The East Africa Campaign 1914–18

Von Lettow-Vorbeck's Masterpiece

David Smith, Graham Turner

• Publisher: Osprey Publishing
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781472848918
• eBook ISBN: 9781472848925
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

A fascinating, beautifully illustrated study of the daring war in East Africa waged by German colonial forces against the wide array of Allied Powers. The East African Campaign in World War I comprised a series of battles and guerrilla actions which began in German East Africa in 1914 and spread to portions of Portuguese Mozambique, northern Rhodesia, British East Africa, the Uganda Protectorate, and the Belgian Congo. German colonial forces under Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck attempt to divert Allied forces from the Western Front. Despite the efforts of the Allied forces, Lettow-Vorbeck's troops remained undefeated at the end of the war. In this fascinating work, David Smith documents how a wide array of British, Indian, South African, Belgian, Portuguese and local native forces invaded German East Africa and slowly ousted the German forces, a process made tortuous by Lettow-Vorbeck's masterful management of the campaign. Among the events covered in this work are the Battle of Tanga, the scuttling of the Königsberg, the German railway campaign, and the battles at Salaita Hill, Kondoa-Irangi, Mahenge, Mahiwa and Namacurra. Colourful period and specially commissioned illustrations bring to life a wide-ranging and eventful campaign in which a high price was extracted for every inch of ground given up.

OPPOSING PLANS

The aims of the multiple protagonists in East Africa were varied. There was the usual thirst for new territories, a desire not to ‘miss out’ on what was likely to be a redrawing of borders after the war, grandiose dreams of empire-building and pragmatic acceptance of limited possibilities.

Of all the combatants, it was the Germans who had the most intriguing and complex approach to the war. The primary driving force behind their presence in Africa had changed over the years. From a brutal regime highlighted by liberal use of the savage kiboko whip, the Germans had transformed into a more paternalistic presence. With the arrival of Schnee as governor, in 1912, emphasis switched to educating the natives and the German colonies became more progressive, within the limitations of the era.

At the same time, Germany was still intent on expanding its empire. The territories owned by Great Britain were considered off-limits, but the Portuguese to the south and Belgians to the west were fair game. These territories would be combined into a great German Central Africa, a new Fatherland.

Although Germany’s long-term ambitions stretched to raising the imperial flag over a vast transcontinental colony (German Central Africa), von Lettow’s aims during the war were more modest – to simply occupy as many resources of the British Empire as possible. (Amoret Tanner/Alamy)

The major problem with this was that Britain was unwilling to accept the status quo in Africa. Germany would have liked nothing more than a form of détente with Britain on the African continent, allowing them to focus their meagre resources on the Belgian Congo and Portuguese East Africa, but Britain’s determination to export the European war made this impossible.

German East Africa was also riven by a philosophical disagreement that was never fully resolved throughout the war. Governor Schnee wanted to remain neutral and was willing to accept almost any indignity from the British as long as it prevented the horrors of war from being visited upon his colony. The military commander, von Lettow-Vorbeck, had very different ideas. Although well aware that he did not have the forces necessary to actually defeat the British, he saw it as his duty as a German officer to tie up as many British troops as possible, thus preventing them from deployment on the battlefields of Europe.

Von Lettow’s tactics therefore served a subtle and unusual strategy, one that his opponents had great difficulty in comprehending. He would antagonize the British, demanding a response from them, but always remaining out of their grasp. He would stand and fight when it suited him, and even mount limited offensives when the risk was low, but his overriding concern was not protecting territory, nor was it defeating his opponent. It was merely to keep his army intact. This required a herculean effort, especially as he was cut off from resupply from Europe for the bulk of the war. What supplies and equipment did fall into his hands had to be husbanded very carefully.

German askari drilling prior to the outbreak of war. Responsibilities mostly included suppression of the native population, but they proved to be elusive and tenacious opponents on the battlefield. (Photo by Haeckel collection/ullstein bild via Getty Images)

British plans were simpler, but vastly more difficult to realize. German territories in Africa were not greatly appealing to the British. Cameroon, Togo and German South-West Africa were not seen as having much potential, but German East Africa was a different story. Considered agriculturally promising, the British very much liked the idea of adding it to their possessions on the continent.

