The Changing Ideology of Hezbollah

Massaab Al-Aloosy

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9783030348465
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030348472
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Internationale Beziehungen

The project discusses Hezbollah's political ideology and how it evolves over time and the conditions that lead to the change of ideology. The author also examines Hezbollah's relationship with the patron states, Syria and Iran. In contrast with major arguments in the literature, the book argues that political ideologies are not fixed and they evolve depending on a number of factors such as the change in context, major events like a civil war in the patron state, and, most importantly, when the change of ideology becomes linked to survival of the insurgency. This monograph will appeal to a wide range of audiences such as researchers, scholars, and graduate students in the fields of Middle Eastern studies, political studies, Islamism, and nationalism.

© The Author(s) 2020

M. Al-AloosyThe Changing Ideology of HezbollahMiddle East Todayhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34847-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Massaab Al-Aloosy¹

(1)

The Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar

Massaab Al-Aloosy

End Abstract

Born while the civil war devastated the Lebanese household to the black sheep Shia, Hezbollah is the inheritor of ignominious and discriminatory centuries. Its soldiers struggled for controversial justice under the banner of a zealous Islamist ideology, growing out of the Iranian Revolution’s womb. But over time, ideological determination gave way to imposed pragmatism. From the year Hezbollah was formally created in 1985, it embarked on several goals; however, the main aims of Hezbollah were ultimately revised. Hezbollah’s initial ideology was based on the destruction of Israel, greater influence in the Lebanese political system, and establishing an Islamic theocracy in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah—also transliterated Hizbollah, Hizballah, and other variations—has evolved significantly throughout the decades, the group continues to regard Israel as their main enemy, and its loyalty to the concept of the rule of the jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) remained at the core of its ideology but not without ideological changes.

Theoretically speaking, the research will address a gap in the literature through explaining an insurgency’s change of ideology over time, and a different dynamic between a patron state and an insurgency through analyzing four periods of Hezbollah’s history. The traditional perception of ideology has a static status quo, and the norm has been a varied support by patron states to insurgencies, but in this instance, the roles are reversed. This research will explain the changing role of insurgency’s ideology, and explain why an insurgency would support the patron state in a civil war. A different understanding as to the significance of ideology for insurgencies will be presented, helping in constructing policy prescriptions that could be applied in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Early Ideology

Every insurgency is motivated by an ideology , which serves multiple functions. Foremost among these functions is constructing an enemy. My research explores two questions: Are insurgency ideologies static? Are their ideologies affected if another, more threatening enemy arises? The conventional wisdom is that ideologies are fixed but ideologies evolve and are heavily influenced by context. An insurgency will alter its ideology for another cause to provide justification and mobilize its population in support of the other cause. Amending an ideology is vital when the survival of an insurgency is challenged. Hezbollah’s rationale for fighting Israel is rooted in nationalistic and Islamist ideology, including liberating Lebanese land occupied by Israel during the 1982 Lebanon war, creating an Islamic theocracy in Lebanon, and liberating Jerusalem from the Israelis. Even though the leaders of Hezbollah have regularly announced that their raison d’être is to fight Israel, they have focused most of their energy toward that endeavor; the revolutionary changes in the Middle East over the past three decades threatened Hezbollah’s existence and forced it to recalibrate. Hezbollah was compelled to intervene, as the fall of al-Assad regime was imminent before any ideological justifications. Al-Assad’s Syria is not only a staunch ally of Hezbollah; his country also serves as a conduit for Iranian support. Furthermore, Lebanon was tacitly recognized as a Syrian sphere of influence after the Taif agreement in 1989, adding to an already-accumulated influence. For Hezbollah, it was unthinkable to allow the replacement of the regime in Damascus.

Al-Assad regime nearly collapsed if it were not for Hezbollah, among other factors. Hezbollah presented several pretexts for its intervention in Syria: fighting Sunni extremists (or takfiris), defending the Syrian Shia, and protecting Shia religious sites; but Hezbollah was already on the ground before it presented any justifications to preserve its interest. Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria is about the survival of the group, because whoever controls Syria ultimately has much influence in Lebanon and holds the lifeline for Hezbollah. And in this case, not only it is unique that an insurgency is supporting a patron state survive instead of being on the receiving end, but also the effects on the former’s ideology can be clearly noticed. Furthermore, for the first time, Lebanon is having an influence in Syria, not the other way around.

