonging – that rationalizes and endorses domination. Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony helped others to explain how apparently stable societies were built on certain social alliances and compromises, under the influence of certain cultural values and political ideals. Moreover, hegemony encouraged analysts to identify mechanisms for producing consent (such as the media, culture, and ideology) and to note where, as hegemony waned, forms of conflict and violence were likely to erupt. Many – though not all – later applications of the concept have worked from the ideas developed by Gramsci.

We will look more closely at Gramsci’s contribution in chapter 2. But what is important to remember here is that, with him, hegemony describes the paradox of domination – that people accept the leadership of a certain set of figures, ideas, and institutions, despite the domination these support. Unless we appreciate this paradox, then hegemony won’t make much sense. Worse, it might be (as it has been) crudely reduced to either the purely objective or the subjective dimensions of domination, in isolation. That is, hegemony might be conceived as either some automatic binding force built in to all power relations without the need to generate leadership, or else as an all-pervasive ‘dominant ideology’ that is externally imposed to distract people from reality.

But hegemony really only illuminates anything if we regard it as a concept for exploring how, to what extent, and with what resulting tensions the reality of domination and the complexities of experience co-exist. That, I want to suggest, means understanding hegemony as the name for a practice, one that operates on different scales, varies in depth and breadth, expands and retracts, and undergoes resistance and reinvention. That is to say, it is another name for politics.

Power, Subjectivity, Ethics

With all this in mind, how are we to explore different approaches to hegemony?

Across the twentieth century, debates over hegemony have been moments of innovation in political theory and analysis, as well as occasions for disagreement and controversy. From Gramsci onwards, hegemony has been regularly revised according to new situations and priorities. What is at stake in different approaches is more than just the meaning of a concept, but questions about the shape and mechanisms of social domination and political rule, how to connect objective structures to subjective experiences, and thus how to challenge and reconstitute power anew.

To distinguish approaches to hegemony, we need to review the broad contexts and debates from which they arose. I also suggest we consider how those debates figure three, distinct but overlapping, dimensions of the concept: power, subjectivity, and ethics. These dimensions are present – if unevenly so – in most approaches. There are, of course, other ways to proceed (see, for example, Haugaard and Lentner 2006; Opratko 2012; Worth 2015), but this one encourages a sense of the complexity of the concept while also recognizing its evolution over time. Let us look briefly at each in turn.

Power – a strategic concept

Hegemony, as I’ve suggested, helps to explain power and domination in terms of the exercise of leadership. Analysing power by reference to the various strategies, contests, and phases in such leadership is one of the concept’s most significant contributions to political theory and analysis. It involves a distinctive, ‘strategic’ concept of power.

In modern political analysis, power has widely been conceived through a theoretical model drawn originally from the natural sciences. Power has been a ‘causal concept’ (Ball 1975) whereby one independent entity changes the behaviour of another. It is a model introduced in the seventeenth century by Thomas Hobbes, who took it from the (then) new science of mechanics (see Hobbes 1991). To ‘hold’ power, in his account, is a capacity to make someone act in a way they would not otherwise have chosen. For example, Hobbes understood the Sovereign (or ‘Leviathan’) as an agent whose overwhelming concentration of power causes others to obey. Since then, that model of power – understood as a ‘zero-sum’ possession with causal properties – has been paradigmatic for social and political analysts, even when they disagree about who possesses it or how it operates (Clegg 1989).

But the causal model cannot really explain human behaviour. Undoubtedly, some individuals, groups or organizations concentrate resources, which gives them a greater ability to shape others’ actions. But humans are not mindless ‘objects in motion’ whose interactions are externally determined. They are agents who create and share meaning, and their actions are conditioned by their self-understanding, and so by the conceptual and linguistic terms and rule-based frameworks they employ. Behaviour is mediated by symbolic constructions that dispose towards – not ‘determine’ – some choices over others. The causal model of power is a metaphor that does not helpfully grasp the varied and complex ways in which symbols can ‘shape’, ‘influence’, ‘urge’, ‘threaten’, ‘encourage’ or ‘provoke’ behaviour (Ball 1975). These terms describe reasons, not causes. Because behaviour is subjectively mediated, it is usually impossible to isolate a single, independent ‘cause’ that acts externally upon individuals.

Hegemony, by contrast, invokes a model of power that we can call ‘strategic’. That model, as described by Clegg (1989: 29–34), rejects the notion of power as a causal force concentrated in one place, as Hobbes argued. Instead, it treats power as an evolving and unstable field of forces. The strategic model derives from the work of the sixteenth-century political thinker Niccolò Machiavelli. For him, power was never fully captured or possessed by any one agent (see Machiavelli 1988). Rather, politics was characterized by shifting strengths and concentrations of resource, in which changing abilities and fluctuating opportunities perpetually alter wider relations, and make the exercise of ‘dominion’ provisional. Machiavelli therefore treated political analysis as the interpretation of changing strategies of rule, not the advocacy of a single structure to order society (see Clegg 1989: 34–6).

Hegemony, I want to suggest, aligns with Machiavelli’s strategic model of power more than it does with Hobbes’ causal account. That makes it problematic for those who conceive power and domination as emanating from an objective and unitary structure. To exercise hegemony is to be in a temporary relation of supremacy over others, not in absolute possession of power. That is not to deny the existence of structures of domination and concentrations of power. But such forces are only ever partially effective and require active support to sustain them. Hegemony directs attention, then, to the strategies, practices, and networks of influence that achieve this. But, in so doing, it transforms the idea of power as absolute mastery into something less precise: a terrain or field of relations whose various parts do not automatically cohere but are, momentarily, held in balance.

The strategic view of power, we might say, is more like a battlefield than a castle – its parameters shift as allies are made and lost, as key strongholds are taken or relinquished, and as patterns of influence expand and retract. We need to ask what is the scope of hegemony? Who are its agents? What are its techniques? To what degree do concentrations of power – such as the state, capitalism, or patriarchy – rely on consensual leadership, and when do they employ coercion? Is there only ever one system of hegemony or can there be many? These are matters of interpretation that vary according to the focus and...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Table of Contents
• Series Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Acknowledgements
• 1 What is Hegemony?
• 2 Gramsci: Hegemony and Revolution
• 3 Marxism: Hegemony and the State
• 4 Post-Marxism: Hegemony and Radical Democracy
• 5 Beyond the State: Hegemony in the World
• 6 The End of Hegemony?
• References
• Index
• End User License Agreement