Introduction
As this book is being written the world is in its second year of a coronavirus pandemic. The movement of people globally is no longer a given. While only recently we could refer to human migration, mainly from the Global South to Western nations, the future is even more uncertain for those who need or plan to do so. Having said that, the issues discussed in this book remain relevant to migrant-destination societies. One such context is Australia, a Western Anglophone nation built on British settler colonialism. The nation was founded on the dispossession of indigenous Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who, before colonisation and since, are diverse.
Australia is a place where the rhetoric of successful multiculturalism is often promoted; indeed, the national government claims it to be the most successful multicultural society in the world (Australian Government, 2018). There are many contradictions to this statement, including the violent way in which the land became a nation; the non-existence of a treaty with, and a denial of recognition to the sovereignty and self-determination of, First Peoples; the inhumane treatment of asylum seekers and temporary migrants (Ratnam, 2019); and the targeting of certain immigrants, mainly those of colour, as a threat to social and economic cohesion (Ezzy et al., 2020; Hage, 1998; Henri, 2019; Piller, 2016). Furthermore, migrants whose English differs from the standard Australian variety can be made to feel linguistically inferior and they can experience discrimination and social exclusion based on their different accents (Dovchin & Dryden, 2021; Dryden & Dovchin, 2021; TankosiÄ et al., 2021). In short, the white native English speaker is largely and persistently perceived as the embodiment of authentic Australianness, with anyone else (that is, those representing multicultural diversity) cast as the Other (Piller et al., 2021). As a reflection of these attitudes towards migrants, the 2020 Mapping Social Cohesion Report (Markus, 2021), the result of an annual survey that seeks to track the social impact of Australiaās immigration programme, found that while 84% of respondents agree that multiculturalism has been good for Australia, 67% support the opinion that ātoo many immigrants are not adopting Australian valuesā (p. 70). Whatever the survey participants deemed Australian values to be, there is little doubt this included an ability to speak Australian English with an acceptable accent.
The 2016 Census showed that two-thirds (67%) of the Australian population were born in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a). However nearly half (49%) of Australians were either born overseas themselves or one or both of their parents were (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a). Approximately one-fifth of the population speak a language other than English at home (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a), representing unprecedented migration-driven diversity in the country (Ndhlovu & Willoughby, 2017).
The concept of superdiversity does not merely connote successful multiculturalism. As Vertovec (2007) describes, superdiversity refers to the unprecedented configuration of people from different countries, ethnicities, languages, religions, and cultures in many urban centres of migrant-destination countries in recent decades. It also acknowledges the complexity of factors associated with migration that multiply these levels of diversity ā such as different migration channels, legal statuses, socioeconomic classes, and degrees of transnationalism.
The response of governments, authorities, policy makers, service providers, and local residents to this diversity is often inconsistent. As an example, elements of migrant cultures such as cuisine or dress might generally be celebrated, even appropriated, however when it comes to religion, host societies tend to be less engaged. There may be a condemnation of unfamiliar religio-cultural practices, as is the case for Muslim women who cover parts of their bodies, or an indifference and ignorance about the diversity within the so-called Eastern religions like Hinduism. There is also a tendency to assume homogeneity of traits of migrants according to their ethnicity or homeland; for example, assuming all Sri Lankan people are Buddhists; and this leads to a lack of nuance when mainstream services attempt to cater to such migrants. Minority community organisations have been central to not only providing forums for specific groups of migrants but also advocating for their specific needs. At the same time, the notion of superdiversity challenges the extent to which such organisations can cater to the diverse needs of their members (Vertovec, 2007). This is further complicated by a finding of the recent Social Cohesion survey that 64% of respondents think that governments should not provide assistance for ethnic minorities to maintain their customs and traditions (Markus, 2021, p. 70), a suggestion that migrants need to keep such practices hidden since they are not in the public interest. It is this very challenge, the visibility of linguistic and cultural difference, that this book explores, via ethnographic data collected in what is ostensibly a migrant religious institution but, as will be revealed, represents so much more. This is a Hindu temple, founded by predominantly Sri Lankan Tamil migrants, in a major city of Australia.
Foundational research into migrant language maintenance and shift has highlighted the role of religion in promoting the transmission of heritage languages (e.g., Clyne & Kipp, 1999; Fernandez & Clyne, 2007). As a result of migration, religion can take on an increasingly important role for those who emigrate in search of improving their life situations yet who often face isolation and exclusion in their new destination (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000; Warner & Wittner, 1998). Religion can be one way for migrants to find solace in their new environment, it can provide them with a framework for understanding their situation (Asor, 2018), and it can enable connection to others with similar cultural backgrounds or in similar situations.
Therefore, the role of religion in social life should not be ignored but critically investigated through in-depth research (Lytra, 2020a). Faith can be viewed as:
However, as the finding from the Social Cohesion report indicates, religion can also be a source for social division, especially when the mainstream media stereotype and misrepresent religious communities (Lytra, 2020a).
So why study a religious institution? It is not only the institution that is under examination but the diverse people that comprise it, from frequent devotees to faith leaders and community volunteers. This includes the second generation ā those young people, born overseas or to migrant parents, who represent Australiaās future society. As the social make-up of Australia evolves, it is important to recognise that faith still has a role in contemporary society and that we need to āunderstand the role of diverse faith contexts in the development of children and adultsā identities, belief systems, languages and cultural traditionsā to contribute to envisioning and creating multicultural and pluralistic societies (Lytra, 2020b, p. 317).
Religion, as a central signifier in superdiversity, has been ignored in the past although this is now changing (Burchardt & Becci, 2016) because we are living in times when āreligious diversity is becoming more diverseā in global cities (Bouma et al., 2021, p. 2). This is an era of religious superdiversity when not only different migrant, ethnic, and language groups lead to a multiplication of religions, but individuals have access to and can draw on new and multiple sources to form their religious expressions (Burchardt & Becci, 2016, p. 3). It is time for research into superdiversity to āconceptualize religion as a marker of differenceā and ārecognize the internal diversity of practices, identities and epistemologies that are grouped under the label of religionā (Burchardt & Becci, 2016, p. 2).
Religious diversification not only entails diversity resulting from migrant-imported religions at different levels of society (local, metropolitan, and national), but the rise of new, perhaps innovative, religious movements that are not directly connected to migration (Becci et al., 2017). While Australia has been a predominantly Christian nation since colonisation, the last national census found that 30% of the population chose āno religionā ā a term which encompasses secular and other spiritual beliefs (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b). Still, 52% of the population chose Christianity as their affiliation, with 8% (or less than 2 million people) choosing āother religionsā of which Hinduism was one (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b). However, the proportion of people affiliated with āother religionsā has increased from 2.6% in 1991 to 8.2% in 2016 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017b). The predominance or normativity of Christianity still pervades society, with Christian festivals (Christmas and Easter) recognised as public holidays and the majority of recent prime ministers acknowledging their Christianity, epitomised in the current Prime Minister Scott Morrisonās evangelical Christian affiliation and his public prayer during the coronavirus pandemic (Karp, 2020). In fact, Australian parliamentary sittings begin with a prayer to āAlmighty Godā and recitation of the Christian prayer, āOur Fatherā (Parliament of Australia, 2010).
Australia is a nation where whiteness and Anglo-centricity are the norm (S. Perera, 1999, 2007). In this context, the fact that Hinduism has been the fastest-growing...