In the following chapters, I will explain why an insurgency interferes militarily in a patron state involved in a civil war and how that interference affects insurgency’s ideology. More specifically, I focus on three potential aspects: first, military intervention of an insurgency in a patron state. An insurgency has an aim and it is supported by a patron state to achieve that aim. In the case of Hezbollah in Syria, the roles have been reversed with the insurgency supporting the state. Second, I seek to explain the dominance of interest over ideology in regard to the survivability of an insurgency and when actions are based on idealistic or pragmatic foundations. When the issue at stake is survivability, however, an insurgency will rely on pragmatism rather than its ideology. And third, I seek to explain the effect of this intervention on the ideology of the insurgency to legitimize its involvement. An insurgency ideology is usually constructed around a specific goal. As it supports a patron state instead of trying to achieve an earlier pronounced aim, an insurgency has to ideologically legitimize its involvement.

Insurgency Intervention

My research into Hezbollah’s revolutionary evolution, including interviews with Hezbollah’s officials, will examine whether contextual changes made insurgency’s leadership more pragmatic than ideological. Ideologies are advocated at the beginning of the life of an insurgency and within a certain context. But the insurgency goes through a process of more pragmatism and change in ideology as the state’s political system becomes more centralized, the occupying forces withdraw, the cadre of the group rises in seniority, and a civil war occurs in the patron state. In other words, the desires and aims of the leadership are captive to reality and become more practical as the leadership becomes more aware of reality and the impossibility of achieving the goals they set. Moreover, insurgencies support the ally regime, at a time of civil war in a patron state. As states support insurgencies, an informal alliance is created based on shared interests. The support includes, but not exclusive to, weapons, training, finances, and safe haven. If the political system of the patron state collapses, then the regime will change and, subsequently, will adversely affect the support for the insurgency. Therefore, when the patron state is embroiled in a civil war, the leadership of the insurgency will naturally believe its interest is threatened and will intervene to prop up the patron regime. In addition, when the survival of insurgency is at stake, interest prevails over ideology. In practice, there are moments when there is a clash between ideology and interest for any insurgency. At the end of the day, insurgencies have a raison d’être they try to highlight and work toward whenever possible, but simultaneously the insurgency is limited in terms of resources amid a constant change of context. Throughout the lifespan of an insurgency, the political environment has massive changes, making it difficult or even impossible to consistently align interest with ideology. Therefore, the insurgency’s interest will dictate a different priority, as the insurgency will fight for its own survival against a second enemy despite the fact that the ideology points at the first enemy, which the insurgency has been mobilizing against since its existence. Finally, military intervention in a civil war of patron state leads to a change of insurgency ideology. To justify military intervention, the insurgency will have to change its ideology. An insurgency, unlike a terrorist organization, draws much support from its population. Thus, it cannot engage in a battle that drains much of its energy without a justification. The ideology, as a result, will change to substantiate its military intervention in the patron state and explain why the insurgency is focusing today on supporting the patron state instead of fighting to achieve the initially set goal.

Decision-Making Process

The decision-making process is of crucial interest to political scientists as well as researchers in many other fields including economists, psychologists, and sociologists. The following section is a brief overview of the major theories of decision-making, which attempt to explain the actions of the organization’s leaders, as well as the gaps in these theories. I will next present a sampling of how some scholars interpret the role of ideology in insurgencies, and finally, a summary of some scholars’ interpretation of Hezbollah’s ideology.

The rational choice theory, according to Kathleen Eisenhardt, among others,¹ is one of the most important theories which explain human behavior based on a purpose that translates into a common model of rational action. Thus, actors enter situations with known objectives and they determine the value of the consequences and develop a set of alternative actions based on the information they have. Over time, however, this theory has been amended.

Bounded rationality theory recognizes the limits of rational choice theory and, at the same time, tries to address its shortcomings. According to Daniel Kahneman, the theory maintains that decision makers intend to be rational, goal-oriented, and adaptive, but they are restricted. The alternatives presented to the decision makers are immensely simplified due to the lack of ability and time. Hence, the name-bounded rationality, which, in essence, implies that it would modify the assumptions presented by rational decision theory by introducing risk and uncertainty. Any rational actor does not have complete information about any particular situation and, therefore, tends to make an imperfect decision because of this misinformat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. From the Outskirt to the Core: How the Shia Transformed Within the Lebanese Society
• 3. Insurgency and the Transformation of Ideology: Changes in Hezbollah’s Thoughts and Practices
• 4. Obliteration and Liberation Change to Deterrence: Hezbollah’s Ideological Transformation Toward Israel and the Palestine Cause
• 5. From a Patron to Patronage: Hezbollah’s Support for the Syrian Regime in the Civil War
• 6. Conclusion
• Back Matter