The "Roads" and "Belts" of Eurasia

Alexander Lukin

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9789811508554
• eBook ISBN:
  9789811508561
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Business
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book addresses the challenges and opportunities of contemporary and future development of Eurasia. The main theme of the first part of the book is examining the reaction evoked in different countries by the Chinese "Belt and Road Initiative." The second part analyses other national and international integration and infrastructure projects in Eurasia. This unique publication brings together in one volume works by leading researchers from different countries, all united by their common interest in the political and economic processes unfolding in the Eurasian continent. By offering various points of view from experts from all over the world, this book provides a multi-dimensional analysis of the Eurasian future and will be of value to a wide range of readers, including scholars, publicists, the international business community and decision-makers.

Part IChina’s Belt and Road Initiative: Views from the Outside

© The Author(s) 2020

A. Lukin (ed.)The “Roads” and “Belts” of Eurasiahttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0856-1_1

Begin Abstract

1. Belt and Road Initiative: Evolution of China’s Approach

Igor Denisov¹

(1)

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), Moscow, Russia

Igor Denisov

End Abstract

“One Belt, One Road”—China’s New Architecture of All-Round Openness as Seen in the Analyses of the Chinese Authorities and Expert Community

References to the “Silk Road” as a symbol of harmonious interstate relations, communication between civilizations, and mutual enrichment across cultures are not new to the Chinese foreign policy discourse. A number of official documents and foreign policy propaganda statements made use of the image of ancient caravan routes even before Xi Jinping became the supreme leader of party and state.

For example, one such reference appeared in “China’s Peaceful Development,” a white paper prepared by the Press Office of the Chinese State Council (中国的和平发展). “Under the influence of the culture of harmony, peace-loving has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese character. The world-renowned Silk Road, for example, was a road of trade, cultural exchanges and peace, which testifies to the pursuit of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation with other peoples by the ancient Chinese.”¹

However, after the “fifth generation” of leaders came to power at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012, the revival of the Silk Road concept, coupled with the modern ideas of multiculturalism, interconnectivity, and globalization, gradually gave shape to the overall concept of what Beijing refers to as the “Chinese plan” or the “Chinese solution” (中国方案) for regional and global issues. Official “Belt and Road” documents now refer to it as a “top national level initiative for cooperation” (国家级顶层合作倡议). This underscores its priority standing amidst a host of other Chinese initiatives—a status resulting from the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping himself spoke of building a new Silk Road.

Beijing now considers the two practically indivisible initiatives to create a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road—that China commonly refers to as “One Belt, One Road” or “Belt and Road,” and that Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed during visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in the fall of 2013—as one of the main measures for continuing the policy of reform and openness in the new conditions prevailing in the Chinese economy. A number of fundamental political documents state this formally. Thus, Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on November 9–12, 2013, notes that the establishment of open financial structures, the accelerated creation of a unified infrastructure network with surrounding countries and regions, and the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road contribute to China’s ability to form a new architecture of all-round openness.²

A document of the Chinese State Council that is devoted to the strategy of creating a Free Trade Area (FTA) also speaks of this new quality of political openness. In particular, the document emphasizes that China faces the task of “raising the level and quality of openness and of participating more closely in defining international rules.”³

At the same time, Chinese experts note the following features of China’s current openness:

1. 1.
   in terms of substance, with more emphasis placed not on attracting capital and technology, but on investing Chinese capital and technology in foreign markets so that the external openness would contribute to the development of the Chinese economy and the continued success of reforms;
2. 2.
   in terms of geographic reach, by shifting the priority away from developing external openness in the eastern coastal regions and toward developing China’s own western regions;
3. 3.
   in terms of the depth of openness—by taking into account the global trend toward regional integration and by creating FTAs with neighboring countries, China can implement the “three freedoms”—the free movement of goods, capital, and labor.

In addition to retaining these basic principles since its launch in 2013, the “Belt and Road” initiative has undergone constant refinement and development. One of the main results of China’s top leader personally launching the initiative has been a broad discussion among both Chinese academic and government circles at all levels on the following questions: What can China offer the world and how, and how to best combine the interests of a growing power with those of foreign partners? How can China use its growing economic potential to strengthen its political influence in the world and to meet its own security and sustainable development challenges? This chapter examines the main aspects of the issues Xi Jinping addressed in his speeches in Astana and Jakarta.

