Islamophobia as an academic topic of study remains relatively new, the first detailed scholarly monographs being less than a decade old (Allen, 2010; Kumar, 2012; Sheehi, 2011). As a discriminatory phenomenon afforded public and political attention, Islamophobia is slightly older. From the initial recognition of a distinct anti-Muslim discriminatory phenomenon emerging in London in the late 1980s (Allen, 2010), Islamophobia entered the public and political spaces in 1997 as a result of the groundbreaking Runnymede Trust report Islamophobia: a challenge for us all (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997). Emanating out from these embryonic origins in the context of the UK, the ensuing years have seen Islamophobia recognised in much of Europe, North America and various other places beyond. In this respect, both the term and the phenomenon of Islamophobia are firmlyâand consciouslyâestablished in the lexicons of different general publics, cross-spectrum political actors and disparate disciplinary scholars. It is unsurprising then that Islamophobia has attracted the attention of the United Nations (UN). According to its Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in 2008 (United Nations, 2008), given the marked increase in Islamophobia since the turn of the century, if immediate action was not taken, Islamophobia would pervade the lived experience of an ever-growing number of Muslims around the world.
In addition to its recognition, Islamophobia has also been rejected: at best, emerging as something of a contested phenomenon, and at worst, a mere construction. Routinely and regularly castigated and challenged, decried and denied, there is little evidence of Islamophobia being responded to with the certainty and seriousness afforded to it by the UN Special Rapporteur. This can be illustrated by some examples from the UK context. For example, the Quilliam foundationâa one-time UK Government-funded and London-based think tank focusing on counter-extremism that was established by former âIslamist extremistsââclaimed that merely acknowledging, let alone using, the term Islamophobia was enough to hand âa propaganda coup to Islamists who canâŚpresent themselves as ordinary Muslims who are victims of âIslamophobiaââ (Readings, Brandon, & Phelps, 2011, p. 24). So influential was this that for a number of years, the UKâs coalition government ceased referring to and subsequently using the term Islamophobia, something subsequent governments have rescinded on (Allen, 2017). Beyond the political spaces, there have been a number of detractors and critics in the public spaces as well. These include the commentator Douglas Murray who cites Christopher Hitchens: âIslamophobia is a word created by fascists, and used by cowards, to manipulate moronsâ (Murray, 2018). Others like the journalist Melanie Phillips concur, contesting the very reality of Islamophobia by arguing that it is little more than mere âfictionâ: a âfictionâ that functions to hamper legitimate and valid criticism of Islam and Muslims (Phillips, 2018).
Despite such protestations, there exists however a vast array of evidence that not only render arguments such as Islamophobia being a mere âfictionâ as nonsense but so too prove it is unequivocallyâand extremely worryinglyâreal. Focusing again on the UK setting, this is evident in the UK Governmentâs official data. Noting that the level of religiously motivated hate crime has been at record highs for the past few years, Muslims comprise the majority of victims (OâNeill, 2017). In support of this, data from Londonâs Metropolitan Police Force offers similar evidence. Focusing specifically on Islamophobic hate crimes, its data evidences increasing levels: showing a rise from 1205 Islamophobic hate crimes per year to 1678 per year most recently (De Payer, 2018). Non-official data sets suggest much the same. Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks)âa national non-statutory organisation that offers support to Muslim victims of hate crimeâhas recorded year-on-year increases in the number of recorded Islamophobic hate crimes for almost half a decade. Its most recent data shows that in the past year alone, the number of attacks increased by 30 per cent (Tell MAMA, 2017). Irrespective of critics and detractors therefore, Islamophobia is real and tangible. Far removed from those suggesting Islamophobia was conceived as a means to âmanipulate moronsâ or âhamper legitimate and valid criticismâ, the evidence shows that Islamophobia is extremely real.
