1.1 Introduction
This book examines the mismatch between the European Unionâs (EUâs)1 supply of policy in its Southern Neighbourhood2 and the demand for change by ordinary citizens in four countriesâEgypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisiaâwhich have been at the forefront of the EUâs Southern Neighbourhood policies and of the 2010â11 Arab Uprisings. The book presents an innovative pairing of EU policy and practice, matching Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on the one hand with innovative approaches to quantitative public opinion survey data on the other. This allows the volume to map the mismatch between âwhat The People wantâ and what the EU is willing to give. Amongst other things, this mapping reveals how it has been possible for EU policy to remain entrenched in a long-failing framework, and how such policy efforts contribute to the retrenchment rather than to resolution of the structural causes of the Arab Uprisings.
A series of events starting with the global financial crisis in 2008 and followed by the popular Uprisings3 in 2010â11 had a profound impact on the Unionâs relations with Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs). In the aftermath of the Uprisings there has been turmoil across the region, with intense conflict in Syria, Libya and Yemen, Europeâs âmigration crisisâ and fears around the radicalisation of European and SMC citizens. What the EU wanted to turn into a âring of friendsâ has instead turned into a âring of fireâ (Bildt 2015). In the face of these events the EU revised its policy towards the region twice, in 2011 and again in 2015, with several significant shifts in between. In 2011 the failure of previous policy was ascribed to inadequate support for democratic political reformâin fact, to de facto support for autocraciesâand for inclusive growth. In the wake of unprecedented region-wide mass protests, the EU recognised on the one hand the need to promote âdeep democracyâ more systematically and coherently, giving greater incentives to countries making faster progress towards democracy, and on the other hand it recognised the importance of inclusive economic growth. Neither of these objectives lived up to the paradigm shift the EU had proclaimed. Moreover, by 2015 the EU had effectively abandoned even these timid reforms and once again focused on narrow, conventional and short-term approaches to pursuing security, economic interests and migration control (Cebeci and Schumacher 2017; Schumacher 2016; Teti 2016). Indeed, the EU explicitly presented stability and (economic) security as prerequisites for both political and economic reformâeven if that meant once again offering de facto support to dictatorships. This shift in EU policy was further emphasised in the EUâs Global Strategy for the European Unionâs Foreign and Security Policy, which emphasises the threat of an unstable and insecure neighbourhood, prioritises the promotion of the interests of EU citizens and sees itself as a global peacemaker (European Commission 2016).
First, the book provides a context for the analysis of the post-Uprisings policy documents by examining the EUâs construction of its own identityâthe model that it wants to export across the globe and more specifically to SMCs, which is ever-present in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) but never defined. We then examine the conceptual construction and framing of EU policy through a detailed analysis of its foreign policy discourse, to corroborate substantive accounts that the EUâs image of the outcome that it wants is European-style liberal democracy (e.g. Pace and Seeberg 2010) combined with a free-market economy. Rather than learning lessons from past mistakes and adopting an innovative approach, especially with respect to democracy assistance, analysis of pre- and post-Uprising policy documents shows that the EUâs promise to learn from past mistakes and its claim to a paradigm shift in policy and practice after the Uprisings is not substantiated by the evidence. A close analysis of its policy discourse contrasted with its practices shows how little either has changed. The EUâs approach to democracy, development and security continued to be underpinned by a narrow procedural understanding of democracy, with human rights restricted to limited, uncontroversial political and civil rights, effectively marginalising both politically difficult human rights such as freedom of association and protest and social rights/social justice (Teti 2016). The second part of the book demonstrates that, both before the Uprisings and since then, the EU has failed to deliver both what it promised and what the people of the region want, namely social and economic justice as well as political rights (Teti et al. 2018, 2019). This approach contributes to several debates, from the international context of democratisation to the nature of EU âexternal actionâ (specifically the construction of EU identity and foreign policy, why the EU is not a ânormative actorâ and why it is not perceived as such), and the under-researched question of how the EU is perceived by others (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Smolinska and SmoliĆska 2013) by drawing specifically on unique survey data which captures popular reception of EU policy and practice in SMCs. It also responds to calls for further research on the security of others by giving voice to the attitudes, values and concerns of people living in the Southern Mediterraneanâto give voice to the âotherâ (Bilgin 2010, 2017).
1.2 Background
Since the 1970s, the EU has aimed to build a âjust basisâ for international relations, staking a claim for itself not just as an influential regional and global actor (Hill and Smith 2000) but as offering a qualitatively different type of foreign policy. It has presented itself as a ânormative powerâ attempting to redefine international norms in its own image, with its foreign policy guided by the principles that it claims inspired its own creation: democracy, human dignity, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities (Hornat 2016; Manners 2002). In this narrative, political and economic progress are presented as the inevitable outcome of a model that could be described as âmarket democratisationâ: neoliberal economic policies, understood as the only way in which a modern economy can be run, are de facto drivers of a latter-day civilising/modernisation process of democratisation and respect for human rights.
This raises a question concerning the Unionâs âactornessââthe extent to which the EU can be considered an independent actor pursuing its own policies, as opposed to being part of a broader alliance not easily separated from the policies of its Member States or other global and regional powers. In pursuing its policies, the EU has to take account on the one hand of the positions of its Member States and on the other of the positions taken by its Western allies and other actors, including Russia, China, Turkey, the Gulf States and international financial institutions (IFIs). In addition, the type of action the Union pursues is not clear. For a start, the idea that the EUâs âfundamental valuesâ are neutral, universal or universally agreed has been shown to be deeply problematic (Leino and Petrov 2009). Secondly, the notion that market liberalisation and democracy can go hand in hand is increasingly challengedâfor example, by studies showing that promoting democracy is in conflict with other policy goals, including market liberalisation, trade policy reforms and private-sector development (Grimm and Leininger 2012; Theuns 2017). Thirdly, the EU is at best inconsistent in its application of conditionality, undermining its actual democracy-promotion performance (Börzel and Lebanidze 2017). Fourthly, whether the EU can be regarded as a ânormative powerâ at all is far from clear; in prioritising stability rather than progress on democratisation and human rights the EU arguably operates as a realist power, at best pursing both objectives but with stability being prioritised over democracy (Börzel and van HĂŒllen 2014; Cebeci and Schumacher 2017; Schlumberger 2011). Finally, while the EU stresses the importance of working in part...