Discussions in China During the Initial Stage of the Implementation of the “Belt and Road” Initiative (Fall 2013–Spring 2015)

Prior to the official announcement of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives, there was no open discussion of them whatsoever within the Chinese expert community. The experts were obviously confused at first and could not provide clear answers to questions about the objectives of the initiative, methods for its implementation, or mechanisms for interacting with other states: each tried to interpret Xi Jinping’s statements according to his own position and understanding of the given tasks.

The two initiatives shared a common vision of promoting economic cooperation with an additional focus on humanitarian exchanges. Overall, China proposed a model for interacting with surrounding countries based on the principles of openness and inclusiveness.⁴ Most experts believed that the “One Belt, One Road” initiative expanded on the tradition of the historic Great Silk Road to create the longest and most promising economic corridor possible.⁵ Some experts saw the initiative as developing the Chinese foreign policy doctrine, noting that “One Belt, One Road” was an important manifestation of the concept of relations between neighboring countries—something that modern Chinese diplomacy usually designates by four characters—亲, 诚, 惠, 容 (friendliness, sincerity, mutual benefit, and tolerance). These specialists spoke of the “spirit of the new Silk Road” that was based on peaceful development and cooperation, mutual benefit, openness, and inclusiveness.⁶ Other experts saw the initiative as developing the concept of China’s external openness. At the same time, they emphasized China’s new international responsibility, arguing that the country had previously used external resources for its own development, but could now share the results of reforms with its foreign partners.⁷

In their initial discussions of the content of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, Chinese specialists typically interpreted the official statements that Xi Jinping made in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. At the same time, experts pointed out that “One Belt, One Road” was a constructive initiative for developing multilateral cooperation, and that it should be built on principles of openness. This model excludes the possibility of creating any closed groupings and alliances, and the formation of alternatives to or competition with existing platforms for cooperation. In their commentary, the experts noted that China did not intend to play a leading role, interfere in the internal affairs of other states, or create an alternative to other mechanisms for cooperation.⁸ Experts also frequently interpreted the “One Belt, One Road” initiative from the standpoint of traditional Chinese morals, basing their views on the concepts of 正确的义利观 (true justice and benefit) that were actively promoted in the official media. According to this view, the project should be guided by moral considerations and should strike a balance between fairness and profit. As the initiator, China should “give more and receive less—give initially, and later receive.”⁹ Experts also noted that the initiative has three main components: economic cooperation, cooperation on security, and humanitarian contacts.¹⁰

Because the country’s highest leader proposed the initiative personally and because it was assigned the status of a priority state policy from the very beginning, experts generally followed the official propaganda line in evaluating the project’s prospects.

First, they emphasized that China is the starting point of the Great Silk Road and that China has maintained trade and economic cooperation with countries along the route of the historical Silk Road from ancient times until the present day. They noted that the initiative was met with enthusiasm by the countries of Eurasia and that an effective system of consultation and cooperation gradually formed around the SREB. They suggested that, for the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, China could also make effective use of such organizations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), and other multilateral organizations with which Beijing has good cooperative relations. It was also suggested that a key to the success of the initiative was strong support in the Chinese regions, each of which had developed its own plans for participating in the SREB.¹¹ This general understanding of the SREB was typical of most of the works published by Chinese authors during the early period of the project’s implementation.

Despite the mostly optimistic assessments, some experts pointed out even at the initial stage that the SREB could face many challenges and problems. These included a lack of trust from the states along the SREB route, the possibility of “color revolutions” in a number of states in the region, the threat of terrorism and extremism, and conflicts over the use of water resources among individual countries. Experts noted that a whole set of traditional and nontraditional security threats could hinder implementation of the SREB project.¹² According to many experts, the main challenges China could face in building the Silk Road Economic Belt include the US plans for a New Silk Road and Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Eurasian integration process initiated by Russia, US and Japanese intervention in the situation in the South China Sea with the goal of containing China, as well as unruly and unfair competition between the provinces hoping to “play the SREB card.”¹³

A number of academic articles published in 2013–2015 considered the practical issues involved in implementing the project. According to the author of one such paper, Wang Hui, any analysis of the SREB should avoid the following three important misconceptions:

1. 1.
   The initiative should not be seen as consisting only of trade and economic cooperation, without the element of developing cooperation in other areas and expanding external openness in general.
2. 2.
   The initiative should not be seen as a market strategy aimed at expanding investment and gaining control over the resources of developing countries while ignoring the principles of mutual benefit and sha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Part I. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Views from the Outside
• Part II. Eurasian Infrastructure Projects: Prospects for Linkage