The main problem faced by the British was their unwillingness to arm the native population. The drawing in of troops from elsewhere in their vast empire was the obvious solution and it gave Britain a greatly superior force, numerically at least, to that employed by the Germans. The size of the British Army in East Africa, however, would become one of its weaknesses – cumbersome, slow and unimaginative, it would lumber after the fleet-footed Germans for the next four years.

Farmhands working on a sisal-agave plantation. The agricultural potential of German East Africa was particularly tempting to the British, who saw the war as an opportunity to expand their African empire. (Photo by Haeckel collection/ullstein bild via Getty Images)

The British war effort would go through multiple phases. Initially, echoing the optimism of the early days of the war in Europe, a short, sharp offensive was envisaged. Using imported troops from India, the British planned a large-scale invasion at Tanga, and then intended using the port as a base to move inland along the Northern Railway, before cutting southwards and then back to Dar-es-Salaam, the German capital.

When this initial strategy failed, a huge infusion of troops effectively handed the war over to the South Africans. Under the command of Jan Smuts, von Lettow’s army itself became the target. Smuts aimed to pin the German commander, encircle him, and annihilate him in a decisive battle. With his overwhelming superiority of numbers, Smuts had reason for optimism, but his strategy demanded two elements that would prove elusive: he needed an opponent who could not move faster than him and one who was obliging enough to stand and fight. The employment of thousands of mounted troops promised to make the former a reality (until the tsetse fly laid waste to Smuts’ mounted columns), but von Lettow was never going to allow himself to be cornered.

The King’s African Rifles were a match for the German askari, but the British initially proved unwilling to employ their East African troops. Events during the early stages of the war would force a rethink and the KAR became the mainstay of the army. (Culture Club/Getty Images)

In the final stage of the war, Britain called in troops from West Africa as well as expanding the ranks of the KAR, handing over the war once more, this time to native Africans, with help from the Belgians and, to a lesser extent, the Portuguese. The final strategy was little more than a pursuit of von Lettow’s dwindling ‘army’ until it was hounded out of German East Africa, allowing the British to temporarily claim victory… before the Germans returned and even had the nerve to invade British Northern Rhodesia.

The Belgians and Portuguese had similar aims. Their goals were merely to be involved, so that they might protect their own territories and possibly scoop up scraps as they fell from the negotiating table after the war. The Belgians made a genuine contribution, despite being viewed with great suspicion by the British, while the Portuguese performed so badly they became known as the ‘Pork and Beans’ to the British and the shenzi ulaia (‘trashy soldiers’) to the German askari.

Gold Coast infantry in Togo, August 1914. Having gained experience on the other side of the continent, they were an obvious choice for bringing eastwards when the initial British strategy of employing largely Indian and South African troops had failed. (Public Domain)

German East Africa, north of the Rufiji, 1914

THE EAST AFRICA CAMPAIGN

PART I: THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE

Indian Expeditionary Force B was just one of six such corps sent out from the subcontinent over the course of the war. Expeditionary Force A was sent to the Western Front, B and C were directed to East Africa, D joined the Mesopotamia Campaign, E headed for Sinai and Palestine, and F saw action at the Suez Canal. Force C, commanded by Brigadier-General James ‘Jimmie’ Stewart and tasked with securing British East Africa, started arriving on 1 September, when the 29th Punjabis reached Mombasa. Force B, with the daunting job of taking control of the huge territory of German East Africa, did not even leave Bombay (after sweltering in troop ships for weeks) until 16 October. Commanded by Major-General Arthur Aitken, IEF B was comprised of two brigades: the 27th (Bangalore) Brigade and the Imperial Service Infantry Brigade.

Before Britain’s reinforcements arrived, the initiative in East Africa lay with the Germans, and they did not waste their opportunity. Governor Schnee wanted to disperse troops about the interior of his vast colony, to guard against civil unrest, but von Lettow, convinced the British would mount an invasi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Table of Contents
• Origins of the Campaign
• Chronology
• Opposing Commanders
• Opposing Forces
• Opposing Plans
• Aftermath
• The Battlefields Today
• Further Reading
• eCopyright