This dichotomous tension is far from the preserve of the UK. In the United States, for instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC )âa non-profit organisation that tracks hate groups and hate crimesâclaims there was a dramatic increase in the number of tangible Islamophobically motivated incidents comprising âhateful harassment and intimidationâ in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trumpâs election as President in November 2016 (Jones, 2016). Evidencing how this increase was sharper than following the 9/11 terror attacks, the SPLC stated that the 300 incidents it recorded in the week following Trumpâs election were equivalent to the number of Islamophobic incidents typically recorded in a five- to six-month period. Counter to thisâand in line with the dichotomy apparent in the British settingâTrump and his supporters regularly and routinely play down the ârealityâ of Islamophobia. As a report from the Bridge Institute at Georgetown University recently put it, not only is Trumpâs White House staffed by individuals who support discriminatory, bigoted and hateful views of Muslims and Islam, but so too does his administration legitimise and mainstream Islamophobic ideas and notions (Bridge Institute, 2017).
While data about tangible manifestations of Islamophobia is extremely limited in the Australian setting, the data that does exist illustrates that the levels of Islamophobic hate crime have been increasing since 2014 (Ozalt, 2017). Similar to the work of Tell MAMA in the UK and the SPLC in the United States, the Islamophobia Register Australia has been attempting to collate academically verified data that it too can use to evidence the realities of Islamophobia. Despite being at a relatively early stage, the data collated suggests the growing scale and prevalence of Islamophobic hate crimes across Australia. Dichotomously, the Australian media outlets have afforded platforms to those who sit in contention to the evidence at hand and who align themselves with the critics and detractors referred to previously. These have included editorial pieces in the Sydney Morning Herald among others that claimed Islamophobia does not exist: instead, the entire phenomenon being a mere construction that serves an ideological function (Sheehan, 2009). Sadly albeit unsurprising, this same dichotomyâone that posits evidence of a very real and tangible Islamophobia against a portfolio of arguments that seek to criticise and detract from those same realities of tangible evidence and contested conceptâis also evident in Canada, France, Germany and Sweden among various others. Islamophobiaâs contestationâlike the phenomenon itselfâis truly global.
A Working Definition of Islamophobia
While there is little rationale for Islamophobia to continue to be contested in the face of overwhelming evidence of its very realities, an insight that can be extrapolated from the UK setting relates to definition; more so, the lack of an agreed definition. While on the one hand evidence shows that Islamophobia is largely akin to other forms of hate crimes that are motivated by racism, homophobia or similar (Zempi & Awan, 2016), it would seem that this is detracted fromâif not entirely dismissedâby the need to convey and duly convince public and political audiences exactly what Islamophobia is and, importantly, what it is not. While considered extensively later in the book, a preliminary consideration affords not just a useful start point but so too a foundation upon which to build and develop thinking.
Despite processes of defining Islamophobia as having been something of a constant in the public and political spaces since it first entered both two decades ago (Allen, 2017), it has been the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims that has most recently actively sought to put forward a potentially agreeable definition. As informal cross-party groups that have no official status within the UK Parliament, the APPGs are run by and for politicians albeit without precluding the involvement of individuals and organisations from outside the governmental and political spaces. Established in July 2017, the APPG on British Muslims was set up to build on the earlier work undertaken by the now defunct APPG on Islamophobia. Despite having a public remit claiming to examine a broad range of issues of importance to British Muslims, the new APPG was as much about distancing itself from the many damaging controversies that doggedâand ultimately rendered impotentâthe APPG on Islamophobia as it was anything else (Allen, 2011).
Within that broad remit was a commitment by the APPG on British Muslims to investigate the prejudice, discrimination and hatred experienced by the countryâs Muslims. Having published reports investigating the charitable activities of Muslims in the UK (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2017, 2018a), it was via its third report that the APPG sought to have its greatest impact. Launched in November 2018, Islamophobia defined: the inquiry into a working definition of Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018b) hoped to make history by putting forward a working definition of Islamophobia that would be adopted and subsequently acted upon by the British Government among others. Setting out how its definition was the culmination of two years of consultation and evidence gathering, it claimed its definition took in the views of academics, lawyers, local and nationally elected officials as well as Muslim organisations, activists, campaigners and local Muslim communities. Echoing the 1997 Runnymede Trust report (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997) two decades earlier, the APPG claimed the time was right to âgive meaning to the word and nature of the thing we call Islamophobiaâ (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018b, p. 8).
In doing so, the APPG on British Muslims proposed the following definition: âIslamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness â (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018b, p. 11). Roundly supported by various Muslim organisations as also British-based scholars, some of those close to the APPG expressed a hope that like the working definition of anti-Semitism put forward by...